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Re: Remailer passphrases
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[To: [email protected]]
[cc: [email protected]]
[Subject: Re: Remailer passphrases ]
[In-reply-to: Your message of Tue, 12 Mar 96 14:51:47 EST.]
<[email protected]>
"Perry E. Metzger" <[email protected]> enscribed:
>Bill Frantz writes:
>> One of the reasons classical (government) crypto users change keys
>> frequently is to minimize the amount of data compromised by a broken key.
>> We keep hearing about NSA decrypting 20 year old cyphertext and showing
>> more of the workings of the atomic spy rings operating in the 40s and 50s.
>> If an opponent can rubber hose the key, her job is easy. If she has to
>> perform cryptoanalysis, it is much harder. Remailers should regularly
>> change their keys to avoid compromising previously recorded traffic. (They
>> can have a long lived key for signing their traffic keys.)
>Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchanges have the property known as
>"Perfect Forward Secrecy". Even if the opponent gets your public keys
>it still will not decrypt any traffic for him at all -- it just lets
>him pretend to be you. Thats one reason why protocols like Photuris
>and Oakley use the technique.
True, but when the problem at hand is sending mail to a remailer, the
technique is of little or no value, since there is no initial exchange,
right? So this is a misleading argument. At least it is related to
cryptography and The Cypherpunk Agenda(tm)!
Chris McAuliffe <[email protected]> (No, not that one.)
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