Re: Remailer passphrases

[Alex Strasheim <cp@proust.suba.com>]

If we ignore the obvious problem (ie., no one is going to put much effort
or expense into running a free remailer), wouldn't splitting the remailer
across two machines help fix the security problem? 

Suppose one unix box accepts the mail and puts it a queue directory.  Then
a second box periodically grabs files from the first box's queue with ssh
(the second box initiates the connection), processes them, and then passes
them out to the smtp server on the first box.  The second box doesn't
accept incoming connections on any port except for the ssh port so there
are no sendmails or httpds to hack.

The remailer files could be running on a cfs drive (with nfs/cfs only
accepting connects from localhost), and you could disable getty so that it
would be hard to physically grab the machine and read the contents of the
disk.  If you had enough ram you wouldn't need a swap file, so there'd be
nothing there for someone who grabbed the machine.  If you set the machine
up while it's plugged into a small lan that's not connected to the net no
one could come in and hide something before you had secured everything. 

You'd also have to try to make as sure as is humanly possible that there
is no way an attacker can construct a trojan remailer packet that would do
something unpleasant.

Finally, don't tell anyone what you're doing or how you're doing it, and
don't post about it to cypherpunks.  It may be unwise to depend on
obscurity for security, but as an extra layer it can't hurt and it might
cause a physcial attacker to come unprepared to hack the machine without 
powering it down and rebooting.

I know an attacker could interrupt service, and I'd guess that a skillful
attacker could probably find a way to grab the cfs and remailer
passphrases if he could grab the machine and the control the site
physically (to work on it while it's running) for awhile, but how would an
attacker come in over the net and hack the remailer box?  

What have I overlooked?