Lack of reporting on CALEA and Encryption issues ...

[Ernest Hua <hua@chromatic.com>]

I must first say that your program is one of the finest in news
reporting, and I tune in every day.

However, nothing is perfect, and your program is no exception:

I am very concerned by the lack of reporting on CALEA (the US $500
Million Digital Telephony bill) and the continuing maneuvering by the
Clinton administration on the encryption issue.

Two years ago, FBI Director Louis Freeh managed to slip a $500 Million
wire tap bill into the Congressional budget using last-minute sneaks.
(He and his predecessors had tried unsuccessfully for several years to
do it in the full light of open democracy, so this was the only way
they could force it down American's throats.)  After seeing this pass,
many Congress members refused to fund it because the FBI continued to
violate terms of CALEA which required full accounting to Congress of
how the wire tap capacities were to be designed and used.  When the
figures were finally published, the public balked.  Not surprisingly,
Freeh had to resort to the same last-minute maneuvers to sneak in
funding for CALEA this year.

If the news media had reported either incident (or both), I would
probably not be so upset, but the news media completely ignored this
horrible abuse of the democratic process.

The same goes for the encryption issue.  It is clear that all present
and past administrations have sided strongly with law enforcement and
national security agencies, and have refused to allow for the
proliferation of strong encryption despite the fact that it is
probably the single biggest technical obstacle to Internet commerce
and personal privacy.

Again I would not be so upset if they let the issue be decided in the
full light of democracy rather than behind closed doors using the "if
you only knew what we knew, you would agree with us" argument.  This
sentiment is precisely echoed by the Congressional study done by the
NRC on national cryptographic policy.  The Clinton administration was
hoping that the two year study would buy time and would eventually
agree with its opinion, and when it did not, the Clinton
administration dismissed it as uninformed, despite the fact that most
of the NRC panel did get the infamous "secret briefing" by the NSA.

Basically, they are not open to reason on this issue; they are open to
one and only one idea: that law enforcement and national security
agencies having guaranteed access to information when they want it,
and they don't care about the technical or the privacy implications.
Oh .. and by the way, they want access to all information, not just
that which crosses national borders.

The significance of these two issues are difficult to summarize in a
sound bite.  The best I can think of is to watch the Tom Clancy movie
"Clear and Present Danger".  While watching this movie, note how the
CIA finds the telephone conversations of the drug dealer's agent.
That sort of capability is called "drift net fishing" (for obvious
reasons).

"drift net fishing" was not possible in the old days of wire taps
because the phone company barely kept enough written logs to find the
cables and the wires, let alone figure out exactly where they go.  The
problem is especially difficult in older/larger cities where phone
company technicians often tap a wire (for normal services) wherever it
works.  By the FBI's estimates, each physical wire tap costs on the
order of $50K.  Basically, the huge cost barrier (in man power) kept
the government's powers in check.

Enter the digital and wireless age, and suddenly every signal from
every phone, beeper, computer and other neato gadgets are sent all
over the place.  True, it has become more difficult to figure out
where a signal is routed, and that is what the FBI complained about.
On the other hand, it has become infinitely easier to intercept
communications without detection because every transmission is just a
perfect verbatim copy of the original.

Suddenly, the cost of monitoring a phone is not so high.  If the
routing capability is there, the FBI agents can sit in their
comfortable offices and press the right buttons, and the contents of
the call is duplicated at their desks.  Of course, they don't have to
have real people monitoring such calls; they can have voice analysis
computers do it.  They can search for anything that sounds like "bomb"
or "kill" or "shoot" or "blow up".

In the Clancy movie, such "drift net fishing" capability is clearly
being used for good purposes, and I certainly applaud that.  I hope
that all of the leading edge technologies used by our law enforcement
and national security agencies are used for good purposes.

But that is not what history tells us.  History tells us that such
technologies are oblivious to the morals and ethics of their masters.
Even in the older days of wire tapping techniques, the FBI was able to
illegally intercept communications of civil rights leaders and other
"dangerous" elements of society.  Therefore, to grant the government
capabilities that would enable "drift net fishing" on our own citizens
is setting a very dangerous precedence.  What if the FBI decides to
search for "democratic" or "republican" or "pro-choice" or "pro-life"?
What if they search for "muslim" or "jewish" or "christian"?

These are the real dangers of CALEA and encryption restrictions.  The
boogie men that will plan bomb attacks and kidnap children have always
found a way to do it, and some have gotten away, without any help from
encryption or secure telephones.

If the law enforcement and national security agencies truly want to
save lives and promote public safety, there are many other issues and
problems to deal with, and they are wasting valuable time with these
two issues; other the other hand, if they just care about keeping and
enhancing their abilities to be omniscient, then their current
behavior is quite consistent with that goal:

1.  Lies and misrepresentations:

    a.  Louis Freeh now claims that CALEA will cost $2 billion.

    b.  The CALEA slush fund Freeh got passed at the last minute of
        this Congress is actually unlimited.

    c.  Despite their promises of full reporting, they have actually
        succeeded in defeating all the reporting clauses in CALEA,
        again, thanks to this last minute sneak.

    d.  Clinton, Gore and company have consistently denied that they
        intend to restrict domestic encryption.  However, if you
        listen to Gorelick, Freeh, Reno, Crowell and others, you will
        find out that they absolutely against domestic encryption.

2.  Beaurocratic maneuvering:

    a.  Spent 3 years "investigating" Phil Zimmerman and then dropped
        without comment.

    b.  Used every trick in the book to keep ITAR encryption rules
        from ever being directly considered for Constitutionality.
        (NSA internal counsel believes it will not withstand such a
        legal challenge.)

    c.  Refused to clearly define what is exportable and what is not.
        (Keep it confusing so that most will stay away just to be
        safe.)  Also refused to clearly define what is "export",
        given that encryption is just algorithms and information in
        the purest form.

I appeal to you, as a respected news organization, to investigate this
in detail and expose the facts and let the public decide.

Thank you.

Ern