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Remailer encryption.


From: [email protected] (Miron Cuperman)

> In any case, the current scheme for ARA's is insecure.  This is
> because people can send plaintext messages attached to the ARA.
> This allows breaking anonymity by monitoring of the traffic from
> all remailers and waiting until the message appears at one of
> the outputs.
> I will implement a more secure scheme.  The ARA will include
> encryption instructions for each remailer.  Since each remailer
> will be doing a transformation on the message, the attack above
> will not be feasible.

I'd like to hear more about this plan.  What kind of encryption
instructions would be used in the ARA?  Would they be public key or
secret key?

Chaum's "Mix" paper in CACM (1981?  I don't have my refs handy) had
a concept where at each step the remailer would encrypt the outgoing
non-address part of the message with a DES key found in the anonymous
address.  The user would remember all the DES keys used in the ARA
and un-apply them in reverse order to reconstruct the original message.
This would require some special software, I'd think, to remember the
DES keys and unapply them (and to construct the anonymous address).
(Actually, Chaum didn't specify DES but rather just an unspecified secret
key system.  If PGP were used for some of this then perhaps IDEA would
be a good choice.)

This system sounded pretty complicated, and it still had the problem
that by sending multiple messages to the same address a remailer could
do some simple traffic analysis and break the ARA.  E.g. it would send
5 messages to an ARA today, and discovers that it later gets 5 messages
for user X (because it happens to be the last remailer in the ARA chain).
Tomorrow, it sends 10 messages to that same ARA, and discovers 10 messages
for that same user.  The next day it sends 7 messages to the ARA, and
discovers 7 messages for that user.  Eventually it can deduce that the
user and the ARA go together.

To avoid this, Chaum calls these "one-time" ARA's and recommends that
mixes not accept messages for the same ARA more than once.  I don't
think this is a practical suggestion, though, since a one-time ARA is
not useful enough.

Hal Finney
[email protected]

Version: 2.1


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