Cryptography of a sort - redux

[Dale Thorn <dthorn@gte.net>]

If anyone remembers my original postings from a couple weeks ago (my
first-ever on The Net), I described a method to "shuffle" bits in a
text-stream, using simple random-number generators, to insure that the
text cannot be descrambled by brute-force methods.

It has occurred to me only after this time that there was significant
misinterpretation of what I proposed. I do not change any bits of text,
I merely reposition them, therefore there is no applicability of
standard analysis techniques (XOR masking, whatever) to the decoding
process. The result file contains the same number of zero and one bits
as it started with, through any number of encryption layers.

The only way to recover the original text is to reposition the shuffled
bits correctly, which requires brute-force guessing of the
pseudo-random-number output. This guess is very simple for the first
encoding layer, but compounds exponentially in subsequent encodings, so
that after half a dozen or a dozen passes, where the executable
program(s) is called from scratch for each pass, the shuffling rapidly
approaches true randomness, and cannot be decrypted in practice except
through the exact mirror-image reversal of the encryption passes.

An example: How long would it take for you to guess the number (between
0 and 32000) I'm thinking of, if you could guess 16 billion numbers per
second? Would it be .000001 second, on average?

If you had to guess the ten different numbers I'm thinking of, and get
all ten correct sequentially, it should take an essentially infinite
amount of time, yes? And remember, since computer bits have such low
differentiation (ones and zeros), looking for "patterns" and so forth
just doesn't apply in this type of encryption.

As to the Public Key part of the argument, once there is general
understanding on the above points at large, it might then be worthwhile
to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of how to make/distribute 
Private keys, etc.

One gentleman on this forum made an argument recently, something to the
effect that it wouldn't be worthwhile for Hacker X to try to break into
datastream Y, assuming datastream Y is encoded with such-and-such a key,
that datastream Y is sufficiently unimportant, and motive for such a
breakin would not be great enough to justify the expected effort.

To such arguments, all I can say is, this is the computer age, and
enough mundane transactions can add up to something significant, or, one
could lower the expected-effort ratio, you get the picture.