The last node in split message remail schemes

[Leonard Janke <janke@unixg.ubc.ca>]

I would like to add an extension to my proposal for split message
anonymous remailing schemes. The current proposal counts on the good will
of the senders to split their messages into random pieces. If a remailer
operator receives non-random text I can think of at least three options
for what to do:

1) The operator can drop the message. 
2) The remailer operator can split the message him or herself and send 
   the pieces through new remailer chains.  
3) Suppose there is a computer named Moe that lives on the internet,
   is hidden behind a nym, and splits messages and enters the pieces into
   remailer chains. The remailer can then encrypt the non-random text
   along with a "please forward to" command to Moe, and  send the ciphertext
   anonymously to Moe. (Due to the encryption there is no need to split
   this message.)
   
The risk, in ascending terms of legal danger, for the operator would
be 1), 3), and 2). Nevertheless, all three alternatives should be safe 
within a secure (in the sense of Chaum, 1981) remailer network.

Leonard