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Re: FCPUNX:PGP Key Escrow and Congress
In <[email protected]>, on 10/15/97
at 02, Eli Brandt <[email protected]> said:
>Bruce Schneier wrote:
>> From: "Barbara Simons" <[email protected]>
>>
>> Some of these are old arguments that we've been hearing for a while,
>> but some are newer. In particular, points 4 and 6 are difficult to
>> refute without getting into some technical details. Both points also
>> undercut the argument that a key recovery infrastructure potentially
>> weakens security. After all, the NSA thinks it's secure enough that it
>> can be used by the government.
>Non-technical point: the NSA (reportedly) has no intention of using GAK
>for classified information. They know that it weakens security.
>Do the privacy of the nation's data and the security of its
>information infrastructure deserve the same consideration as the
>Pentagon's "Confidential" memos? When you're planning to build in a
>single point of failure, this is a question you have to ask.
There are those of us who see a single point of failure in such
infrastructures as a GoodThing(TM).
--
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William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0
Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html
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