Re: SecurID

[Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org>]

Paul J. Bell wrote:

| someone at my firm is about to press the securid system down our collective
| throats. please point me to the recent thread on this subject, and/or point
| me to some url's or the like, or to someone who has some firsthand knowledge
| of the pitfalls and/or vulnerbilities of secirid.

	www.l0pht.com/~mudge/skey_white_paper.html has many attacks
which will work on securid as well as s/key.

	The software is slow.  The Ace/Server calculates expected
values of information by running stuff through des & f2.  This is
slow.  It also encrypts the logs, which can be slow.  I've found that
a sparc 2 can die under the load of 2 people running sdlogmon, one
running sdadmin, and 2 or 3 people trying to authenticate.  (This
seems to be bad design, since the Sparc2 has hardware des in it, which
they don't take advantage of.

	The software is not the most bug free.  I'll flame at length
about the fact that you can't get source to fix the bugs yourselves.
I looked into hacking in a new des library (shared libraries are great
sometimes) to fix the slowness problem, but without source it turned
out to be more effort than buying a faster machine.

	You're stuck with their hardware.  With some other systems,
that use open standards, and you might be able to switch card vendors.
With SD, you must buy new cards from them every three years.  (SD
claims that their cards have a much higher failure rate after three
years, and that this is a feature.)

	You're stuck with their software.  SD libraries must be on every
machine that they authenticate for.  You can't bugfix those libraries,
even if you replace things like sdshell (an analouge of skeysh).
(sdshell, incidentally, munges wtmp on solaris machines because it
doesn't use the right library calls.)  This also means that you can't
run on unusual machines, like a BeBox.

	There are of course more fundamental things, like the fixed
length authentication code, the lack of peer review on the hash
algorithims, and the lack of ongoing authentication.  Also, I have a
few cryptographic attacks on the system which I hope to present at
Crypto's rump session, and I'll put on the web afterwards.

Adam


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume