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Re: cfs & remailers
Bill O'Hanlon writes:
> I half-expect Eric or Tim to jump in here to point out that this is one
> of those situations where you have to define who your enemy is, and to make
> sure that your efforts apply to the situation.
Well, if they won't, I will :-) You have to define your threats,
or at least think about them a bit.
> I run a remailer on a home Unix machine via a phone line UUCP feed. [...]
> block the following foes: my service provider and any node upstream of it,
> thieves/misguided law enforcement types, and phone taps. Encrypting something
> that I receive in the clear over an insecure line isn't useful.
It's still useful - it lets you protect yourself against attackers who
seize your machine but aren't actively wiretapping. For instance,
the thugs who raided Steve Jackson Games, etc. Wiretapping is a lot of work,
and takes a better argument to a fancier judge than simple search warrants.
Even if you are wiretapped, it lets you protect messages that got there
before the wiretap started - it's not surprising to have messages stick around
for a week in a uucp environment, and there are all your UUCP databases.
There's also a legal problem to be addressed, since nobody's established whether
remailer operators are common carriers or co-conspirators or RICO-racketeer
(probably depends on the quality of lawyers you can afford.)
Encrypting your disks makes it *much* harder for them to examine your system
until you've had time to get a lawyer and do things in front of the judge
instead of on their own in some back room.
Bill Stewart