Re: Panix attack

[Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>]

On Thu, 12 Sep 1996, John Young wrote:

> WSJ and WaPo have reports on Panix-jamming by info-request bombardment, and
> Bell Labs security expert Bill Cheswick's attempt to solve it. 

This particular attack has been known for some time; kind of suprising it 
hasn't been used before. It is defensible, but it can take a lot of 
memory to give full protection.

The best way IPV4 way I know of to stop the listen queue being filled is to
use a special structure to hold half-open incoming connections, and not
allocate the full TCB until the ack of the syn-ack comes in; that way, the
listen queue can be made large enough to keep enouygh connections to cover
the number of SYNS recievable before the half-open connection times out 

This ensures that there's at least a traceable return address for the 
connection. Sort of like photuris cookies but without the forced RTT delay

(The timeout was added to most stacks in 94 after backbone fuckups caused
queues to wedge on most of the big web servers with all sorts of asymetric
routing problems. It's not strictly legal TCP)



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