Re: Crypto, C4 Explosives, and Destroying the Infrastructure

[Michael Wilson <0005514706@mcimail.com>]

Tim May wrote:
>However, there are a couple of *obvious* errors. My supposition is that he
>"pulled his punches" a little, choosing to gloss over certain things which
>would have made the "terrorist" essentially impossible to detect. (The most
>glaring error, which he surely knew better about, was to assert that NSA
>could break any cipher if given enough time and computer power.)

I would assume that anyone considering the potential of infrastructural
warfare attacks in a dramatic setting would have to handicap the moves
of the opposition force--the mechanisms of tradecraft in the modern
age are such that the anti- and counter-terror forces are whistling
in the dark as they pass the graveyard.

Steve Schear wrote:
>Any intelligent terrorist knows that explosives are old hat.
>Perhaps this is an opportunity for CPs to join in and re-write the book
>with a more factual basis and outcome, are re-publish on-line.  I volunteer
>to OCR.

The modern terrorist or opposition force will use whatever makes them
the most effective--if that means, on the cost/benefit curve, that
they use explosives, then by all means they will.  Terrorism evolves
under pressures much the way any other social element does; in this
case, evolutionary pressures are those of environment and predators.
As the security increases or improves, terrorists have historically
advanced as well (guns to explosives when airport security improved,
and the coming shift to chemical or biological weapons, as thermal
neutron analysis comes on-line).  Predators, such as intelligence or
law enforcement, merely serve to cull the herd a bit, which is why
you see fewer but more effective terrorist attacks, even as narrowly
defined in the recent U.S. State Dept. reports.  As for publication or
other expansion on the subject matter, let me point out my own work on
the topic (always pro strong crypto, pro cypherpunks, incidentally).

Infrastructural warfare is a field that should interest cypherpunks--
it has been my strongest argument for getting government out of the
security and cryptography business for a number of years now.  Feel
free to reference the URL:

		http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4843/

Particularly of interest to cypherpunks (or anyone with an interest
in how to run an untraceable opposition force that could give most of
the infrastructure a good thrashing):

Waging IWAR (1997)
>From the Introduction:
"So as not to alarm the reader, let me advise you that this paper is
intended as an informal presentation of the material, very much in the
spirit of 'let us conspire!' What has been sorely lacking in
treatments of the infrastructural warfare (IWAR) subject matter has
been a practical, personal approach of thinking about, planning, and
waging IWAR operations. Given the nature of most of the professionals
acting as documentarists, the published materials are strong on theory
and speculation, and short on practical guidelines. I shall attempt to
begin to fill that gap, and I hope the reader will accept a temporary
'partnership in crime' as we work through the problems facing an
opposition force (OpFor) together.

This paper is be broken into four sections:
-Definitions, assumptions, and theory; the conceptual basis of
IWAR is important to review;
-Exploration of OpFor as a practical matter;
-A set of IWAR potential operations, for which I have chosen a
variety of examples;
-Defense-In-Depth, battling IWAR."

Infrastructural Warfare Threat Model (1997)
Abstract:
A threat model is essential to proving the validity of the threat
posed by infrastructural and information warfare (I2WAR); exploration
of the scope/activities of the threat are essential to understanding
the threat and mounting a defense against it. An opposition force' is
postulated and explored for its intent, organization, communications,
recruiting, armament, intelligence gathering and analysis, and
funding. A methodology for defining the infrastructure and
dependencies is proposed. I2WAR is defined as conflict oriented around
denial of service attacks on physical infrastructure elements
(including targets such as communications, public utilities, financial
organizations, transportation mechanisms, public facilities/events,
emergency management services, commerce, and government), denial of
service attacks on virtual' infrastructure elements (information
warfare), psychological warfare operations (attacks on decision
processes), and technologically augmented political warfare
(agitation, subversion, rioting; propaganda). Conclusions are drawn,
including suggestions for a defense-in-depth.

Battle for the Soul of Information Warfare: Pearl Harbor vs. the
Hashishim (1997)
Abstract:
Infowar has at least two distinct camps, each operating with different
basic assumptions on the threat. As these assumptions are critical to
threat modeling and defense strategies, comparing the differences is
essential. The assumptions of the Pearl Harbor' mass denial-of-service
infowar attack are contrasted with those of the Hashishim,' subtle
efforts of perversion; the historical case is presented to demonstrate
the reasoning regarding the labels. Contrasted are assumptions
regarding opposition force approach, intent, focus, targets, scale of
attack, resources of opposition force, management, command and
control, organization, funding, intelligence, defensive focus, and
political view of the problem.

Considering the Net as an Intelligence Tool (1996)
An exploration of the fitness of the net for intelligence gathering
and operational support; this is usually an assumption made by many of
the theorists on the subject, but I thought a detailed explanation
worth engaging in.

Michael Wilson
5514706@mcimail.com