Re: Remailer traffic analysis foiling

[Jidan <yusuf921@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>]

On Wed, 3 Aug 1994, cjl wrote:

> Remailer hackers,
> 
> Would there be any advantage to giving remailers a MIRV capability?  
> 
> [deleted]

> I guess the issues involved are:
> 
[ deleted] 

> 2)  What is the credible threat of traffic analysis?
> 	a)  Does multiplication of messages and their routing schemes create 
>             problems of scale for these alleged eavesdropers?
>         b)  Do you assume that if it's not a compromised server, that 
> 	    what goes on inside the machine is hidden? 
> 

for total anon post/mail
How workable is setting up remailers with psudo-cooperation
so that when it recieves an anon mail it waits 20 or so min
and then randomly sends copies of it to 5 other remailers of which
the original reciever randomly decides which 1 of the 6 will post 
and the rest simply discard. 
  a 5 fold increase in traffic will make it harder to analize if
80% is just noise

Duct tape is like the force.  It has a light side, and a dark side, and
it holds the universe together ...
		-- Carl Zwanzig