[fwd] Implementing the anonymous.net domain

[Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>]

John Gilmore posted this on coderpunks, the response seems
underwhelming (only one response so far).  Looks interesting, and I
think a cool replacement for penet.  I'd be interested to see any
comments on practical implementations for this.

-Adam

Forwarded message:
======================================================================
To: coderpunks@toad.com
From: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Subject: Implementing the anonymous.net domain
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 1996 18:33:15 -0700

I'm looking for a project leader and a team who will take on the job
of making a working cryptographic "anonymous.net" domain.

I'm looking for software that would permit mail to be anonymized with
a return address like:

    lkjasdflkjaslkdjfhakjshdfokiuhasdouilkjasdflkjasdfkjl@anonymous.net

which would permit a reply to reach the originator by some secure
chain of remailers (I'm not interested in an implementation that
includes a Julf-like database).  This would require at least two
pieces of software:

	*  Something to anonymize mail and put in that return address
	*  Something to run on the anonymous.net server machines to
	   read the address, and remail the mail.

Additional subdomains can be allocated for other services, e.g.
web.anonymous.net, julfmail.anonymous.net, news.anonymous.net,
digicash.anonymous.net, etc.  These are particularly valuable when
multiple machines around the world can provide identical, replicated
service.

Current email and packet delivery protocols (A records and MX records)
permit us to offer a large set of potential machines to which
anonymous email would be delivered, at random, all under the same
domain name.  Each of these machines would have to be able to properly
route mail for any email address in the anonymous.net domain.  This
would avoid denial of service by shutting down any particular remailer
machine, as long as at least one advertised remailer remained up.  The
domain records themselves (for anonymous.net), which list the set of
advertised remailers, can also be replicated on numerous hosts to make
them harder to censor.

Having replicated, random entry point machines would also make it
harder to trace any specific message unless all the entry point
messages were tapped by an attacker.  The message they care about
might go through some entry point that wasn't tapped.

I'm willing to hold the domain name and defend it, but am too busy
to do any of the protocol design or technical work required.

The InterNIC has billed me for this domain; if we want it, it's time
for a team to step up and build it.  I'll pay the bill if I get a
team, else the domain will go away.  Have a discussion and let me
know.

Thanks,

	John