Re: mirroring services, web accounts for ecash

[Tim May <tcmay@got.net>]

At 7:14 PM -0800 1/12/98, Adam Back wrote:
>Some meta-level thoughts on the eternity service document availability
>problem:
>
>Many of the problems with designing an eternity service are introduced
>by trying to build real time accessibility of data (with similar
>response times for documents to those offered by web servers).
>
>The BlackNet model can quite ably provide eternity like services with
>perhaps 24 hour turn around on documents.  Everything is operated by
>digital dead drop (via say news:alt.anonymous.messages), or mixmaster
>remailers.

Ah, I just saw this message after already sending my last message, where I
described several axes. I even cited the same estimate, of "~days," for the
latency of Blacknet sorts of Eternity implementations.

Adam and I are apparently thinking similar sorts of thoughts. A pity we
waste so much time at Cypherpunks physical meetings getting "updates" on
commercial (and boring, from an issues viewpoint) crypto products when some
exciting seminars and brainstormings on these sorts of issues would be so
much more fun.

(Note: I shouldn't be criticizing Cypherpunks physical meetings too much. I
suppose they serve a purpose, and the Bay Area community has moved away
from "exotic" applications and ideas to more commercial issues. And why I
basically don't go to meetings much anymore.)

Back to Back:

>This suggests that another approach would be to have two classes of
>services.  Users of high risk documents can put up with 24 hour turn
>around, and lower risk documents can be served by an alternate
>service, intermediate risk documents can exist by using low risk
>resources until detection.

Here's a meta-question: Suppose one holds highly secret or sensitive data,
for which one wants to use an Eternity service to ensure the information is
not suppressed by some government or other actor.

Why centralize the data at all?

Why not just use the "pointer" to the data and offer to provide it?

Which is what Blacknet was all about. Instead of focussing on a data base,
focus instead on an untraceable market mechanism.

(I admit that a system which can provide *A LOT* of data *VERY FAST*, and
also untraceably or unstoppably, is an attractive goal. It would blow both
Adam's "repost to Usenet" and my "Blacknet" approaches to hell and gone.
The catch is that I can't see how such a system will get built, who will
run the nodes, how payment will be made to pay for the nodes and work, and
how traffic analysis will be defeated.)

And I think implementing the slower-but-no-breakthroughs approach (Blacknet
or variations) has some advantages. It may be many years before we need to
be in the corner of the graph that is "large amounts of data--very fast
retrieval--very secure."

Most candidates for untraceable/secure storage and retrieval are NOT in
this corner, yet. (Kiddie porn may be, but whistleblowing and scientific
information are not.)

--Tim May

The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221   | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."