RE: Fighting the cybercensor

[Sean Roach <roach_s@alph.swosu.edu>]

At 11:15 AM 1/30/97 -0800, jim bell wrote:
>What you're presented (included in its entirety below) is what I've come to 
>call an "AP story problem."   I've worked through many of those myself; 
>their main problem is that they don't carefully describe why _each_ person 
>in the "play" you've described would be motivated to do what it's claim he 
>does, and why he DOES NOT do other things to fix the situation he's in.  
>Remember, I'm not merely talking about the main character, but also the ones 
>who are (apparently?) incidental.  
>
>For just one example, you said:    "conventional bodyguards could be 
>included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledgethat they will be 
>buried with the tyrant."
>
>What motivates these people?  Are they hostages?  If they're hostages, then 
>presumably that means they're motivated to seek the death of anyone who is 
>holding them.  What about their relatives; don't they have any sympathy for 
>those who are taken?  Why don't they donate to AP to see the lead guy dead?

As I stated in the bottom, the children would be privaledged.  They would
merely be told that it is a great honor.  It could very well be.  Assuming
that the tyrant did not die, these children would live in comparable luxery.
They would be at risk only if the tyrant was.  By keeping the children at
hand, the parents would balk at taking action against the tyrant, not only
their own action, but also that of others.  The children would merely be
there to thwart the attempts of others.
The "Tiger Teams" would have to get through security on their own, takers on
this offer would be very few unless the bounty were great, the defenses were
weak, or the thrill level were high.  An encounter with a bloodless thrill
seaker might go like this "I hacked your system, here's proof, now pay up",
remember, for some, it is the proof that a thing can be done that is the
greatest thrill.  Also, the tyrant would feel bound to keep h[is/er] word to
avoid others deciding to take the challenge for the smaller sum.

Remember also that 10% controls 90%, this means that each potential tyrant
has on average 9% of the wealth, while the remaining 90% has about 1/90th of
the remaining 10%.  To match the wealth of the tyrant, these people would
have to get together 90% of their numbers and commit everything.
If 100 people were in the total population, and 1000 dollars in circulation,
10 people would be tyrants with about 90 dollars apiece, the remaining 90
people would each have 100/90 dollars, or 1.11 dollars each.  It would take
81 of them together to match the wealth of one.  With that many, they might
as well attack outright because they would now include practically all of
the population.  If the tyrant had more than 9 of the peasants close to him,
he would be at risk by conventional means.
The real threat would not be the people, of limited means, using the system.
But rather other tyrants using the system.