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Re: SSL search attack

D > >  The odds can be improved somewhat by scaling the granularity of the
D > >sweep to the size of the sweep. (Align larger chunks on large-chunk
D > >boundaries, eliminating the chance of overlap with other large chunks.)
D >
D > Some kind of step (ie, round-down) function performed on the random (I

  More like deciding ahead of time that if you are going to take 1/n of
the keyspace, you should take a chunk aligned on a 1/n boundary. That
way, you don't have two people take chunks right next to each other,
just missing the key, or take chunks that overlap each other massively,
duplicating effort.

  If a random protocol were to be used, each person would roll up an
appropriate starting spot, and then simply search sequentially
thereafter, so that he would not double up on his =own= previous
efforts. The point of scaling the starting point is basically the theory
that says:

     "I will generate a random number of the form xxxxxx0000, because if
     I trust that a person has scanned any given number, I also trust
     that he has scanned the next FFFF keys, so it would be
     counterproductive for me to start anywhere not so aligned."

  And the number of 0s is based on my pathetic amount of computing power
being estimated as 2**(-24) of the total effort. For those who made the
Big Boys list, a few more zeros are in order.

D > is searching an X segment area around where the dart hit. In order to
D > get any kind of boundry, you have to scale the allowed segment blocks, by
D > powers of two, for example, or something, so everyone knows where the
D > borders are. Its a nice thought but I don't see that it's necessary.

  It should improve the odds just a bit. Instead of throwing darts at
2**40 targets, we are only throwing them at 2**24 small ones, and people
with large darts to throw can worry about, say, 2**16 or even 2**12
targets to hit.

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