Re: SAFEPASSAGE BRINGS STRONG CRYPTO TO WEB BROWSERS WORLDWIDE

[null@void.gov]

I would say that depends on -where- &/or -how- you store the premaster/master,
and is dependent on platform threat models rather than attacks on the wire.  
These are different problem spaces with different solutions, which some
contemplated
changes to SSL may help address: some tweaks may be useful to support more
secure secret management on the platforms.  But I would not go so far as to
say
that these issues make SSL or an implementation insecure per-se, until I
did the
complete job.  

If my platform is compromised such that the master or premaster secret
can be subverted, then I have problems that go way deeper than SSL or a
particular
implementation of it.

Would you like to propose some fixes?  We would be very interested.

Ben Laurie wrote ....
>SSL requires the keying material to be available at all times. This is rather
>different from many applications of cryptography, where one can keep keying
>material safely locked away except when it is needed.
>
>This is the inherent vulnerability.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Ben.
>
>-- 
>Ben Laurie                Phone: +44 (181) 994 6435  Email: ben@algroup.co.uk
>Freelance Consultant and  Fax:   +44 (181) 994 6472
>Technical Director        URL: http://www.algroup.co.uk/Apache-SSL
>A.L. Digital Ltd,         Apache Group member (http://www.apache.org)
>London, England.          Apache-SSL author
>
>