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Just don't get GAK

>From the DOJs' letter to all CongressPersons in re SAFE,
http://jya.com/hr105-108-pt4.htm, signed by Reno and Freeh, one has

"Further, today's international drug trafficking
organizations are the most powerful, ruthless and affluent
criminal enterprises we have ever faced. We know from numerous
past investigations that they have utilized their virtually
unlimited wealth to purchase sophisticated electronic equipment
to facilitate their illegal activities."

How can anyone expect that mandated GAK will do anything
at all to prevent "affluent criminal enterprises" from using
steganography, covert channels, etc. and why is this point never 
directly addressed?

Lord knows I can use the dinero and I can stego this months'
receipts mui pronto. Entende amigo?

Am I supposed to believe that tools for steganography, etc. are
not already widely and irretrievably disseminated? Or am I to 
assume that gaked traffic between inept felons is so valuable as 
to justify the $? infrastructure implied by the Weldon/Dellums and/or
Oxley amendments (what awaits in the Senate)?

US security agencies have recently emphasized the value of intelligence
received from unencrypted channels (don't remember where). Perhaps, this 
is because they decrypt ever less and less of the remainder.

But if traffic between the duh set is that great, why not just maintain the
status quo? Or is this some evil plot to listen to our bathroom sounds?