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Re: Anonymous browsing (was Re: Getting Back to our Radical Roots)
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At 04:23 PM 6/25/97 -0400, [email protected] wrote:
>On Fri, 20 Jun 1997, Jeremey Barrett wrote:
>
>> The question is what's the threat model. If the goal is to prevent the
>> server from identifying the client given limited resources, then
>> www.anonymizer.com or similar is sufficient. However, the real problem
>> is preventing an entity with unlimited resources and control over most
>> of the nodes in the anonymous network from conducting successful traffic
>> analysis. This is an entirely different and very difficult problem.
>
>Having got the latest Applied Cryptography, it looks like it would be
>possible to set up a series of servers on the "Dining Cryptographers at a
>Disco" model. It would require a constant flow, probably something like
>token ring, so couldn't be used for high bandwidth applications, but it
>completely nukes traffic analysis.
You'll have a secure black box then. Everything in the black box
is secure, but the real information comes from watching what goes
in one side and out the other. Unless there is an astronomical amount
of traffic, it will be fairly obvious who's doing what.
After all, knowing who did what is the goal of traffic analysis, usually
not what route they took in between.
The trick is to design a system where an eavesdropper can't correlate
a connection into the anonymous network to one coming out. Such a system will
almost certainly involve some sort of "personal proxy" running on your own
machine. It might maintain a constant bandwidth to the anonymous network, but
that's sub-optimal since most people like their bandwidth for other things.
Jeremey.
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Jeremey Barrett BlueMoney Software Corp.
Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems http://www.bluemoney.com/
PGP key fingerprint = 3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80 DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64