Re: Chaining ciphers

[ghio@temp0201.myriad.ml.org (Matthew Ghio)]

Jim Gillogly wrote:

> Yes, that's definitely better for high-confidence long-term archival
> stuff than relying on one cipher.  Carl Ellison's suggestion was DES |
> tran | nDES | tran | DES, where "tran" is an unkeyed large-block
> transposition.

One other possibility is to encrypt with plaintext block chaining, then
superencrypt it PBC in reverse order, starting with the last block first.
An attacker would thus have to decrypt the entire message before knowing
whether the key was correct or not.

> One word of caution (which should be obvious, but can't hurt to repeat it):
> if you chain ciphers (e.g. DES | IDEA | 3DES | CAST | Blowfish), be sure to
> use separate keys for each of them; otherwise breaking the last one will
> give the key to the whole lot.

Only if the cryptanalyst knows that the decryption of the last one was
correct, which shouldn't be possible without also decrypting all the other
layers.