attracting funding for tempest? (Re: SOFT TEMPEST)

[Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>]

In an interesting discussion on software tempest measures,

Markus Kuhn <Markus.Kuhn@cl.cam.ac.uk> writes:
> One more remark: This was so far unfunded research initiated by
> our private interest in the subject of compromising radiation. In
> this field, the available research literature is very close to zero
> (there are the van-Eck/Moeller/Smulder papers and that's it basically), and
> all the real knowledge is tightly guarded by the military and diplomatic
> community. We hope that developing commercial applications for
> compromising radiation will open the way to non-military funding
> and open research in this field.

People who are interested in communications and data security to the
extent of arguing about the difference in security offered by 56 bit
keys as compared to 128 bit keys ought to be worried about RF
information leaks and tempest shielding.

Perhaps similar justification can be used for the relevance of tempest
research -- it is just the hardware half of assuring confidentiality
of information.  There should be a reasonably large supply of
commercial funding candidates even given the 90 : 10 ratio of business
interest in availability over confidentiality.

> Copyright protections seems to be an interesting application.

Personally I view technology to assist copyright piracy a more
interesting research goal!  Candidate technologies include high
bandwidth eternity services, anonymous remailers with sufficient
bandwidth, pipenets, DC-nets, free software movements, countries
with modern intellectual ownership rules like Argentina*, and 
undermining the power of the state so that state provided copyright
enforcement susidies disappear.

(* See my previous post: reposted news report "ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
RULES SOFTWARE PIRACY LEGAL").

I am not sure I want to see my computer narcing out over RF
frequencies what software is installed -- once enabled for corporates
there is the risk it will be used against individuals.  This sounds
about as (un)desirable as CPUs capable of running encrypted
instruction streams, with per CPU keys loaded at manufacture enabling
software to be purchased for your CPU only (and hence disempowering 
users who will thus be unable to even disassemble such code prior to
running), or smart cards as modernized next generation dongles.

Adam