RE: Fighting the cybercensor

[jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>]

At 01:16 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Sean Roach wrote:
>At 10:47 PM 1/27/97 -0800, jim bell wrote:
>>In the current political system, in the US for instance, 51% of the 
>>population is able to screw the remaining 49%, just as long as they can 
>>maintain the majority.  Or, perhaps even more accurately and ominously, a 
>>tiny fraction of the population (the current leadership class) is able to 
>>screw the 49%, as long as they have the un-thinking backing of the remaining 
>>and relatively uninvolved 51%.
>>
>>AP disables this system.  AP turns government into the moral equivalent of a 
>>pick-up football game:  Nobody is being forced to play, and everybody and 
>>anybody can simply "get up and leave" whenever he wants to.  The moment the 
>>"rules of the game" to make an individual's continued participation 
>>unsatisfying, he can leave.
>>
>...
>In our society, which, if I remember correctly, 10% of the population
>control 90% of the wealth, AP would only lead to 10% of the population being
>able to screw the remaining 90%.  At least as it is, it takes a simple 
majority.

No, that doesn't work.  AP does involve money, that's true, but what "the 
poor" lack in individual assets they make up for in numbers.   And AP 
implements a sort of "mutual disarmament," by not only preventing that 10% 
from screwing the 90%, but also prevents the 90% from screwing the 10%.   

>As for the murder of the rich, here is a scenerio.
>
>A collection of poor pool their capitol to have a tyrant killed.
>The tyrant assembles a counter-wager saying that anyone able to prove thier
>ability to kill him without harming him, and who can show they got through
>will get 110% of the poor's bid.

Question:  Where does he get the money for the reward?  If he gets it 
through taxation, he'll anger the people who were taxed and they'll pay to 
see him die.  If he got in through taxation in the past, enough people will 
STILL be angry enough with him to see him dead.  His employees (the ones who 
probably have the most opportunity to kill him) would be made just about as 
wealthy by killing him as taking him up on his odd offer.  Worse, for him, 
is that he'd lose money paying off those people if they showed they could 
have "succeeded."  Even if they were not motivated to actually kill him, 
they'd be motived to SHOW they could kill him, and notice that they'll 
become just about as rich for KILLING him as merely showing they can!  

Notice that your idea also assumes that an employee has to become willing 
to, in effect, plot against his employer in such a way that he can be 
assured that his actions won't be incorrectly interpretated as a genuine 
assassination attempt. How can you (or anyone else?) tell the difference 
until the plan either succeeds or fails?)  Moreover, how can the employee 
trust that his boss will actually honor his promise?

I think you're also (falsely) assuming that a deliberately-unsuccessful 
assassination demonstration immunizes the tyrant from a repeat performance.  
True, it's often useful to know what kinds of attacks are possible, but that 
doesn't mean that the system can be fixed to prevent future repetitions...

The tyrant, then, either loses his life or a lot of money, and he still 
can't trust anybody.


Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com