Re: Remailer passphrases

[Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>]

>Bill Frantz writes:
>> One of the reasons classical (government) crypto users change keys
>> frequently is to minimize the amount of data compromised by a broken key. 
>> We keep hearing about NSA decrypting 20 year old cyphertext and showing
>> more of the workings of the atomic spy rings operating in the 40s and 50s. 

The NSA's decryption of old cyphertext that's been publicized, other than
World War II cyphers such as Enigma and Purple, has primarily been
Russian "One Time Pads".  OTPs are perfectly secret - if they're made with
real random numbers and only used once, which the Russians were sloppy about.
Minimizing exposure is good.

perry@piermont.com replied
>Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchanges have the property known as
>"Perfect Forward Secrecy". Even if the opponent gets your public keys
>it still will not decrypt any traffic for him at all -- it just lets
>him pretend to be you. Thats one reason why protocols like Photuris
>and Oakley use the technique.

DH key exchange is really only Exponentially Good Forward Secrecy,
and in its primary use (exchanging keys for symmetric-key algorithms)
the system is at best Good Enough Forward Secrecy.  The difference
between exponentially good and perfect is exponentially small,
which is fine if your keys are long enough.  On the other hand,
cracking a symmetric-key algorithm is generally the weak link,
unless you're using 112-bit or better secret keys, and even 112s
might be crackable during the lifetime of the current universe.

How much information leaks if you reveal (say) 128 bits of a 
1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key?  Does it tell you anything at all
about any of the remaining 896 bits?  Is it safe to use 8 slices
of the 1024-bit key if 7 are revealed?   Does RSA have the same
problem?  This is partly an efficiency hack (cutting the number
of big slow calculations by 8) and partly a question of other
uses one might make of the bits, such as stealthing PGP headers.
#--
#			Thanks;  Bill
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