Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns

[jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>]

At 09:02 PM 5/22/96 -0700, Martin Minow wrote:
>Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li> comments on the responsiblity
>of prudent persons (in, I presume, the context of threating e-mail
>sent through an anonymous remailier).
>
>I'm still perplexed: what can a "prudent" remailer operator do if a
>threatening e-mail was sent through a remailer under one or more of
>the following conditions:
>
>-- The remailer operator is legally enjoined from reading messages
>   transversing his system. (For example, the remailer is subject to
>   data privacy laws.)
>
>-- The message was encrypted using the intended recipient's public key.
>   (This means that, without access to the private key, the operator
>   has no mechanism to examine the e-mail.)

That's just it, the government wants (or, will want) "the prudent operator" 
to SHUT DOWN his system entirely. We, on the other hand, should take the 
position that operating a remailer is a right, and further that such 
remailers get a broad immunity for materials send through their system.  

Providing for the opposite  was one of the reasons the Leahy bill on 
encryption was so bad.  It criminalized use of encryption to "thwart a 
law-enforcement investigation" and there was no way for a (encrypted) 
remailer operator to know that any given message flowing through his system 
might eventually trigger such an investigation.  In fact, the prospect of 
the government actually setting up such an operator by having his remailer 
act as the last link in the chain of an otherwise-untraceable message, whose 
transmission could arguably be a violation of law.  
Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com