Re: Transitive trust and MLM

[eli+@GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU]

In article <+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+IlYDbnW00UfAI10=1K@andrew.cmu.edu> Raph writes:
>   Now for the mathematical model. Signatures can bind keys to e-mail
>addresses, or act as assertions that the signed public key is trusted to
>transitively sign other keys. Let's assume that each signature has a
>certain probability p of being good, and a 1-p probability of being
>bogus, and that all probabilities are independent. These are probably
>bad assumptions in the real world, but that's the difference between
>theory and practice.

I'm not happy with the independence assumption.  Let's say I create a
keypair, put "president@whitehouse.gov" in the name field, and try to
get people to sign it as valid.  (I don't know what you're asserting
when you sign a key, but I'd say you're at least binding the key to
the name and address attached to it.)

Each signature has an /a priori/ probability p of correctly indicating
validity, but these probilities are not independent at all: this key
isn't valid, period.  If one certifying signature is incorrect, all
others on the same key must be, and vice versa -- about as correlated
as they come.

>   Now we can actually evaluate the probability of a given key being
>good. Consider a Monte Carlo process in which each edge in the graph is
>present with probability 1-p. For each run, we determine whether the
>recipient's public key (actually the binding between public key and
>recipient's e-mail address) is reachable from our trust root.
>The probability over a large number of runs is (given our assumptions) the 
>probability of the key being good.

There are two separate problems:
1) key reachability -- do I think I can trust this key?
2) key validity -- is this key really okay?

The graph reachability problem asks whether there exists a valid path.  
This is what you want for the key reachability problem.  But the key
validity problem should be asking whether all paths are valid; a
single invalid path to me (posing as the Prez, remember) means that I
get to read your mail to Bill (big deal, eh?).  So you'd need to turn
it around, and ask whether there exists an invalid path.  From your
use of "1-p" for the probability, you may have been thinking along
these lines already.

So an edge (u,v) in G indicates that u trusts v.  With probability 
q = 1-p, Mallet is able to fool v.  That is, Pr[(u,v) in G'] = q.
Then we ask whether there's a path from s to t in G' -- that is, from
you to the key you pulled off the net.  If one exists, you lose.  

To limit transitivity, constrain the path length.  This limits key
reachability too, but I think we agree that it's essential in the real
world.  (It should also make the math simpler!)  The model generalizes
to non-binary conceptions of trust, but I don't think these can
rehabilitate transitivity.  Hmm, there are some possible approaches,
though.

These probabilities q are somewhat dependent: if I'm smart about whom
I trust, all of the q_(me, v) values will be somewhat lower, and vice
versa.  I think they're mostly independent, though.  But this is an
improvised model; poke holes in it.

-- 
. Eli Brandt                                        usual disclaimers .
. eli+@cs.cmu.edu                                  PGP key on request .
. violation of 18 U.S.C. 1462:                                  "fuck".