[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: SSLeay - Whats the story...

On Fri, 4 Aug 1995, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
> On Fri, 4 Aug 1995, Alex Tang wrote:
> Perry Metzger and Mark Chen have recently expressed some criticism, and
> Adam Shostack, around the end of May, posted a review that hilighted a 
> number of potential problem areas.

Do you have a copy of this?

> Personally, I especially dislike the use of RC4-40 (yes, other algorithms 
> are supported, but not using the export version of Netscape Navigator); 
Totaly agree, hell, I going to give the option for users and server to 
specify at run time which ciphers never to use :-).

> the excessively large portion of the handshaking data exchanged as 
> cleartext; and the limitations in certificate management (no provisions 
> for verifying the revocation status with a CA).

The clear text I don't like, I agree.  But then when used for http, 
everything begins with a GET anyway.  The CRL verification is again to me 
a matter of implementation.  Currently my library does not support CRL 
(but I can load and manipulate them).  It is simply a function of the 
infrastructure to go with the library.  SSL v3 of the spec does alow for 
CRL to be passed along with the certificate heigherachy (a PKCS-7 object).

I'm mostly concered with any objections raised with the protocol, not the 
particular implementation around right now.  With my library I fully 
intend to make it possible to refuse to authenticate the server unless a 
current CRL is present.

Anyway, I'm intersted in hearing people complains so I can attempt to 
make sure none of the fixable problems are in my library :-)


Eric Young                  | Signature removed since it was generating
AARNet: [email protected]    | more followups that the message contents :-)