Re: (eternity) Re: Eternity Services

["Akasha" <akasha@netsense.net>]

Tim May wrote:

> At 3:06 PM -0800 1/11/98, Adam Back wrote:
>
> >Archiving USENET as a separable enterprise which charges for access
> >(altavista for example charges via advertisements) seems less
> >problematic than directly trying to build a database of controversial
> >materials.  Archiving it all partly reduces your liability I think,
> >because you are not being selective, you just happen to have a
> >business which archives USENET.  However there are two problems with
> >this: a) volume -- USENET daily volume is huge; b) the censors will
> >ask you to remove articles they object to from the archive.
>
> News spool services are already showing signs of getting into this "Usenet
> censorship" business in a bigger way. Some news spool services honor
> cancellations (and some don't).  Some don't carry the "sensitive"
> newsgroups. And so on. Nothing in their setup really exempts them from
> child porn prosecutions--no more so than a bookstore or video store is
> exempted, as the various busts of bookstores and whatnot show, including
> the "Tin Drum" video rental case in Oklahoma City.
>
> >The solution I am using is to keep reposting articles via remailers.
> >Have agents which you pay to repost.  This presents the illusion of
>
> This of course doesn't scale at all well. It is semi-OK for a tiny, sparse
> set of reposted items, but fails utterly for larger database sets. (If and
> when Adam's reposted volumes begin to get significant, he will be viewed as
> a spammer. :-) )
>
> >> - CD-ROMS made of Eternity files and then sold or distributed widely
> >
> >This is an interesting suggestion, but surely would open the
> >distributor up for liability, especially if copyright software were
> >amongst the documents.  Were you thinking of
> >
>
> The CD-ROM distribution is just a side aspect, to get some set of data
> widely dispersed. For example, if the data base is of "abortion" or
> "euthanasia" information (a la Hemlock Society), which various parties want
> suppressed, then handing out freebie CD-ROMs is one step.
>
> Many examples of this: Samizdats in Russia, crypto/PGP diskettes handed out
> at conferences (was Ray Arachelian doing this several years ago?), and
> various religious and social tracts. Obviously, this is what broadsheets
> and fliers are designed to do. Self-publishing in general.
>
> If the intent is to collect money for the data base accesses, then of
> course other considerations come into play.
>
> (Critical to these "Eternity" things is a good model of the customers, the
> reasons for the data, etc.)
>
> >> - purely cyberspatial locations, with no know nexus
> >>
> >> (I point to my own "BlackNet" experiment as one approach.)
> >
> >This is the best option.  Make it entirely distributed, so there is no
> >nexus, period.  cyberspacial -> meatspace mappings are often easier to
> >trace than we would wish, especially where there is continued usage
> >(for example there are various active attacks which can make progress
> >even against mixmaster remailers).  This is the weak point of my
> >reposting agent, be that human, or automated.
>
> My model, contained in the actual working software (*), allowed customers
> to pick some topic, enclose a public key and payment, use a remailer to
> post, then collect the information some time later. Using Usenet, but not
> by reposting the actual data. Only pointers.
>
> (* I say "working" in the sense that the concept was very easy to
> demonstrate just by using PGP and remailers. Not much more than what I
> demonstrated in 1993 would be needed to deploy a real system. Except for
> one thing: true digital cash. Not the bullshit one-way-traceable stuff that
> Chaum and others are now pushing, but the original, online-cleared or
> escrow-cleared form, a la the work of Goldberg et. al. For some of these
> applications, below, simple token- or coupon-based schemes might work
> adequately.)
>
> How these models will work using existing infrastructure (Usenet,
> remailers, Web proxies, etc.) depends on some factors. It might be useful
> to consider some benchmark applications, such as:
>
> 1. Anonymous purchase of financially important data. (A good example being
> the Arbitron ratings for radio markets...subscription to Arbitron is quite
> expensive, and posting of results on Usenet is prosecuted by Arbitron. A
> good example of a BlackNet market.)
>
> 2. Anonymous purchase of long articles, e.g., encycopedia results...
>
> (I'm not sure there's still a market for this....)
>
> 3. Anonymous purchase of "term papers." (A thriving market for ghostwritten
> articles...already migrating to the Web, but lacking adequate anonymizing
> methods.)
>
> This is an example of a very large data base (all term papers on file)
> which cannot possibly by distributed feasibly by Usenet.
>
> And so on...lots of various examples.
>
> The whole Eternity thing is interesting, but we haven't made a lot of
> progress, it seems to me. (I distributed a proposal a bit similar to what
> Ross Anderson was proposing, a proposal more oriented toward making a
> _persistent_ Web URL for academics and lawyers to reliably cite, with less
> of the "404--File Not Found" sorts of messages, the things which make the
> Web largely unusable for academic and scientific citations.)
>
> >> It is also likely in the extreme that a working Eternity service will
> >> quickly be hit with attackers of various sorts who want to test the limits
> >> of the service, or who want such services shut down.
> >
> >I agree with this prediction.  Remailers have seen this pattern, with
> >`baiting' of operators, and apparently people posting controversial
> >materials and reporting the materials to the SPA or others themselves,
> >etc.
>
> Yep, it's hard to disagree with this. Any centralized "Eternity service"
> will be hit with various kinds of attacks in quick order.
>
> Building a data base, as Ryan comments seem to indicate he is mostly
> interested in doing, is the least of the concerns.
>
> --Tim May
>
> The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> Higher Power: 2^2,976,221   | black markets, collapse of governments.
> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."



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