Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)

[Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>]

My commentary below supposes that the robbers are _not_ cypherpunks,
but are fanatic logicians, and prefer poverty to death.
It also assumes that all motions are non-debatable,
which reduces the amount of dealmaking possible.

At 05:52 AM 7/26/96 -0400, Rabid Wombat <wombat@mcfeely.bsfs.org> wrote:
>If only 19 and 20 are left, 19 has 50% of the vote, and can take all. #20 
>loses out.
>Therefore, with 18,19, and 20 left, 20 will take whatever 18 offers, as 
>it is better than getting nothing.
>With 17,18,19,20 left, 17 should propose a split with 20, who will likely 
>get a smaller cut from 18, because of the above.
>
>With 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, three votes are needed, reducing the take for 
>the majority, so no one other than #16 is acting in their best interest 
>to approve a split, except for #19 trying to avoid losing out to 17/20 in 
>the next round. Not enough for a majority.

Wrong.  If 16 gets killed, 18 knows that 17 and 20 will probably 
split the money, so it's in 18's interest to team with 16 and 19.

15, 17, and 20 can also vote to split the money.

14's position is a bit shakier, but he's got more people to deal with.

...>...
>All even-numbered cypherpunks should then expect a short life expectancy. 
>(You are number 6; who is number 1?)

What do you want?
        - The money!
#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts@ix.netcom.com
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