Re: SRP (from the cutting-room floor)

[qut@netcom.com (Dave Harman OBC)]

This sounds simple to implement by users and remailers,  after all,
cpunk messages with bad syntax -> /dev/null .

Users can implement this quite easily, simply use the cpunk 
more than you actually need to.  You are your best decoy.

I muse about the idea of remailers that freely allow anybody to
access the ques of the cpunk remailers with http and telnet.
If people are using the remailers properly, and the destination is
usenet, there's no loss to privacy.  This can even be implemented
with e-mail destinations, with no loss to privacy that isn't already 
lost simply by using the net itself.  Should this idea be 
implemented with the cpunk remailers, it can actually prevent the
seizure of the server by the authorities, considering how they
couldn't get anything they couldn't have already gotten by simply
telneting or httping in.  There is the reported risk of the timing
cryptanalysis attacks, so a que of messages can be made inaccessable
while the actual {en|de}cryption is being done. 

I plan on doing these things when I can get the Linux/BSD system
more figured out than I have.  I'm primarily intersted in learning,
so I plan on keeping an open system, other than the Mixmaster
binaries and other stuff affected by ITAR.