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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
On Wed, 22 May 1996, Martin Minow wrote:
> Black Unicorn <[email protected]> comments on the responsiblity
> of prudent persons (in, I presume, the context of threating e-mail
> sent through an anonymous remailier).
>
> I'm still perplexed: what can a "prudent" remailer operator do if a
> threatening e-mail was sent through a remailer under one or more of
> the following conditions:
>
> -- The remailer operator is legally enjoined from reading messages
> transversing his system. (For example, the remailer is subject to
> data privacy laws.)
Nothing. Perhaps block e-mail from the address the threat mail was sent
from after a certain number of legitimate complaints.
This, of course, depends on the threats/whatever being sent to the
remailer in question as a 'first in chain' mailer.
> -- The message was encrypted using the intended recipient's public key.
> (This means that, without access to the private key, the operator
> has no mechanism to examine the e-mail.)
Ask the recipient if he or she wishes all encrypted mail addressed to his
or her key to be supressed.
> Confused in Cupertino.
>
> Martin Minow
> [email protected]
>
>
>
---
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