Re: Stopping the buying of candidates

[jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>]

At 10:58 PM 1/1/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote:
>> >This is my last reply.  I guess I forgot your overarching theory. 
>> >Reality, nah.
>> 
>> "My last reply"?  Sorta the rhetorical equivalent of "I think I heard my 
>> mommy calling," huh?
>
>I wanted to take this crypto-irrelevant discussion off the list.

If you think the applications for the use of cryptographic blinding 
techniques is "crypto-irrelevant" then you're even more clueless than I'd 
previously surmised.  See Chaum's article of August 1992 if you doubt this.

>> >It's not a long shot.  When Bob the Big Bad Lobbyist comes into the 
>> >Senator's office and leads him to believe a donation will be made and 
>> >magically a sizeable one does, it can be reasonable infered from 
>> >whence it came. 
>> 
>> Except that "sizeable" donations won't appear.  If you don't understand 
>> this, you haven't been reading the descriptions of how the system would 
>> work.  Individual donations won't be identified either by name of amount; 
>> they'll be accumulated and only approximately reported.
>
>They will have to eventually appear.  

The money will eventually be spendable.  But information as to the number 
and timing and size of the donations will be disguised using blinding 
techniques.  Re-read my comments.


>In reality vendors have to get 
>paid real money.  Not approximations of money.  It would be like 
>getting a new job and your boss telling you that he would pay you 
>some money at randomly occuring times.  That would be a fun way to 
>budget.

Nobody said politics had to be easy.  They'll adjust to the new reality; 
they always do.


>My point is, Jim, that your idea is unworkable in reality. 

Since you obviously don't understand it, and you also don't understand 
cryptographic blinding, why should anybody pay attention to your opinion?


> In theory it would be nice to have complete anonymity.  In reality it won't 
>work.

Always overstating your case, I see.  For the application I described, it 
isn't necessary to have "complete anonymity."  What's needed is a healthy 
dose of fog and uncertainty, making sure that the candidates can't trust any 
claim that a donor has made a donation of any particular size.

>  Take, for example, the current attempt at finance reform.  X 
>cant give Y over $500 per State Assembly race.  What if X holds a 
>fundraiser for Y and invites their entire executive board.  What if X 
>is at a legislative conference and suggests that all the participants 
>give Y at least $500.  Do you plan on outlawing X's Freedom of 
>Speech? 

Since today's campaign contribution limits seem to be inherently a violation 
of freedom of speech, why not embrace my solution, which doesn't do this?

> A self-proclaimed Constitutionalist like yourself should 
>hold individual freedom in a paramount position.

"Constitutionalist"?  Hell no!  I subscribe to the idea inherent in the 
joke, "The Constitution may be bad government, but it's better than what we 
have now."  I think there's no doubt that a government based scrupulously on 
the US Constitution would be a vast improvement.  However, we've never had 
such a thing.


>> > In the real world, politicians have access to the 
>> >names and addresses of people who regularly donate to political 
>> >campaigns. 
>> 
>> I wonder how many people will still be donating if they can't get their 
name 
>> associated with the donation...
>> 
>
>My point has always been that they will.  Even if you totally blind 
>the donation, inuendo backed up with any modicum of external proof 
>will do. 

Such "proof" will be easily faked, BTW, which is part of the reason this 
system will work so well.  I could go to some candidate and claim that I'd 
made a $10,000 contribution to his campaign.  Let's say I'd show him a 
(forged) cancelled check.  What could he do about it?  Would he risk pissing 
off a valuable contributor?


> The minutes of the executive board meeting, the cancelled 
>check, whatever.  Even in a technically sound system, human inginuity 
>will prevail.

Which is exactly why the faking process will be so easily accomplished.

>All lobbies will continue to give.

And, obviously, they'll claim they gave far more than the really did.  This 
is okay, it'll destroy the credibility of anyone who claims to have made a 
contribution.

> They seek access and control.  
>Politicians know the interests with the wherewithall to fund a 
>campaign.  They know Right-to-life wont fund a pro-choice candidate.  
>Labor Unions will seek out pro-labor candidates and business will 
>find business friendly candidates.  You can make it completely 
>anonymous with NO POSSIBLE WAY to know.  It would make NO difference.

Sure about that?  Let me provide some contrary evidence.  Every once in a 
while, you'll see on the TV networks a report about corporate (and labor, 
BTW) campaign giving, and they will occasionally point out that a given 
corporation (or PAC, etc.) gives money BOTH to the Republicans and the 
Democrats.  They have no reason to do this, except that they think they will 
get some benefit in the future from the "access" that contribution produces. 
 This is particularly true, since the identities of all contributors are 
currently public knowledge.  
If an organization expected no direct return benefit from making 
contributions (for example, if the donations were adequately blinded), it 
would make them ONLY to the side they considered would best help them, and 
not the opponents.  If they thought it necessary, they would lie about 
making a contribution to the other candidate.


>> And it'll be even less when this system is adopted.
>
>No it wont.  If the good Senator supports business with his votes, 
>business has to support them with their money.  It is in THEIR best 
>interest.

I don't think there's necessarily anything wrong with this AS LONG AS the 
system makes it difficult or impossible to identifiably reward contributors.


>> >My fault.  I forget whom I was replying to.  Of course my reply above 
>> >was in response to your question about developing a "working" system. 
>> >Have fun in your politicianless world (with no physical 
>> >infrastructure, information infrastructure, national defense, etc.) 
>> 
>> Who needs "national defense"?  As for "information infrastructure, are you 
>> under the illusion that private industry couldn't do it?  Hell, it DOES 
it!  
>> The Internet is essentially fully privatized, NOW.
>
>Fully privitized?  Jim, I have been on the net since the late 80's.  
>I know how it started and what it looks like today.  If you know as 
>little about the internet as you do about politics maybe you do not 
>know what the first budget item in any company is to go in tough 
>times.  There is little public interest in private industry. 

I stand by my original statement.  True, the origins of the Internet were 
primarily government-sponsored and financed, but by now the vast majority of 
the traffic goes through privatized connections (Sprint, MCI, AT+T), and 
most of the users access the web through private (not government owned or 
controlled) ISP's:  Compuserve, AOL, Prodigy, and hundreds if not thousands 
of "Mom+Pop" ISP's around the country.

I should also point out that given the fact that the Internet is at least 
doubling and probably tripling in size (packets and/or users) every year, if 
you go back to the last year that the backbone was government-financed) 
you'll probably discover that the Internet was far less than 1/10th of its 
current size.  

 
>Let me ask you this.  Do you enjoy the net of today (AOL, Spam, 
>XXX-rated transfers bogging down traffic)

Why should I mind the particular characteristics ("XXX-rated transfers") of 
the traffic jams?  What are you, some kind of Born-again christian or 
something?   And while I don't like the spam, either, I am under no illusion 
that this would be particularly avoidable, and certainly not EASILY or 
perfectly avoidable.  Spam is, at most, a minor inconvenience most of the time.


> to the net of yesterday 
>(100's of newsgroups not thousands, voluntary acceptance of 
>nettiquette, etc).  Dont get me wrong I was glad to see the AUP go.  
>But your absolute statements are maddening.
>
>> And "physical infrastructure"?  Sure they'll be physical infrastructure.  
>> It'll just be _privately_ owned.
>> 
>
>If it were feasible it would happen today.  Business groups (the ones 
>I have had VERY personal contact with, subsets of NAM) are frustrated 
>with Legislature's refusal to act in the best public interest.  If it 
>were feasible they would own their own transportation system.  It is 
>not!

It sounds like you're making a contradition.  Previously, you suggested that 
a privatized system wouldn't work, but at the end of the last paragraph you 
seem to be saying that the blame falls on "the legislature"'s doing 
something wrong.

See the problem with that position?  Please get your story straight.


>> The difference between private and public corruption is that in private 
>> corruption, individuals presumably have the right to fight that corruption 
>> where it impacts on their rights and assets.  In PUBLIC corruption, the 
>> taxpayer is rarely given the opportunity to fight the loss of his assets.
>
>Where did you get that law degree?  (BTW, mine comes from the 
>University of Wisconsin- Madison).  Ask the victims of the S&L 
>fiasco, the latest NASDAQ controversy, anyone making claims against a 
>company in some types of bankruptcy, etc., etc.  If you want I can 
>extend that list for you.

The main victims of the "S&L fiasco" were the taxpayers who had to pay 
hundreds of billions of dollars in claims due to the government 
simultaneously maintaining the S&L insurance but chancing the laws to allow 
the fraud that trashed that industry.  In other words, the problems were 
CAUSED BY GOVERNMENT.  And like I suggested, no the average taxpayer didn't 
have any ability to fight this rape of his wallet:  He didn't find out about 
it until it was mostly all over.

And if you object to being rooked in a company's bankruptcy, complain to the 
government who makes itself a preferred creditor  in almost all circumstances.


>Take for another example the recent corruption at Pabst.  Pabst 
>mismanaged the company and then took away RETIREEs benefits 
>(including death benefits.  No recourse.  Perfectly legal.  
>Inherently unfair.

If it's "perfectly legal" yet "inherently unfair," it sounds like much of 
the blame lies with the legislature, since it is the legislature that is 
responsible for the laws.  Huh?



>
>If it were done in a public context, heads would roll. " the 
>taxpayer is rarely given the opportunity to fight the loss of his
>assets."  What?  Are you suggesting there are no layers of 
>bureaucracy?  Not enough process?  Funny you sound like a democrat.

In the example _you_ mentioned, the S&L bailout, no "heads rolled."  Was any 
government employee punished at all?  I don't recall it!


>> It appears that you've convinced yourself that ESP exists and works.  Given 
>> that, it isn't surprising that you would believe that donations to 
>> candidates can't be "blinded" sufficiently to help dramatically reduce 
>> political quid pro quo.
>
>Jim, since you like the ad hominim, you are naive.  I understand 
>cryptographic blinding.  The world is not a computer.  And as I 
>stated above, even if you could, it wouldnt stop the flow of money.

The goal is not, specifically, to "stop the flow of money."  The goal is to 
ensure that candidates know as little as possible about where the money 
comes from.


>> >What you are not getting is that, in this case, the public employees 
>> >are the edge that causes the win.
>> 
>> How do you know this?  
>> 
>
>Try looking at election results. 

You still haven't proven your case.

> Jesus Jim, if you are going to take 
>controversial stands at least understand how the system works in 
>reality.  Get a copy of campaigns&elections.  Look in the back.  
>Remember we are in an information society.  People collect political 
>information.  It is for sale.  I am suprised that is new to you.

You are coming to conclusions without support.  As I said before, you've 
convinced yourself that you KNOW that a particular election went a 
particular way precisely because of "public employees."  Sigh!  


>
>
>> >  We have had some close races, the 
>> >winning margin is clearly less than the number of voting public 
>> >employees. 
>> 
>> The winning margin is ALSO clearly less than the number of many different 
>> identifiable groups.  You seem to be making assumptions in support of your 
>> theory.
>
>Actually, in my small city, with under 2000 active voters, it is 
>fairly easy to discern the number one identifiable group.  I DONT 
>deal in theory.  I deal in reality, you should try it.  While your 
>theories are enticing they are TOTALLY without the ability to be 
>realized.

You STILL aren't supporting your claims!

>> >This came from a discussion of vote delivery.  X has a block Y that 
>> >will vote for Z (the endorsed candidate) every time.  If victory 
>> >margin is less than Y, X's delivery controls the race.
>> 
>> Except that plenty of voting blocks exist.  And there's plenty of unknowns 
>> that you can't figure out with any certainty:  How certain are you that 
>> "Block Y" ALL voted for Z?  How do you know some other group didn't?  Etc.
>
>Politics deals with probability not certainty.  If you had ANY real 
>world experience you would know that.  Budgets are all dependant upon 
>reasonable probabilities.  Its really not that hard to grasp.

How much longer do you intend to waste my time?  


Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com