Why BlackNet *IS* a Data Haven

[tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)]

Jim McCoy and Larry Dettweiler have, in their own ways, raised objections
to my characterization of BlackNet (and that class of mechanisms) as a
distributed, untraceable, robust "data haven."

Without splitting too many semantic hairs about the precise definition of
"data haven," let me examine some ways in which BlackNet behaves
identically to a conventional data haven.

Imagine a piece of data has been outlawed in some jurisdiction. For
simplicity, imagine this to be a book, a text. Let's give it a name, "The
Necronomicon." This "Necronomicon" is contraband, illegal, forbidden,
banned, on The Index in many countries, including the Vatican and the
United States.

(This is just an example. Replace "Necronomicon" with "child porn" for a
more realistic, if distasteful to many, example.)

The classical, Sterling-style "data haven" would have it that this piece of
data, this book, is stored and is available (perhaps for a price) in a
physical site. Maybe Anguilla (thought this is appearing less and less
likely), maybe "The Raft," maybe an orbiting DeathStar, maybe a weather
balloon drifting in the jet stream...

The classical data haven is closely identified with "place." To many
people, they naturally assume "data haven" = a haven for data, a "harbor"
(same IE root as haven) = a physical place.

But is "place" important?

Consider someone in the United States who wants a copy of the Necronomicon.
He can't get it locally, as it is banned. He can try dialing-in or
connecting to a country where it is not banned, but this introduces risks
(as with those who download child porn, arrrange to have it shipped to
them, etc.).

(And the physical jurisdictions which carrry the Necronomicon, or child
porn, or Church of Scientology secrets, etc., will likely be under pressure
to limit or deny access.)

Cryptography offers another way, as it does in so many other areas.

A person in the U.S. seeking the Necronomicon posts a message to BlackNet
(or any similar forum, using the same methods) asking for a copy of it, or
offering to pay for it. (Whether the information is free or for a fee is
not central to the idea.) This request is, of course, untraceable.

Anyone, anywhere in the world, with a copy of this banned material on his
or her private machines may see this request and respond, either giving the
material away, or negotiating a fee. (As I said before, the absence of a
robust digital cash system, bidirectionally untraceable, is a known
limitation of all such systems.)

Thus, it is as if there is a "virtual data haven" (tm), or a "virtual
library," for banned/controversial/etc. materials.

Anyone may "check out" materials by submitting requests (and perhaps paying
a fee). The source of the materials is, of course, unknown. The receiver of
the materials if, of course, unknown.

I call this at least as functional as a "physical data haven," where
someone might physically travel to Anguilla, say, to buy a copy of the
Necronomicon...

...and a whole lot more convenient.

This is, then, my vision of a "distributed, robust, untraceable data haven."

It's a data haven.

And it exists, or at least there are exemplars of it. It's lacking robust
digital money, to keep the transactions untraceable, but it's here.

The Church of Scientology documents essentially exist at this virtual data
haven site. Think about it.

--Tim May

Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software!
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist         | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."