Re: From: dac@zurich.ibm.com (Marc Dacier)

[Anooshiravan Merat <merata@sums.ac.ir>]

STOP SENDING ME EMAILS MR PAYNE
STOOOPPPP IITTTT!!!!!!

bill payne wrote:

> Friday 7/31/98 11:40 AM
>
> John Young
>
> I am looking at http://www.jya.com/raid98.htm
>
> Dacier asked me why NSA/Sandia was concerned about what
> each bit in an executable image did when I was in his office in
> Zurich in April 1997.
>
> Spiking, of course.  A SECRET OTHER FUNCTION to a device.
>
> http://caq.com/cryptogate  http://www.aci.net/kalliste/speccoll.htm
>
> NSA/Sandia doesn�t trust its own employees!
>
> On the other hand, NSA/Sandia employees don�t trust NSA/Sandia either.
>
> The REAL WORLD again.
>
> IBM Zurich was BIG into Java.
>
> Network World, July 20, 1998 page 6
>
>   The incredible shrinking Java alliance
>
>   By Chris Nerney and Andy Eddy
>
>     A year ago there were four of them, members of a new alliance
>   touting a potent new weapon designed to end Microsoft Corp.'s
>   growing dominance in the computing industry.
>     Now the Java Gang of Four is the Gang of Two and a Half.
>     Java creator Sun Microsystems, Inc., of course, is still fully
>   committed to the programming language, as is IBM. ...
>
> Not looking good for Java future.
>
> Java is similar to FORTH.  FORTH executes super-slow on high-level
> in most machines.  About 10% of the speed of a compiled-language
> program - such as Visual Basic.
>
> Specialized Forth and Java machine can be made to run fast.
> http://groucho.gsfc.nasa.gov/forth/ and http://www.ptsc.com/
>
> But I am not confident Java or Forth machines are going anywhere.
> May be hard to get parts in the future.
>
> But I'm confident about the 80C32 supply!
> http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2
>
> Let's hope this UNFORTUNATE matter http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm gets
> settled soon so that we can move on to constructive projects.
>
> Later
> bill
>
> /\/\/\
>
> Marc
>
> Since I was working the OTHER SIDE of
>
>   Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
>
> for the FBI, I might be able to give a nice talk about what the US
> government is REALLY UP TO on defeating intrusion detection!
>
> I am not reading e-mail.
>
> best
> bill
>
> Hi Matthias!
>
>   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Counterfeiting Wiegand Wire Access Credentials
>
>                                    Bill Payne
>
>                                  October 16,1996
>
>                                     Abstract
>
>                   Wiegand wire access credentials are easy and
>                   inexpensive to counterfeit.
>
>         Access Control & Security Systems Integration magazine, October
>         1996 [http://www/securitysolutions.com] published the article,
>
>              Wiegand technology stands the test of time
>
>              by PAUL J. BODELL, page 12
>
>              Many card and reader manufacturers offer Wiegand (pronounced
>              wee-gand) output.  However, only three companies in the
>              world make Wiegand readers.  Sensor Engineering of Hamden
>              Conn., holds the patent for Wiegand, and Sensor has licensed
>              Cardkey of Simi Valley, Calif., and Doduco of Pforzheim,
>              Germany, to manufacture Wiegand cards and readers. ...  A
>              Wiegand output reader is not the same thing as a Wiegand
>              reader,  and it is important to understand the differences.
>
>                 In brief, Wiegand reader use the Wiegand effect to
>              translate card information around the patented Wiegand
>              effect in which a segment of a specially treated wire
>              generates an electronic pulse when subjected to a specific
>              magnetic field.  If the pulse is generated when the wire is
>              near a pick-up coil, the pulse can be detected by a circuit.
>              Lining up several rows of wires and passing them by a cold
>              would generate a series of pulses.  Lining up two rows of
>              wires - calling on row "zero bits" and the other "one bits"
>              - and passing them by two different coils would generate two
>              series of pulses, or data bits.  These data bits can then be
>              interpreted as binary data and used to control other
>              devices.  If you seal the coils in a rugged housing with
>              properly placed magnets, and LED and some simple circuitry,
>              you have a Wiegand reader.  Carefully laminate the special
>              wires in vinyl, and artwork, and hot-stamp a number on the
>              vinyl, and you have a Wiegand card.
>
>              IN THE BEGINNING
>
>                Wiegand was first to introduce to the access control
>              market in the late 1970s.  It was immediately successful
>              because it filled the need for durable, secure card and
>              reader technology.
>                Embedded in the cards, Wiegand wires cannot be altered or
>              duplicated. ...
>
>         Bodell's Last statement is incorrect.
>
>         Tasks for EASILY counterfeiting Wiegand wire cards are
>
>         1    Locate the wires inside the card to read the 0s and 1s.
>
>         2    Build an ACCEPTABLE copy of the card.
>
>         Bodell's clear explanation of the working of a Wiegand card can
>         be visualized
>
>              zero row    |     |   |
>
>              one row        |          |
>
>              binary      0  1  0   0   1
>              representation
>
>         Solutions to Task 1
>
>              A    X-ray the card
>
>              B    MAGNI VIEW FILM,  Mylar film reads magnetic fields ...
>                   Edmunds Scientific Company, catalog 16N1, page
>                   205, C33,447  $11.75
>
>         is placed over the top of the Wiegand card.
>
>         COW MAGNET,  Cow magnetics allow farmers to trap metal in the
>         stomachs of their cows.  Edmunds, page 204, C31,101 $10.75
>         is placed under the card.
>
>         Location of the wires is easily seen on the green film.
>
>         Mark the position of the wires with a pen.
>
>         Next chop the card vertically using a shear into about 80/1000s
>         paper-match-sized strips.
>
>         Don't worry about cutting a wire or two.
>
>         Note that a 0 has the pen mark to the top.  A 1 has the pen mark
>         at the bottom.
>
>         Take a business card and layout the "paper match"-like strips to
>         counterfeit the card number desired.
>
>         Don't worry about spacing.  Wiegand output is self-clocking!
>
>         Tape the "paper-match - like" strips to the business card.
>
>         Only the FUNCTION of the card needs to be reproduced!
>
>                                      History
>
>         Breaking electronic locks was done as "work for others" at Sandia
>
>         National Laboratories beginning in 1992 funded by the Federal
>         Bureau of Investigation/Engineering Research Facility, Quantico,
>         VA.
>
>         The FBI opined that this work was SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY
>         INFORMATION.
>
>         Details of the consequences of this work are covered in
>
>              Fired Worker File Lawsuit Against Sandia
>              Specialist Says He Balked When Lab Sought Electronic
>              Picklock Software, Albuquer Journal, Sunday April 25, 1993
>
>              State-sanctioned paranoia,  EE Times, January 22, 1996
>
>              One man's battle,  EE Times, March 22, 1994
>
>              Damn the torpedoes,  EE Times, June 6, 1994
>
>              Protecting properly classified info,  EE Times, April 11,
>              1994
>
>              DOE to scrutinize fairness in old whistle-blower cases,
>              Albuquerque Tribune, Nov 7 1995
>
>              DOE boss accelerates whistle-blower protection,  Albuquerque
>              Tribune, March 27, 1996
>
>              DOE doesn't plan to compensate 'old' whistle-blowers with
>              money, Albuquerque Tribune September 27, 199