Re: CLI_pr3

[jya@pipeline.com (John Young)]

On May 23, 1996 10:41:13, 'tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)' wrote: 
 
>Of course, this appears to be implying that _domestic_ data will be
subject 
>to Clipper 3  restrictions, else this statement is meaningless. 
> 
>So, will my stored-value cards that I "charge up" in California and carry 
>in my wallet to Zurich be GAKked? If not, Morris's statement is 
>meaningless. If so, domestic data is intended to be GAKked. 
> 
>(But we knew this, didn't we?) 
 
 
   Several news reports in the last few days seem to be aiming 
   at raising the alarm about crypto, perhaps in response to 
   the various crypto bills, administration reformulations, 
   and studies such as that headed by Herb Lin. 
 
   The recycling of the news of DoD break-ins supposedly due 
   to heavy military reliance on the Internet; the drumbeat of 
   conferences, press releases and planted stories on 
   international money laundering, the hazards of E-money to 
   the stability of the banking system, spreading "Russian" 
   criminality, and the role of high-technology in each; global 
   Chinese arms dealers and copyright pirates; thousands of 
   Japanese spies needed to combat "Asian" threats. 
 
   These scares might well be orchestrated in support of 
   Clipper 3 -- to the mutual benefit of international  
   governments and commerce as stated by the IWGCP report. 
 
   The Clipper 3 report, as John Gilmore and others have 
   noted, aims at an international clampdown on non-GAKed 
   crypto. For this to work, all the major crypto players must 
   agree to act at the same time so that no one gets an 
   advantage by offering non-GAKed products. 
 
   But is it not probable that there will be a holdout 
   nation(s), like the Swiss in war and bank secrecy, to offer 
   crypto that is non-GAKed? Or will a holdout be starved? 
 
   Or is it more likely that the genuine alternative to 
   multilateral governmental regulation is going to be small- 
   scale, non-corporate, private parties, insusceptible to 
   large-sacle governmental-market coercion, willing to offer 
   risky, covert services, perhaps as lucrative as prohibited 
   armaments? 
 
   In such a case, for example, would not a highly skilled 
   cryptographer, let us call her Mathilda Blaze, be able to 
   sell covert crypto (on the side, encrypted transactions, 
   anonymity assured) for far greater reward than a not-very- 
   secure pittance and pension at a downsizing ATT, or NSA, or 
   Russia, China, Israel, France, UK, NL, JP ... ? 
 
   To be sure, if we knew what they knew, we would understand 
   why the House has just increased the intelligence budget to 
   $30bn, $2bn more than 1996 (WaPo 5-23-96). 
 
   Maybe all the major crypto nations (gov-and-com), are 
   minting E-money to pay their best techies to protect their 
   secrets. If so, may the best algorithmist take 'em all to 
   the cleaners -- just remember to share with the hackers 
   spooking the spooks-and-crooks of gov-com intel-insec, 
   and causing "Yo, man's" of recognition and admiration of  
   those peering for pennies at ELINT and NetSec screens.