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Re: >Clipper trapdoor?
- To: Cypherpunks <[email protected]>
- Subject: Re: >Clipper trapdoor?
- From: David Sobel <[email protected]>
- Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1993 14:01:54 EST
- Organization: CPSR Washington Office
>As for the example of snooping on Hussein and his officers, you know
>exactly how much legal authorization the NSA needs to conduct that
>wiretap. Exactly none. Hence, it needs no paperwork to get the key
>to Hussein's phone.
>How the escrow agents make the NSA prove that the keyid in question
>belongs to Hussen's phone is an exercise left to the legislature :-/
As you (and others) noted in response to my posting, there is either a
trapdoor *or* a "national security exception" to the warrant/escrow
arrangement. As your comment suggests, NSA has heretofore been
able to act unilaterally in exercising its "legal authorization" to
intercept communications overseas, but with the Clipper scheme must
obtain assistance from a third (and fourth?) party -- the escrow
agents. I think the question you raise is a critical one -- under what
guidelines will the escrow agents determine the validity of an NSA
request for the key without a FISA warrant?