keystrokes and crooked judges

[bill payne <billp@nmol.com>]

I am reading http://www.jya.com/gaks-de.htm

Perhaps this e-mail may interest you

Best
bill
http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2
http://www-hto.usc.edu/software/seqaln/doc/html/gfsr.3.html



Monday 6/8/98 7:53 AM  
  
John Young  
  
I am reading http://jya.com/sitesec.htm a bit more carefully.  
  
You have NEVER WRITTEN SO MUCH.  
  
Fishing was great.  
  
I used a   
  
          $10 THE  INSTANT CALLING CARD [TM]   
          VOCALL COMMUNICATIONS CORP  
	  The World's Most advanced prepaid Calling Card  
  
which allows access with a pin of 718-2455-7091-xxx [my SECRET]  
in ENGLISH, SPANISH, ARABIC, URDU, KOREAN, JAPANESE, GERMAN,   
FRENCH, ITALIAN to call you TWICE on Saturday.  At only $.14/min.  
  
I left one message about Xandi and spiking computer keyboards.  
  
Xandi MADE low-power transmitters,   
  
http://www.gernsback.com/HyperNews/get/forums/resource/226.html  
  
like the kind I MIGHT use IF I were going to spike a keyboard [most
which use an 8051  
  
 
http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2]  
  
so that the keystrokes would be broadcast.    
  
This, of course, defeats crypto attempts to cipher keystrokes.  
  
But I DO NOT DO, or have to do, ILLEGAL THINGS for the FBI or any other
government agency.  
  
I, as a DOE contractor employee, was protected under 10 CFR 708.  
http://av.yahoo.com/bin/query?p=10+cfr+708&hc=0&hs=0  
  
But 10 CFR 708 does not appear to be working well in my case.   
  
Therefore, we had to try other remedies.  
  
VOCALL is getting real close to digital cash, one of Orlin Grabbe's 	  
interests.  http://www.aci.net/kalliste/dcguide.htm  
  
I have to do mostly technical work on the digital FX this week but will
try to  
get two notices of appeal to the Tenth circuit written.
http://jya.com/whp043098.htm  
  
Morales and I, with all the publicity you and Orlin have given us, can  
go all the way to the Supreme Court with our genocide and crypto  
deficiency lawsuits. http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm  
  
Pro se, of course.  
  
Too bad NSA did not take my criticisms of its shift register work  
more constructively.  http://jya.com/da/whpda.htm,  click on Appendix S  
  
Perhaps NSA should have worked with some of us at Sandia to come-up  
with fixes to overcome deficiencies. This unpleasantness could have been
avoided.  
  
I've had ideas to improve shift register algorithm operation before.  
http://www-hto.usc.edu/software/seqaln/doc/html/gfsr.3.html  
  
Let's all hope for settlement of this UNFORTUNATE matter before it  
gets worse.  
  
Later  
bill  

And this too.

Subject: 
        FBI agents and Junger
  Date: 
        Tue, 07 Jul 1998 07:32:36 -0600
  From: 
        bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
    To: 
        jy@jya.com
    CC: 
        art morales <armoral@sandia.gov>, whitfield diffie
<diffie@eng.sun.com>, tom carpenter - halcyon <tomcgap@halcyon.com>,
        marc rotenberg <rotenberg@epic.org>, national employee rights
institute <neri@nerinet.org>, mab@research.att.com,
        mejudson@mail.wdn.com, lwirbel@aol.com, klayman
<jwatch@erols.com>, john gilmore <gnu@toad.com>,
jpcarson@mindspring.com,
        jdelia@gnn.com, jeff debonis <76554.133@compuserve.com>, jay
coughlan <ccns@nets.com>, jason vest <vestj@aol.com>,
        j orlin grabbe <kalliste@aci.net>, david sobel <sobel@epic.org>,
Cindy@McGlashan.com


Tuesday 7/7/98 7:28 AM

John Young

I am reading http://www.jya.com/pdj10.htm

FBI agents Perez, Rodrigues, and Silva warned us about the crooked
judges at the appellate level.  

The FBI blackmailed Perez, Rodrigues, and Silva into a cheap settlement
of their race discrimination lawsuit win in Lucius Bunton's West Texas
court.

They all lost money.  And all got divorced.

Perez is a buddy of Morales and Gonzales.

Gonzales and Armenta are buddies of Silva.

Hugo Rodrigues moved to Florida.

This information is VERY VALUABLE to Morales and me.

It shapes our response to the two letters from the Tenth I put
in the mail to you yesterday.

NO FUTURE IN ARGUING POINTS OF LAW WITH CROOKED JUDGES.

bill
Counterfeiting Wiegand Wire Access Credentials
     
                                   Bill Payne
     
                                 October 16,1996
     
                                    Abstract
     
                  Wiegand wire access credentials are easy and
                  inexpensive to counterfeit.
     
        Access Control & Security Systems Integration magazine, October
        1996 [http://www/securitysolutions.com] published the article,
     
             Wiegand technology stands the test of time
     
             by PAUL J. BODELL, page 12
     
             Many card and reader manufacturers offer Wiegand (pronounced
             wee-gand) output.  However, only three companies in the
             world make Wiegand readers.  Sensor Engineering of Hamden
             Conn., holds the patent for Wiegand, and Sensor has licensed
             Cardkey of Simi Valley, Calif., and Doduco of Pforzheim,
             Germany, to manufacture Wiegand cards and readers. ...  A
             Wiegand output reader is not the same thing as a Wiegand
             reader,  and it is important to understand the differences.
     
                In brief, Wiegand reader use the Wiegand effect to
             translate card information around the patented Wiegand
             effect in which a segment of a specially treated wire
             generates an electronic pulse when subjected to a specific
             magnetic field.  If the pulse is generated when the wire is
             near a pick-up coil, the pulse can be detected by a circuit.
             Lining up several rows of wires and passing them by a cold
             would generate a series of pulses.  Lining up two rows of
             wires - calling on row "zero bits" and the other "one bits"
             - and passing them by two different coils would generate two
             series of pulses, or data bits.  These data bits can then be
             interpreted as binary data and used to control other
             devices.  If you seal the coils in a rugged housing with
             properly placed magnets, and LED and some simple circuitry,
             you have a Wiegand reader.  Carefully laminate the special
             wires in vinyl, and artwork, and hot-stamp a number on the
             vinyl, and you have a Wiegand card.
     
             IN THE BEGINNING
     
               Wiegand was first to introduce to the access control
             market in the late 1970s.  It was immediately successful
             because it filled the need for durable, secure card and
             reader technology.
               Embedded in the cards, Wiegand wires cannot be altered or
             duplicated. ...
     
        Bodell's Last statement is incorrect.
     
        Tasks for EASILY counterfeiting Wiegand wire cards are
     
        1    Locate the wires inside the card to read the 0s and 1s.
     
        2    Build an ACCEPTABLE copy of the card.
     
        Bodell's clear explanation of the working of a Wiegand card can
        be visualized
     
             zero row    |     |   |
     
             one row        |          |
     
             binary      0  1  0   0   1
             representation
     
        Solutions to Task 1
     
             A    X-ray the card
     
             B    MAGNI VIEW FILM,  Mylar film reads magnetic fields ...
                  Edmunds Scientific Company, catalog 16N1, page
                  205, C33,447  $11.75
     
        is placed over the top of the Wiegand card.
     
        COW MAGNET,  Cow magnetics allow farmers to trap metal in the
        stomachs of their cows.  Edmunds, page 204, C31,101 $10.75
        is placed under the card.
     
        Location of the wires is easily seen on the green film.
     
        Mark the position of the wires with a pen.
     
        Next chop the card vertically using a shear into about 80/1000s
        paper-match-sized strips.
     
        Don't worry about cutting a wire or two.
     
        Note that a 0 has the pen mark to the top.  A 1 has the pen mark
        at the bottom.
     
        Take a business card and layout the "paper match"-like strips to
        counterfeit the card number desired.
     
        Don't worry about spacing.  Wiegand output is self-clocking!
     
        Tape the "paper-match - like" strips to the business card.
     
        Only the FUNCTION of the card needs to be reproduced!
     
                                     History
     
        Breaking electronic locks was done as "work for others" at Sandia
     
        National Laboratories beginning in 1992 funded by the Federal
        Bureau of Investigation/Engineering Research Facility, Quantico,
        VA.
     
        The FBI opined that this work was SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY
        INFORMATION.
     
        Details of the consequences of this work are covered in
     
             Fired Worker File Lawsuit Against Sandia
             Specialist Says He Balked When Lab Sought Electronic
             Picklock Software, Albuquer Journal, Sunday April 25, 1993
     
             State-sanctioned paranoia,  EE Times, January 22, 1996
     
             One man's battle,  EE Times, March 22, 1994
     
             Damn the torpedoes,  EE Times, June 6, 1994
     
             Protecting properly classified info,  EE Times, April 11,
             1994
     
             DOE to scrutinize fairness in old whistle-blower cases,
             Albuquerque Tribune, Nov 7 1995
     
             DOE boss accelerates whistle-blower protection,  Albuquerque
             Tribune, March 27, 1996
     
             DOE doesn't plan to compensate 'old' whistle-blowers with
             money, Albuquerque Tribune September 27, 199