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Re: clipper pin-compatibl




> T >Yeah, a lot of folks suggested the same thing (I didn't, so I'm
> T >neutral on the credit issue). It was debated in scy.crypt, as well as
> T >here on Cypherpunks.
> 
> Modesty, modesty.  It seems to me than *some* T. C. May discussed the 
> reverse engineering of the Clipper Chip in April 1993 as part of the 
> Clipper/Capstone announcement firestorm.
> 
> DCF
> 
> An elephant never forgets. 

Yeah, I guess Duncan is right. I did write some comments about the
procedures that would be needed to reverse-engineer the Clipper chip
(having started Intel's electron-beam analysis lab in 1981), but I
don't think I ever advocated it as a Cyperpunks project, that's for
sure!

(If I'm misremembering, someone will correct me.)

Spending this kind of money and time, and gathering the expertise, is
not something you do on a lark, or because it would be cool. A company
seriously motivated to take on the Clipperphone _might_ attempt such a
thing, but probably wouldn't, for lots of reasons.

If some of you wish to start a major project to reverse-engineer the
Clipper, or the Skipjack, etc., good luck!

Might I suggest first spending several thousand dollars to buy--if you
can--some Clipperphones, then tear them apart to see how the chips are
mounted (rumor: surface mount, hard to get at) and what kind of
encapsulization is used. I'll be happy to provide a few hours or more
of free consulting on what kind of plasma asher you'll need to get to
the chip surface, some approaches to voltage-contrast analysis, and
other "peeling" steps to consider.

--Tim May


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Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
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