From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 15:15:26 +0800 To: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Subject: Re: Can We Cut the Crap? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601010637.AAA22761@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: > > There is no point in the back-and-forth of insults, "Dr. Fred is a loon," > > "Alice is Detweiler," and other such nonsense. If you don't want to read > > the comments of Fred Cohen, Dimitri Vulis, Alice whatever, > > Vlad/Lance/Larry/Pablo, then just don't read them! Filter them out, delete > > them immediately, read them briefly, whatever. > > Or Chris Shalutis, or Ed Carp, or Perry Metzger... > > Too bad majordomo@toad.com can't be instructed not to send contributions from > certain folks to certain other folks. I guess I'll have to figure out how > to use procmail with this thing after all. Hey, Dimitri? That's what it's *for*! This is not about censorship, or is it? Is that what you're suggesting? No one is forcing you to read anything I, or anyone else, says. If you don't like it, the 'd' key is somewhere on your keyboard. Or is that too much manual labor for you? Grrr... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOeBFCS9AwzY9LDxAQHDxwQApbzrRLJQTcLshlPGx5qCUNYNfFBeloYY 7o0ULL3+dGs+bjE+VsGy+taEBnWp1L1i5BK4NGo44dEV9SwkndnE5bCalS3vCIsd YidfhM8nfDa9+e93Uh7VM63ZLVxi6F2SBvN6vcfnmxC7V9LN/b+jrvUPbJG2tVMx D64Dg2Zd5Jk= =lIHF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "James M. Cobb" Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 14:17:25 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Ah, the future... Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Friend, 12 31 95 Associated Press reports: Ah, the future ... At least part of what will happen in the coming year seems clear. Cyberspace will be regulated -- kicking and screaming -- and the court battles over free speech will begin. "It's going to throw the Internet into a state of uncertainty for several years," said [Bob] Smith [of Interactive Services Association]. You may recall the question I asked in an earlier message: And when the State DECIDES...? But that's all right... Despite that, business growth on the net will begin to catch up with the phenomenal increase in accounts. Cordially, Jim NOTE. The newsstory's headline? YEAR OF THE INTERNET: What a tangled web we weave. Its dateline? (Dec 31, 1995 - 00:23 EST). Accessed at? Nando News (www.nando.net). Online filename? info306_3.html That message? Date: Wed, 22 Nov 1995 04:16:50 -0500 (EST) From: "James M. Cobb" To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Secrets of the Internet This critical essay, "Ah, the future..." was composed 12 31 95. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: amp Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 14:57:35 +0800 To: cypherpunks Subject: Re: Australian "calculatorcard" Message-ID: <01HZH81RU4DE95P4B0@MAIL-CLUSTER.PCY.MCI.NET> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- From: Vin McLellan \ Internet: (vin@shore.net) > it's Pretty Good >(tm) security, but like anything not biometric, it is vulnerable to >black-bag attacks. physical possession being all that is required. VM> Actually, all ACE/Server or ACE software modules _require_ a VM> user-memorized PIN. Physical possession of a stolen token is not VM> enough to gain illicit access. >if >you know the algorithm and the serial number of the card and the >time, even that isn't necessary. VM> Bleep! Earth to amp! Check your voltage, lately? The token's VM> serial number has nothing whatsoever to do with the generation of a VM> SecurID's PRN token-code. hmmmm, let me see... yup. you are right. voltage low. give me a second to plug back in... VM> and distribution. The serial number stuck to the back of a SecurID VM> after it is programmed with its secret key -- a unique PRN VM> "significantly longer" than 56 bits -- but they are not the same VM> thing. The cpu in a SecurID doesn't even "know" the serial number VM> stuck on the back of the token. VM> (It would be Pretty Stupid to glue or emboss a secret on VM> the back of the damn token, wouldn't it?) I should note that Alan is VM> just regergitating one of the most widely circulated rumors about VM> SecurIDs -- which like any popular crypto device attracts a lot of VM> wiLd & w00ly speculation. actually, i was speaking pretty much off the top of my head. it's been a while since i registered it, but all i basically had to tell the server the first time i used it was the s/n. and yes, i think it would be Pretty Damn Stupid to have the s/n have anything to do with the actual seed or pin. VM> Getting the algorithm for SDI's one-way hash is no big deal, VM> given that it sits in software in thousands of SDI customer VM> installations, protected only by contract and trade secret status. VM> (The integrity of the product -- the unpredictability of the VM> token-code PRN series, and the secrecy of a specific token's seed or VM> key -- rightly depends cryptographic strength of the hash, not the VM> secrecy of the algorithm.) Getting a token-specific secret key would VM> hopefully be a much greater challenge. one would certainly hope so. personally, i like the card. it offers pretty good security and thus gives me remote access to systems my employer would otherwise laugh in my face for access to (and did, more than once before we got these things). its main weakness would be a black bag job where someone gains physical posession. at that point, all bets on its securty are off for obvious reasons. luckily, because of the nature of the device, i can simply report it as stolen and it quickly becomes a rather worthless piece of silicon. amp <0003701548@mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 31, 1995 22:15 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: amp Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 14:57:23 +0800 To: David Lesher Subject: Re: Australian "calculatorcard" Message-ID: <01HZH81Y0DKI95P3WV@MAIL-CLUSTER.PCY.MCI.NET> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- From: David Lesher \ Internet: (wb8foz@nrk.com) To: amp \ Internet: (alan.pugh@internetmci.com) cc: Cees de Groot \ Internet: (c.degroot@inter.nl.net) cc: cypherpunks \ Internet: (cypherpunks@toad.com) Subject: Re: Australian "calculatorcard" > sounds like the card i use for remote dialup to certain non-public > systems i use at work. it has a six digit number on the front that > changes every 60 seconds. DS> Do these card systems use a window to handle clock-slip? i'm not sure. i would image so. DS> I'd think you could have the server safely accept # N, N-60 sec, and DS> N+60 seconds; and adjust the server's idea of your card's clock speed DS> from that. DS> What new risk would that create? i would figure the server would give a minute or so for slippage. basically the risk is that it would give someone 3 minutes to do a brute force attack rather than one. if you have decent security on the server side, i.e., disallow the card for 5 minutes or more after 3 or so failed attempts, brute attacks would be minimized. however, if the actual window for a single code is 3 minutes, that increases your chance of hitting it as 3 separate numbers would be valid for a given card at any given time. amp <0003701548@mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 31, 1995 21:59 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: anon-remailer@utopia.hacktic.nl (Anonymous) Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 08:45:25 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: first germany, now china Message-ID: <199601010025.BAA04537@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain BEIJING (AP) _ China is planning measures to stop obscene or harmful material from entering the country via the Internet, its official news agency reported Sunday. The Communist Party and the State Council, China's cabinet, recently ordered such measures after learning that ``pornographic and detrimental information'' had been disseminated electronically in China, the Xinhua News Agency said. The report said China intended to use the Internet to promote the exchange and transfer of technology and scientific information, while at the same time blocking what it sees as negative influences. It did not provide further details. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: groundfog@alpha.c2.org Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 11:34:18 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: For the New Year: A Symbol for Information Freedom Message-ID: <199601010311.WAA12624@mail.FOUR.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In talk.politics.crypto, ptupper@direct.ca (Peter Tupper) wrote: > A Symbol for Information Freedom > by Peter Tupper > 1996 is off to a discouraging start when it comes to the >future of information freedom. The American Congress seems >determined to impose censorship on the Internet. The legal >status of strong dual-key cryptography is still in debate. >Telephone companies, cable TV services and publishing services >are all eagerly trying to seize control of the Internet and >eliminate the many-to-many nature of the medium. The accidental >wonder that is the Internet seems to be threatened on all sides, >in danger of being destroyed or denatured before reaching its >potential. > My proposal is only a small contribution to the solutions to >this problem. I believe a symbol is needed; a simple yet >recognizable item that will communicate to others that you are: > -for freedom of speech and expression in all realms, >particularly via computer mediated communications. > -against the imposition of arbitrary community standards by >centralized authority on communications. > -for making access to communications available to everyone. > -against the violation of individual privacy by wiretapping, >intercepting computer communications, compiling dossiers by >government or commercial organizations or other forms of >surveillance. > -for making strong, dual-key encryption programs without >back-doors available to the public. > -against building surveillance measures into communications >and financial infrastructures. > -for a future of communications that is by, for and of the >people, not the state or the market. > The symbol I have chosen is the paper clip. Why a paper >clip? > There are many reasons: > Pragmatic: Paper clips are readily available for >practically nothing, all over the world. They can be applied to >collars, lapels, scarves, pocket edges, suspenders and neck ties >without damaging them and without risk of the pin breaking the >skin. > Aesthetic: The paper clip is a simple, elegant design that >is easily recognized the world over. It can be rendered in many >colors or plated with precious metals. > Symbolic: The paper clip is a simple but effective piece of >technology. An individual uses it to bundle together documents >from disparate sources to create a unified document upon a given >subject, which may be dismantled and remade for another topic. >Furthermore, a paper clip may be bent out of its regular shape >and used as an improvised tool for any number of purposes. > Historic: During the German occupation of Norway in World >War II, Norwegians wore paper clips on their collars as a sign of >solidarity against the invaders. > Commercial: While anybody can obtain a plain paper clip >with little trouble, funds for Information Freedom can be raised >by marketing electroplated or designer paper clips. > The cause of awareness of and activism about AIDS had a >simple, readily recognized symbol, the folded red ribbon. Just >as every celebrity who wears a red ribbon, no matter how trite >and self-promoting it is, is a reminder to those watching that >AIDS is happening and that many people are concerned, >celebrities appearing at the Academy Awards or Grammies with a >designer, gold-plated paper clip on their outfit reminds the >world that information freedom is under fire and that people are >concerned. It will make the Internet community a visible reality >in the public sphere. It will bring these issues into the public >eyes, and give those involved a rallying symbol. It will make a >small difference, but it will contribute to the greater good. > Advertising couldn't hurt. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Raph Levien Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 23:06:58 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: List of reliable remailers Message-ID: <199601011450.GAA17007@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = " cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = " cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = " cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = " cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = " eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = " penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = " cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = " cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = " cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = " cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = " cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = " cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = " mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = " cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = " cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = " cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{'alpha'} = ' alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = ' alpha pgp'; catalyst@netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth@ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura@replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: all of the "ek" tags have been verified correct. Apologies to those who were inconvenienced by incorrect "ek" tags in the past. Last update: Mon 1 Jan 96 6:49:52 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail@c2.org +.-+++-.-*** 47:18 99.99% hacktic remailer@utopia.hacktic.nl *****+****** 8:12 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*#+#+##++*# 3:50 99.98% replay remailer@replay.com *****+**+*** 6:58 99.98% pamphlet pamphlet@idiom.com +--++* 1:32:43 99.97% ford remailer@bi-node.zerberus.de -+-++-+--+++ 2:16:40 99.97% hroller hroller@c2.org #.-##+-.-#*# 23:11 99.94% flame remailer@flame.alias.net +.-----+-++ 2:35:44 99.93% spook remailer@valhalla.phoenix.net *.--+-.--.-+ 4:33:40 99.88% amnesia amnesia@chardos.connix.com -++--------- 3:31:08 99.85% rmadillo remailer@armadillo.com +++++++ #### 15:42 99.81% mix mixmaster@remail.obscura.com __.------+- 6:43:02 99.77% extropia remail@extropia.wimsey.com --.-------- 5:40:08 99.69% wmono wmono@valhalla.phoenix.net * **+ *** * 13:04 98.86% penet anon@anon.penet.fi --- *+++++++ 3:07:11 98.86% alumni hal@alumni.caltech.edu +###*++*-- # 31:22 98.14% vishnu mixmaster@vishnu.alias.net ----- - -* 1:22:32 98.12% portal hfinney@shell.portal.com #####+##- # 26:19 97.36% shinobi remailer@shinobi.alias.net -+++++++++ 1:33:37 90.69% rahul homer@rahul.net -+##*+*+#### 5:20 99.99% tjava remailer@tjava.com #+#*#*# :40 89.19% ecafe cpunk@remail.ecafe.org -#___.## 16:32:15 67.10% gondolin mix@remail.gondolin.org -*+..* 15:03:39 46.77% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jmatk@tscm.com (James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 02:48:52 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: TSCM.COM Counter Surveillance, Privacy, & Security Page Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Happy New Year!!!!! TSCM Technical Surveillance Counter Measure - new materials finished... Check it out... http://www.tscm.com/ New section on TSCM test equipment New section on TSCM training and career paths Coming Soon, TSCM Hand tools TSCM and Technical Surveillance books - James M. Atkinson "...shaken, not stirred" From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: attila Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 18:01:40 +0800 To: amp Subject: Re: Australian "calculatorcard" In-Reply-To: <01HZH81Y0DKI95P3WV@MAIL-CLUSTER.PCY.MCI.NET> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Mon, 1 Jan 1996, amp wrote: > DS> I'd think you could have the server safely accept # N, N-60 sec, and > DS> N+60 seconds; and adjust the server's idea of your card's clock speed > DS> from that. > > DS> What new risk would that create? > > i would figure the server would give a minute or so for slippage. > basically the risk is that it would give someone 3 minutes to do a > brute force attack rather than one. if you have decent security on > the server side, i.e., disallow the card for 5 minutes or more after 3 > or so failed attempts, brute attacks would be minimized. however, if > the actual window for a single code is 3 minutes, that increases your > chance of hitting it as 3 separate numbers would be valid for a given > card at any given time. > START Bank wire systems over the SWIFT private wire are time synched much closer than a minute although I have never been given more of an answer than that. given that you have a tolerable high speed link, and are not dealing with an overloaded concentrator at the telco -> carrier inferface or an overloaded server, I believe you can solve most of the windowing problem by: 1. client sends number and time to server 2. server send what it thinks as time to client 3. client can place a delta on servers time for local time 4. enter PIN, etc. and you are working with a much narrower window. the security risk does not appear to increase from the exchange times and entering the PIN and letting the normal progression go forward once v. just monitoring a series of successive verifications trying to effect a pattern in the hash. Secure-ID seems to be a one-time time-based single use pad; to me, using a time exchange initiator has the advantage of a smaller window, and fewer problems with client machines running on strange times which require sloppier time windows. END From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 23:21:24 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: 96R_azz Message-ID: <199601011504.KAA14190@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain 1-1-96: NYP: Denise Caruso offers '96 resolutions on Nscp/Aol bugs, Web rubes, daft pols, Gates' dogs, crypto zip, Apple rot, W$ dupes. 96R_azz From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 01:41:24 +0800 To: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Subject: Re: Can We Cut the Crap? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601011646.KAA23871@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > There are people on this mailing list who appear to have very little technical > expertise (e.g., can't figure out how an anonymous remailer works), contribute > nothing but silly puerile flames to the discussion, and whose harassment has > caused Fred to stop contributing. They've deprived Fred of his right to spreak > and readers like me of our right to listen. This is censorship by bullying. Now there you are wrong. No one forced Fred to stop posting to the list (I noticed that I just got a posting from him just yesterday, so he may have stopped since then), but no one deprived Fred of his right to speak. I don't see Eric Hughes standing up and saying "Fed, stop posting to the list", and I certainly note that his postings are getting through to the list. So, your statements regarding people harassing Fred, causing him to stop posting, etc., are just eyewash and an attempt to emotionally manipulate your audience by calling it "censorship". - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOgP1yS9AwzY9LDxAQG2tgQAqpoTneK0dSqK7VKWBUZZcS710KOnWLlC j1opYymkAzc4dhNUw7NSqwrEm51+lty7xxrXuqDSBrBJp5fkI5sn81Bg3SIN2JFx iIKyvo57oOe/jOoJp7ONmqCpnPvsJbar0T+q7eHXdZCGM4VRSLVrqDxwMg4NnYE4 JFxgqp2qBDo= =09VD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Steve14571@aol.com Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 00:29:56 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Who sent me this message? Message-ID: <960101111333_28712586@emout04.mail.aol.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Someone from this list sent me a message encrypted with the international version of PGP 2.6.2. Unfortunately, my system crashed and lost the email address... Plaintext of the message follows: Hi Stephen, >Me too 8^) This is a 2047 bit key (I think big) :-) As I can see. How did you generate this key? Are you using a special version of PGP? Maybe something about myself to start with: I'm from Belgium (that small spot between France, Germany and the Netherlands). I work in a bank (no, this does not mean that I'm swimming in money!) as a system engineer. We work mainly with A-Series mainframes from UNISYS. At home I spent some time on the internet, my PC, reading a good book and last but not least having a beer with my friends. That's it for now, looking forward to hear from you again. Happy New Year! Luc Whoever sent me this message please write back, and send a public key so that I can respond. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Gordon Campbell Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 01:36:00 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Can We Cut the Crap? Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960101164513.006a3e98@limestone.kosone.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 12:18 PM 12/31/95 -0800, tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: > >Really, the S/N ratio is approaching all-time lows, even for the Silly >Season of Xmas. A week or so ago there was a massive flame war involving >insults and counter-insults--I returned from my Xmas vacation to find the >list melting down. Now, a week later, a new flamewar has erupted. As a lurker on the list, I'd like to second this opinion. The cypherpunks list is held up to be this almighty oracle of cryptographic information. Yet, every time I subscribe to it (this is the fourth time in a year) I have to wade through irrelevant personal attacks and various other rubbish. I mean, really. This is worse than Fidonet. However, I suppose that with any gathering of (mostly) intelligent, liberty and privacy minded people, there are likely to be clashes of one sort or another. If the anonymous twits will grow up and stop stirring things up, maybe the rest of us can learn something. Just my $0.02 ----- Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics P.O. Box 1902, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 5J7 Ph: (613) 542-4087 Fax: (613) 542-1139 2048-bit PGP key available on request. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 02:40:19 +0800 To: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Subject: Re: Can We Cut the Crap? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601011751.LAA27876@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" writes: > > > There are people on this mailing list who appear to have very little techni > > > expertise (e.g., can't figure out how an anonymous remailer works), contrib > > > nothing but silly puerile flames to the discussion, and whose harassment ha > > > caused Fred to stop contributing. They've deprived Fred of his right to spr > > > and readers like me of our right to listen. This is censorship by bullying. > > > > Now there you are wrong. No one forced Fred to stop posting to the list > > (I noticed that I just got a posting from him just yesterday, so he may > > have stopped since then), but no one deprived Fred of his right to speak. > > I don't see Eric Hughes standing up and saying "Fed, stop posting to the > > list", and I certainly note that his postings are getting through to the > > list. So, your statements regarding people harassing Fred, causing him to > > stop posting, etc., are just eyewash and an attempt to emotionally > > manipulate your audience by calling it "censorship". > > Ed, I've met Eric Hughes. You're no Eric Hughes. So? How do you know? Your comment made absolutely no sense at all. > The crypto people on this mailing list have asked people repeatedly to > curtail non-crypto-related postings (most recently, Tim May, who started > this thread). This is not censorship. The sliencing of Fred Cohen by a lynch > mob of non-technicals (who, e.g., send e-mail twice) is a disturbing example > of censorship. Crap. If Fred doesn't want to post, that's his choice (as he has indicated in private mail to me), but it's not your call to conclude that he is being "censored". - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOgfCCS9AwzY9LDxAQEIHwP/QBvrw/2ePyPqPzs8UcZ3COomXwtYpgBz 8RWnIIdNbEqkf0U/v+OWoeb1cMAPdvyo4CmYLfRlaroSaCGGzfcCDRp3GOtq6zEO njk1QPAoSb5pxT6zABGPO3ogeBbGB3E5a5AKy+yQrc2MpmzFN0r8EOQ1CPReF3c0 YmOgPbn/b5o= =EJk4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 02:16:24 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Can We Cut the Crap? In-Reply-To: <199601011646.KAA23871@dal1820.computek.net> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" writes: > > There are people on this mailing list who appear to have very little techni > > expertise (e.g., can't figure out how an anonymous remailer works), contrib > > nothing but silly puerile flames to the discussion, and whose harassment ha > > caused Fred to stop contributing. They've deprived Fred of his right to spr > > and readers like me of our right to listen. This is censorship by bullying. > > Now there you are wrong. No one forced Fred to stop posting to the list > (I noticed that I just got a posting from him just yesterday, so he may > have stopped since then), but no one deprived Fred of his right to speak. > I don't see Eric Hughes standing up and saying "Fed, stop posting to the > list", and I certainly note that his postings are getting through to the > list. So, your statements regarding people harassing Fred, causing him to > stop posting, etc., are just eyewash and an attempt to emotionally > manipulate your audience by calling it "censorship". Ed, I've met Eric Hughes. You're no Eric Hughes. The crypto people on this mailing list have asked people repeatedly to curtail non-crypto-related postings (most recently, Tim May, who started this thread). This is not censorship. The sliencing of Fred Cohen by a lynch mob of non-technicals (who, e.g., send e-mail twice) is a disturbing example of censorship. --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Tim Philp Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 01:52:33 +0800 To: Cypherpunks List Subject: Canadian Cypherpunks Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Is there some interest in a meeting of Canadian Cypherpunks? If you are a Canadian (or an American who is fortunate enough to live near our sainted shores ;-)) send me a private E-mail message. Because Canada is such a big country, I propose that we start with a meeting in Toronto or area. If there is enough interest, I will arrange for a meeting place. Regards, Tim Philp =================================== For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to: pgp-public-keys@swissnet.ai.mit.edu In Subject line type: GET PHILP =================================== From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 05:00:22 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: p vs. np etc. In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601012034.MAA28180@netcom2.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain TCM: >There is no point in the back-and-forth of insults, "Dr. Fred is a loon," >"Alice is Detweiler," and other such nonsense. If you don't want to read >the comments of Fred Cohen, Dimitri Vulis, Alice whatever, >Vlad/Lance/Larry/Pablo, then just don't read them! Filter them out, delete >them immediately, read them briefly, whatever. this of course would be obvious to anyone without an ego. however because this list is really "war of the egos", it escapes everyone here (and has for the entire existence of the list). far more fun to yell at someone publicly, esp. through a pseudonym. interesting too how some people who use pseudonyms still cannot avoid defending themselves when attacked. it appears that pseudonyms do not dissociate ego-based psychology from communication. in fact to the contrary they appear to make it more prevalent. this would be an interesting area to study. ripe with lots of seething, semi-conscious feelings and attitudes deep within the psyche. Freud would have a field day with flamewars, trolls, and pseudonyms. > I'm not convinced there's much more about the >_theory_ of viruses to "push forward," for various reasons. The theory was >laid out, some Bulgarians and others are busily writing viruses, but >there's not likely to be some whole reservoir of new theory to be worked >on. I object. this sounds like the 1890 patent worker who suggested the patent office be shut down because, after all, all the important inventions had already been invented. you are careful to attribute your opinion only to yourself, but you must recognize how dangerous speculation about the future is, if you wish to preserve your credibility in the long run. especially sentences that sound like, "there is not much more to be uncovered in so-and-so area" tend to sound especially foolish from future perspectives. the Virus area is in fact ripe with study. Java is actually a language designed to prevent viruses. many have proposed operating systems for computers that may work like the way computer viruses spread. I predict that virus study is really going to blossom even more once Java or other similar languages become more entrenched and "distributed computing" really comes to the fore. >(This is true of a lot of fields, where the work done decades ago >basically was complete....look at how we all cite Garey and Johnson and how >little has changed in the field of NP-completeness.) whoa, you are way off here. NP vs. P is a field *ripe* with new studies. what these pioneers did was map out the terrain. but there are still many *unresolved* areas of research here. P vs. NP is *entirely* unresolved. that doesn't mean that someone has come up with an answer and everyone says, "the field is basically complete". what it means is that a bazillion researchers are dying to know the answers to tough questions posed by the pioneers decades ago. it is true there is little progress in some key areas, but only because the problems are so insanely difficult. the work is only "complete" in the sense that it has posed questions that have not required any modification-- they are still the hardest in all of mathematics and computer science, and still not solved. are you aware of how critical the P vs. NP question is to cryptography? theoretically public key cryptography and many other forms in common use today would be "impossible" if P= NP. I've met some very good cryptographers who don't understand this basic point of computer theory. they think one can always just create more ingenious algorithms. >Blasting Cohen because you don't think he carried his work far enough is >clearly blasting wildly. Have you asked whether others on this list have >carried the work they did in their early careers far enough? (Did I carry >my work in the 1970s on alpha particle effects on chips far enough, or am I >just a Cohen-like slacker because I moved on to other things?) uhm, I have to side with PM on this one -- I vote for 40-something slacker. >So why don't I just do this? Well, I do have a filter file in my Eudora Pro >mailer, and I use it. But I still see the crossfire on the list, the >pointless flames and personal attacks. This angers and saddens me. Hence >this message. the noise is a periodic reoccurence because of the basic list architecture. personally I enjoy it immensely. it's all the grandeur and muck of seething human psychology in digital form. no amount of continual concerned messages will ever change the basic fact that the list architecture by design is highly conducive to noise. to complain about this is like complaining that cars emit exhaust. well, yes, but that's the basic design. you can't get rid of the exhaust until you experiment with a new design. I'm actually not necessarily in favor of a new design here either, even though I have suggested variations/alternatives frequently. as I say, I enjoy it here a lot. > The recent increase in "one-sentance >repartee" is indicative of late-stage list meltdown. (Some of the posts >here quote a couple of paragraphs, add one or two lines of insults, then > have another screenful of PGP sigs, auto-signing sigs, anonymous IDs, and >then a conventional sig. Jeesh!) hee, hee. "meltdown". love that term. but again you mix big egos and a totally open list (throw in a little cryptoanarchy for more explosive force), and this is the inevitable result. there's nothing perplexing or mystifying why this happens. its the basic conclusion reaffirmed zillions of times by many years of this list activity. to complain about this reminds me of person who murdered his parents and then pleads to the court that he was an orphan who deserves relief. that is, this situation here is the creation of everyone who participates, and those who suffer are precisely those that created it. cyberspatial karma if you will. >I'm hoping that this is just a Xmas vacation silly season. well you can always post a exasperated message in which you declare you've had it with the list, period, and are not going to hang out here any more. there is a precedent for that kind of thing. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Michael Froomkin Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 02:49:31 +0800 To: John Young Subject: Re: SEY_use In-Reply-To: <199512311518.KAA19667@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain SEY_use A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin@law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 05:31:16 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 14:17 1/1/96, Mike McNally wrote: >Seems to me at as soon as things like a general-purpose browser (and >associated TCP/IP stack & PPP or SLIP) becomes as easy to load up as >an AOL demo disk, and local ISP's are listed in the yellow pages, the >advantage of being able to pay a provider for nothing more than the >routing of IP packets so that the net as a whole can be explored (and, >perhaps, more services purchased) will FAR outweigh any of the goodies >the current big providers offer. But how many of them will be willing to forward certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison term? Hint: count the number of narcotics dealers that advertize in your local yellow pages. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 06:29:28 +0800 To: m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 15:14 1/1/96, Mike McNally wrote: >Lucky Green writes: > > But how many of them [ IP providers ] will be willing to forward > > certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison > > term? Hint: count the number of narcotics dealers that advertize > > in your local yellow pages. > >But an IP provider doesn't have to know that it's "forwarding" *any* >newsgroups; all it has to know is that IP packets are moving between >my PC and the outside world. It doesn't have any way of knowing what >those packets contain and doesn't want to. Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of owner. If you don't have a host, there won't be any packets to forward. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 06:36:54 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Canadian Cypherpunks [NOISE] Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > Is there some interest in a meeting of Canadian Cypherpunks? If > you are a Canadian (or an American who is fortunate enough to live near > our sainted shores ;-)) send me a private E-mail message. > Because Canada is such a big country, I propose that we start > with a meeting in Toronto or area. If there is enough interest, I will > arrange for a meeting place. I don't think it is any more practical to have "Canadian Cypherpunks" meetings than "U.S. Cypherpunks" meetings. Call them what they are, i.e. regional meetings, (e.g. areas around Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Quebec, Calgary-Edmonton, etc.), but I suspect that most people are unlikely to travel in excess of 3000km for meetings which last a few hours. For example, I expect that Vancouverites are much more likely to travel to Seattle for a meeting than to Toronto. My point is, don't advertise what is really a Southern Ontario regional meeting as the meeting of "Canadian Cypherpunks". This would be like calling the S.F. Bay Area meetings the "U.S. Cypherpunks meetings". -- Mark Henderson -- markh@wimsey.bc.ca, henderso@netcom.com, mch@squirrel.com PGP 1024/C58015E3 fingerprint=21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto/sun-stuff/change-sun-hostid-1.6.1.tar.gz From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Wink Junior Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 06:44:15 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: CSPAN Currency Creation Hearings Message-ID: <199601012202.OAA02434@kelly.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Dave Feustel on talk.politics.crypto mentioned that on Saturday morning CSPAN was broadcasting congressional hearings on "currency creation, during which smartcards, Ecash, encryption, privacy and government regulation of all of the above were discussed." There's supposed to be at least one rebroadcast. A brief review of the highlights would be very interesting. Wink -- winkjr@teleport.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 04:44:09 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <9601012017.AA15101@alpha> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Timothy C. May writes: > And support your local ISPs! > > (Or, even better, direct connection to the Net, though this is harder for > most of us to arrange.) For how long is this really going to be the case? As the whole world of HTTP and related things (like Java & VRML) advances in capability and sophistication, how long will the Compuserve/AOL/Genie "Big Online Service" model continue to make sense? Seems to me at as soon as things like a general-purpose browser (and associated TCP/IP stack & PPP or SLIP) becomes as easy to load up as an AOL demo disk, and local ISP's are listed in the yellow pages, the advantage of being able to pay a provider for nothing more than the routing of IP packets so that the net as a whole can be explored (and, perhaps, more services purchased) will FAR outweigh any of the goodies the current big providers offer. The flip side of that, of course, is that big service providers can offer access to their goodies to anybody with net access. That sort of setup would make the whole concept of Internet regulation even more bizarre; we'd really have something more directly parallel to the phone system. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Nobody's going to listen to you if you just | Mike McNally (m5@tivoli.com) | | stand there and flap your arms like a fish. | Tivoli Systems, Austin TX | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 04:10:25 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Re: "Deterrence" Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 19:17 12/29/95, jim bell wrote: >In my essay, "Assassination Politics," I pointed out that it would be >relatively easy to deter such official-type actions if enough of us simply >said, "NO!" and denominated it in terms of dollars and cents. After all, >with four million Compuserve users, if they each were willing to donate a >penny to see this latter-day Fuhrer dead, that would be $40,000. (Pardon me >if I don't translate this into marks and other currencies.) [snip] >WHEN, exactly, would it be appropriate to act? This reminds me of a Science Fiction story by H. Beam Piper called "A Planet for Texans" where as part of the laws of the planet (and the oath of office) was a statement that the politician was representing the interests of ALL of their constituents. Every constituent had the legal right (and duty) to register any protests of the politician's actions _in-person_ with said politician. Such protest could take any form up-to-and-including killing the SOB on the spot. In the story, this right was illustrated by a small farmer being charged will killing a Senator by hacking him to death with a machete (all legal protests are required to be registered in person and use of long range techniques such as car-bombs or snipping with rifles is not regarded as a valid protest) and we are shown his trial. The charge is not killing the Senator (which is by law the farmer's right since he felt that the Senator was violating his oath of office by misrepresenting him) but whether, in exercising this right, he used excessive force out of proportion to the actions that was being protested. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 04:11:47 +0800 To: jonnyx Subject: Re: (NOISE) Re: PLA_gue Germ Terrorism Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 21:54 12/30/95, jonnyx wrote: > >Think that's fun? How 'bout this: given that the initial "mapping" >phase of the human genome project is nearly complete, and the huge >amount of genetic information available on the net, PLUS ever- >more-powerful-yet-less-costly computers anyone can purchase, just >how long do y'all think it'll be before some nut whips up a bug >that targets, say, people with negroid genetic characteristics? >Or epicanthic folds? Or blonde hair? This reminds me of a 1940's Novel by Science Fiction Author Robert A. Heinlein called "Sixth Column." In it the US has been conquered by an invasion from Asia and the resistance (such as it is) is a small Top Secret hidden US Army research center with some equipment that can act on people based on their genetic makeup. Thus when it is time to go after the invaders, it is done with guns that kill only Asians but have no effect on anyone-else. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 07:39:22 +0800 To: Andreas Bogk Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 23:30 1/1/96, Andreas Bogk wrote: >So I guess we'll need some computers in outer space, on offshore boats >or in well-bribed stable dictatorships. o Outer space: not very realistic o Offshore boats: see the fate of drug trafficers in international waters after the Coast Guard is through with them. o Stable dictatorships: Not stable enough to withstand an humanitarian mission by the US Army. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 05:47:56 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <9601012114.AA15133@alpha> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Lucky Green writes: > But how many of them [ IP providers ] will be willing to forward > certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison > term? Hint: count the number of narcotics dealers that advertize > in your local yellow pages. But an IP provider doesn't have to know that it's "forwarding" *any* newsgroups; all it has to know is that IP packets are moving between my PC and the outside world. It doesn't have any way of knowing what those packets contain and doesn't want to. The Internet is more than news, FTP, the web, and so on primarily because it's so much *less*. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Nobody's going to listen to you if you just | Mike McNally (m5@tivoli.com) | | stand there and flap your arms like a fish. | Tivoli Systems, Austin TX | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Felix Lee Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 08:06:09 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601012332.PAA10533@desiree.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Lucky Green: > Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. > That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of > owner. but if it turns out that 30% of home PCs have to be seized to prevent dissemination of dangerous-information-X? though we're not quite there yet... eg, it's a little expensive to run your own httpd 24 hours/day. -- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 09:09:15 +0800 To: Felix Lee MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 15:32 1/1/96, Felix Lee wrote: >Lucky Green: >> Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. >> That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of >> owner. > >but if it turns out that 30% of home PCs have to be seized to prevent >dissemination of dangerous-information-X? Wrong. Only 0.03% of the home PCs have to be seized and the owners incarcerated. The remaining users will cease to carry controlled data on their own. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 09:09:30 +0800 To: Brad Dolan Subject: Re: CSPAN Currency Creation Hearings Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 19:04 1/1/96, Brad Dolan wrote: >I caught part of it. > >The general theme was,~"we're going to establish a `partnership' with >digicash / crypto firms to ensure that our `legitimate law-enforcement >needs' are designed into the products."~ I sincerely doubt that there will be any 'partnerships' between DigiCash and law enforcement. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: andr0id@midwest.net (Jason Rentz) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 07:20:27 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Who sent me this message? Message-ID: <199601012250.QAA04037@cdale1.midwest.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >:-) As I can see. How did you generate this key? Are you using a >special version of PGP? > Well I didn't send the message but I also use an undocumented larger key with PGP. Read it in the book a friend got. (andr0id@midwest.net callsign: N9XLM) ( Computer Consulting & Management ) (P.O. Box 421 Cambria, IL 62915-0421) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzCsIi4AAAEH/1hb5+tO/n99Nbppf0ImLJ6AaVZ3NlZP0ZHwRQor00uA129i d4zWixNXxc8t2auaqN+asV99LpIip3/nQzBnjydiumeBdGLF2PR9+6X8X/RrqKa1 dVIukxM5Agg2eM6ih+0J38hgKJ3qzKXSz6sjYmpaxvbXZoHHOLUk/ZtHUKvvEyPw hnJEYnut8NUnIeK56lqeqRw86yoeRKymbfCdjdpgeY2aRwK2FJts8sbb7Fs10s4y jgxWIxIipBznbGUTh1hb2XrLGPENwk3E/qqXQJEsrySbtwdl6VgTVQjhDDEJMitL DYeiQ3W5EgxfcdbM1j2FwYu3P/dM6Y0I8xLMYT0ABRG0NmFuZHIwaWRAb2ljdTgx Mi5jb20gKG9pY3U4MTIuY29tIHN5c3RlbSBhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yKYkBFQMFEDCs LO90C7R/GkJcSQEB01cH/0KC3sd+u4OxMku5378SJktoN6QIQYLJ7uVbuV4S51yK NAotCGf4Wl6wwjynzZvXKU0H87oDuMiq7FybgMNL2n+4bQIZi0iz0lIuzwoMDu63 NrHUW9Kz42pOnhrEhrdkHhHL9O5GgD1yc40fJ3qw5h7LQEjDxgypyw0IFILFc34u LeRLliNibxKp8JwAxXNHWSgxu28TQvmnkHi0AHP6tJ/uZYe+4dqJtrMMsYFjzZaz DPmxD+dzbTwlQKtJaP1ZkDI0Sr072wrZDv+G86GyGBMX2lpSafpRitnxuUttjU9o wsQ9Qo5xiH1nZRCs/bDzJe/gng+GHzevixDIITurtNA= =SgPT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: sameer Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 18:40:46 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601020114.RAA06256@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. > That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of > owner. Said site, however, can be located in a different jurisdiction than the laws. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777x3 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer@c2.org From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 18:40:55 +0800 To: sameer Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 17:14 1/1/96, sameer wrote: >> Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. >> That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of >> owner. > > Said site, however, can be located in a different jurisdiction >than the laws. Seems to me that the laws are becomming unified on a global scale. The people in power all over the world have the same interests. To stay in power. The 'unregulated' Internet is in direct confilict with this interest. Since these powers make the laws, they will use the laws to reduce the threat the present day Internet presents. Will C2 carry certain newsgroups/info after doing so has become a felony? Who wants to be an 'illegal data' kingpin and face execution? (Kingpins are 'data trafficers' that carry more than 1.5 Megs of 'controlled information'.) -- Lucky -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 08:14:10 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <199601012358.RAA01029@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: > From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Mon Jan 1 17:53:37 1996 > Message-Id: <199601012332.PAA10533@desiree.teleport.com> > Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers > To: cypherpunks@toad.com > In-Reply-To: Your message of Mon, 01 Jan 1996 13:41:13 PST. > > Date: Mon, 01 Jan 1996 15:32:37 -0800 > From: Felix Lee > Sender: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > Lucky Green: > > Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. > > That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of > > owner. > > but if it turns out that 30% of home PCs have to be seized to prevent > dissemination of dangerous-information-X? > > though we're not quite there yet... eg, it's a little expensive to run > your own httpd 24 hours/day. > -- > If you live in the Austin, TX area I will setup a dedicated slip for you at only $100/mo. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: joee@li.net (j. ercole) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 07:48:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Prevention Of Trauma 2 [NOISE] Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain [Here's something scary to start your new year. . . ] << start of forwarded material >> ** Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 23:41:38 -0000 ** Reply-To: "POLI-PSY [ Political Science-Psychology/Psychiatry ]" ** ** Sender: "POLI-PSY [ Political Science-Psychology/Psychiatry ]" ** ** From: Michael Benjamin ** Subject: Prevention Of Trauma 2 ** X-To: Multiple recipients of list FORENSIC-PSYCHOLOGY ** , ** Multiple recipients of list LEGALTEN ** , ** Stress Traumatic ** X-cc: Multiple recipients of list TRANSCULTURAL-PSYCHOLOGY ** , ** Traumatic Stress Forum ** To: Multiple recipients of list POLI-PSY ** ** PREVENTION TRAUMA II ** ** In a previous letter I pointed out the need to eliminate ** trauma by prevention. I mentioned that there are generally Agencies ** whose function is to prevent trauma, if it is in industry, military, driving, ** etc. These agencies have criteria for excluding people who they feel ** are liable to mal-function and cause trauma (danger). Often these ** Agencies employ programs to reduced the likelihood of trauma. ** I pointed out that I feel it is legitimate to help these Agencies ** not in defining their criteria but in eliciting the given criteria by the use ** of the techniques which are used in a Diagnostic Setting. I emphasize ** that the presence or absence of these criteria are not indicative of any ** pathology. As such I feel that this discussion does not only belong in ** the field of Forensic Psychiatry but is a legitimate form of treating ** trauma, i.e. prevention. ** In the field of Road Safety in Israel the Institute for Road ** Safety is a medical institute which advises on likelihood of a driver to ** be dangerous. ** The examination is carried out on all applicants for a Public ** License (taxi, autobus), heavy vehicle drivers, and drivers involved in ** fatal accidents, and drivers or prospective drivers who have had ** contact with Mental Health Care. Generally the exams are given by ** Psychologists and are based partially on the M.M.P.I. and a clinical ** examination. More difficult cases are referred to Consultant ** Psychiatrists and an Ad-Hoc Committee. ** The criteria under discussion are mainly:- Concentration, ** Attention, Projectivity, Judgment, Consistency, Reality Jesting, Ability ** to identify , Confirm with instructions, Impulsivity and Control over ** Impulsivity. ** Over the years we have found these to be of primary ** importance and we thus concentrate on illnesses or personality ** disturbance where these criteria may well occur. ** If these indications are discovered we check if they are ** causing driving delinquency. If so, we then determine if there is a ** reasonable likelihood of the patient / examinee being made to ** understand and correct himself. Obviously in some instances this is of ** little likelihood. If these indications are present or applying for a new ** license, the application is rejected. If we allow a "trial" period, the ** position is first explained to the examinee, and we try and ascertain if it ** at all possible that he both understands and is able of "changing his ** ways". ** In addition to the "meeting point" between Forensic ** Psychiatry and "Preventive" Traumatology we feel that we are on the ** delicate meeting point of "Personal Rights" and Societies "Right to ** defend itself". ** We are under perpetual scrutiny, which I feel is justified and ** healthy. I would very much enjoy any comments or suggestions. ** ** ** Michael. << end of forwarded material >> j. ercole ny, usa pgp public key at: http://www.li.net/~joee/index.html $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$********************&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& Stand By---.sig presently being unearthed in regression therapy. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 11:08:52 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 20:19 1/1/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Has anyone looked at operating systems like Plan 9 which divide the services >into 3 sets (terminal, file, process) and then distribute them over various >machines (and cpu's in multi-cpu systems) on a 'cost' basis? > >This would effectively address the issue of where named, httpd, or whatever >was running. Mainly because it would never run on the same machine (or cpu) >each time or necessarily all the time (ie run a while here then over there). That is called a conspiracy. The consequence is that all machines involved will be confiscated and their respective owners jailed. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brad Dolan Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 08:27:06 +0800 To: Wink Junior Subject: Re: CSPAN Currency Creation Hearings In-Reply-To: <199601012202.OAA02434@kelly.teleport.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I caught part of it. The general theme was,~"we're going to establish a `partnership' with digicash / crypto firms to ensure that our `legitimate law-enforcement needs' are designed into the products."~ bd On Mon, 1 Jan 1996, Wink Junior wrote: > Dave Feustel on talk.politics.crypto mentioned that > on Saturday morning CSPAN was broadcasting congressional hearings on > "currency creation, during which smartcards, Ecash, encryption, privacy and > government regulation of all of the above were discussed." There's supposed > to be at least one rebroadcast. > > A brief review of the highlights would be very interesting. > > Wink > > -- > winkjr@teleport.com > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: attila Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 04:20:10 +0800 To: Michael Froomkin Subject: Re: SEY_use In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain somewhere along the line, the body of your message was lost... the concept is interesting... diplomatic immunity is not automatic in that it implies diplomatic recognition. does a rogue state enjoy the privilege of obviously bogus diplomatic passports? the diplomatic passport is a "gentleman's agreement" to facilitate trading intelligence officers --sarcastic maybe, truthful? been there, done that. if nothing else, the bearer of a diplomatic passport can be effectively forcing house arrest in the embassy/consulate while the host government forces a recall --I hope the islands have a luxury hotel in every port of call. actually, I would be more interested in your comments on the wire fraud charges used for an "insufficient" lab facility of a known microbiologist who happens to be a kook. standard US procedural use of conspiracy or wire fraud and/or conspiracy to force a plea bargain. In return, we get more government bureaucracy, and probably government review of credentials, or licensing. academic freedom? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 14:09:06 +0800 To: Jim Choate MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 21:16 1/1/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Wow, you mean you can prosecute an operating system? Well, you can seize the machine running the OS for the crimes it committed. I am serious. No prosecution needed. Prosecution followed by conviction is what will happen to the owner of the computer on which the OS was running. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Douglas F. Elznic" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 09:44:47 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: [local] Syracuse new york Message-ID: <2.2.16.19960102011329.2e1723c0@terminus.storm.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Are their any interested people in having a meeting in the syr area? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 10:38:00 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Guerilla ISP's... Message-ID: <199601020219.UAA00419@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Has anyone looked at operating systems like Plan 9 which divide the services into 3 sets (terminal, file, process) and then distribute them over various machines (and cpu's in multi-cpu systems) on a 'cost' basis? This would effectively address the issue of where named, httpd, or whatever was running. Mainly because it would never run on the same machine (or cpu) each time or necessarily all the time (ie run a while here then over there). From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "James A. Donald" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 21:20:32 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: <199601021621.IAA07942@blob.best.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:07 PM 1/1/96 -0500, David Mandl wrote: >I agree. It's not a good idea to assume that there's going to be some kind >of widespread opposition movement when the big Net Crackdown comes. Most >people will either obey the law, be unaffected by it, or violate it in very >insignificant ways ("net jaywalking"). When printing was introduced in the west, the big print crackdown was successful, but there was great resistance, and the crackdown on the printed word required great and continuing violence over a long period, and was never entirely effective. A net crackdown will be substantially less effective than the print crackdown was, and the level of violence is likely to be greater. There is of course a tradeoff: An highly ineffectual net crackdown will not provoke large scale resistance. They can probably force the stuff on alt.pictures.erotica.children to be published in a more discreet manner. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd@echeque.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Felix Lee Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 00:52:55 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601012358.RAA01029@einstein.ssz.com> Message-ID: <199601020427.UAA16858@desiree.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Lucky Green: > Wrong. Only 0.03% of the home PCs have to be seized and the owners > incarcerated. The remaining users will cease to carry controlled data on > their own. depends. prohibition was a failure. information is much easier to duplicate and conceal, spy thrillers aside. many people find it hard to justify information being dangerous, especially if it's something innocuous like just another cryptosystem, or just another penis. compare with software piracy. when was the last time a kid in your neighborhood was busted for unlicensed copying of software? and software is big business, lots of suits and $$$. they can try to make disassemblers illegal, but it's not likely to succeed. Jim Choate: > If you live in the Austin, TX area I will setup a dedicated slip for you at > only $100/mo. in the Portland Oregon area, the price ranges from $234/year to $1750/year for unlimited ppp access. (I have no idea how long the $234/year is going to stay in business. that won't even cover the cost of a phone line.) -- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: dmandl@panix.com (David Mandl) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 18:41:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 4:44 PM 1/1/96, Lucky Green wrote: >At 15:32 1/1/96, Felix Lee wrote: >>Lucky Green: >>> Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. >>> That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of >>> owner. >> >>but if it turns out that 30% of home PCs have to be seized to prevent >>dissemination of dangerous-information-X? > >Wrong. Only 0.03% of the home PCs have to be seized and the owners >incarcerated. The remaining users will cease to carry controlled data on >their own. I agree. It's not a good idea to assume that there's going to be some kind of widespread opposition movement when the big Net Crackdown comes. Most people will either obey the law, be unaffected by it, or violate it in very insignificant ways ("net jaywalking"). There's strength in numbers, but I just don't think the numbers will be there. --Dave. -- Dave Mandl dmandl@panix.com http://www.wfmu.org/~davem <---Completely overhauled--tons of new stuff From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 11:26:34 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... (fwd) Message-ID: <199601020316.VAA00545@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 18:49:28 -0800 > From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) > Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... > > At 20:19 1/1/96, Jim Choate wrote: > >Has anyone looked at operating systems like Plan 9 which divide the services > >into 3 sets (terminal, file, process) and then distribute them over various > >machines (and cpu's in multi-cpu systems) on a 'cost' basis? > > > >This would effectively address the issue of where named, httpd, or whatever > >was running. Mainly because it would never run on the same machine (or cpu) > >each time or necessarily all the time (ie run a while here then over there). > > That is called a conspiracy. The consequence is that all machines involved > will be confiscated and their respective owners jailed. > Wow, you mean you can prosecute an operating system? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 15:41:02 +0800 To: Jon Lasser Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 23:35 1/1/96, Jon Lasser wrote: >More work needs to be done on untracable, yet at least modestly >efficient, truly anonymous routing, even in a system where many of the >participants, and perhaps even one of the endpoints, is or is willing to >"cheat." Time to bring up my favorite CP invention of the last years: Wai Dai's Pipenet. Of course running Pipenet would be a felony in the future I forsee, but it sure is a great idea. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: sameer Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 15:43:15 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601020520.VAA24179@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > Prosecution followed by conviction is what will happen to the owner of the > computer on which the OS was running. It's hard to jail a corporation. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777x3 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer@c2.org From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "David K. Merriman" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 12:08:01 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Paperclip original posting? Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102032915.00683458@arn.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain could someone kindly forward me a copy of the original paperclip symbology posting? Thanks. ------------------------------------------------------------- "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954), U.S. Judge <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geopages.com/CapitolHill/1148 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: attila Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 06:15:43 +0800 To: David Lesher Subject: Re: SEY_use [NOISE] In-Reply-To: <199601012027.PAA02788@nrk.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Mon, 1 Jan 1996, David Lesher wrote: > > > > > > the concept is interesting... diplomatic immunity is not automatic in > > that it implies diplomatic recognition. does a rogue state enjoy the > > privilege of obviously bogus diplomatic passports? the diplomatic > > passport is a "gentleman's agreement" to facilitate trading intelligence > > officers --sarcastic maybe, truthful? been there, done that. > > A Dip Passport does nothing of the kind. > come on, David. stated and "real" use are often quite different. I meant what I said, literally: "...been there, done that." it's nice to believe that governments are above board --they never have been, and never will be --and Bubba is a prime example. I would buy a used car from Tricky Dick long before I would from Bubba! power is not only corruption, it is _deceit_! BTW, I do not disagree with your "protocol" in the slightest. PNG, and the trading of PNGs has been around ever since the French seemed to their language dominate foreign affairs --however, persona non gratis is rather explicit. and, I still wonder how the host country will treat "bogus" DPs from rogue states if they have more DPs than real citizens. uncle has been getting less suble these days.... > You are awarded stutus by your placement by the host country, on their > Diplomatic List. If you are there, fine; otherwise... Now, you'll never > get on that list without a Dip. Passport & recipricol agreement but it's > not enough... > > Your name can be removed by the host at any time (PNG'ed) but some kind > of warning is necessary so you can leave the host country prior to > expiration of the status. (Not much, however! I recall one case where it > was _literally_ "Be on the 4pm plane, or else.") If you are out of the > country already, you won't be back. (One person was, and his cat became > the ""PNG Pussy"" as she was shipped home the next day.) > > The Dip List being out-of-date caused considerable embarrassment to the > US during our invasion of Panama. Marines raided the Nicaraguan > Ambassador's Residence because the out-of-date copy at the US Mission > showed the _old_ address. > > -- > A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com > & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX > Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 > is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433 > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 14:38:03 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: <9601012017.AA15101@alpha> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) writes: > For how long is this really going to be the case? As the whole world > of HTTP and related things (like Java & VRML) advances in capability > and sophistication, how long will the Compuserve/AOL/Genie "Big Online > Service" model continue to make sense? For as long as they're able to provide information and services that customers want, which are not available via "generic" small ISP's. For example, one can read the New York Times (and many other periodicals) via AOL; one can read the NCSA forum on CompuServe. One has to be pretty dumb to use AOL or CS as an _Internet_ provider. Yet a lot of very sharp people use these services. The content providers aren't willing to put their wares on "generic" internet, and won't be willing to in the foreseeable future. --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Clark Matthews" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 15:22:08 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: A weakness in PGP signatures, and a suggested solution Message-ID: <199601020339.WAA15209@cnct.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Just a note to Dr. Dmitri Vulis -- your post by this name appears to have been forge-cancelled on mail. cypherpunks 1/1/96 at 4:13 EST. Two replies also forge-cancelled. Anybody running lazarus on mail.cypherpunks? Might be an interesting idea. Dr. Vulis, can you repost the item to this list? Best, Clark .---. .----------- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: / \ __ / ------ * clark.matthews@paranet.org / / \(..)/ ----- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ////// ' \/ ` ---- * //// / // : : --- * PERMISSION TO \\/ / * / /` '--* COPY / REPOST \*/ * //..\\ x-x-UU----UU-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x- '//||\\` N E M O..M E..I M P U N E..L A C E S S I T x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 19:09:03 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: [Local] Portland OR Cypherpunks anyone? Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102063831.0091f620@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I am considering getting regular Cypherpunks meetings going in the Portland, OR area. If anyone is interested in such a thing, please drop me e-mail. I have gotten some interest from a few friends and so I am sending out the request to the rest of the list to see who else is interested. Ideas for a local meeting place would also be appreciated, as my apartment is way too small. (And not the same time and place of the 2600 meetings. I am alergic to video cameras.) It would also be a chance to meet some of the people I see on the list who I know post from Portland... | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano@teleport.com | From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: mpd@netcom.com (Mike Duvos) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 17:32:53 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601020701.XAA29889@netcom18.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain An embarrassed Brad Dolan writes: > Gulp. Sorry. That's the last time I believe anybody with a > name like "Y." Netcom has not removed access to the alt groups, but they have definitely screwed something up in the news system for the shell machines. Netcruiser accounts seem to work fine. I just tried a test post to a bunch of alt.sex groups from Netcom shell and it bounced instantly with the obnoxious message. /usr/lib/newsbin/inject/injnews:alt.sex.girl.watchers, alt.sex.graphics,alt.sex.hello-kitty,alt.sex.homosexual, alt.sex.incest,alt.sex.intergen,alt.sex.magazines, alt.sex.masturbation,alt.sex.pedophile.mike-labbe: no groups in active file /usr/lib/newsbin/inject/injnews: article in /u1/mpd/dead.article /usr/lib/news/inews failed Given Netcom's superb reputation for protecting free speech, It is very unlikely this has anything to do with censorship. Possibly someone encountered this glitch while trying to access an alt group and jumped to conclusions. Then again, maybe the Bavarians are running Netcom now. :) -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd@netcom.com $ via Finger. $ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 17:31:53 +0800 To: sameer Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 21:20 1/1/96, sameer wrote: >> Prosecution followed by conviction is what will happen to the owner of the >> computer on which the OS was running. > It's hard to jail a corporation. Pretty hard. That's why the corporate officers will be jailed instead. Not that this would be necessary to stop the corporation from operating. The authorities can just confiscating all the equipment and thereby put the corporation out of business. Saves time and trial costs. They just haul off the computers and declare that they are now property of the government. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: ghio@netcom.com (Matthew Ghio) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 17:34:07 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601020708.XAA23044@netcom15.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed >its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups >altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup >other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it >appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those >discussion groups. Can you say B-U-L-L-S-H-I-T ??? Man, this place is like a bunch of guerilla fighters preparing for war. People are really on edge. Make one wrong move and everybody starts shooting. I'm afraid that sooner or later it could be real bullets too. BTW, Netcom splits its newsfeed between two servers. Currently the netcom.*, comp.*, and rec.* are all on one, and everything else is on the other, although they move them around every few months. Occasionally one or the other server starts acting up, causing the respective heirarchies to be temporarily inaccessable. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 17:34:35 +0800 To: bdolan@use.usit.net (Brad Dolan) Subject: Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601020708.XAA23593@netcom22.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > Another shoe drops? > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed > its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups > altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup > other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it > appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those > discussion groups. > Not entirely. From my shell account I just used Tin to view and subscribe to alt.sex and several others without a problem. Perhaps the above is true of their browser (NetCruiser) accounts? Bart From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Andreas Bogk Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 07:05:53 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>>>> "Lucky" == Lucky Green writes: Lucky> Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the Lucky> ftpd, and the httpd. That site will be subject to search, Lucky> seizure, and arrest and conviction of owner. So I guess we'll need some computers in outer space, on offshore boats or in well-bribed stable dictatorships. Andreas -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAgUBMOhgZ0yjTSyISdw9AQEfggP+N2p9/ar1Z9gFFlpwAUf21YX0jd8XeU7Z jzgUWP5n/A4udka4T6sqLef1gu68BxEQYGBe3ZUQmV286xcyouelg2OTfriGRh/j E2rpl7EO1kyUrK3zbDU5OSglmHBI9kJzLK8fs+gyhyLiu3t9MeFf9ydgJ45BmIuj ztZbMPrvhJc= =XW6V -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jon Lasser Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 00:56:41 +0800 To: Lucky Green Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Mon, 1 Jan 1996, Lucky Green wrote: > At 15:14 1/1/96, Mike McNally wrote: > >Lucky Green writes: > > > But how many of them [ IP providers ] will be willing to forward > > > certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison > > > term? Hint: count the number of narcotics dealers that advertize > > > in your local yellow pages. > > > >But an IP provider doesn't have to know that it's "forwarding" *any* > >newsgroups; all it has to know is that IP packets are moving between > >my PC and the outside world. It doesn't have any way of knowing what > >those packets contain and doesn't want to. > > Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. > That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of > owner. > > If you don't have a host, there won't be any packets to forward. This is _exactly_ where the transnational nature of the Internet becomes successful, when combined with strong crypto. If the sites coming into your machine are encrypted, nobody outside of your system (perhaps only you) know that said newsgroups, websites, etc. are being hit. If the site they originate from is determined to be offshore, they can't stop the site. Probably. Subject, at least, to foreign cooperation or direct CIA/NSA involvement. The potential for traffic analysis is the danger here. If an "FBI International Data Laundering Expert" testifies in court that said data came from a site known to be frequented solely by so-and-sos, all the strong crypto in the world won't stop the average jury from convicting you. Carl Ellison (among others, I'm sure) has suggested various means of foiling traffic analysis among a group of trusted conspirators, using a token-ring-like routing scheme. I'm not completely convinced that it's robust enough, but a variation on it is probably adaptable. The point-to-point nature of the internet is also its achilles heel, as far as traffic analysis is concerned... the troubles faced by traditional cypherpunk remailers, the generalized problem of anonymous message distribution, and such are the current limits of consideration on the list (as far as I'm thinking right now... I may be wrong). However, the problem of, say, webservers collecting statistics on users, would be moot should it be possible for truly anonymous websurfing (I'm convinced that traditional http proxies have the same flaws as traditional cypherpunk remailers). More work needs to be done on untracable, yet at least modestly efficient, truly anonymous routing, even in a system where many of the participants, and perhaps even one of the endpoints, is or is willing to "cheat." Jon Lasser ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jon Lasser (410)494-3072 Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brad Dolan Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 00:53:53 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Another shoe drops? ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 19:44:30 -0600 From: x To: y Y - Coming off CompuServe's announcement last week that it was cutting off all access to "alt.binaries" newsgroups under pressure from the German government, I'm passing along another apparent development from another Internet access provider, Netcom. Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those discussion groups. We are witnessing the not-so-gradual erosion of freedom of the Net. I not often find myself allied with John Perry Barlow, but on this one we are four-square: what with stupid attempts of government to pass unconstitutional restrictions, and acquiescence of the private sector to intimidation and pressure, freedoms of the many are being dictated by reactionary elements in places like Memphis, Tennessee. The next opportunity, I expect, will be to help underwrite the defense of the first criminal action brought under the new law. In the meantime, we can unsubscribe to services that curtail our liberties. "X" Speaking solely for myself, this time. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 16:47:32 +0800 To: bdolan@use.usit.net (Brad Dolan) Subject: Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601020615.AAA12494@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed > its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups > altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup > other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it > appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those > discussion groups. Really? A quick check shows that alt. groups, even the alt.sex.* groups, are still in /usr/lib/news/active, and articles are still in /usr/spool/news/alt/sex/*. Whoever supplied that information is apparently wrong. - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOjNciS9AwzY9LDxAQE74gP+MD9vqln8W/55QXW7IgBosZkWu0923Wp/ 8il41W2xhJEv7/DYcDjzMAZZKK1/F5Nwl6rv1mqxzUGP6UJg60RC3w6+Q9Pnr5R3 i7DJ0IO8LryJOFMFrIT9RAKLdwjic7NjglksD8rWjHJP14XV2m1R8xToGMtFeE+T Y8VWdh98ZXM= =V6vA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Brian A. LaMacchia" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 16:46:37 +0800 To: flee@teleport.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601020427.UAA16858@desiree.teleport.com> Message-ID: <9601020613.AA28127@toad.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Date: Mon, 01 Jan 1996 20:27:23 -0800 From: Felix Lee Sender: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Precedence: bulk compare with software piracy. when was the last time a kid in your neighborhood was busted for unlicensed copying of software? and software is big business, lots of suits and $$$. Look for this to change if the copyright "high-protectionists" succeed in getting Congress to criminalize every act of copyright infringement, which is what the Leahy-Feingold "Criminal Copyright Improvement Act of 1995" (S.1122) will do if it becomes law. Under current copyright law infringements that are not committed wilfully and "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain" are not criminal. Such non-profit/noncommercial infringements are still civil infringements, and copyright holders may sue for actual and/or statutory damages, but since the typical kid has net assets less than $39.95 it's not worth the effort. If S.1122 becomes law, though, the software companies (or other copyright holders) will be able to get the Feds to prosecute such cases criminally (so we, as taxpayers, get to foot the bill for those prosecutions that are not monetarily attractive to the copyright holders). --bal From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brad Dolan Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 17:13:46 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601020615.AAA12494@dal1820.computek.net> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Gulp. Sorry. That's the last time I believe anybody with a name like "Y." bd On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > > Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed > > its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups > > altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup > > other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it > > appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those > > discussion groups. > > Really? A quick check shows that alt. groups, even the alt.sex.* groups, > are still in /usr/lib/news/active, and articles are still in > /usr/spool/news/alt/sex/*. > > Whoever supplied that information is apparently wrong. > - -- > Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com > 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager > 800/558-3408 SkyPager > Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi > > "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, > through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a > waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and > asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" > > -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQCVAwUBMOjNciS9AwzY9LDxAQE74gP+MD9vqln8W/55QXW7IgBosZkWu0923Wp/ > 8il41W2xhJEv7/DYcDjzMAZZKK1/F5Nwl6rv1mqxzUGP6UJg60RC3w6+Q9Pnr5R3 > i7DJ0IO8LryJOFMFrIT9RAKLdwjic7NjglksD8rWjHJP14XV2m1R8xToGMtFeE+T > Y8VWdh98ZXM= > =V6vA > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: David Lesher Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 17:19:23 +0800 To: bdolan@use.usit.net (Brad Dolan) Subject: Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601020639.BAA05196@nrk.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed > its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups > altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup > other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it > appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those > discussion groups. Horsefeathers. I'm reading alt.fan.david-sternlight in another window as I type. Yes, on netcom8.netcom.com..... -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 20:17:46 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Unmuzzling the Internet Message-ID: <199601021139.GAA10271@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain The New York Times, January 2, 1996, p. A15. Unmuzzling the Internet [OpEd] How to evade the censors and make a statement, too. By Jaron Lanier (Visiting scholar at the Columbia University department of computer science.) If President Clinton signs the telecommunications bill drastically restricting private as well as public speech on the Internet, he can expect a rollicking cat-and-mouse game. It can be comical when politicians try to control something they do not understand. Such is the case with the bill's censorship provision, which not only outlaws the transmission of material over the Internet that would be allowed in most newspapers, but also makes owners of computers on a network liable for the speech of others. (As Compuserve demonstrated last week when, to satisfy a German court, it blocked American subscribers' access to sexually explicit material, regulation of the Internet can threaten both commercial and constitutional freedoms.) The other day, I came up with a way to easily evade the proposed American restrictions. My simple idea would be to create a computer program, dubbed "Unmuzzle," which would deposit incomprehensible fragments of any forbidden material in different foreign computers (though maybe not Germany's). The contraband communication would only be reassembled into a coherent whole when downloaded in the home of the user back in the United States, where it would become protected speech, as in any other medium. I had no intention of actually building "Unmuzzle," but I mentioned the notion in E-mail to a friend, and within days I was hearing from people I didn't know who were busy creating the program with the idea of distributing it freely. Fine with me. Such a program would make an mportant statement. Speaking as someone who has been involved with computers for most of my life (I coined the phrase "virtual reality" in the early 1980's and created much of the technology for it), I find that many Internet users have been reacting to attacks on freedom in cyberspace by slumping into a separatist, angry mood. They feel that they are being denied the rights that others enjoy. On the Internet, separatism is expressed by encryption: an encrypted message can be read only by the party it is intended for. Therefore, in the spirit of the First Amendment, I suggest Unmuzzle as an alternative method: it may break up images or text into a hundred pieces, but they are still accessible to the public. The idea of censoring the Internet should be unthinkable, especially in the United States. Aside from the question of free speech, there's the economic imperative as well. The Internet is not a plaything: it is the infrastructure of our information technology industry. The young have the most to lose from the new restrictions, in spite of the fact that such limits are purportedly meant to protect them. Schools and libraries will find it extremely difficult to offer vital Internet services in the face of a mine field of criminal liabilities. It is members of Congress and the President who need to show some maturity, by rejecting free-speech restrictions in the telecommunications bill. [End] From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 05:16:29 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102115316.008b7368@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:07 PM 1/1/96 -0500, David Mandl wrote: >I agree. It's not a good idea to assume that there's going to be some kind >of widespread opposition movement when the big Net Crackdown comes. Most >people will either obey the law, be unaffected by it, or violate it in very >insignificant ways ("net jaywalking"). There's strength in numbers, but I >just don't think the numbers will be there. > > --Dave. During Prohibition, consumption of illegal booze increased steadily during the whole period. Hard liquor consumption was actually higher at the end of Prohibition than it had been before Prohibition. DCF From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 20:36:00 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102115836.008c6b40@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 06:49 PM 1/1/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: >That is called a conspiracy. The consequence is that all machines involved >will be confiscated and their respective owners jailed. > > >-- Lucky Green > PGP encrypted mail preferred. If the processes are operating in encrypted accounts not under the control of the machine owner it is hard to find the machine owner liable. In addition, the Feds can only afford a few prosecutions at $50-$100K each (Brian, if you're listening what *does* the average Federal prosecution cost?). The cost of setting up servers is much lower than the cost of busting them. DCF "RIP -- the Interstate Commerce Commission. Dead Jan 1 at the age of 120(?). The first Federal regulatory agency. One down, thousands to go." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 22:03:08 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601021330.HAA11247@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky sez: > At 21:20 1/1/96, sameer wrote: > >> Prosecution followed by conviction is what will happen to the owner of the > >> computer on which the OS was running. > > It's hard to jail a corporation. > > Pretty hard. That's why the corporate officers will be jailed instead. Not > that this would be necessary to stop the corporation from operating. The > authorities can just confiscating all the equipment and thereby put the > corporation out of business. Saves time and trial costs. They just haul off > the computers and declare that they are now property of the government. Good way to get the latest and greatest technology without paying for it, too. I wonder how many of those Mercedes and BMWs are sitting around in impound lots ad how many of them are being driven around by DEA bigwigs? Didn't they used to do this sort of thing 200+ years ago - convict someone of a minor crime, then seize all their assets? Wasn't this one of the things that prompted the US breaking away from GB? Seems like history is full of stuff like this. Sad case of 'those who fail to learn from history are destined to repeat it.' - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOkzXyS9AwzY9LDxAQG0CAQAgSNBJnp0IFwCL8YfpF1n7xQUIkQsN8Mq gaHD1SBPvVUvOtqQqgUK8uQVLGeN5aXVcITtt0RfSgqQKQ8twmkbKtaU9t5hwNnb seN4N3RJ3IbOKGV0nfj9u8fUGyIDuZQGX916RyPWUgDuF0iORpBpf5aEjJCEeqyq ebuU6dxaUgo= =6tCV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 03:43:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: In Search of Computer Security Message-ID: <199601021239.HAA10963@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain The New York Times, January 2, 1996, p. C15. Special section "Business World Outlook '96." In Search Of Computer Security By John Markoff Computer security is making a transition from the university and the research laboratory to the real world. So far it is proving to be a rocky evolution. Last year, a series of embarrassing gaffes and shortcomings undermined the faith of potential computer users in the certainty that their data are secure. The flaws have led to a growing realization that computer security systems are largely untested and that in complex environments like the Internet, they do not always respond the way their creators had intended. Paul C. Kocher, a computer security expert who discovered one potential flaw, said, "Many of the security systems that I am examining are good enough to keep out casual snoopers, but they're failing catastrophically when it comes to protecting data against determined attacks." The problems are emerging as the computer industry increasingly relies upon an arcane mathematical discipline that is intended to hide the secrets embedded in digital information behind a veil of imposing math problems. Cryptography, the science of writing secrets, was for centuries largely the province of kings, soldiers and spies. But that has changed in the 1990's as the world has rushed to use personal computers and computer networks as the basis for electronic commerce, communication and entertainment. Data scrambling has become the key to a vision that it will be possible to have private electronic conversations and secure financial transactions. In principle, data coding protects information by scrambling it to keep it out of the reach of everybody but those with a supercomputer and tens or even hundreds of years to crunch the data. But computer researchers have begun discovering flaws, sometimes subtle and sometimes glaring, that can help criminals take devious shortcuts to obtain the mathematical keys used to scramble the data. In August, a French computer hacker proved that it was possible to use a network of work stations to guickly find the secret key created by a coding system developed by the Netscape Communications Corporation, the leading developer of World Wide Web software. The feat cast doubts on the security of a system whose security had been scaled back to meet stringent United States Government export controls. The following month, two computer science graduate students at the University of California at Berkeley reported a flaw in the Netscape that would permit a technically skilled attacker to steal data by circumventing the complex calculations needed to break the code. In October, a team of Berkeley researchers, including the two computer science students, detailed security weaknesses in the fundamental software of the Internet that make it difficult to protect data that is sent between computers. And last month, Mr. Kocher explained a potential flaw in a widely used data coding approach known as public-key cryptography. The flaw could allow eavesdroppers to infer a secret key used to protect data in Internet security software, electronic payment smart cards and related systems by carefully timing how long it takes to compute the secret key. Mr. Kocher said that while he believed that trusted electronic security systems would ultimately emerge, there should be no urgency to rush their deployment. Banks have spent several hundred years perfecting systems for protecting money, he noted, but they have far less experience with the new computerized systems designed to protect information that represents money. One of the pioneers in the mathematics underlying most public key systems agrees that prudence is required in developing digital commerce. "Paul's discovery is one more piece of evidence that designing security mechanisms is tricky," said Whitfield Diffie, a Sun Microsystems researcher who was one of the co-inventors of the original public key technology. "Given the trust that we will be placing in systems for electronic commerce," he continued, "we should be putting all the effort we can into getting them right." [End] ---------- [Box] 1996 Will Be the Year When: "Congress will pass a law restricting public comment on the Internet to individuals who have spent a minimum of one hour actually accomplishing a specific task while on line." Andrew Grove, Intel Corp. CEO From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 17:16:47 +0800 To: Cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: <199601020640.HAA03781@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 1/1/96 at 3:11 pm Lucky Green replied to Andreas Bogk about: >>So I guess we'll need some computers in outer space, on offshore boats >>or in well-bribed stable dictatorships. >o Outer space: not very realistic >o Offshore boats: see the fate of drug trafficers in international waters >after the Coast Guard is through with them. What about using converted freighters offshore in international waters for storing the computers? i.e. Sameer the Wolfman Jack of Pirate Internet Services (tm) I was told that Belize is offering passports for the next two years for $50,000 and that might be even less if offers were made to the government to provide low cost Internet access to the citizens of Belize. http://www.belize.com/citzdoc.html Belize has always been known as a home for pirates, A wonderful Cypherpunk candidate for an offshore data haven! L. Malthus -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOjOmQJo+wOswDgJAQEdGgP8CzcIf7/p1QS8yYc7uelApYLWcDUHo1AE LHBz4kWg8bdrvWEqck1oIgY/Z+gvr88tKP3l7TDei8y+mJFoqYeSM27aE0ohvS2a XVq7YwbGs+/CKTWJTWsyxwsQEQHyj+Ig7oY+JB76wUN9WTz9pfuwXQ7oaF4RXHcf WqFOXM6ogMA= =0UFR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 23:21:51 +0800 To: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: <199601020640.HAA03781@utopia.hacktic.nl> Message-ID: <199601021341.HAA12007@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > On 1/1/96 at 3:11 pm Lucky Green replied to Andreas Bogk about: > > >>So I guess we'll need some computers in outer space, on offshore boats > >>or in well-bribed stable dictatorships. > > >o Outer space: not very realistic > >o Offshore boats: see the fate of drug trafficers in international waters > >after the Coast Guard is through with them. Why isn't outer space realistic? We already have store-and-forward packet radio systems in AMSAT satellites - they usually hitch a ride up with a commercial satellite. - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOk2ByS9AwzY9LDxAQFM0AQAgrdQAJnu5Jd3edGDqCMfCU5TFnBJRp7Z gg6bdH1SdSKVEe+/GGFsHg6ITUWg6L9Hjuz63jw6yrjek4i7GZZY4pcb44Cqe4cP CSk5GJkebJL21dl3egN+jAmNl+rD5JJfTW/jHCibB5p/6cWem9QEUmhLDquFZebb /fFQEHN0A/E= =MUq5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: andr0id@midwest.net (Jason Rentz) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 07:05:07 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: <199601021435.IAA10484@cdale1.midwest.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >At 23:30 1/1/96, Andreas Bogk wrote: > >>So I guess we'll need some computers in outer space, on offshore boats >>or in well-bribed stable dictatorships. > >o Outer space: not very realistic Not that I'm into Guerilla Internet Services or anything; but; an Outer space server isn't all that far off. Its not hard at all controlling a lynix box remotely using a good sat. link. All you need to do is go to your nearest junkyard and get an old used Satalite, contract Russia to send it up for you for the price of an e-mail account or somthin and away you go. :) (andr0id@midwest.net callsign: N9XLM) ( Computer Consulting & Management ) (P.O. Box 421 Cambria, IL 62915-0421) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzCsIi4AAAEH/1hb5+tO/n99Nbppf0ImLJ6AaVZ3NlZP0ZHwRQor00uA129i d4zWixNXxc8t2auaqN+asV99LpIip3/nQzBnjydiumeBdGLF2PR9+6X8X/RrqKa1 dVIukxM5Agg2eM6ih+0J38hgKJ3qzKXSz6sjYmpaxvbXZoHHOLUk/ZtHUKvvEyPw hnJEYnut8NUnIeK56lqeqRw86yoeRKymbfCdjdpgeY2aRwK2FJts8sbb7Fs10s4y jgxWIxIipBznbGUTh1hb2XrLGPENwk3E/qqXQJEsrySbtwdl6VgTVQjhDDEJMitL DYeiQ3W5EgxfcdbM1j2FwYu3P/dM6Y0I8xLMYT0ABRG0NmFuZHIwaWRAb2ljdTgx Mi5jb20gKG9pY3U4MTIuY29tIHN5c3RlbSBhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yKYkBFQMFEDCs LO90C7R/GkJcSQEB01cH/0KC3sd+u4OxMku5378SJktoN6QIQYLJ7uVbuV4S51yK NAotCGf4Wl6wwjynzZvXKU0H87oDuMiq7FybgMNL2n+4bQIZi0iz0lIuzwoMDu63 NrHUW9Kz42pOnhrEhrdkHhHL9O5GgD1yc40fJ3qw5h7LQEjDxgypyw0IFILFc34u LeRLliNibxKp8JwAxXNHWSgxu28TQvmnkHi0AHP6tJ/uZYe+4dqJtrMMsYFjzZaz DPmxD+dzbTwlQKtJaP1ZkDI0Sr072wrZDv+G86GyGBMX2lpSafpRitnxuUttjU9o wsQ9Qo5xiH1nZRCs/bDzJe/gng+GHzevixDIITurtNA= =SgPT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 12:00:33 +0800 To: Felix Lee Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 08:27 PM 1/1/96 -0800, you wrote: >Jim Choate: >> If you live in the Austin, TX area I will setup a dedicated slip for you at >> only $100/mo. > >in the Portland Oregon area, the price ranges from $234/year to >$1750/year for unlimited ppp access. (I have no idea how long the >$234/year is going to stay in business. that won't even cover the >cost of a phone line.) It seems to me that phone line costs are turning into a floor price for Internet access, when they shouldn't really be. The main asset telephone companies have, right now, is in RIGHTS OF WAY. Put an ISP in a business park that allows you to run your own dedicated copper pairs, and you've bypassed $25/month/line business phone line charges. At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could easily be "guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious trenching, etc. The phoneco would still be involved, but in a far lower-profit mode, as the supplier of a single T1 to a multi-block area. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 08:19:34 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: COP_box Message-ID: <199601021507.KAA00575@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain 1-2-96. WaPo: "Undercover on the Dark Side of Cyberspace. On-Line FBI Agents Troll for Those Who Prey on Children." The FBI unit now has more than $1 million worth of equipment, including high-speed modems and large data storage devices. In cases where suspects' computers have been seized, the agents have run up against password-protected and encrypted files, which sometimes have taken FBI technicians hundreds of hours to decode. 1-2-96. FiTi: "Pobox and the magic cookie." Which company will have the greatest effect on the development of the Internet this year? My answer is neither Microsoft nor Netscape. It is a tiny new company called Pobox.com. Its product consists of a simple forwarding service that is an electronic equivalent of a post office box. This service allows people to give out an e-mail address that is independent of where they work or where they choose to buy Internet access. COP_box From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:58:02 +0800 To: cjl@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu (cjl) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601021624.KAA22254@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > I don't know if I am the only one who this is happening to, but I keep > getting two copies of every post you send. Has anyone else commented on > this? I will forward them back to you following this response so that > you will have the header info if you choose to track down the source of > the duplication. I don't know where the dups are coming from - my logs don't show that I'm sending two copies, and no one else has complained. I'm also not sending out dups on any other list I'm on... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOlcFyS9AwzY9LDxAQFSjQP/dYUpg2SNMb3qGhrkerD5nIU0GcopXkZ+ odhi4KhyUiipPljwwBcPxLfrduxW/A8QOviXJR++Fz/ZOnRrZ6NfKC2sgiO3GuYn W642nNFEJ/cf+pFVxvxcyDMyOc0db+hOWC54JrctyjckNkJKTyE6OyLIfQ3O+aBF l2YhORWBWOQ= =0Idn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "David R. Rorabaugh" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 21:18:42 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups Message-ID: <199601021605.LAA26607@bb.hks.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>I pointed my copy of Free Agent at CPCNET's open news server >>(198.70.185.5) and grabbed a list of groups sure enough, there were >>the seasoned citizens in all their glory. And I was checking out >>those binaries via CompuServe. I suspect that CompuServe doesn't care much what goes over their network (they will claim "common carrier" status) as much as they care about what they themselves provide. The groups in question ARE gone from CompuServe's news servers. - -- David R. Rorabaugh Systems Operations Specialist Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, L.L.P. The opinions expressed are my own. - -- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMOlXuioZzwIn1bdtAQGgAgF9GOa8Sl3mu6wDt70k6Ij3ZBAfi0j+9i1f bxC/+g1qecXUCL//wPwiTToTjyLouUaW =vXmL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:54:15 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601021624.LAA21091@jekyll.piermont.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Lucky Green writes: > >> That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of > >> owner. > > > >but if it turns out that 30% of home PCs have to be seized to prevent > >dissemination of dangerous-information-X? > > Wrong. Only 0.03% of the home PCs have to be seized and the owners > incarcerated. The remaining users will cease to carry controlled data on > their own. Just like no one smokes pot any more. Perry From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Mark Hittinger Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:17:33 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Netcom censoring alt.* ? Message-ID: <199601021625.LAA04725@ritz.mordor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text I don't think thats the case. I'm the senior admin at the Dallas backup site for Netcom. I'm setting up several backup news servers here and we aren't doing any alt.* censorship. "alt" groups are still sucking up lots of bandwidth and gigs :-). On the other hand the San Jose site has had a lot of power problems and news software problems to contend with lately (hence the idea of a "backup" site for netcom :-) ) Maybe you are branching to a conclusion? Now if there was only a way to tie the scientology thing in with the alt.* censorship conspiracy. Regards, Mark Hittinger Netcom/Dallas bugs@freebsd.netcom.com bugs@ritz.mordor.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:31:18 +0800 To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell) Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960102170305.0069891c@panix.com> Message-ID: <199601021729.LAA26098@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > It used to be said that no country would be allowed to move from Communism > to Capitalism. It can now be said that it is inconceivable that a modern > country will move from a Market to a Command Economy. Market discipline is > strong. Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free market economy. Never underestimate the value of human stupidity and shortsightedness. > Where are the pressure points where regulation can be applied? How about on the backbone itself? Since everyone goes through the htree major backbones, all one would have to do is control access at those points. Of course, that would lead to clandestine use of store-and-forward LEOsats, s&f UUCP sites, etc. UUCP might even make a comeback ;) - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOlrZCS9AwzY9LDxAQE5NgP+K0M4dCNmi6lJSiew+BELRQs9A+YU5XeX TVte3vtTrpwhqePj2c6YXzPtKAl5Bu+JbQxI9+4m6dbmYQ6gW9D7VZLni5EOKWwP CSHg/bUJIf3tFY5/p0tRPIx800AH+n/TOIg9fMtqe3unjkJ78a014aAij6/ssoyO UKbUXDYOxOk= =E+l9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 13:31:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Criminal Money-laundering Offshore Digital Banks Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 1:34 AM 1/2/96, Lucky Green wrote: >Will C2 carry certain newsgroups/info after doing so has become a felony? >Who wants to be an 'illegal data' kingpin and face execution? (Kingpins are >'data trafficers' that carry more than 1.5 Megs of 'controlled >information'.) I've also heard that some of these Data Kingpins (shudder!) are making use of Criminal Money-Laundering Banks (tm), including a bank called "The Mark Twain Bank"! (I hear that MTB has been offered a deal they cannot refuse.) These criminal "offshore" banks are of course illegal for ordinary citizen-units (aka proles) to use, being the sole province of Certain Government Agencies. Authorized Offshore Criminal Banks, like the Castle Bank, the Nugan-Hand Bank, and the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) are of course needed by legitimate government as a way to fund Contra resupply efforts from the Southeast Asian drug trade. (Seriously, really seriously, our list is generally not a place to obsess on conspiracies. But anyone who has any doubts about what is going on, and how some parts of government have become too large/too corrupt, should spend at least a day or so looking into these things. You should all know the search keywords by now (BCCI, Mena, Castle Bank, Air America, Khun Sa, Banco Lavoro del Nazionale, Gehlen, etc.). Anyone who looks into the tangled web of such dealings will never, ever think the government is trying to ban encryption so it can protect us from child pornographers.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Daniel Miskell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:50:46 +0800 To: delznic@storm.net Subject: Re: [local] Syracuse new york Message-ID: <9601021659.AA08805@envirolink.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Douglas F. Elznic writes: >Are their any interested people in having a meeting in the syr area? I most certainly would. I currently reside in the western ny state area. Anybody else interested? Munster --- _________________________________ *!Cheese Doctrine:!* Though cultured over time, and aged to perfection, one must not yield to produce mold. One must also not belittle themselves by conforming to the "whiz", but melt over the unprocessed ideas of Ghuda. _________________________________ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 19:23:30 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102170305.0069891c@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sometimes in the day-to-day wrangling with the net censors, we forget the larger picture. There is an assumption here and in the media (see the Newsweek year-end piece on the nets by Steven Levy) that the prospect of 2 years in stir and $100,000 fines will quell net speech. This seems unlikely because of the nature of the medium. Thought control is a very difficult task. It always has been. The Inquisition, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China tried but three of the four are no longer with us. Short of totalitarian controls, thought controls will be ineffective. And totalitarian controls are difficult to impose these days. It used to be said that no country would be allowed to move from Communism to Capitalism. It can now be said that it is inconceivable that a modern country will move from a Market to a Command Economy. Market discipline is strong. Since only totalitarians have a shot (for a short time) to enforce thought control, the OECD countries will not succeed at thought control. This used to be unimportant because one's thoughts were trapped in one's head. You could speak only to a few people and "mass media" from books to TV was expensive, centralized and somewhat easy to control. You were free in your mind but cut off from communicating your thoughts freely to others. Those conditions no longer exist. If you can think it (or even not think it) you can communicate it easily and cheaply to others. Since thought is free and communications is almost free, control by others is difficult. The net is a fair mapping of the consciousness of its participants onto a world spanning communications system. Large companies and even quite small businesses are concerned about legal hassles. They have an investment to lose and they are more likely to be prosecuted than ordinary individuals. Ordinary people rightly suspect that their risk of punishment is quite low. Particularly since if they are worried about it, they can take many easy steps to protect themselves. In the coming world in which millions of households have multitasking computers with full-time highspeed connections to the nets, Java-like applets running wild, etc; the opportunities to stash info in easily accessible but hard to trace forms expands without limit. I was trying to imagine over the weekend how the Feds would regulate the Net. Will Janet and her Storm troopers (wearing Nazi-style bucket helmets) smash into the next meeting of the Internet Engineering Task Force and lock everyone up or force them at gunpoint to adopt standards proposed by the government? And if they do, will their code be any good and will it be accepted by enough nodes to make a difference? Unlikely in the extreme. Where are the pressure points where regulation can be applied? To me, it looks like King Canute ordering back the tide. DCF From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jay Holovacs Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 12:00:18 +0800 To: cypherpunks Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: <199601021341.HAA12007@dal1820.computek.net> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: > > Why isn't outer space realistic? We already have store-and-forward > packet radio systems in AMSAT satellites - they usually hitch a ride up > with a commercial satellite. > - -- Commercial satallites have land based corporate owners. Remember the success that Alabama had a few years ago pulling the plug on a New York based softporn tv satellite distribution system. They simply went after the assets of the satellite companies and got quick cooperation. Jay Holovacs PGP Key fingerprint = AC 29 C8 7A E4 2D 07 27 AE CA 99 4A F6 59 87 90 (KEY id 1024/80E4AA05) email me for key From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:51:56 +0800 To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell) Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960102115836.008c6b40@panix.com> Message-ID: <199601021849.MAA31203@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > If the processes are operating in encrypted accounts not under the control > of the machine owner it is hard to find the machine owner liable. In > addition, the Feds can only afford a few prosecutions at $50-$100K each > (Brian, if you're listening what *does* the average Federal prosecution > cost?). The cost of setting up servers is much lower than the cost of > busting them. And the servers could really be set up anonymously. Pay cash to an ISP for a SLIP or PPP account, get a phone line under a ficticious name, set up a PO box for the (few) bills, find somewhere to set up the machine, and away you go... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOl+VCS9AwzY9LDxAQGFfAQArUOg/QPRluQEwJQNxx7VxhwgxrzCO91T WRHvP71Cgb8cpYorWrHTf0xrh+ng7RtLkXaiJJd7RWmx2ggp8Tpv1sBxaAN9sgXm lhHFlD9eHVf/q6ZsmohNTQSh7ZDav4gB2ewHwZDzTwD3stm4Q06tH6p7XUAfmGlK iYT8dN2fHBg= =MwEh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Kurt Buff (Volt Comp)" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:06:52 +0800 To: "nobody@REPLAY.COM> Subject: RE: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Another suggestion: The Republic of the Seychelles. Saw an AP article on them over the weekend. Seems they now (since November, if I remember the article correctly) offer unconditional haven for anyone who has $10,000,000 (didn't specify if in US$). No extradition, guaranteed, no matter what the crime, if perpetrated anywhere else in the world. Instant citizenship, no questions asked. Kurt ---------- From: nobody@REPLAY.COM[SMTP:nobody@REPLAY.COM] Sent: Monday, January 01, 1996 22:40 To: Cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 1/1/96 at 3:11 pm Lucky Green replied to Andreas Bogk about: >>So I guess we'll need some computers in outer space, on offshore boats >>or in well-bribed stable dictatorships. >o Outer space: not very realistic >o Offshore boats: see the fate of drug trafficers in international waters >after the Coast Guard is through with them. What about using converted freighters offshore in international waters for storing the computers? i.e. Sameer the Wolfman Jack of Pirate Internet Services (tm) I was told that Belize is offering passports for the next two years for $50,000 and that might be even less if offers were made to the government to provide low cost Internet access to the citizens of Belize. http://www.belize.com/citzdoc.html Belize has always been known as a home for pirates, A wonderful Cypherpunk candidate for an offshore data haven! L. Malthus -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOjOmQJo+wOswDgJAQEdGgP8CzcIf7/p1QS8yYc7uelApYLWcDUHo1AE LHBz4kWg8bdrvWEqck1oIgY/Z+gvr88tKP3l7TDei8y+mJFoqYeSM27aE0ohvS2a XVq7YwbGs+/CKTWJTWsyxwsQEQHyj+Ig7oY+JB76wUN9WTz9pfuwXQ7oaF4RXHcf WqFOXM6ogMA= =0UFR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:09:12 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: CIA intelligence info Message-ID: <199601022117.NAA13088@netcom12.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain some interesting info on apparent efforts by the CIA spooks to get into economic espionage and be more "user friendly" .. (blecch) ------- Forwarded Message From: "Ron Pappas" Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 18:17:52 +0000 Subject: Intelligence Anyone? FRM: Ron Pappas FOR: All - - -=> Quoting Paul McGinnis <=- April 12, 1994 -- the CIA released a document in February 1994 called "A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence". My copy arrived today, so I will provide a review for interested parties. This item has a slick marketing feel to it, similar to that of a prospectus for a new stock or something given to prospective car buyers. It's even printed on glossy paper. About the only thing missing, that other marketing documents have, is color photographs of happy employees. Apparently, in this era of shrinking budgets, it was prepared to "sell" the Intelligence Community to various government officials. In fact, inside the front cover, is the statement "This publication is prepared for the use of US government officials, and the format, coverage, and content are designed to meet their specific requirements." So, what's the content like? It discusses what various intelligence agencies actually do, types of intelligence, how intelligence is collected (helpful tip: if you have just come back from an exotic foreign country, the U.S. government would really like to have a friendly chat with you...) and the reports that can be provided to policymakers. For example, if you have enough political clout, you can get a free subscription to the following (quoted verbatim from page 23 of the CIA publication): Defense Intelligence Agency Current Assessments _______________________________________________ A tabloid product that provides a brief and timely assessment of an ongoing military or military-related situation or recent development considered highly significant to national-level decisionmakers. Given the word "tabloid" one wonders if it features lurid New York Post style headlines, such as "Serbian general's secret Bosnian girlfriend"... There are a few surprises though. For example, among current large consumers of intelligence information, it lists the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). They also discuss the rarely mentioned MASINT field (Measurements and Signatures Intelligence). MASINT involves using scientists and engineers to study other characteristics of intelligence information gathered. For example, although it is not stated in this publication, it is believed that MASINT specialists studied the spectral characteristics of Soviet rocket exhausts to determine the fuel mixture used in the rocket. How does one obtain a copy of this document? It is available for $12.50 to addresses in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, and $25.00 elsewhere. (There was an error in the NTIS database entry I posted earlier which indicated the price was $17.50). Also, you need to add $3.00 for postage per order (not per copy) in the U.S., Canada and Mexico, and $4.00 for postage elsewhere. To order, make checks payable to NTIS, and request item # PB93-928021 from U.S. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service Springfield, VA 22161 phone (703) 487-4650 Ask for a free copy of their catalog of products and services. So, is it worth ordering? If you are interested in intelligence, I recommend this publication. Also, it might be a good thing to leave laying around on your coffee table if you have "politically correct" visitors... Paul McGinnis / TRADER@cup.portal.com - - ------------------------------------------------ (This file was found elsewhere on the Internet and uploaded to the Patriot FTP site by S.P.I.R.A.L., the Society for the Protection of Individual Rights and Liberties. E-mail alex@spiral.org) Peace, Pap... The College Board 864.878.7340 FIDO - 1:3639/60 - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:09:24 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: How the Gov't. "Deputizes" Corporations to Enforce Laws Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 4:27 AM 1/2/96, Felix Lee wrote: >compare with software piracy. when was the last time a kid in your >neighborhood was busted for unlicensed copying of software? and >software is big business, lots of suits and $$$. they can try to make >disassemblers illegal, but it's not likely to succeed. Though I generally agree with the point that laws can and are skirted (I've argued this too many time myself to repeat it again here), this point about software piracy needs to be critiqued. The software piracy laws are usually targetted at _corporations_. The Software Publisher's Association has very effectively caused corporations to launch extensive anti-piracy programs (including the very audits of disk drives that so many on this list think is a violation of their human rights). As with the drug laws, which corporations have been "deputized" (= threatened) to enforce via drug testing, urine tests, random searches, etc. Whit Diffie has been making this point for several years, that the drug laws may not be very enforceable on street corners, but by threatening corporations with loss of contracts, shutdown of plants, seizure of assets, and even criminal prosecution if they fail to take approved steps to create a "drug-free workplace," the long arm of the law is supplemented by corporate enforcement. The "War on Drugs," "Just Say No," and "FooCorp Maintains a Drug-Free Workplace" sorts of campaigns. (When I was at Intel, 1974-86, nobody cared what drugs were used in the evenings, weekends, etc., so long as one did not come to work stoned or otherwise impaired. Now, like most other large corporations, there are posters up on the walls with childish slogans about the dangers of "substance abuse," extensive drug tests for new employees (not sure about existing employees), employee training seminars devoted to substance abuse, etc. Not because Andy Grove sees a drug problem, but because of the drum beat of "Just Say No!" hysteria and the threats of government sanctions. Corporations have been enlisted into the War on (Some) Drugs.) The same applies to software piracy. Nobody expects casual, personal copying to stop, but anyone in a company can anonymously narc out the company to the SPA and law enforcement. The SPA and cops may then decide to "make an example" out of the company, launching raids, detailed audits of all machines, and the levying of huge fines for copies of software which are thought to be illegal. (This course of action seems to happen regularly in the Bay Area...the press is usually invited along or tipped off, and the evening news shows some company shut down for a day as SPA and law enforcement agents carry off dozens of bootlegged copies of WordPerfect and Excel.) The drug and software piracy cases give us some hints about how restrictions on "illegal crypto" are likely to be enforced. The "casual user" will not be targetted. He can pretty much expect to see no effective enforcement. However, the Lockheeds and Apples will face sanctions, loss of contracts, asset forfeiture, etc., unless they take "positive steps" to ensure that PGP, BlackNet, non-GAKked crypto, anonymous remailers, and other illegal programs are not being used on their systems. This will entail packet sniffers checking for the usual signs, audits of employee workstations and PCs, posted policies on "cybersubstance abuse" and its dangers, etc. (I'm only slightly joking here.) While this will still not stop all crypto use--just as tax evasion continues, drug use is rampant, and software piracy is done to some extent by nearly everyone--it will halt certain types of rapid deployment, pushing crypto use to the fringes and away from mainstream use. It will terrorize the Intels and Merrill Lynches of the country into being enforcers of the laws. This is how things are being done in these waning years of the 20th Century. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Raph Levien Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:24:44 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: New year's letter picked up by Netly News Message-ID: <199601022206.OAA27617@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Hi cypherpunks, In case anyone missed it the first time, or just prefers to see it in HTML (with URLs), my new year's eve letter got picked up by the Netly News, Josh Quittner's daily column on Time's Pathfinder Web site. http://pathfinder.com/@@noje*HGS0AMAQNl0/Netly/nnhome.html The second part will run tomorrow. Raph From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Cees de Groot" "Cees de Groot" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 11:59:05 +0800 To: raph@c2.org Subject: Re: A great time to be a cypherpunk In-Reply-To: <199512312146.NAA22286@infinity.c2.org> Message-ID: <199601021319.OAA01013@bofh.cdg.openlink.co.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > > Here's a subjective top 5 list: > 6. Premail 0.42alpha, by Raph. I know got elm+pgp sending its mail through premail, making elm a all-in-one solution for signing, encryption, decryption, nymming and all types of remailing. Perfect job! -- Cees de Groot, OpenLink Software 262ui/2048: ID=4F018825 FP=5653C0DDECE4359D FFDDB8F7A7970789 [Key on servers] -- Any opinions expressed above might be mine. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 16:11:53 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 12:49 1/2/96, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: >And the servers could really be set up anonymously. Pay cash to an ISP >for a SLIP or PPP account, get a phone line under a ficticious name, set >up a PO box for the (few) bills, find somewhere to set up the machine, >and away you go... Only to have the box impounded within a few days after going on-line. A very costly and likely short lived hobby. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brian Davis Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 23:03:15 +0800 To: Duncan Frissell Subject: Re: Guerilla ISP's... In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960102115836.008c6b40@panix.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > At 06:49 PM 1/1/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: > > >That is called a conspiracy. The consequence is that all machines involved > >will be confiscated and their respective owners jailed. > > > > > >-- Lucky Green > > PGP encrypted mail preferred. > > If the processes are operating in encrypted accounts not under the control > of the machine owner it is hard to find the machine owner liable. In > addition, the Feds can only afford a few prosecutions at $50-$100K each > (Brian, if you're listening what *does* the average Federal prosecution > cost?). The cost of setting up servers is much lower than the cost of I am listening, but don't know the marginal cost of such a prosecution. It is really more a reallocation of already existing resources. For example, we could let the state prosecutors handle a bank robbery or three while we protect the unwary innocent from encryption! EBD BTW our office collects more every year (from fines, foreclosures, bankruptcies, affirmative civil cases, etc. etc.) than our total office budget. We make money -- so why am I unpaid this week! :-) > busting them. > > DCF > > "RIP -- the Interstate Commerce Commission. Dead Jan 1 at the age of > 120(?). The first Federal regulatory agency. One down, thousands to go." > > Not a lawyer on the Net, although I play one in real life. ********************************************************** Flame away! I get treated worse in person every day!! From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:33:19 +0800 To: Brian Davis Subject: Shut 'er down Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102203509.006bed68@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 03:06 PM 1/2/96 -0500, Brian Davis wrote: >BTW our office collects more every year (from fines, foreclosures, >bankruptcies, affirmative civil cases, etc. etc.) than our total office >budget. We make money -- so why am I unpaid this week! :-) The courts cost too though. Also there's your share of general government overhead. You may cover variable direct costs but perhaps not indirect and fixed costs. I take it you are unpaid but working. Couldn't we reverse the process and pay you not to work? Sort of like protection money. It would be worth it I think. DCF "Some of my best friends are public employees but I wouldn't want my sister to marry one. She needs someone with a steady income and future prospects." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: cman@communities.com (Douglas Barnes) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 23:03:19 +0800 To: Duncan Frissell Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I think that there is still a substantial possibility that many kinds of expression will be marginalized and hard to access for a great many users. One of my co-workers has pointed out that the need for something as simple as a helper application for Netscape loses about 90% of his audience. By simply making it rather more difficult for people to chat about some things, governments can effectively push such things out of the way of all but the most determined readers. This is actually one of those odd Laffer-curve-like phenomena, where as long as the expression isn't too inherently desirable, government restrictions can be somewhat effective, but the more tightly they try to control things, the more likely the are to lose, as there will be more and more desirable content outside the sanctioned sphere of activity. Consequently, I was much happier to see the "indecency" standard get passed instead of the "harmful" standard, as the former will push far more content into the "gray" area of the net, which will encourage development and adoption of appropriate tools. A quote from Star Wars (which I'm just now incorporating into my .sig) was just echoed back to me in a letter from a chap I spoke with from the Australian Office of Strategic Crime Assessment, as encapsulating what he got out of a rather long chat we had when he was passing through the Bay Area last month. Here it is: ------ , ------ Douglas Barnes "The tighter you close your fist, Governor Tarkin, cman@communities.com the more systems will slip through your fingers." cman@best.com --Princess Leia From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:15:44 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <9FP4gD15w165w@bwalk.dm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain David Mandl writes: > The number of people who drank booze when Prohibition began dwarfs the > number of people who want access to "controlled" information on the > net today. Most people still don't even understand what the net is. > They're two completely different situations. Also, the powers that be > have much better reasons for killing the net than they had for banning > booze. Also, the powers that be could have wiped out bootlegging if they really wanted to -- by draconian means. Corrupt politicians at various levels chose to let the laws be violated and to accept the bribes. There's much less money involved in the distribution of "undesirable" information. --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "J. Kent Hastings" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:33:59 +0800 To: "cypherpunks@toad.com> Subject: Inter-Patch Voice Network Message-ID: <199601030419.UAA11507@Chico.pinsight.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -- [ From: J. Kent Hastings * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Cpunx, This may be old hat, but now that PGPfone is available, why don't we start an "Inter-Patch" Network using PGP and ecash? Here are features to consider: * Computer users generate pre-paid phone cards for non-geeks. * Rate is say, 2 cents per minute, for near-real-time voice. * "Voice Mail" service is not subject to telco utility regs. * PIN#s can be changed by users, who can also confirm value. * Thus a user can sell remaining time on a card to others. * A local participant to the target number is selected. * Ecash is instantly delivered in exchange for communications. * Perhaps a 50 percent split, 1 cent per minute for example. * Bad participants are removed from the network. Kent - -- J. Kent Hastings Assistant Director of The Agorist Institute zeus@pinsight.com, http://www.pinsight.com/~zeus/agorist/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOn0hTTxxI221vktAQHs3AQAj/uI2xYGSfE9iSVttCncBrS7yDAUaecX +s1U8zF29zx4a/zq6yUOOJncxS7GWXavUhNLcjuruH7f9tHO1Sam8XcT59rwVlvv P+xnrV/NwaDW0q+TxWjnNhVgTJePC6Hq+6bLRiod+hOTuawkJ3vx50CmDoEKC1Fk HrNqiRLzNQc= =O3Bo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 11:52:35 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <199601030331.TAA27550@netcom2.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 9:51 1/2/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could easily be >"guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious trenching, etc. The >phoneco would still be involved, but in a far lower-profit mode, as the >supplier of a single T1 to a multi-block area. Don't forget about infrared to cross public rights-of-way. I have long dreamed of tossing a piece of coax over the fence to my neighbors. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz@netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 12:01:46 +0800 To: gbroiles@darkwing.uoregon.edu Subject: [local] Portland OR Cypherpunks meeting Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960103034409.0091ae54@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain It looks like the Portland Cypherpunks meeting is going to happen. The meeting plans are not set in stone. (I am still trying to make certain that the maximum amount of people can attend.) The current plans: Location: The Habit Internet Cafe 21st and Clinton Portland Or Time: 5:23pm (Discordian Standard time) Date: January 20th, 1996 There are machines and Internet connections available at the site. I am concidering adding an IRC channel for virtual Cypherpunk attendance. (Encrypted IRC anyone?) Planned activities include keysigning, discussing various issues and projects of the day, drinking lots of coffee, and whatever else we can come up with. (A Detwiller Doom patch?) No video cammeras, regualer cameras, and/or other soul stealing devices will be allowed on the premises. (Many of the people attending have pork and pork-substitute related alergies.) A more detailed porting will occur in a couple of days. For more information, complaints, flames, etc., just send me e-mail. Thanks! Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 11:59:17 +0800 To: Jon Lasser Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 20:02 1/2/96, Jon Lasser wrote: >When the group of packets arrives at a given station, it replaces its >current encrypted packet with a new packet; if it doesn't have any new >packets to send, it puts up a garbage packet that is indistinguishable >from a normal packet. It then scans all the other packets and attempts to >decrypt them with its private key. Any it can read, it does; all the >packets are forwarded to the next station in the ring. All participants in this network are clearly guilty of conspiracy. Their assets will be confiscated under RICO. As Brian mentioned, the law enforcement agencies are creating a surplus by such seizures. The costs associated with more prosecutions are more than offset by the revenue generated. Your computer will make a welcome addition to their budget. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: ghio@c2.org (Matthew Ghio) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 12:22:55 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Risks of writing a remailer In-Reply-To: <199601022345.AAA04572@utopia.hacktic.nl> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Anonymous (nobody@flame.alias.net) wrote: > What are the legal risks of writing (and releasing) a remailer, > and what steps can an author go to to minimise any unwanted (legal > or civil) attention ? I've never heard of anyone complaining that I wrote a remailer. A few were upset at my running a remailer, but nobody every complained that the software was available. As far as minimizing attention to yourself, you obviously know how to post anonymously. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jon Lasser Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 22:59:57 +0800 To: "Timothy C. May" Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > At 4:35 AM 1/2/96, Jon Lasser wrote: > > >The potential for traffic analysis is the danger here. If an "FBI > >International Data Laundering Expert" testifies in court that said data > >came from a site known to be frequented solely by so-and-sos, all the > >strong crypto in the world won't stop the average jury from convicting you. > > > >Carl Ellison (among others, I'm sure) has suggested various means of > >foiling traffic analysis among a group of trusted conspirators, using a > >token-ring-like routing scheme. I'm not completely convinced that it's > >robust enough, but a variation on it is probably adaptable. > > How does this differ from Dining Cryptographers approaches? Totally different from a DC-Net, as far as I understand DC-Nets (I think I do, but Applied Crypto's in my dorm, and I'm at home, so I can't check) In this approach, computers are organized in "rings"; each computer in a given ring always has an encrypted packet in circulation. When the group of packets arrives at a given station, it replaces its current encrypted packet with a new packet; if it doesn't have any new packets to send, it puts up a garbage packet that is indistinguishable from a normal packet. It then scans all the other packets and attempts to decrypt them with its private key. Any it can read, it does; all the packets are forwarded to the next station in the ring. By the time the next set of packets arrives, all have been replaced; the station is unable to determine either the source or the destination of any given packet. Routing between loops is done by routers, which are computers on multiple loops. Perhaps all machines are on multiple loops and serve as routers. I'm not sure about traffic analysis in cases where Mallet controls a significant portion of the network; while this is unlikely, it must be considered. Any significant inconsistancies are probably mine... Jon Lasser ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jon Lasser (410)494-3072 Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Bob Bruen, MIT Lab for Nuclear Science" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:24:59 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: RE: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work Message-ID: <960102200837.4460036b@mitlns.mit.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain DCF wrote: >Thought control is a very difficult task. It always has been. The >Inquisition, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of >China tried but three of the four are no longer with us. Short of >totalitarian controls, thought controls will be ineffective. And >totalitarian controls are difficult to impose these days. While thought control is difficult, one cannot ignore the damage done trying to do it. All of the above examples were expensive in terms of human suffering and death toll for long periods of time. The controls were effective for some time with long periods for recovery. The facists may lose in the end but the price of victory is very high. I fear the current and future efforts at controls will be costly no matter what the outcome. bob From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 10:22:22 +0800 To: pmonta@qualcomm.com (Peter Monta) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601030140.RAA03047@mage.qualcomm.com> Message-ID: <199601030209.UAA27249@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > It seems to me that phone line costs are turning into a floor price for > > Internet access, when they shouldn't really be. The main asset telephone > > companies have, right now, is in RIGHTS OF WAY. Put an ISP in a business > > park that allows you to run your own dedicated copper pairs, and you've > > bypassed $25/month/line business phone line charges. > > > > At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could easily be > > "guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious trenching, etc. The > > phoneco would still be involved, but in a far lower-profit mode, as the > > supplier of a single T1 to a multi-block area. > > For the "last mile" to the ISP user, wireless could be a better bet. > Have antenna, will surf. I can easily visualize mobile and portable systems linking to an ISP, downloading email via encrypted POP/UUCP/whatever, using itinerant 2m or 450 MHz frequencies. A mobile system connects to any ISP, gets a login: prompt, enters "xyz@host.domain", gets thrown into a POP session on host.domain, uploads/downloads, then disconnects. All it would really require is implementing "exec rlogin -l xyz host.domain" into getty (a very simple patch) and suitable crypto protocols... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOnlPyS9AwzY9LDxAQHJ2QP7BhISrKa3zgNs7gsGaTdp3JLj39ER6mJ1 NiefPhys5wsKfSSzOeGbVzOTahmFJHofeY3qyhkCjycinLttSYtN7lAhwrskXbdx 8x/DjHBisOaloyEZPjpdSRshGi65ziUNhudEr+NAWdF3izZ/R0M3m6WkN7O7VH2S 8xh+SQWFA44= =P+B0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 12:30:35 +0800 To: "J. Kent Hastings" Subject: Re: Inter-Patch Voice Network Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 19:25 1/2/96, J. Kent Hastings wrote: >-- [ From: J. Kent Hastings * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Cpunx, > >This may be old hat, but now that PGPfone is available, why >don't we start an "Inter-Patch" Network using PGP and ecash? The time for that type of project is definitely here. There is a "Free World Dial-up" project out there that offers free calls worldwide. It is modeled after the remote printing fax network. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:38:08 +0800 To: ravage@ssz.com (Jim Choate) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601030146.TAA02574@einstein.ssz.com> Message-ID: <199601030240.UAA29676@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > From: Jeff Simmons > > Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers > > Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 16:32:33 -0800 (PST) > > > > Punknet is a 'Guerilla ISP'. Twenty of us share a 128k ISDN line, > > distributed via high-speed modems. It's been running fine for over > > a year now, but Pacific Bell has evidently decided to get rid of us. > > > > How? Simply by refusing to either repair or replace our 25 pair trunk > > line, which is rapidly degrading. We've offered to replace it ourselves, > > but according to them, it's illegal. Right now, we've got three dead lines, > > and two others that only will do 1200 baud. > > Hmmm, you should have some kind of Public Utility Commission (PUC) in your area > that regulates the service provider. Here in Texas if SWBT received more Anyone else get two copies of this? I don't think this is me... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOnsgiS9AwzY9LDxAQF1RwQApz1hFlsNIMiX5cKf9Sy484HIg8N5WfDr PX12AVDlfmbCxbMRAJ/lyfJMgEOYTEURinjg5rk53KLOA+TNimTyawl0sArIOvdQ xJvklJQd3LFH6EfIg7pDXOiD/Rn6b/+bnDI4FBYL06C708cWWuWxcFGzghF9PWyI mouSBFOl8zQ= =lQ4N -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:31:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: FCC require ISDN? (fwd) Message-ID: <199601030308.VAA02856@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 02 Jan 1996 20:40:25 -0600 > From: "David K. Merriman" > Subject: FCC require ISDN? > > At 07:46 PM 01/2/96 -0600, Jim Choate bespake thusly: > > >The FCC is enacting a new regulation that will cause every phone company to > >provide 100% of their service areas with ISDN (you should have received some > >kind of notice last week, I did). This also sets some minimum standards as > >well as to the type and quality of service the phone company must provide. > > Citation? Here in Amarillo, if it rains, the phone lines start caving in, > and I'd like to beat up SWBT for ISDN service :-) > > Dave Merriman > > PS - sorry for posting this to the whole list, but couldn't get this past my > ISP to Jim directly :-( Public Utility Commission of Texas 7800 Shoal Creek Blvd. Austin, TX 78757 512-458-0256 512-458-0221 Please be advised that the PUC is not responsible for enforcing the technical standards overall, that is the FCC. It is responsible for setting rates and resolving problems with customers on specific problems. The letter I received from SWBT is as follows: Dear Customer: On November 17, 1995, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (SWBT) filed an application (assigned Tariff Control No. 15024) concerning its ISDN-based services, as required by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Commission) Substantive Rule (SR) 23.69 Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). ISDN is a digital network architecture that provides a wide variety of services, a standard set of user-network messages, and integrated access to the network. Access methods to the ISDN are the Basic Rate Interface (BRI) and the Primary Rate Interface (PRI). This application does not increase the currently approved rates or optional ISDN based services (i.e. SWBT's DigiLine(sm), SmartTrunk(sm), SelectVideo Plus(sm) and PLEXAR(sm) ISDN services) and their features. SR 23.69 sets forth the requirements for the provision of optional ISDN-based services. In accordance with SR 23.69, at a minimum, ISDN-based services shall comply with National ISDN-1 and National ISDN-2 Standards and be capable of providing end-to-end digital connectivity. SWBT's application includes the offering of ISDN with PLEXAR(sm) II Service and new features to DigiLine(sm) and SmartTrunk(sm) Services to meet the standards required to meet standards required by SR 23.69. Also, SBWT is proposing in this application to eliminate the minimum station requirement for PLEXAR II(sm) Service and the offering of occassional user plan for DigiLine(sm) Service to future customers. In addition, SR 23.69 requires SWBT to make ISDN-based services available to all its exchanges in Texas by July 1, 1996. SWBT is currently offering ISDN-based services in its exchanges comprised in the Abilene, Amarillo, Austin, Brownsville, Dallas, El Paso, Houston, Lubbock and San Antonio LATAs. In compliance with the rule, SWBT will make ISDN-based services available in its remaining exchanges comprised in the Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Hearne, Longview, Midland, Waco, and Wichita Falls LATAs by July 1, 1996. SR 23.69 also establishes the effective date of this application to be no later than July 1, 1996. The new optional ISDN-based service and features are expected to generate first year net revenues of approximately $372,000. Persons who wish to comment on this application should notify the Commission by January 12, 1996. Requests for further information should be mailed (faxed material is not acceptable for filling) to the Public Utility Commission of Texas, 7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Austin, Texas 78757, or you may call the Public Utility Commission Public Information Office at 512-458-0256 or 512-458-0221 for text telephone. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:27:40 +0800 To: Carl Ellison Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 23:21 1/2/96, Carl Ellison wrote: >This is merely a technical means for producing anonymous communications. > >Anonymity = conspiracy? Poll after poll shows that the majority of Americans is eager to allow warrantless searches of their homes and property to aid the War on Drugs. Every non-CP person that I tell about remailers asks me "This is legal?". Meaning that they would expect it to be illegal. Surely a prohibition against anonymous remailers and especially against DC nets is a small prize to pay for perceived security against the Four Horsemen... Inevitably, a DC net or the Token Ring approach described earlier will be used for illegal purposes. Once, not if, that comes to pass all participants will be guilty of conspiracy and their property subject to forfeiture. No trial needed and it will happen to the applause of the general public. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:00:11 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: No Subject Message-ID: <199601022027.VAA24980@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Cypherpunks write code. With that phrase and the wave of attempts to censor the 'Net, I've embarked on a quest to make remailers easier to use. Has anyone written an easy to use Windows or DOS application that will let someone chain a message through several remailers, perhaps with support for the mailer at alpha.c2.org? Would the writer of such a program, if in the US fall under the provisions in ITAR? Obviously, calls to the PGP program would have to be made. I recall reading that such hooks do fall under the ITAR. If this is true, so much for a more user friendly version of chain for the masses. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Bruce Schneier Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:02:42 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: no subject (file transmission) Message-ID: <199601030329.VAA04190@parka> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, Second Edition ERRATA Version 1.0 - 3 January 1996 This errata includes all errors I have found in the book, including minor spelling and grammatical errors. Please distribute this errata sheet to anyone else who owns a copy of the book. Page 11: Line 18, the reference should be "[703]" and not "[699]". Page 13: Fifth paragraph, first sentence, should read: "The German Enigma had three rotors, chosen from a set of five,...." Page 14: The last sentence should read: "The smallest displacement that indicates a multiple of the key length is the length of the key." Page 16: Third line from the bottom, "1.44" makes more sense as "1.544". Page 18: Table 1.1, second item. 1 in 4,000,000 is 2^22. Page 53: Second to last sentence about SKEY should read: "Similarly, the database is not useful to an attacker." Page 61: Step (3), the second message should contain A instead of B. Page 62: In the third line, there's a comma missing. Page 63: Second protocol, step (2), the second message should be "S_T(C,K_C)". Page 70: In the first step (4), the equation should be "R XOR S = M". In the second step (2), it should be "to generate U". Page 77: In step (2), the message is signed with Trent's private key. And T_n is mistakenly both the time and the timestamp. Page 82: Fourth line from the bottom, the correct expression is "up and died." Page 99: Tenth line from the bottom, delete the second word: "will". Page 104: Graph isomorphism has never been proven to be an NP-Complete problem. It does seem to be hard, and is probably useful for cryptography. Page 105: In Step (2), Peggy gives Victor a copy of H'. Page 112: Step (1) should read "Alice takes the document and multiplies it by a random value." Page 116: The protocol could be worded better. Step (3) should begin: "Alice decrypts Bob's key twice, once with each of her private keys." Step (4) should begin: "Alice encrypts both of her messages, each with a different one of the DES keys...." Page 126: The "Voting with Blind Signatures" protocol is a little more complicated. The voter does not send all the blinding factors in step (2). The CTF requests 9 of 10 blinding factors in step (3), and the voter sends only those blinding factors to the CTF. Page 134: Another problem with this protocol is that there are numerous ways that various participants can cheat and collude to find out the salary of another participant. These cheaters can misrepresent their own salaries during their attack. Page 135: Lines 13-14; technically Alice and Bob get no additional information about the other's numbers. Page 136: Lines 14-15; technically Alice and Bob get no additional information about the other's numbers. Page 144: Line 27, the odds should be "1 in n". Line 29, "step (2) should be "step (1)". Page 161: In the eleventh line from the bottom, "harnesses" should be "harnessed". Page 181: Line a should read "he does not know it" instead of "he does know it". Page 195: In line 13, the reference number should be [402]. Page 201: Error Propagation, lines 5-6. The sentence should read: "In 8- bit CFB mode, 9 bytes of decrypted plaintext are garbled by a single-bit error in the ciphertext." Page 202: Third to last line, toggling individual bits does not affect subsequent bits in a synchronous stream cipher. Page 203: Section 9.8, both equations should be "S_i = E_K(S_(i-1))". Page 209: Table 9.1. CFB, Security: Bits of the last block can be changed, not the first. CFB, Efficiency: The speed is the same as the block cipher only in 64-bit CFB. CFB and OFB, Efficiency: "Ciphertext is the same size as the plaintext" should be a plus. Page 217: The Table 10.1 headers got garbled. They should be: "Algorithm", "Confidentiality", "Authentication", "Integrity", and "Key Management". Page 246: The last line should be: "#define isEven(x) ((x & 0x01) == 0)". Page 249: Line 9, "Euclid's generalization" should be "Euler's generalization". Page 251: Lines 20-21. The sentence should read: "For example, there are 11 quadratic residues mod 35: 1, 4, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 21, 25, 29, and 30." See page 505 for more details. Page 258: In line 27, his name is spelled "Chandrasekhar". Page 275: Table 12.4; it should be a "48-Bit Input". Page 281: In line 4, "minuscule" is misspelled as "miniscule". Page 287: In Figure 12.6, there should be no period in X or Y. Page 292: Second line, "b_24" should be "b_26". In line 10, "1/2 - .0061" should be "1/2 + .0061". Page 295: Third line from the bottom, 2^(120/n) should be (2^120)/n. Page 300: In the first line, "56" should be "48". Page 319: In line 11, Section "25.13" should be "25.14". Page 322: Last line, the chip is 107.8 square mm. Page 338: In Figure 14.3 and in the first line, "f" should be "F". Page 340: Second equation should be "mod 256". Page 341: The current variants of SAFER are SAFER SK-40, SAFER SK-64, and SAFER SK-128, all with a modified key schedule, in response to a theoretical attack by Lars Knudsen presented at Crypto '95. Page 345: Lines 10 and 11; the + should be a -. Page 346: The reference number for BaseKing should be [402]. Page 352: In line 8, that second "l" should be an "r". Page 358: In the decryption equation of Davies-Price mode, the final D should be an E. Page 362: In the first equation, P is used to indicate both padding and plaintext. If P is plaintext and p is padding, then the equation should be: C = E_K3(p(E_K2(p(E_K1(P))))). Page 362: Figure 15.2 is wrong. The middle and top rows of "Encrypt," and the plaintext feeding them, are shifted right by 1/2 block from where they should be. Page 363: The parenthetical remark would be clearer as: "encryption with one of n different keys, used cyclically". Page 363: Second to last line, the equation should have an I_2 in place of the I_1. Page 367: Second equation, "P XOR K_3" should be "C XOR K_3". Page 369: A maximal period linear congruential generator as a period of m, not m-1. Page 375: Third paragraph should read: "It is easy to turn this into a maximal period LFSR. The highest exponent is the size of the register, n. Number the bits from n-1 to 0. The numbers, including the 0, specify the tap sequence, counting from the left of the register. The x^n term of the polynomial stands for the input being fed into the left end." The next paragraph is wrong. Page 379: Second line of code has an extra close parentheses. Page 380: The forth line should begin: "On the other hand, an astonishingly...." Page 393: In Figure 16.16, there should be an arrow from b_4 to the Output Function. Page 393: Second sentence should be: "It's a method for combining multiple pseudo-random streams that increases their security." Page 429: The second sentence should be: "It returns a fixed-length hash value, h." Page 431: In step (2), "prepend" instead of "append". Page 440: In item 3, there is an "AND" missing in the equation. Page 441: The compression function of MD2 is confusing without the indentations. The two for-loops are nested, and include the next two statements. Page 444: In figure 18.7, the a, b, c, d, and e variables are backwards. Page 445: Line 14, SHA should be compared to MD4. Page 447: Lines 3-4 should read: "...CBC in [1145], CBC in [55,56,54]...." Page 449: Figure 18.9, M_i and H_i-1 in the upper-left diagram should be reversed. Page 456: Table 18.2. Encryption speed should be in "kilobytes/second", and "SNEERU" should be "SNEFRU". Page 457: Lines 3 and 4, the ending "-1" and "-2" should be superscripts. Page 465: In the third line of text, the number should be n^-1. Page 470: The second to last line is missing an "is". Page 480: An additional reference for elliptic-curve cryptosystems is N. Koblitz, A Course in Number Theory and Cryptography, Springer-Verlag, 1988. This is an excellent book, and omitting it was an oversight. Page 489: Caption to Table 20.3 should specify an "80386 33 MHz personal computer". Page 495: In Step (8), the constant should be "0x7fffffff". Page 497: Delete the fourth equation in the list of verification equations. Page 499: ESIGN, seventh line: "m-1 should be "n-1". Page 505: In step 3, the third sentence should be: "If Victor's first bit is a 1, then s_1 is part of the product...." Page 514: In step (1), Alice must sent X to Bob. Page 515: In line 1, "commutitive" is misspelled as "communitive". Page 515: Hughes. Step (2): In order for step (4) to work, y must be relatively prime to n-1 else the inverse function in step (4) won't work. If n is a strong prime such that (n-1)/2 is also prime, then y can be any odd random large integer except for (n-1)/2. In step (4), Bob computes: z=y^-1 mod (n-1). Page 516: In the Station-to-Station protocol, the exponentiation is missing. In step (1), Alice sends Bob g^x mod p. In step (2), Bob computes the shared key based on g^x mod p and y. He signs g^x mod p and g^y mod p, and encrypts the signature using k. He sends that, along with g^y mod p, to Alice. In step (3), Alice sends a signed message consisting of g^x mod p and g^y mod p, encrypted in their shared key. Page 529: Line 13 should be a polynomial of degree 5, not 6. Page 535: The technique wherein Mallory leaks 10 bits of DSA secret per signature, can be sped up by a factor of 16 or so. Instead of choosing a 4-bit block randomly and then searching for a k that leaks the correct 14 bits, he can just use the low 4 bits of r to select the block of the signature to leak (no need to have an opaque subliminal channel) and he only has to check an average of 1024 k values until the bits sent out over the 10 subliminal channels match the 10 bits of the secret selected by r = (g^k mod p) mod q. Page 568: In the Kerberos Version 5 Messages, step 3, the final "s" should not be subscripted. Page 586: Figure 24.7, in the key the arrow should point from y to x. Page 586: Seventh line, "revokation" should be spelled "revocation". Page 589: Section 24.15, fourth line: "Nambia" should be "Namibia". Page 592: The equation is wrong. The structure of the LEAF is "E_KF(U,E_KU(K_S),C)", where U is the 32-bit unit ID, K_S is the 80-bit session key, and C is a 16-bit checksum of K_S and the IV (and possibly other material) used by the receiving chip to ensure that it has a valid LEAF. Page 604: Fourth line from the bottom should read: "to U.S. patent law." Page 606: In lines 12 and 13, the cross-references are to chapter 18. Page 607: In Table 25.4, the column headers are reversed. Page 610: Sixth line should read "it is filed", not "it is filled". Page 683: In reference 210, the title of the paper is "A Comparison of Three Modular Reduction Functions". Page 705: In reference 727, subscript should be a superscript. This errata is updated periodically. For a current errata sheet, send a self-addressed stamped envelope to: Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems, 101 East Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis, MN 55419; or send electronic mail to: schneier@counterpane.com. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Laszlo Vecsey Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 10:51:28 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Unmuzzy Explained Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain So is the idea beyond this that if file or a group of files were to be distributed over many computers (possibly hundreds or more) then none of the computers would be "responsible" for their content? I would think that any participant in the network would have to claim full responsibility for the content, assuming the file(s) could be accessed from any of the participating servers. I'd be interesting in joining the Unmuzzy (programmers) mailing list, does anyone know what the email is or where the home page is? A net search returned nothing. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:23:58 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Errata for _Applied Crypto_ Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Wink Junior writes: > Bruce Schneier has an errata file for the second > edition of _Applied Cryptography_ available on request. Hopefully he will > also make it available via the Web. Hats off to Bruce for making this > information available in a timely, cost-effective manner. It is available from the Wimsey crypto archive (thanks Bruce!) ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto/Doc/applied_cryptography/2nd_ed_errata-1.0 -- Mark Henderson -- markh@wimsey.bc.ca, henderso@netcom.com, mch@squirrel.com PGP 1024/C58015E3 fingerprint=21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto/sun-stuff/change-sun-hostid-1.6.1.tar.gz From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:22:52 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 8:17 PM 1/2/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >That would require outlawry of crypto over the backbone and some way of >convincing the backbone to run government approved code. Quite a bit of >resistance would ensue. Have the Feds ever successfully mandated that large >numbers of people run government code? Aren't we all using Ada? --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:28:06 +0800 To: Peter Monta Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 05:37 PM 1/2/96 -0800, you wrote: >> It seems to me that phone line costs are turning into a floor price for >> Internet access, when they shouldn't really be. The main asset telephone >> companies have, right now, is in RIGHTS OF WAY. Put an ISP in a business >> park that allows you to run your own dedicated copper pairs, and you've >> bypassed $25/month/line business phone line charges. >> >> At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could easily be >> "guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious trenching, etc. The >> phoneco would still be involved, but in a far lower-profit mode, as the >> supplier of a single T1 to a multi-block area. > >For the "last mile" to the ISP user, wireless could be a better bet. >Have antenna, will surf. Yes, you're absolutely right. It would be great if some entrepreneur could buy a T1, put up a 2000 MHz (or somewhere around that; whatever frequency was allocated appropriately) local "cellular" data system which would be able to connect to up to, say, 100 simultaneous or so local users using modems little more complicated than a current 900 MHz cordless phone. Okay, maybe all this stuff is already being worked on at a few dozen or hundred companies around the globe, but I can't wait... >(Not speaking for Qualcomm, etc.) > >Peter Monta pmonta@qualcomm.com >Qualcomm, Inc./Globalstar Question: Is this the "Qualcomm" that does the Internet access software, or the "Qualcomm" who builds the wireless amps/filters/hardware/etc? Or is it all the same company?!? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: sameer Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:27:09 +0800 To: accessnt@ozemail.com.au (Mark Neely) Subject: Re: US calls for measures against Internet porn In-Reply-To: <199601030047.LAA07011@oznet02.ozemail.com.au> Message-ID: <199601030549.VAA11513@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > You can't tell me that someone who fires up their Web browser and points it > to http://www.playboy.com, or clicks yes to a request that they acknowledge > that they are over 18/21/majority and agree to access adult material doesn't > know what they are getting themselves into... Just to offer another story of the cluelessness of some people: I've been receiving a number of complaints about one of my users who has gotten into a flamewar on Usenet. They claim that flaming is a violation of FCC regulations. (Maybe eventually it will be.. sigh.) -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777x3 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer@c2.org From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@alpha.c2.org (Anonymous) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:24:51 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601030331.TAA27550@netcom2.netcom.com> Message-ID: <199601030611.WAA13284@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) wrote: > Don't forget about infrared to cross public rights-of-way. What about fog? > I have long dreamed of tossing a piece of coax over the fence to my > neighbors. That's not difficult. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 20:11:08 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 08:09 PM 1/2/96 -0600, you wrote: >> For the "last mile" to the ISP user, wireless could be a better bet. >> Have antenna, will surf. > >I can easily visualize mobile and portable systems linking to an ISP, >downloading email via encrypted POP/UUCP/whatever, using itinerant 2m or >450 MHz frequencies. A mobile system connects to any ISP, gets a login: >prompt, enters "xyz@host.domain", gets thrown into a POP session on >host.domain, uploads/downloads, then disconnects. All it would really >require is implementing "exec rlogin -l xyz host.domain" into getty (a >very simple patch) and suitable crypto protocols... >- -- >Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com As a ham, too (N7IJS) I recognize your implicit selection of 2m or 450 MHz. But I gently object to this, for reasons that I think will be obvious. First, technology has been marching on in the last 10-20 years, and communications frequencies of 2 GHz and more are technically do-able and comparatively empty. (and with modern IC technology, even easy) Secondly, ham gear tends to be used for long-range communication (miles and watts) and generally has little or no ability to frequency hop/time hop or to automatically turn down transmitter power to be able to share frequencies over short distances (low milliwatts or even microwatts). Those high gigahertz frequencies would be ideal for communication over a few blocks distance. (Sure, packet has been done for years but it is a still-born development; they still think 9600 bps is a "fast" modem speed.) I forsee locally-owned boxes that are the equivalent of a wireless phone switch implementing re-used freuqency microcells; the cost SHOULD be far lower than the current copperline phone systems, once the telephones are paid for. And they shouldn't cost much more than current 900 MHz cordless telephones, too. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Steve Gibbons Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 20:11:53 +0800 To: jimbell@pacifier.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <0099BCED.4820A3A0.346@aztech.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In Article: , jim bell wrote: # It seems to me that phone line costs are turning into a floor price for # Internet access, when they shouldn't really be. The main asset telephone # companies have, right now, is in RIGHTS OF WAY. Put an ISP in a business # park that allows you to run your own dedicated copper pairs, and you've # bypassed $25/month/line business phone line charges. # At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could easily be # "guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious trenching, etc. The # phoneco would still be involved, but in a far lower-profit mode, as the # supplier of a single T1 to a multi-block area. I had a similar thought about a month ago. In particular, I was thinking that skyrise office buildings would be a great market for ISPs to target. Rent a closet in the basement/top floor close to the telco demarc. Run lots of UTP to the cients through the existing conduit, ceiling acces, air ducts, or whatever and boom, lots of clients, low overhead, telco bills cut to 1/2 of the competitions'. Up-front costs might (or might not be) higher, since the wire installation would now be the burden of the ISP. ObCrypto: Wiring overhead could be reduced if the building network was moved away from a star configuration to something closer to a backbone with multiple physical subnets (say, per floor.) How do you keep your next door neighbor from sniffing your traffic on the same subnet? Encrypt it, silly... For performance reasons, truly local traffic could be in the clear, but traffic between the clients' routers and the ISP's would run through something that could keep up with the ISP's max throughput on the ISP's outside interface. You might read "Firewall with encrypted tunnels" for "router" in the paragraph above. If you do, then you have the infrastructure for supporting "secure" trans-Internet traffic. Of course we're not talking about $25.00/mo. service with a $50.00 setup anymore, but low-ish priced, "secure" 56Kb/s, fractional T1, T1, and even T3 seem to be where corporate America/Earth wants to go. FWIW, (and if anyone winds up doing something like this, I want a "finders fee" ;-) ) -- Steve@AZTech.Net From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Rich Salz Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 12:17:25 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: altavista.digital.com Message-ID: <9601030354.AA29834@sulphur.osf.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >From a friend at work. Marginal crypto relevance but useful for alerting those who think public mailing lists and Usenet are one-time pads. :) >A friend of mine at Digital implemented the Alta Vista search engine. >Here's the configuration he's working with today, with plans for scaling >as necessary. > >>The web index is built and queried by a two processor 300MHz Alpha. >>There's 2GBytes of RAM and 200GBytes of disc on RAID controllers. >>We'll have to expand if load really takes off. There are other, >>smaller machines doing the HTTP server, the news index, the news spool, >>and the web robot. /r$ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Douglas F. Elznic" Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 13:04:20 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: <2.2.16.19960103035752.3e0fe0d8@terminus.storm.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain What is the deal with the 2047 bit keys? How do you produce one? IS it compatible with international versions? -- ==================Douglas Elznic=================== delznic@storm.net http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/ (315)682-5489 (315)682-1647 4877 Firethorn Circle Manlius, NY 13104 "Challenge the system, question the rules." =================================================== PGP key available: http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/pgpkey.asc PGP Fingerprint: 68 6F 89 F6 F0 58 AE 22 14 8A 31 2A E5 5C FD A5 =================================================== From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Goerzen Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 20:17:16 +0800 To: Steve14571@aol.com Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet In-Reply-To: <951231091526_102864093@mail06.mail.aol.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I have not been a CompuServe subscriber for years. But I do remember how things worked. It is my _assumption_ that the Usenet gateway operates by importing all Usenet news into the CompuServe system, at which point users can access it. CompuServe is not location-dependant. The network operates exactly the same regardless of calling location (indeed, the system doesn't even know where you're calling from I believe). It is a worldwide CompuServe Network that people use to access it. This network just allows dialups and then gets the users connected to the CompuServe computers. The main computers handle all traffic. They don't are location-independant, making it impossible to block access based on location. -- John Goerzen, programmer and owner | Merry Christmas! | Communications Centre, Goessel, KS +-------------------------------------+ Main e-mail: jgoerzen@complete.org | Other e-mail: goerzenj@complete.org | On Sun, 31 Dec 1995 Steve14571@aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 95-12-30 21:34:12 EST, accessnt@ozemail.com.au (Mark > Neely) wrote: > > I assume that C$ is only filtering the newsfeed as it hits German shores? > Please tell me > they aren't denying access to these "banned" newsgroups for all users > worldwide! > > This is exactly what they are doing, Mr. Neely. I am not familiar with > CompuServe, as I have never used it. However, based on my understanding of > how Usenet operates, it would be possible to write software and incorporate > it into CompuServe software that would block German readers from the > "obscene" newsgroups. CompuServe would rather score points with the mostly > ignorant general public by saying that they are becoming more > "family-oriented." > > I get my access through America Online, and I am afraid that these monolith > online services (AOL, Delphi, Prodigy) will follow C$'s lead so they may also > say they are "family-oriented." > > I will no longer send mail to addresses that end with "compuserve.com." If > AOL decides to become family oriented, I will look for other ways to connect > to the net. > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 16:12:59 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <199601030710.XAA28408@netcom5.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 22:11 1/2/96 -0800, Anonymous wrote: >frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) wrote: > >> Don't forget about infrared to cross public rights-of-way. > >What about fog? How much reliability do you need? As a first approxmation, look out your window. How often is it that you can't see your neighbor's house? Here in California, power failures are more frequent. (N.B. higher level protocols will recover from interruptions due to, e.g. large trucks.) I first heard of people using the technology to extend an IBM mainframe channel across a freeway 15 or 20 years ago. Bill From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 16:24:22 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work Message-ID: <199601022214.XAA28190@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Ed Carp: >Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old >Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying >that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free >market economy. > >Never underestimate the value of human stupidity and shortsightedness. Definitely. The number of warm and well-fed people who are willing to lecture the cold and starving on morals and higher principles is mind-boggling. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Carl Ellison Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:27:43 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis Message-ID: <199601030421.XAA29402@clark.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >Date: Tue, 02 Jan 1996 19:44:53 -0800 >From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) >Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis >At 20:02 1/2/96, Jon Lasser wrote: > >>When the group of packets arrives at a given station, it replaces its >>current encrypted packet with a new packet; >All participants in this network are clearly guilty of conspiracy. Their >assets will be confiscated under RICO. Sounds like disasterizing to me. This is merely a technical means for producing anonymous communications. Anonymity = conspiracy? - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Carl M. Ellison cme@acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | | PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 21:09:15 +0800 To: Jim Choate Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 01:47 PM 1/2/96 -0600, you wrote: > >Forwarded message: > >> Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 18:43:31 +0000 (GMT) >> From: "Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon)" >> Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers >> >> About ten years ago a group I was involved with were thinking about >> putting something into space as a publicity stunt. One company we talked >> to claimed they could put 1 kg into orbit on one of their sounding rockets >> for about $ 30,000 (that's a 1 kg satellite, not $ 30,000 per kg). How >> small can you build a "data haven" satellite ? >> >> Looking a few years into the future, you could probably stick a >> stripped-down Linux laptop with solar cells and a stripped-down satellite >> telephone as a Net link on top of a slightly larger rocket and charge for >> on-orbit storage using ecash... Using remailers it should be pretty-much >> untraceable. >> > >Actualy, both the Pacific Coast Rocketry group and the Experimental >Spacecraft Association are working on putting the first amateur payload in >LEO. ESA wants to put a telescope with real-time downlink up as their >payload. PCR wants to put some kind of transponder up. > >Under current technology a group of about 30 dedicated amateurs (with >suitable skills) could put a 25kg payload in orbit for under 1/4 million. >It would consist of surplus and amateur built equipment. > >Tripolli puts out a magazine called High Performance Rocketry which you may >be able to find at your local newstand (in Austin you get it at the Central >Market Bookstop). It usually carries at least a couple of adds for material >that PCR and a couple of smaller groups are putting out to help fund their >project. I would say it will be less than 3 years before this dream occurs >unless the DOT (the people who regulate all space shots now) decides not to >give them a permit. As I understand the physics, the whole process could be made FAR FAR FAR more efficient if the rocket was boosted to about 40000 feet with a subsonic airplane, a' la' X-15 and such. It's above 75% of the earth's atmosphere (dramatically reduced drag), is already going 600 mph in the correct direction, and is 8 miles closer to the ultimate goal 250 miles up). This might not sound like much of an advantage, but if you've ever worked out the mathematics of the Saturn V (or space shuttle, etc), the VAST majority of the fuel was used up in the first 20,000 feet, maybe even the first 5000 feet. It would be even better if the first stage could be an air-breathing supersonic ramjet, but that's not my field of expertise. In addition, the existence of relatively low-cost GPS receivers would make achieving an accurate orbit vastly cheaper than with the inertial guidance systems historically used. Sure, cheap accelerometers are being sold by Analog Devices and Murata Erie sells cheap vibrational gyros (not to mention fiber gyros) but it would be hard to beat the accuracy you could get with GPS. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:45:09 +0800 To: Steve Gibbons MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 22:51 1/2/96, Steve Gibbons wrote: >I had a similar thought about a month ago. In particular, I was thinking that >skyrise office buildings would be a great market for ISPs to target. Rent a >closet in the basement/top floor close to the telco demarc. Run lots of >UTP to >the cients through the existing conduit, ceiling acces, air ducts, or whatever >and boom, lots of clients, low overhead, telco bills cut to 1/2 of the >competitions'. Up-front costs might (or might not be) higher, since the wire >installation would now be the burden of the ISP. [...] >FWIW, (and if anyone winds up doing something like this, I want a "finders >fee" ;-) ) Sorry, I thought of this months ago :-) But there is an even better business opportunity out there. Wireless T1 service covering a whole downtown area. I speced the whole system for the last company I worked for before they ran out of money. My calculations show that you can deliver close to T1 speed to corporate customers at fraction of the cost using land lines. In the best case scenario, you can produce the individual connection at below $200. No land line based ISP can ever touch that. The total cost for a land line based IPS is at least $395/T1. Set-up fee is lower too. Best, the whole thing can be set up self financing. If I wasn't so busy with other projects, I'd implement it myself. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 15:42:42 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 22:11 1/2/96, Anonymous wrote: >frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) wrote: > >> Don't forget about infrared to cross public rights-of-way. > >What about fog? Infrared and laser are not very reliable between buildings during fog. Between your house and your neighbor, a low cost 900MHz bridge would be the best way to go. On such short distances, an omni-directional antenna will work just fine. Check out Solectek (cheaper) or Cylink (faster). Both offer DES link encryption. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Steve Gibbons Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 19:21:11 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <0099BD00.63F6D1E0.1@aztech.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In Article: , shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) wrote: # At 22:51 1/2/96, Steve Gibbons wrote: # >I had a similar thought about a month ago. In particular, I was thinking that # >skyrise office buildings would be a great market for ISPs to target. Rent a # >closet in the basement/top floor close to the telco demarc. Run lots of # >UTP to # >the cients through the existing conduit, ceiling acces, air ducts, or whatever # >and boom, lots of clients, low overhead, telco bills cut to 1/2 of the # >competitions'. Up-front costs might (or might not be) higher, since the wire # >installation would now be the burden of the ISP. # [...] # >FWIW, (and if anyone winds up doing something like this, I want a "finders # >fee" ;-) ) # Sorry, I thought of this months ago :-) But did you post/publish? :) # But there is an even better # business opportunity out there. Wireless T1 service covering a whole # downtown area. I speced the whole system for the last company I worked for # before they ran out of money. My calculations show that you can deliver # close to T1 speed to corporate customers at fraction of the cost using land # lines. In the best case scenario, you can produce the individual connection # at below $200. No land line based ISP can ever touch that. The total cost # for a land line based IPS is at least $395/T1. Set-up fee is lower too. # Best, the whole thing can be set up self financing. If I wasn't so busy # with other projects, I'd implement it myself. I'd be interested in seeing your numbers and cost breakdowns. I'd really be interested in the up-front costs that would be associated with the equipment and set-up time/training that will help "insure" data privacy over wideley broadcast media. The up-front costs for ~T1 capable tranceivers isn't insignificant either. I figure ~$10K up front (maybe half of that, maybe twice when you include management overhead) Amortize over 3 years, and compare. All of this is assuming that the bandwidth is available on the airwaves to handle ~200 ~T1s. (If we're talking $200.00/mo. for T1, sign me up tomorrow, and my neighbor, and his, and hers, and... *poof* no more bandwidth in a "decently" populated metro area or even a downtown. (Back of the envelope calculations show that ~200 T1 ~= 1 TV station [although I might be off by an order of magnitude.]) I apologize if this is off topic, but the crypto part still applies (moreso, even!) to broadcast over the airwaves. (Besides, I'm sure that this list has enough subscribers that are shelling out $200-$500/mo. for 56K/Frac T1/ISDN that they'd be interested in a less expensive alternative.) -- Steve@AZTech.Net From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Loren James Rittle Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:33:08 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: NYT's _Unmuzzling the Internet_ Message-ID: <9601030920.AA05852@supra.comm.mot.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jaron Lanier wrote in the _The New York Times_, January 2, 1996, p. A15: ``The other day, I came up with a way to easily evade the proposed American restrictions. My simple idea would be to create a computer program, dubbed `Unmuzzle,' which would deposit incomprehensible fragments of any forbidden material in different foreign computers (though maybe not Germany's). The contraband communication would only be reassembled into a coherent whole when downloaded in the home of the user back in the United States, where it would become protected speech, as in any other medium.'' Is this the state to which the Internet must evolve to withstand attack from the possible near-future legislation contained within the current draft of the Telecommunications Reregulation Bill? The Internet technology that was designed to withstand network outages by routing around the problem must now, perhaps, also be designed to allow information to be split for storage and transmission to navigate around mere political insanity. I know: "Cypherpunks write code!", but something seems amiss with the technical solution proposed in the opinion editorial quoted above. Many questions are begged in my mind. At first, the Jaron proposal sounds like an interesting thought experiment but a total waste of bandwidth, both CPU and network, to me. The unconstitutional Bill must be defeated in Congress, by that Presidential veto pen that Clinton has become so fond of using recently or the Court system, if absolutely necessary. If none of that happens, then surely technology can be used to route around this "political" problem. It just seems like a shame to have to expend technical effort and valuable network resources to play games to meet the letter of a law, which would so clearly break the direct spirit of the Constitution, if signed into Law and later found during a Supreme Court battle to "pass constitutional muster," as they like to say. Under my model, which may be different than Jaron's, I assume the raw data is useless without a recipe, or algorithm, if you prefer. Jaron doesn't say how the ``incomprehensible fragments of any forbidden material'' are known to be joinable and how they are to be joined so I invented this as the missing glue to discuss his idea in this forum. I assume a recipe would be a new base item fetchable via a standard URL. It would disclose the location of raw data sets, how they should be joined and the resultant data-type of the information, if the recipe were to be followed. In this way, it might be possible to work a decoder directly into Mosaic/NetScape/HotJava/. (Perhaps a self-imposed rating could be included within the recipe as additional information bits. Or, perhaps the recipe could be signed by one or more reviewers, which may be trusted by end-users. These features are mentioned only as side features, they do not affect the basic operation to circumvent the letter of the proposed Law. Back to the questions begged and partial solutions. For instance, if one provides, in a distributed fashion, data sets --- which taken apart are not indecent in anyone's mind since they appear completely random --- and a recipe to generate information from the data sets --- which may construct something which might be considered indecent --- does anyone violate any portion of the insane Indecent Bill, if passed by Congress and signed into Indecent Law by the President? Does the person who set up the information split get in trouble? Do the people pulling in recipes and various piece of random-looking data sets get in trouble? Do the data set warehousers get in trouble, even if they could have had no direct way to know the raw pieces of data that they stored were to something eventually seen to be indecent when a recipe was followed. Do the recipe warehousers get in trouble, since they could have known what might be created if all data sets were obtained and joined as proscribed by the recipe? What if end-user client software was taught to do all the steps required to follow a recipe automatically? Same as last question, except the user was explicitly asked before any recipe was followed to completion? I think that the Court would be hard-pressed to find a difference between distribution of something indecent and a recipe known to create something indecent from raw data. But, what if recipes were used for everything, not just items thought to be borderline indecent to totally obscene. Under this assumption, if it could be shown that a recipe and raw data warehousers had no knowledge of each other's contents, they could do no self-policing. It appears that raw data warehousers have "no knowledge" of recipe warehousers as long as the raw data contains no reference to the recipe. The recipe warehousers appear to have no such luck since they contain URLs that point to the raw data chunks required to form coherent information. Recipe warehousers could follow the recipe to "check" content. Finally, on a different tangent, why do the raw data pieces have to be stored on different machines in different countries, if by themselves they are unreadable? Since I believe it is the recipe, not the contributing raw data that presents a problem, it seems like this must be the piece to be stored external to the U.S. For example, only the recipe need be stored abroad in a nice little computer in the Netherlands. Assuming the recipe included only URL-style pointers to the data sets' distributed location and mixing method, a recipe should be quite small. Imagine the Government trying to explain to a jury that random looking transmissions taken together in some exotic manner --- as described by a file fetched from outside the U.S. --- equals some filthy text or image or some other unpopular political speech. Using these rules, I could probably find three passages of text in the 100,000's of pages composing the U.S. Code that when XOR'd together generate something obscene. To make the Government's job even harder before a jury, what if the recipe to be fetched from the foreign country always generated the First Amendment text when followed directly. Imagine the Government's surprise when the Defense later shows a recipe involving the exact same information sets that, perhaps, yields the text of the First Amendment, The Indecent Bill itself or another interesting historical document. What if certain implementations of software that decode these recipes could infer another recipe implicitly encoded within the fetched data sets which were required to follow the explicitly given recipe. Since the information required to regenerate the First Amendment text will have always been pulled, in its entirety, an external observer must concluded that the receiver might have plainly followed the directions in the recipe leading to its generation instead of any hidden inferred recipe for the questionably indecent text or image. That sounds like reasonable doubt to me, regardless of the facts of the case. The Defense can always argue that the client was just trying to express the First Amendment in a novel manner, which happens to be true in more ways than one in this case. :-) The Jaron proposal does have some major benefits at least as I have framed the idea. These need to be mentioned explicitly, in case the important side goal was too subtle expressed above. I reverse the location of the bulk of the data required to store the real information. The recipe, which is assumed to be small with respects to the size of the raw data, is stored in any Internet friendly location (i.e. most of the world except the U.S. after the CDA passes) and pulled into the U.S. as required. The raw data is stored within the U.S., randomly spread between data set servers. When arranged in this manner, the bulk of the data continues to be stored as it would have been before stupid U.S. regulations took affect. This final analysis might sound U.S. centric. It was not meant to be. I assume that any information replication scheme that might have been used could continue to be used. For example, one recipe might exist for each regional replication that existed. Hopefully, the recipes themselves would be replicated in many Internet friendly locations. I welcome informed legal comments on this modified proposal. Regards, Loren -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOpKUv8de8m5izJJAQH+cgP+MDO6TK5s1MkkiWcvSKP9wwoVn0VqMM+U hPRGQJ2MjL3s7r9mPTqlbnPOllI4FO6rBQt5vqmzMnemFG1k94REvmGHuSMxZ7xV zoqYcvZzxdG2KwKBiLWiilirA0IrDV1MQJ4i7xMYYdOoOoeN1VnUbgHW9iWquwKT tIpWzbFFGO0= =m0bM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: lull@acm.org (John Lull) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 21:08:08 +0800 To: jirib@cs.monash.edu.au Subject: Re: Proxy/Representation? In-Reply-To: <199601030633.RAA16556@sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au> Message-ID: <30ea3076.11971382@smtp.ix.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Wed, 03 Jan 1996 17:32:59 +1100 (EST), jirib@cs.monash.edu.au wrote: > To avoid such confusion, Dave should create a separate key with > the key ID "Dave pp. Helen" (or similar). However, Helen doesn't need > to (shouldn't) know that key! This is Dave's key, created by Dave > for Dave's use while he is agent for Helen. Helen would probably > sign this key, but doesn't need to since the PoA has the f'print. > > In fact, you don't want Helen to know it, so that if Dave oversteps > his authority she can prove that it was him not her. Ie if Helen finds > out the key, Dave should revoke it. There is also something to be said for Helen having a copy of the revocation certificate for the key. If Helen believes Dave has or is likely to overstep his authority, she could then essentially revoke the power of attorney by revoking the "Dave pp. Helen" key. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@flame.alias.net (Anonymous) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 17:13:25 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: NSA gets into the ISP business Message-ID: <199601030825.JAA21055@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Recently I went out shopping for a cheaper ISP. I found one which was very inexpensive. Too inexpensive. At first I was thrilled...then I began to wonder how they could charge so little. Pcix.com is offering static ip address, domain name, etc, the whole schebang for $20 a month, or $75 if you want a dedicated line. That's less then TLG, and TLG is a non-profit organization. As the saying goes, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. It seems our government friends have found themselves a new hobby. I'm not sure exactly what this sting operation was set up for, but I'm sure you can use your imagination. The user agreement is very interesting. It states: 1) You're not allowed to upload any encryption software (even if you don't export it) or have any strong crypto in your shell account, and 2) They are allowed to monitor anything you send over their network. Spooks' dream ISP. Highlights from the user agreement: Section 2.7(b) > Member further agrees not to upload to the PCIX services any data or > software that cannot be exported without the prior written > government authorization, including, but not limited to, certain > types of encryption software. Section 4.1 > PCIX may elect to electronically monitor any and all traffic > which passes over our Wide Area Network. This monitoring may include > public as well as private communications and data transfers from our > Members and to our Members as well as any and all communications and > data transfers to and from any other internet sites. PCIX will > monitor our Members and those who use or transmit communications or > other data over our network to try and ensure adherence to > international, federal, state and local laws as well as the PCIX > Terms of Service Agreement. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Mark Neely Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 22:59:01 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn Message-ID: <199601030047.LAA07011@oznet02.ozemail.com.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > WASHINGTON DC (Reuter) - The US called Sunday for improved >management of the Internet to prevent people seeing pornographic >material on the world computer network. Perhaps it is a result of many self-interested parties who have hyped the Internet to the hilt, but it never ceases to amaze me how people think that as soon as you connect a PC to the Internet, suddenly, all this information and computer wizardry _leaps_ down the phone line and _jumps_ out of your screen. It can be clearly demonstrated (even to US politicians) that the Internet is not a passive media - users must go out and find what they are looking for (especially pornography). You cannot "stumble" upon pornography, as you might by, say, channel surfing on cable. You can't tell me that someone who fires up their Web browser and points it to http://www.playboy.com, or clicks yes to a request that they acknowledge that they are over 18/21/majority and agree to access adult material doesn't know what they are getting themselves into... Mark ___ Mark Neely - accessnt@ozemail.com.au Lawyer, Professional Cynic Author: Australian Beginner's Guide to the Internet Work-in-Progress: Australian Business Guide to the Internet WWW: http://www.ozemail.com.au/~accessnt From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 20:13:50 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: NOISE.SYS /dev/random driver for DOS, v0.3.3-Beta Message-ID: <199601031215.HAA19436@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain The leatest version is ready to be examined. Much rewriting. Send a message with the subject "send noise033" and an automated responder should eventually send you a uu-encoded Info-Zip file with a compiled version of the driver, assembler source-code, and pgp-sig. Again, comments & criticism would be appreciated. Help is especially needed trying to find IRQs to sample for sources of randomness. Finding a good way to sample mouse or video scan lines would also be a help.... etc. --Rob From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jiri Baum Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 20:12:32 +0800 To: perry@piermont.com Subject: Re: Proxy/Representation? In-Reply-To: <199512290024.TAA10333@jekyll.piermont.com> Message-ID: <199601030633.RAA16556@sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello "David E. Smith" and cypherpunks@toad.com and "Perry E. Metzger" PEM wrote: > "David E. Smith" writes: ...[about power of attorney and PGP, reply-to-reply]... > > >standard for "Power of Attorney" documents, and for the entity > > >receiving something signed in your key that should be signed in > > >another person's key to also see the digitally signed power of ... > > That's more of what I was looking for. I suppose that (I'm still using > > PGP as my example) there could be a shared PGP key, signed by Helen and > > myself, where only the two of us know the passphrase, I don't think that's what was intended. If I understood: There'd be a document (hereinafter PoA) signed by Helen which would say "This is a PoA appointing Dave, PGP key X fingerprint Y, to do A, B, C on my behalf #include". Then, when signing, Dave would sign with his own key X, making sure that every document has "p.p. Helen" at the end. The recipient checks Dave's signature on the document and Helen's signature on the PoA. > Huh? Why? Why would you need [a separate key]? ... Many automatic systems will assume that a key can only sign for one person (though each person may have several keys). Therefore, it'll confuse "Dave" and "pp. Helen". The RISKS are obvious. To avoid such confusion, Dave should create a separate key with the key ID "Dave pp. Helen" (or similar). However, Helen doesn't need to (shouldn't) know that key! This is Dave's key, created by Dave for Dave's use while he is agent for Helen. Helen would probably sign this key, but doesn't need to since the PoA has the f'print. In fact, you don't want Helen to know it, so that if Dave oversteps his authority she can prove that it was him not her. Ie if Helen finds out the key, Dave should revoke it. Hope that makes sense... Jiri - -- If you want an answer, please mail to . On sweeney, I may delete without reading! PGP 463A14D5 (but it's at home so it'll take a day or two) PGP EF0607F9 (but it's at uni so don't rely on it too much) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMOoi4CxV6mvvBgf5AQGUJwP/fUPQgzYrbAuGGC8Q4ha8zNNoiAJVU3Rw /mAZbPtG6OQsoFal3xKtsquilXuCsj40btJc2XaTNL7adcKAN+0ZNwYgCHC5C8Yc zzgTwCSdnb9t8RY6vcZeIcXixboF1BKGtqSyzICJfd7yHNJWrh0YfUzTSPVD6jXC kOl7JNurEFY= =a/TW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: David Mandl Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 14:28:00 +0800 To: Duncan Frissell Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960102115316.008b7368@panix.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > At 09:07 PM 1/1/96 -0500, David Mandl wrote: > >I agree. It's not a good idea to assume that there's going to be some kind > >of widespread opposition movement when the big Net Crackdown comes. Most > >people will either obey the law, be unaffected by it, or violate it in very > >insignificant ways ("net jaywalking"). There's strength in numbers, but I > >just don't think the numbers will be there. > > > > --Dave. > > During Prohibition, consumption of illegal booze increased steadily during > the whole period. Hard liquor consumption was actually higher at the end of > Prohibition than it had been before Prohibition. > > DCF The number of people who drank booze when Prohibition began dwarfs the number of people who want access to "controlled" information on the net today. Most people still don't even understand what the net is. They're two completely different situations. Also, the powers that be have much better reasons for killing the net than they had for banning booze. Also, access to the net for Joe Average is still largely limited to authoritarian giants like AOL (which forwards people's mail to the FBI) and CompuServe (which bans hundreds of newsgroups). Maybe these companies will eventually be knocked out by small libertarian-minded ISPs, maybe not. --D. -- David Mandl Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. Phone: (212) 272-3888 Email: dmandl@bear.com -- ******************************************************************************* Bear Stearns is not responsible for any recommendation, solicitation, offer or agreement or any information about any transaction, customer account or account activity contained in this communication. ******************************************************************************* From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:07:17 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Foiling Traffic Analysis Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 4:35 AM 1/2/96, Jon Lasser wrote: >The potential for traffic analysis is the danger here. If an "FBI >International Data Laundering Expert" testifies in court that said data >came from a site known to be frequented solely by so-and-sos, all the >strong crypto in the world won't stop the average jury from convicting you. > >Carl Ellison (among others, I'm sure) has suggested various means of >foiling traffic analysis among a group of trusted conspirators, using a >token-ring-like routing scheme. I'm not completely convinced that it's >robust enough, but a variation on it is probably adaptable. How does this differ from Dining Cryptographers approaches? --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Simon Spero Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:00:37 +0800 To: Jason Rentz Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: <199601021435.IAA10484@cdale1.midwest.net> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Jason Rentz wrote: > > All you need to do is go to your nearest junkyard and get an old used > Satalite, contract Russia to send it up for you for the price of an e-mail > account or somthin and away you go. :) > [Why am I taking this seriously? :-)] Make sure that the person you talk to in Russia is actually allowed to sell you the launch system first; a few years ago there were a lot of people trying to sell the stuff on, some of whom were even authorised. Simon From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 14:13:10 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <199601021947.NAA01688@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 18:43:31 +0000 (GMT) > From: "Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon)" > Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers > > About ten years ago a group I was involved with were thinking about > putting something into space as a publicity stunt. One company we talked > to claimed they could put 1 kg into orbit on one of their sounding rockets > for about $ 30,000 (that's a 1 kg satellite, not $ 30,000 per kg). How > small can you build a "data haven" satellite ? > > Looking a few years into the future, you could probably stick a > stripped-down Linux laptop with solar cells and a stripped-down satellite > telephone as a Net link on top of a slightly larger rocket and charge for > on-orbit storage using ecash... Using remailers it should be pretty-much > untraceable. > Actualy, both the Pacific Coast Rocketry group and the Experimental Spacecraft Association are working on putting the first amateur payload in LEO. ESA wants to put a telescope with real-time downlink up as their payload. PCR wants to put some kind of transponder up. Under current technology a group of about 30 dedicated amateurs (with suitable skills) could put a 25kg payload in orbit for under 1/4 million. It would consist of surplus and amateur built equipment. Tripolli puts out a magazine called High Performance Rocketry which you may be able to find at your local newstand (in Austin you get it at the Central Market Bookstop). It usually carries at least a couple of adds for material that PCR and a couple of smaller groups are putting out to help fund their project. I would say it will be less than 3 years before this dream occurs unless the DOT (the people who regulate all space shots now) decides not to give them a permit. Hi ho, Hi ho, it's of to LEO we go.... From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: dmandl@panix.com Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:29:49 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work In-Reply-To: <9601021825.AB15309@virgo.bsnet> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Ed Carp wrote: Duncan Frissell wrote: > > It used to be said that no country would be allowed to move from Communism > > to Capitalism. It can now be said that it is inconceivable that a modern > > country will move from a Market to a Command Economy. Market discipline is > > strong. > > Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old > Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying > that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free > market economy. > > Never underestimate the value of human stupidity and shortsightedness. In other words: If people dump communism for capitalism, it shows how the free market will always triumph, and if people dump capitalism for communism, it shows how stupid and shortsighted humans are. Hmmmm... --Dave. -- Dave Mandl dmandl@panix.com http://www.wfmu.org/~davem From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:32:59 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102201728.0069e780@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:29 AM 1/2/96 -0600, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: >Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old >Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying >that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free >market economy. I said "modern" country. Even so, Russia and the rest are much more market dominated than they used to be. Transition will not be easy but I doubt if they'll go back. As for an eternity of slavery being superior to too rambunctious freedom -- we won't let them be that stupid. The "cancer of Anglo-Saxon values" is pretty powerful. >> Where are the pressure points where regulation can be applied? > >How about on the backbone itself? Since everyone goes through the htree >major backbones, all one would have to do is control access at those >points. Of course, that would lead to clandestine use of >store-and-forward LEOsats, s&f UUCP sites, etc. UUCP might even make a >comeback ;) That would require outlawry of crypto over the backbone and some way of convincing the backbone to run government approved code. Quite a bit of resistance would ensue. Have the Feds ever successfully mandated that large numbers of people run government code? DCF From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:58:25 +0800 To: dmandl@panix.com Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960102203505.006abc30@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 02:13 PM 1/2/96 -0500, dmandl@panix.com wrote: >In other words: If people dump communism for capitalism, it shows how >the free market will always triumph, and if people dump capitalism for >communism, it shows how stupid and shortsighted humans are. Hmmmm... > > --Dave. > Remember the old Russian joke: What's the difference between capitalism and socialism? Capitalism is the exploitation of man by man and socialism is the exact reverse. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jonathan Blake Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:02:46 +0800 To: Mark Hittinger Subject: Re: Netcom censoring alt.* ? In-Reply-To: <199601021625.LAA04725@ritz.mordor.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Mark Hittinger wrote: > Now if there was only a way to tie the scientology thing in with the alt.* > censorship conspiracy. There is. Netcom is a repentant squirrel. To ensure that Netocom will never ever deliver anything which offends Co$, Netcom has deleted all alt.* nesgroups. xan jonathon grafolog@netcom.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jeff Simmons Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:11:45 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: <199601030032.QAA00749@goblin.punk.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jim Bell writes: >It seems to me that phone line costs are turning into a floor price for >Internet access, when they shouldn't really be. The main asset telephone >companies have, right now, is in RIGHTS OF WAY. Put an ISP in a business >park that allows you to run your own dedicated copper pairs, and you've >bypassed $25/month/line business phone line charges. > >At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could easily be >"guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious trenching, etc. The >phoneco would still be involved, but in a far lower-profit mode, as the >supplier of a single T1 to a multi-block area. That's assuming the phoneco cooperates. Punknet is a 'Guerilla ISP'. Twenty of us share a 128k ISDN line, distributed via high-speed modems. It's been running fine for over a year now, but Pacific Bell has evidently decided to get rid of us. How? Simply by refusing to either repair or replace our 25 pair trunk line, which is rapidly degrading. We've offered to replace it ourselves, but according to them, it's illegal. Right now, we've got three dead lines, and two others that only will do 1200 baud. We've been told that what they're doing is probably illegal, but it's the old problem: Where does an 800 lb. gorilla sleep? We're fighting this like all hell, but who knows? After they get rid of us, I wonder who's next ... - -- Jeff Simmons jsimmons@goblin.punk.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOnOnuL8IP70uJJBAQF3EwP9He5bWGBRcYv3LZDAB7XJt34zr+Pi/WWp a2NjFdDuxxc7VwO1tcSvqq+PX23OtJnay9yWkcpRBUissyJ5CPzqGQv4dX8vqN0R F1EK8zTSuEnQpiMVSqduknusVeQYOq2tP6b+iDtGKgCu2veDSLS10SY82qOPmQ8j OjxkfDcxJjI= =xJeV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Michael C. Peponis" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:06:30 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: What to do about Germany Message-ID: <199601030019.SAA23577@unique.outlook.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain What the German goverement threatned to do was inexcusable, but something can be done about it. The way that mail and postings are handeld, it is possible to trash mail and posting coming or going to a certin destination. This is censorship, but maybe the members of the goverment have justified such an action. If they can censor others, should others not be able to censor them? That's one of the beauties of the electronic age, the only thing that matters is intelligence, numbers or political power have negligable effects. Are the german authorities worthy of such an reaction? Have they crossed the line? If they have, maybe they can serve as the example of what happens when a group of people attempt to force their will on others. Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon)" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:33:30 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Jay Holovacs wrote: > Commercial satallites have land based corporate owners. Remember the > success that Alabama had a few years ago pulling the plug on a New York > based softporn tv satellite distribution system. They simply went after the > assets of the satellite companies and got quick cooperation. About ten years ago a group I was involved with were thinking about putting something into space as a publicity stunt. One company we talked to claimed they could put 1 kg into orbit on one of their sounding rockets for about $ 30,000 (that's a 1 kg satellite, not $ 30,000 per kg). How small can you build a "data haven" satellite ? Looking a few years into the future, you could probably stick a stripped-down Linux laptop with solar cells and a stripped-down satellite telephone as a Net link on top of a slightly larger rocket and charge for on-orbit storage using ecash... Using remailers it should be pretty-much untraceable. Mark From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "David K. Merriman" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 06:22:59 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: FCC require ISDN? Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960103024025.00684b40@arn.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 07:46 PM 01/2/96 -0600, Jim Choate bespake thusly: >The FCC is enacting a new regulation that will cause every phone company to >provide 100% of their service areas with ISDN (you should have received some >kind of notice last week, I did). This also sets some minimum standards as >well as to the type and quality of service the phone company must provide. Citation? Here in Amarillo, if it rains, the phone lines start caving in, and I'd like to beat up SWBT for ISDN service :-) Dave Merriman PS - sorry for posting this to the whole list, but couldn't get this past my ISP to Jim directly :-( ------------------------------------------------------------- "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954), U.S. Judge <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geopages.com/CapitolHill/1148 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@flame.alias.net (Anonymous) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:51:24 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Risks of writing a remailer Message-ID: <199601022345.AAA04572@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain What are the legal risks of writing (and releasing) a remailer, and what steps can an author go to to minimise any unwanted (legal or civil) attention ? ob. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: fc@all.net (Fred Cohen) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 01:41:13 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis In-Reply-To: <199601030421.XAA29402@clark.net> Message-ID: <9601031202.AA18524@all.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text You seem to be missing an important point about foiling traffic analysis. It is essentially the same problem as the covert channel problem and its solution has the same challenges - it consumes a great in the way of resources. In order to eliminate traffic analysis, you essentially have to always use the full bandwidth available (although you can have pseudo-random burst behaviors). This in turn means that instead of gaining the low cost resulting from sharing bandwidth, you end up having far more utilization and (depending on what portion of the world does this) increasing the price of the resource. So it costs a lot more and uses a great deal of bandwidth. -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: stevenw@best.com (Steven Weller) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 10:08:14 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >As I understand the physics, the whole process could be made FAR FAR FAR >more efficient if the rocket was boosted to about 40000 feet with a subsonic >airplane, a' la' X-15 and such. It's above 75% of the earth's atmosphere >(dramatically reduced drag), is already going 600 mph in the correct >direction, and is 8 miles closer to the ultimate goal 250 miles up). This >might not sound like much of an advantage, but if you've ever worked out the >mathematics of the Saturn V (or space shuttle, etc), the VAST majority of >the fuel was used up in the first 20,000 feet, maybe even the first 5000 >feet. It would be even better if the first stage could be an air-breathing >supersonic ramjet, but that's not my field of expertise. Orbital Sciences Corp in Virginia do exactly that, but with a B52 and a 60 foot long rocket. They launch relatively small payloads for relatively cheap and have done it successfully on many occasions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw@best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 15:19:59 +0800 To: jimbell@pacifier.com (jim bell) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601031508.JAA05085@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > As a ham, too (N7IJS) I recognize your implicit selection of 2m or 450 MHz. > But I gently object to this, for reasons that I think will be obvious. I was thinking of the itenerant frequencies around 151 MHz, but the bandwidth would be limited. I wasn't thinking of amateur frequencies, but my fingers sometimes have a mind of their own ;) > First, technology has been marching on in the last 10-20 years, and > communications frequencies of 2 GHz and more are technically do-able and > comparatively empty. (and with modern IC technology, even easy) I'd love to see plans (or used commercial gear) able to do this - I've got a point-to-point application that I'd love to set up ... > Secondly, ham gear tends to be used for long-range communication (miles and > watts) and generally has little or no ability to frequency hop/time hop or > to automatically turn down transmitter power to be able to share frequencies > over short distances (low milliwatts or even microwatts). Those high > gigahertz frequencies would be ideal for communication over a few blocks > distance. (Sure, packet has been done for years but it is a still-born > development; they still think 9600 bps is a "fast" modem speed.) The opportunities for this sort of thing are amazing. And remember, there are two types of spread spectrum - the high bandwidth stuff as well as the frequency hopping stuff. > I forsee locally-owned boxes that are the equivalent of a wireless phone > switch implementing re-used freuqency microcells; the cost SHOULD be far > lower than the current copperline phone systems, once the telephones are > paid for. And they shouldn't cost much more than current 900 MHz cordless > telephones, too. Again, I'd like to see this, too... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOqb1CS9AwzY9LDxAQGDQQP5AaMaKy6t4q6Xfog19JFAnuqxULH6r6UV 03I2sA+h1/vyM9fAuyUEwlBlKUrA3+tByM3VCn5Q2HH4twxwRRLRSn9peJG7fpnE pc36wVwqwXHvKslrSFA10Y5lahEzuS7NC+jTYgw6l+VF17yJaPw+dtXlpcsq+SMo bj3VDH6nVDQ= =vamo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 01:40:52 +0800 To: Steve Gibbons Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 01:08 AM 1/3/96 -700, you wrote: >All of this is assuming that the bandwidth is available on the airwaves to >handle ~200 ~T1s. (If we're talking $200.00/mo. for T1, sign me up tomorrow, >and my neighbor, and his, and hers, and... *poof* no more bandwidth in a >"decently" populated metro area or even a downtown. (Back of the envelope >calculations show that ~200 T1 ~= 1 TV station [although I might be off by an >order of magnitude.]) > >I apologize if this is off topic, but the crypto part still applies (moreso, >even!) to broadcast over the airwaves. (Besides, I'm sure that this list has >enough subscribers that are shelling out $200-$500/mo. for 56K/Frac T1/ISDN >that they'd be interested in a less expensive alternative.) >Steve@AZTech.Net To a certain extent, I think this is (or should be!) VERY MUCH "on topic." If our goal is to allow/assist privacy, we need to start actually anticipating technological developments so that we can do "minor course corrections" that will end up guaranteeing unbreakable security. One of these is by routing data through organizations (NOT THE PHONE CO!) that won't tend to kow-tow to the wishes of the government. We know that if this telephone-company bypass is done, it can either be done "right" (from a cypherpunks standpoint; so that it's including encryption, etc) or "wrong." If we don't plan ahead, it will almost certainly be done "wrong." Witness the fact that the vast majority of modems contain no encryption standard, for example. If USR or somebody else had mandated it in 1982 with 2400 bps modems, we might all be talking on encrypted lines already. And as you pointed out, this is especially important if RF is the medium-of-choice for connections. We should definitely make a serious amount of contact with people working on the PCS standards to ensure that GOOD encryption is included. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:17:37 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:08 AM 1/3/96 -0600, you wrote: > >> As a ham, too (N7IJS) I recognize your implicit selection of 2m or 450 MHz. >> But I gently object to this, for reasons that I think will be obvious. > >I was thinking of the itenerant frequencies around 151 MHz, but the >bandwidth would be limited. I wasn't thinking of amateur frequencies, >but my fingers sometimes have a mind of their own ;) Interestingly enough, my primary objection was NOT really commercial encroachment on an existing amateur structure (though that is an important consideration!); rather, it was the fact that because we're talking really short-range communication (way less than a kilometer, in most cases) using frequencies below a gigahertz would be a counter-productive shame. Here, we WANT "line of sight"! And, of course, the bandwidth issue is inherently better: It would be FAR easier to get 100 MHz width at around 2.5 GHz than under 1 gig! >> First, technology has been marching on in the last 10-20 years, and >> communications frequencies of 2 GHz and more are technically do-able and >> comparatively empty. (and with modern IC technology, even easy) > >I'd love to see plans (or used commercial gear) able to do this - I've >got a point-to-point application that I'd love to set up ... I get a free (bingo-card) magazine industry magazine called "Microwaves and RF," which is sort of the EDN for the high-frequency communication crowd. You'd be amazed at the level of technical (chip) development there. Chip sets that do frequency synthesis/full RF/IF on surface mount chips. Jim Bell, N7IJS (BTW, I use Eudora, and I have PGP. Could somebody explain how to PGP-sign messages, ideally EASILY?) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 10:52:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: AP Story: "Germans: Was CompuServe's Call Message-ID: <199601031516.KAA13633@pipe5.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain CPers may want to examine this Associated Press story: "Germans: Was CompuServe's Call" 02 Jan 1996, 14:30 clari.news.censorship Message-ID: -- -- tallpaul -- Visualize HappyNet! From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:40:51 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <199601031815.KAA15424@netcom5.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 23:33 1/2/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: Previous exchanges deleted... >Infrared and laser are not very reliable between buildings during fog. >Between your house and your neighbor, a low cost 900MHz bridge would be the >best way to go. On such short distances, an omni-directional antenna will >work just fine. Check out Solectek (cheaper) or Cylink (faster). Both offer >DES link encryption. With a tightly focused beam (light is easy, I don't know about lower frequencies), you can prevent interception except by very obvious physical devices. (e.g. Someone in a cherry picker truck.) You may be able to avoid the need to encrypt the link (and all the paranoia about key management, advances in factoring etc. that that implies.) Bill ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz@netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 00:12:07 +0800 To: jimbell@pacifier.com (jim bell) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers [NOISE] In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <96Jan3.102233edt.2052@cannon.ecf.toronto.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > As I understand the physics, the whole process could be made FAR FAR FAR > more efficient if the rocket was boosted to about 40000 feet with a subsonic > airplane, a' la' X-15 and such. It's above 75% of the earth's atmosphere > (dramatically reduced drag), is already going 600 mph in the correct > direction, and is 8 miles closer to the ultimate goal 250 miles up). This > might not sound like much of an advantage, but if you've ever worked out the > mathematics of the Saturn V (or space shuttle, etc), the VAST majority of > the fuel was used up in the first 20,000 feet, maybe even the first 5000 > feet. It would be even better if the first stage could be an air-breathing > supersonic ramjet, but that's not my field of expertise. Cypherpunks isn't the right place to discuss this in detail, but... Efficiency != Cheap Kerosene is cheap. Steel fuel tanks and rocket motors are quite cheap. Making big dumb rockets is well understood. However, aircraft integration is not. If you use an 'off-the-shelf' aircraft, it has a human in it. That means the whole thing must be safe. If you don't, you have a drone aircraft which isn't cheap at all. Remember, the cost of materials scales linearly with size. The cost of a complex system scales as the square of the parts count. These arguments are hashed out (admittedly without consensus) regularly in the sci.space newsgroups. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:41:11 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960103182405.00946468@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:43 AM 1/3/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >(BTW, I use Eudora, and I have PGP. Could somebody explain how to PGP-sign >messages, ideally EASILY?) I use Eudora as well. It is not as easy as I would like. You have a couple of options: 1) Use cut-and-paste into Private Idaho. Private Idaho will allow you to paste back into Eudora. (Or you can send out from Private Idaho directly.) This option is useful becuase it supports nyms and chaining of remailers. 2) Get one of the standard Windows PGP shells and paste into that. After signing, you will have to repaste into Eudora again. These seem to be the only options. I am not certain if there is a standard DDE or OLE interface that could be used to feed message information back and forth between Eudora and some other app. There have been a number of promises of Eudora/PGP integration, but nothing has materialized yet. There are no easy answers I know of... If you need a copy of Private Idaho, I can point you to a web site or bring a copy along to the meeting on the 20th. Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: rubin@faline.bellcore.com (Aviel D Rubin) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 10:52:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Experience teaching cryptography and computer security at NYU Message-ID: <199601031528.KAA04490@faline.bellcore.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Last semester, I taught a graduate course called "Cryptography and Computer Security" at NYU. I have written up a summary of the experience. You can find it at ftp: thumper.bellcore.com in /pub/rubin/fall95.ps or fall95.ps.Z web: ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/fall95.ps.Z and there is a link to it from my home page: ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/rubin.html I will be teaching the same class next semester at NYU, and there are plans for a sequel next fall. Avi ********************************************************************* Aviel D. Rubin Email: rubin@faline.bellcore.com Research Scientist Adjunct Professor at NYU Bellcore (MRE-2M354) 445 South St. ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/rubin.html Morristown, NJ 07960 Voice: +1 201 829 4105 USA FAX: +1 201 829 2645 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Mike Fletcher Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 09:12:17 +0800 To: cman@communities.com (Douglas Barnes) Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <9601031537.AA16841@outland> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > One of my co-workers has pointed out that the need for something as > simple as a helper application for Netscape loses about 90% of his > audience. By simply making it rather more difficult for people to > chat about some things, governments can effectively push such things > out of the way of all but the most determined readers. Ah, but consider what happens when Java (or Java-esque platform independant executable content) really takes off. Gee, your browser doesn't know how to view image/stego? Just pull down https://foobaz.com/isView.class and off you go. (Or your browser will pull it down automagically for you and pay the author for it from your ewallet. Or it could rent a copy from Blockbuster(tm) Applets. You get the idea :) Software will become less and less what your machine has and more what it has access to. --- Fletch __`'/| fletch@ain.bls.com "Lisa, in this house we obey the \ o.O' ______ 404 713-0414(w) Laws of Thermodynamics!" H. Simpson =(___)= -| Ack. | 404 315-7264(h) PGP Print: 8D8736A8FC59B2E6 8E675B341E378E43 U ------ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Vincent Cate Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:15:52 +0800 To: frissell@panix.com Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain It seems to me that posting this widely on Compuserve (or at least on alt.online-service.compuserve) and then contacting CNN and making comments about how "the Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it" is the best way to handle this. We want the public to get the idea that censorship does not work on the Internet. Are you up for this Duncan? Or do you want to call for volunteer, or should this get posted anonymously. :-) Seems better if someone does it who is willing to talk to reporters, and who is a Compuserve user. Makes a better story on TV etc. -- Vince Duncan: > I grabbed a copy of the Free Agent newsreader: > > http://www2.interpath.net/forte/agent/freagent.htm > [...] > I grabbed the latest list of open NNTP Servers from: > > http://dana.ucc.nau.edu/~jwa/open-sites.html From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 05:17:56 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 7:02 1/3/96, Fred Cohen wrote: >You seem to be missing an important point about foiling traffic >analysis. It is essentially the same problem as the covert channel >problem and its solution has the same challenges - it consumes a great >in the way of resources. In order to eliminate traffic analysis, you >essentially have to always use the full bandwidth available (although >you can have pseudo-random burst behaviors). This in turn means that >instead of gaining the low cost resulting from sharing bandwidth, you >end up having far more utilization and (depending on what portion of the >world does this) increasing the price of the resource. So it costs a >lot more and uses a great deal of bandwidth. You are correct. A network of encrypted links that allways move packets at full bandwidth is the basis of Wei Dai's Pipenet. If anyone ever codes this, I am willing to sponsor a node. Other nodes may be set up if some payment mechanism using Ecash is integrated with the system. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:11:21 +0800 To: jim bell MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 9:43 1/3/96, jim bell wrote: >Interestingly enough, my primary objection was NOT really commercial >encroachment on an existing amateur structure (though that is an important >consideration!); rather, it was the fact that because we're talking really >short-range communication (way less than a kilometer, in most cases) using >frequencies below a gigahertz would be a counter-productive shame. Here, we >WANT "line of sight"! And, of course, the bandwidth issue is inherently >better: It would be FAR easier to get 100 MHz width at around 2.5 GHz than >under 1 gig! There are several vendors offering 2.4GHz wireless with ranges up to 20 miles. Though the 900MHz stuff is much cheaper. Unless you have a pager cell on your roof, 900MHz should serve you fine. >I get a free (bingo-card) magazine industry magazine called "Microwaves and >RF," which is sort of the EDN for the high-frequency communication crowd. >You'd be amazed at the level of technical (chip) development there. Chip >sets that do frequency synthesis/full RF/IF on surface mount chips. If you don't want to build your own, there are various vendors that use the NEC 900MHz bridge card in their products. Or just buy the card, get an old 486, and round up the software from somone. >(BTW, I use Eudora, and I have PGP. Could somebody explain how to PGP-sign >messages, ideally EASILY?) Assuming Eudora for Mac: Download MacPGP Control. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 00:33:53 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: FOI_led Message-ID: <199601031602.LAA06860@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain For comparison to snooping on search site searchers. 1-3-96. WsJo: "Freedom of Information Act Gets Wider Use by Sleuths, Snoops and Senators." FOIA is a handy tool for companies, politicians and journalists to snoop on one another. Many people who file requests aren't aware that the requests themselves are made public. Those who really know the process make FOIA requests on other people's FOIA requests. "It's not like I tapped someone's phone or got them drunk. These are public documents." Journalists sometimes use FOIA to scoop their colleagues. A cottage industry provides information about other people seeking information. Lexis/Nexis carries synopses of FOIA requests. So rich is FOIA intelligence that some are learning to take countermeasures. For a $36 fee, FOI Services will file its own FOIA requests on behalf of people who wish to remain anonymous. FOI_led From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: sameer@eternity.c2.org Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 08:37:21 +0800 To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell) Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960103180226.006a9ffc@panix.com> Message-ID: <199601031928.LAA18583@eternity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > CIS refugees will be forced to pay Sameer the massive $12.50 (?) a month for $7.50 -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777x3 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer@c2.org From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Sten Drescher Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:02:49 +0800 To: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Subject: Re: Chinese Cypherpunk quote [NOISE] In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <557mz96uc7.fsf@galil.austnsc.tandem.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) said: DV> Corey Bridges writes: >> To reply simply: Wrong -- the will of the people is as fickle as the >> wind. Follow the will of the people, and you run your country by >> following fads. Mob rule and all that. We're in deep trouble if we >> ever get a true democracy. DV> One of the things Adolph Hitler and Bill Clinton have in common is DV> that both were democratically elected leaders. That, and that the elections were bad decisions, without much better alternatives at the time );. But as much as I dislike Clinton, I think that that's about as far as a comparison can go. -- #include /* Sten Drescher */ To get my PGP public key, send me email with your public key and Subject: PGP key exchange Key fingerprint = 90 5F 1D FD A6 7C 84 5E A9 D3 90 16 B2 44 C4 F3 Junk email is NOT appreciated. If I want to buy something, I'll find you. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Cees de Groot" "Cees de Groot" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:15:55 +0800 To: mianigand@unique.outlook.net Subject: Re: What to do about Germany In-Reply-To: <199601030019.SAA23577@unique.outlook.net> Message-ID: <199601031052.LAA09691@bofh.cdg.openlink.co.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > > What the German goverement threatned to do was inexcusable, but > something can be done about it. > Sorry, but the "German government" did not threaten to do anything at all. A (conservative-ish) prosecutor started an _investigation_, which in his eyes was nothing more than executing the law (and sorry, that's what the guy is paid for). If the German government did something wrong, it was accepting a law for the protection of minors (Jugendschutzgesetz), which says that minors should not be allowed to have access to booze, dope and porno. Please tell me such laws do not exist in your country... If anything, this whole bussiness will be one step in the correct direction: - Either some modus operandum is found which makes it clear for everybody how to offer pornographic material and comply with the law at the same time (cf. the First Virtual account ID's you have to enter at all those sites pointing to www.infohaus.com - in the US, this modus operandum seems to be ``proof of having a credit card''); - Or the German Government learns about the lack of frontiers on the Net, and gives up (which is highly improbable). I think the first point is most realistic (especially when considering that German prosecutors don't have the option of not prosecuting when they hear about a felony, like for example Dutch prosecutors). Given my experience with the German government, however, it will take some time for them to realize that they need a set of rules in this area. -- Cees de Groot, OpenLink Software 262ui/2048: ID=4F018825 FP=5653C0DDECE4359D FFDDB8F7A7970789 [Key on servers] -- Any opinions expressed above might be mine. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Declan B. McCullagh" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 09:38:20 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: US calls for measures against Internet porn In-Reply-To: <199601030549.VAA11513@infinity.c2.org> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 2-Jan-96 Re: US calls for measures a.. by sameer@c2.org > Just to offer another story of the cluelessness of some > people: I've been receiving a number of complaints about one of my > users who has gotten into a flamewar on Usenet. They claim that > flaming is a violation of FCC regulations. (Maybe eventually it will > be.. sigh.) This apparently is becoming a common tactic among would-be censors. One example involving a web site and complainants from Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh is at: http://joc.mit.edu/attack.html And more on Compuserve... Excepts from today's Washington Post: BERLIN, Jan. 2 -- German authorities say the CompuServe on-line service decided on its own which sexually explicit Internet forums to ban its 4 million customers from viewing. In addition, prosecutors reiterated today that they never explicitly threatened CompuServe Inc. with criminal charges. The statements appear to conflict with CompuServe's explanation last Thursday of why it blocked access to 200 newsgroups. But a CompuServe spokeswoman repeated the company's initial explanation today, saying German authorities specified which newsgroups should be banned... Munich senior public prosecutor Manfred Wick said today that his office did not provide CompuServe any such list as part of its investigation of child pornography on the Internet. "We did not make any stipulations. It was the decision of CompuServe alone," he said. -Declan From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Sten Drescher Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:29:08 +0800 To: "Douglas F. Elznic" Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: <2.2.16.19960103035752.3e0fe0d8@terminus.storm.net> Message-ID: <5568et6trn.fsf@galil.austnsc.tandem.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed" --Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit "Douglas F. Elznic" said: DE> What is the deal with the 2047 bit keys? How do you produce one? IS DE> it compatible with international versions? When you do 'pgp -kg', you are asked to pick a PGP key size, and given 3 preselected sizes. You can select one of the sizes, or enter your own choice. Actually, the pgp source will allow 2048, but there is a bug in the DOS version (from the compiler) that limits that one to 2047. The international version is identical to the domestic one, except for the RSA code, so everything is interoperable. There is a hacked version that allows 4096 bit keys, and the supersized keys are incompatible. -- #include /* Sten Drescher */ To get my PGP public key, send me email with your public key and Subject: PGP key exchange Key fingerprint = 90 5F 1D FD A6 7C 84 5E A9 D3 90 16 B2 44 C4 F3 Junk email is NOT appreciated. If I want to buy something, I'll find you. --Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="pgp00000.pgp" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pgp00000.pgp" Content-Description: "PGP signature" LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQR1AgTUVTU0FHRS0tLS0tClZlcnNpb246IDIuNi4yCgpp UUNWQXdVQk1PckUyRnZCZ1JjZGtHd0ZBUUhCZkFRQWxlaXdBaURKbFhsbGlj ckk1UmtmQ1VQd0gxT2xvYUFmCnRQRTRLRVNlL09UamE0VUo0SVVEQ3hhbkRv TzZ2aDkraitacVNaR0l0TDdkaXUvbWtkMnZGMnVEQmpPay9ZS24KbXBZN0Zt OHIzWTZjTFk0Y2NoOXJZV0YwUTE5UEptdEtpc1N4Z1RGcjZlRllSbGh5MDdV SXVYRjZXTUNNZVgvcgp1eGdzZm9sVURJRT0KPVdIRGQKLS0tLS1FTkQgUEdQ IE1FU1NBR0UtLS0tLQo= --Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed-- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Simon Spero Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 06:13:06 +0800 To: "Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon)" Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon) wrote: > About ten years ago a group I was involved with were thinking about > putting something into space as a publicity stunt. One company we talked > to claimed they could put 1 kg into orbit on one of their sounding rockets > for about $ 30,000 (that's a 1 kg satellite, not $ 30,000 per kg). How Hey! I've just had an epiphany. HOToL promised much cheaper costs to put things in LEO. The initial design was finished and tested, but nobody would provide the funds for the second round or implementation (probably because it wasn't French enough :) Nowdays, anything involving the Internet automatically gets ridiculous levels of funding. If we can just get John Markoff or Walter Mossberg to declare HOTol to be an Internet Technology they'll be able to use banknotes as heat shields. Simon Spero, BSc. Eng, ACGI {Ok, this whole thread is noise - I'm up to my eyeballs doing PKCS in java, and I canna take no more :)} From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: koontz@MasPar.COM (David G. Koontz) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 06:18:29 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn Message-ID: <9601032009.AA01109@argosy.MasPar.COM> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >> WASHINGTON DC (Reuter) - The US called Sunday for improved >>management of the Internet to prevent people seeing pornographic >>material on the world computer network. I feel so much better, having the burden of deciding what I can see or read lifted from my weary shoulders. Maybe a ban on politicians appearing in the media? (Some might consider it an obscenity.) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 09:07:53 +0800 To: Steve Gibbons Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 1:08 1/3/96, Steve Gibbons wrote: >I'd be interested in seeing your numbers and cost breakdowns. I'd really be >interested in the up-front costs that would be associated with the equipment >and set-up time/training that will help "insure" data privacy over wideley >broadcast media. The up-front costs for ~T1 capable tranceivers isn't >insignificant either. I figure ~$10K up front (maybe half of that, maybe twice >when you include management overhead) Amortize over 3 years, and compare. You can get by with one base station per five remote receivers. This is no different than the 5/1 to 12/1 oversale ratios common to the T1 ISP business. As long as you prohibit resale of bandwidth and specialize in hooking up business lans you'll have no problems with this layout. Latency, which really is more important than bandwidth in many cases, is actually better using wireless than using traditional T1s. The set-up costs are also less to the customer than if they used a regular ISP. Only difference is that by paying the set-up fees they are buying the equipment for _you_. So once they leave your ISP, you still have all the hardware :-) >All of this is assuming that the bandwidth is available on the airwaves to >handle ~200 ~T1s. (If we're talking $200.00/mo. for T1, sign me up tomorrow, >and my neighbor, and his, and hers, and... *poof* no more bandwidth in a >"decently" populated metro area or even a downtown. 900MHz spread spectrum can get a bit crowded, but you don't need to sell 200 connections to make money. Breakeven based on competitive montly fees (in my original calculations that ment less than the lowest priced local ISP) is about 10 customers. Of course this is not at <$200 per customer. That figure is the lowest possible if you max out a T3, but still, no landline based ISP will be able to deliver bandwidth that cheap. Remember that the fees _include_ the cost for the pipe. Breakeven based on the set-up fees (meaning zero dollars investment by you) is about 18 customers. >I apologize if this is off topic, but the crypto part still applies (moreso, >even!) to broadcast over the airwaves. All major wireless vendors offer DES encryption at about $300 per node. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:34:14 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960103180226.006a9ffc@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 05:30 PM 1/3/96 +0100, Anonymous wrote: > If you do this, you'll find out very quickly just how empty (or at >least how slippery) slogans like "the Internet routes around censorship" >are: if your efforts pay off and you steer even a fraction of CIS's >traffic toward the remaining open newsservers, they'll close faster than >you can say "alt." So before you do it, think about how the net will route >around sysops closing their servers off from the net. > >Hieronymous You mean that the thirty-some odd open news servers listed on http://dana.ucc.nau.edu/~jwa/open-sites.html might get swamped. Then the CIS refugees will be forced to pay Sameer the massive $12.50 (?) a month for a net-access-only account and read off of c2.org's server. (Or any of the thousands of sites worldwide one can open a shell account on.) DCF From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alex Strasheim Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 04:21:59 +0800 To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell) Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960103180226.006a9ffc@panix.com> Message-ID: <199601031919.NAA02071@proust.suba.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text > You mean that the thirty-some odd open news servers listed on > http://dana.ucc.nau.edu/~jwa/open-sites.html might get swamped. Then the > CIS refugees will be forced to pay Sameer the massive $12.50 (?) a month for > a net-access-only account and read off of c2.org's server. (Or any of the > thousands of sites worldwide one can open a shell account on.) And if the feds come knocking on Sameer's door, the refugees can go to the Netherlands or some other country with respect for privacy. When netscape releases an official, untimed browser with ssl news and mail built in, one that lets users pick their own CAs, we'll have reached escape velocity. I think this all comes back to anarchy. Anarchy as it relates to cyberspace isn't a political ideology or a vision of how things ought to be. Rather it's a realistic analysis of the net dynamic as it is, a natural and almost unavoidable consequence of the interaction of the market and the technology. Our opponents' position is weak, despite their having the massive power of the government behind them. In order for them to pull out a victory, they'll have to impose extraordinarily draconian restrictions on crypto very quickly, and they'll have to do it in the face of overwhelming public opposition as well as strong resistance from business. On top of that, they'll have to secure an unprecented degree of international cooperation to enforce rules net wide, something that's probably going to prove impossibly difficult for them. Again, they've got to do this quickly, because genies are popping out of bottles all over the place. It's not impossible for them to pull this off, but I think the smart money's with us. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: andr0id@midwest.net (Jason Rentz) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 04:36:37 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Unmuzzy Explained Message-ID: <199601031924.NAA24001@cdale1.midwest.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >So is the idea beyond this that if file or a group of files were to >be distributed over many computers (possibly hundreds or more) then >none of the computers would be "responsible" for their content? I would >think that any participant in the network would have to claim full >responsibility for the content, assuming the file(s) could be accessed >from any of the participating servers. > Okay. So what if serveral groups of computers, in public FTP directories, allowed anonymous ftp uploads of "parts" of a file that would be construde as bad content. The only way to assemble the file is to download several parts of it from serveral diffrent servers and assemble the file on your system. Thus the illegal file isn't illegal until its assembled. Sorta like switchblade knives. Lots of places can sell the parts legally, they just can't sell the assembled product. Would the servers that contain "parts" of the file be responsible for the content? (andr0id@midwest.net callsign: N9XLM) ( Computer Consulting & Management ) (P.O. Box 421 Cambria, IL 62915-0421) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzCsIi4AAAEH/1hb5+tO/n99Nbppf0ImLJ6AaVZ3NlZP0ZHwRQor00uA129i d4zWixNXxc8t2auaqN+asV99LpIip3/nQzBnjydiumeBdGLF2PR9+6X8X/RrqKa1 dVIukxM5Agg2eM6ih+0J38hgKJ3qzKXSz6sjYmpaxvbXZoHHOLUk/ZtHUKvvEyPw hnJEYnut8NUnIeK56lqeqRw86yoeRKymbfCdjdpgeY2aRwK2FJts8sbb7Fs10s4y jgxWIxIipBznbGUTh1hb2XrLGPENwk3E/qqXQJEsrySbtwdl6VgTVQjhDDEJMitL DYeiQ3W5EgxfcdbM1j2FwYu3P/dM6Y0I8xLMYT0ABRG0NmFuZHIwaWRAb2ljdTgx Mi5jb20gKG9pY3U4MTIuY29tIHN5c3RlbSBhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yKYkBFQMFEDCs LO90C7R/GkJcSQEB01cH/0KC3sd+u4OxMku5378SJktoN6QIQYLJ7uVbuV4S51yK NAotCGf4Wl6wwjynzZvXKU0H87oDuMiq7FybgMNL2n+4bQIZi0iz0lIuzwoMDu63 NrHUW9Kz42pOnhrEhrdkHhHL9O5GgD1yc40fJ3qw5h7LQEjDxgypyw0IFILFc34u LeRLliNibxKp8JwAxXNHWSgxu28TQvmnkHi0AHP6tJ/uZYe+4dqJtrMMsYFjzZaz DPmxD+dzbTwlQKtJaP1ZkDI0Sr072wrZDv+G86GyGBMX2lpSafpRitnxuUttjU9o wsQ9Qo5xiH1nZRCs/bDzJe/gng+GHzevixDIITurtNA= =SgPT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alex Strasheim Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 04:50:22 +0800 To: jk@digit.ee (Jyri Kaljundi) Subject: Re: Starting an e-cash bank In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601031925.NAA02085@proust.suba.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text > What does it take to be called a bank? Is it necessary to be called a bank? I've got a storefront in Chicago. What would prevent me from opening up a Mark Twain account and buying and selling ecash on floppies, in person? Do account holders have to agree not to do that before Mark Twain gives them an account? Is it illegal? The currency exchange model almost seems more appropriate for most users than the bank model. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:07:10 +0800 To: Alan Olsen Subject: Re: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 10:24 AM 1/3/96 -0800, you wrote: >At 09:43 AM 1/3/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote: > >>(BTW, I use Eudora, and I have PGP. Could somebody explain how to PGP-sign >>messages, ideally EASILY?) > >I use Eudora as well. It is not as easy as I would like. You have a couple >of options: > >1) Use cut-and-paste into Private Idaho. Private Idaho will allow you to >paste back into Eudora. (Or you can send out from Private Idaho directly.) >This option is useful becuase it supports nyms and chaining of remailers. > >2) Get one of the standard Windows PGP shells and paste into that. After >signing, you will have to repaste into Eudora again. > >These seem to be the only options. I am not certain if there is a standard >DDE or OLE interface that could be used to feed message information back and >forth between Eudora and some other app. There have been a number of >promises of Eudora/PGP integration, but nothing has materialized yet. [sigh] Just what I thought, no easy solutions. Well, for now I'll just skip signing; I haven't had any problem (that I know of...knock on silicon) with forged messages, and my normal posts are so enthusiastically anarchical and inflammatory that the only way anybody could really embarrass me is to forge a message, ostensibly from me, saying I agreed with some governmental activity somewhere. >There are no easy answers I know of... > >If you need a copy of Private Idaho, I can point you to a web site or bring >a copy along to the meeting on the 20th. Please do... From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Laszlo Vecsey Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 02:58:47 +0800 To: Sten Drescher Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: <5568et6trn.fsf@galil.austnsc.tandem.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > "Douglas F. Elznic" said: > > DE> What is the deal with the 2047 bit keys? How do you produce one? IS > DE> it compatible with international versions? > > =09When you do 'pgp -kg', you are asked to pick a PGP key size, and > given 3 preselected sizes. You can select one of the sizes, or enter > your own choice. Actually, the pgp source will allow 2048, but there is > a bug in the DOS version (from the compiler) that limits that one to > 2047. The international version is identical to the domestic one, > except for the RSA code, so everything is interoperable. There is a > hacked version that allows 4096 bit keys, and the supersized keys are > incompatible. Are you sure it's a bug in the DOS version? When I did a pgp -kg in my UNIX shell (US version 2.6.2) I also entered 2048 bits and it too created a 2047 bit key instead. Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP doesn't support any size key (within reason). From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:01:40 +0800 To: Alex Strasheim Subject: Re: Starting an e-cash bank Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 13:25 1/3/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >> What does it take to be called a bank? > >Is it necessary to be called a bank? To get a license for the bank software from DigiCash, you have to convince them that you are a major player in whatever country you are in or have to offer some exceptional additional value to the service. >I've got a storefront in Chicago. >What would prevent me from opening up a Mark Twain account and buying and >selling ecash on floppies, in person? You touched on a very important issue: the party converting currency into Ecash does not have to be the Ecash bank. There have been discussions that in the future one should be able to buy Ecash on floppy at the local supermarket, similar to today's prepaid calling cards. I certainly would like to see that happen rather sooner than later. It is my understanding that you would be welcome to issue MT Ecash for USD. Here is another business opportunity: MT Bank does not allow the purchase of Ecash by credit card, since they consider the risk of chargebacks unacceptable. This might be a market for a third party. >Do account holders have to agree >not to do that before Mark Twain gives them an account? Is it illegal? MT Bank doesn't mind. IANAL. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Bruce Schneier Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 06:22:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Someone wanted to give PGP lecture at CSI conference Message-ID: <199601032007.OAA26735@parka> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text I'm looking, on behalf of the COmputer Security Institute, for someone who is willing to give a 1.5 hour PGP primer at their summer conference in SF. They don't pay, but they will give you free admission into the conference (and two bad hotel conference meals). I speak at their conferences; they're not a bad lot. Interested parties should email me directly. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 * schneier@counterpane.com ************************************************************************** From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Peter Monta Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 19:26:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla ISPs In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601032207.OAA03764@mage.qualcomm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Thomas Edwards writes: > [ microcellular nets ] > > But how can these things compete with @Home, which is promising 10 Mbps > in and 128 kbps out of homes with cable modems? I'm skeptical about cable modems---few cable providers have adequate return paths, and everyone competes for the downlink bandwidth. Broadcast is not the right architecture. Any systems in actual operation? How many users do they support? Cheers, Peter Monta pmonta@qualcomm.com Qualcomm, Inc./Globalstar From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Sten Drescher Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 06:22:07 +0800 To: Laszlo Vecsey Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5520ph6naq.fsf@galil.austnsc.tandem.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Laszlo Vecsey said: LV> Are you sure it's a bug in the DOS version? When I did a pgp -kg in LV> my UNIX shell (US version 2.6.2) I also entered 2048 bits and it too LV> created a 2047 bit key instead. I had heard elsewhere that there was such a bug. My mistake, then. LV> Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP LV> doesn't support any size key (within reason). As I understand it (which, given my previous error, is in serious doubt), after a point the IDEA session keys become far easier to use a brute force attack on than the RSA keypair. Since I think that increasing the RSA keysize is supposed to double the attack time, if a RSA key size of N takes as much time to break as 1 IDEA key, making the RSA key N+8 bits makes it better to break the IDEA keys of 200 messages rather than the RSA key. Does anyone know if there are comparisons of estimates of the time to break the IDEA session keys used in PGP vs time to break RSA keys of various sizes? -- #include /* Sten Drescher */ To get my PGP public key, send me email with your public key and Subject: PGP key exchange Key fingerprint = 90 5F 1D FD A6 7C 84 5E A9 D3 90 16 B2 44 C4 F3 Junk email is NOT appreciated. If I want to buy something, I'll find you. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Sten Drescher Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 06:45:07 +0800 To: Laszlo Vecsey Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <55zqc557z8.fsf@galil.austnsc.tandem.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed" --Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit (sorry if this is a duplicate) Laszlo Vecsey said: LV> Are you sure it's a bug in the DOS version? When I did a pgp -kg in LV> my UNIX shell (US version 2.6.2) I also entered 2048 bits and it too LV> created a 2047 bit key instead. I had heard elsewhere that there was such a bug. My mistake, then. LV> Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP LV> doesn't support any size key (within reason). As I understand it (which, given my previous error, is in serious doubt), after a point the IDEA session keys become far easier to use a brute force attack on than the RSA keypair. Since I think that increasing the RSA keysize is supposed to double the attack time, if a RSA key size of N takes as much time to break as 1 IDEA key, making the RSA key N+8 bits makes it better to break the IDEA keys of 200 messages rather than the RSA key. Does anyone know if there are comparisons of estimates of the time to break the IDEA session keys used in PGP vs time to break RSA keys of various sizes? -- #include /* Sten Drescher */ To get my PGP public key, send me email with your public key and Subject: PGP key exchange Key fingerprint = 90 5F 1D FD A6 7C 84 5E A9 D3 90 16 B2 44 C4 F3 Junk email is NOT appreciated. If I want to buy something, I'll find you. --Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="pgp00001.pgp" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pgp00001.pgp" Content-Description: "PGP signature" LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQR1AgTUVTU0FHRS0tLS0tClZlcnNpb246IDIuNi4yCgpp UUNWQXdVQk1PcnBZbHZCZ1JjZGtHd0ZBUUgvb0FRQXNyeTdPdjYyRzkzR1pC UEU3Z3huSUw3VjBZeUxwbzFaCm5mTldobGlIelUyUzh5UTA0U0NaVjJ0dFFt QjlWY0RROGFHOWVzMEZLeTVZQ2plTUZxdnE2Q2Z1OVQrV0ZFMDQKT1RQR2dI dlVEdElZem9vU3NscjVsV1NhK0tsSU1GbHV4VWY2Zkk3TG9leThrdm1NY1RQ elRjTDdzTU5LRTRMSQpzSi9tdEpxUUFmbz0KPTF2WkUKLS0tLS1FTkQgUEdQ IE1FU1NBR0UtLS0tLQo= --Boundary..3937.1071713532.multipart/signed-- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Thomas Grant Edwards Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 05:50:35 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Guerilla ISPs Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On LECs attacking ISPs, it is interesting to note that several medium-sized ISPs in Maryland which have over 100 phone lines are now getting them delivered by fiber direct to the ISP. This is nothing new - what is news is that some of these fiber setups use a form of SLC-96 systems which are incapable of carrying data traffic over 21 kbps with modern 28.8 kbps modems. Nobody new what the problem was for a long time, until finally Bell Atlantic admitted that there were some bandwidth limitations in some SLC-96 setups. They went on to note that the tarrif required them to carry only acceptable voice and 4800 bps communication, nothing more, and that these ISPs were basically stuck with substandard lines. The ISPs involved are now looking into alternative local dialtone, but it is few and far between. Bell Atlantic is looking to get into the Internet business...perhaps they will engineer their own dialups properly, while giving low-data-rate fiber connections to ISPs? And on the radio-last-mile service, I used to be enthusiastic about it, but I am no more. It is pretty impractical to discuss VHF or UHF frequencies for real net connectivity, there just isn't enough bandwidth to be practical. 900 MHz and higher appear to be the best solution, using CDMA spread-spectrum in a microcellular environment. Metricom (http://www.metricom.com) has CDMA microcellular modems which get 14.4 kbps equivalent throughput in the 900 MHz region, and they have a large microcellular network already set up in the Bay Area with Internet connectivity. Once 2 GHz technology becomes cheap enough (that's GaAs chips instead of Si), I can imagine wide-scale 56kbps service over microcellular networks. But how can these things compete with @Home, which is promising 10 Mbps in and 128 kbps out of homes with cable modems? -Thomas Edwards From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Joe Thomas Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 07:46:24 +0800 To: Duncan Frissell Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960103180226.006a9ffc@panix.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > You mean that the thirty-some odd open news servers listed on > http://dana.ucc.nau.edu/~jwa/open-sites.html might get swamped. Then the > CIS refugees will be forced to pay Sameer the massive $12.50 (?) a month for > a net-access-only account and read off of c2.org's server. (Or any of the > thousands of sites worldwide one can open a shell account on.) Cheaper still (and more compatible with GUI newsreaders) try AltNet: > telnet news.alt.net nntp Trying 204.137.156.2... Connected to tofu.alt.net. Escape character is '^]'. 200 Mail info@alt.net for info about $5/month NNTP access (posting ok). If you can't afford $5/month, you're not using Compu$erve. Joe (not affliated with AltNet, just giving them a random plug) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: anonymous-remailer@shell.portal.com Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:39:25 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn In-Reply-To: <9601032009.AA01109@argosy.MasPar.COM> Message-ID: <199601032247.OAA00603@jobe.shell.portal.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain My original post, "US calls for measures against Internet porn" was a satire. The entire point was that, by changing a few words in the "China calls for measures against Internet porn" story, a statement by a totalitarian communist regime could be made to look like official US policy. Obviously, the project was a success, as people are taking it seriously in spite of the fact that it had telltale clues, and that the original source was revealed. The exact changes were: BEIJING -> WASHINGTON DC China -> The US State Council -> Clinton administration's State Council Communist Party -> Republican Party Xinhua news agency -> the Associated Press personal computers in China -> modems in the US That's it. None of the actual words quoted from the statement were changed. Frightening, isn't it? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Mark M." Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:34:58 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Laszlo Vecsey wrote: > > "Douglas F. Elznic" said: > > > > Are you sure it's a bug in the DOS version? When I did a pgp -kg in my > UNIX shell (US version 2.6.2) I also entered 2048 bits and it too > created a 2047 bit key instead. This is correct. I believe there are some UNIX flavors under which U.S. PGP can generate 2048 bit keys. However, most only allow 2047 bit keys. The international version does not have this bug. > > Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP > doesn't support any size key (within reason). I really don't see the point of using a key larger than 2048 bits. Any larger key would actually be harder to factor than brute forcing the IDEA keyspace. Very little security would be gained from using a key larger than 3000 bits. Of course, one can always argue that improved factoring methods would require that an RSA public key be longer than 3000 bits to have equal security to IDEA. However, I doubt that factoring methods will improve that much. A 2048 bit key should be more than enough security for most applications. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOrkUbZc+sv5siulAQFWJgP+IlKURN3TtdXrqzLf3vCrva1tYkYC/lZU fIOlk5Cvnt9wpm/huZKu/nESvFmJutoTbZVvJz1EPglLc1YrAlo4xyWTJZgwMpgv khXzkEMaPludU1qfKowaM0qqeSHv80zSB97Mq0SbqNEPyM2K0r+gDobSjUgwKQCQ Mb5D9L3hTLA= =CDHg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- finger -l markm@voicenet.com for PGP key http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ Fingerprint: bd24d08e3cbb53472054fa56002258d5 Key-ID: 0xF9B22BA5 -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GAT d- s:- a? C++++ U+++>$ P+++ L++(+++) E--- W++(--) N+++ o- K w--- O- M- V-- PS+++>$ PE-(++) Y++ PGP+(++) t-@ 5? X++ R-- tv+ b+++ DI+ D++ G+++ e! h* r! y? ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Laszlo Vecsey Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:10:00 +0800 To: Jason Rentz Subject: Re: Unmuzzy Explained In-Reply-To: <199601031924.NAA24001@cdale1.midwest.net> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > >So is the idea beyond this that if file or a group of files were to > >be distributed over many computers (possibly hundreds or more) then > >none of the computers would be "responsible" for their content? I would > >think that any participant in the network would have to claim full > >responsibility for the content, assuming the file(s) could be accessed > >from any of the participating servers. > > > Okay. So what if serveral groups of computers, in public FTP directories, > allowed anonymous ftp uploads of "parts" of a file that would be construde > as bad content. The only way to assemble the file is to download several > parts of it from serveral diffrent servers and assemble the file on your > system. Thus the illegal file isn't illegal until its assembled. Sorta > like switchblade knives. Lots of places can sell the parts legally, they > just can't sell the assembled product. Would the servers that contain > "parts" of the file be responsible for the content? PGP encrypting a file and putting it on an ftp site is unusable unless you have the key to unlock it.. in this sense the file is only partly on-line and therefore there would be no need to even split the file apart to various servers! Would the site containing this PGP encrypted data be responsible for it's content? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Scott Brickner Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:08:14 +0800 To: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601031815.KAA15424@netcom5.netcom.com> Message-ID: <199601032143.QAA25385@universe.digex.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Bill Frantz writes: >With a tightly focused beam (light is easy, I don't know about lower >frequencies), you can prevent interception except by very obvious physical >devices. (e.g. Someone in a cherry picker truck.) You may be able to >avoid the need to encrypt the link (and all the paranoia about key >management, advances in factoring etc. that that implies.) Key management problems? With someone across the street? You gotta be kidding. If you can't memorize the key (say with the S/Key key-to- phrase algorithm) and walk it across the street, write it on the back of an envelope, walk it over, re-key, and burn it. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 06:38:58 +0800 To: John Goerzen Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 23:03 1/2/96, John Goerzen wrote: >CompuServe is not location-dependant. The network operates exactly the >same regardless of calling location (indeed, the system doesn't even know >where you're calling from I believe). It is a worldwide CompuServe >Network that people use to access it. This network just allows dialups >and then gets the users connected to the CompuServe computers. The main >computers handle all traffic. They don't are location-independant, >making it impossible to block access based on location. CIS always knows where you are dialing in from. Here is the start of a typical connection (using the Mac Program NAVIGATOR). >0001NUH > >Host Name: CIS > >User ID: xxxxx,xxx/INT >Password: >[Navigator: Logged on] > >Welcome to CompuServe Information ServiceT01NUH @38400! > >Last access: Mon, Dec 18, 1995 23:11 >Connected to port CIS T01NUH @38400 That NUH identifies that I am calling in via a V34 Node in NYC and the T01 says I got the first modem on the Rotory. If CIS wanted to restrict access via the NYS nodes, that NUH would be an adequate flag to trigger this action. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 08:53:59 +0800 To: rittle@comm.mot.com Subject: Re: NYT's _Unmuzzling the Internet_ In-Reply-To: <9601030920.AA05852@supra.comm.mot.com> Message-ID: <199601040008.QAA14520@netcom18.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >At first, the Jaron proposal sounds like an interesting thought >experiment but a total waste of bandwidth, both CPU and network, to >me. The unconstitutional Bill must be defeated in Congress, by that >Presidential veto pen that Clinton has become so fond of using >recently or the Court system, if absolutely necessary. If none of >that happens, then surely technology can be used to route around this >"political" problem. It just seems like a shame to have to expend >technical effort and valuable network resources to play games to meet >the letter of a law, which would so clearly break the direct spirit of >the Constitution, if signed into Law and later found during a Supreme >Court battle to "pass constitutional muster," as they like to say. the laws are very likely to be challenged almost from the instant they become active by EFF et. al-- there are a lot of powerful legal allies against it. however, to borrow from Nietzche, "that which attempts to destroy the net will only help it grow stronger". Congressmen and governments have a choice: be a friend or enemy of cyberspace. if they choose the latter, they will simply become increasingly irrelevant. cyberspace will inevitably transcend local regulatory laws and feebleminded bureacrats in the long run. if parts of it have to go "underground" to do so, that will be the approach. a network that is impervious to these misguided bureacrats, far from being a waste of time developing as you write, would be a very, very significant achievement. it would be a form of technology that resists attack on more than merely technological grounds but work in ideological areas as well. I am all for helping congressmen "get a clue" at this moment in time. the Digital Telephony bill is not a declaration of war. when they try to tax Cyberspace or get the FCC to regulate it, or outlaw cryptography, *that* will be a declaration of war. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Tony Iannotti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:06:11 +0800 To: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: > CIS always knows where you are dialing in from. Here is the start of a > typical connection (using the Mac Program NAVIGATOR). > > >0001NUH > > > >Host Name: CIS > > > >User ID: xxxxx,xxx/INT > >Password: > >[Navigator: Logged on] > > > >Welcome to CompuServe Information ServiceT01NUH @38400! > > > >Last access: Mon, Dec 18, 1995 23:11 > >Connected to port CIS T01NUH @38400 > > That NUH identifies that I am calling in via a V34 Node in NYC and the T01 > says I got the first modem on the Rotory. If CIS wanted to restrict access > via the NYS nodes, that NUH would be an adequate flag to trigger this > action. Wouldn't this require some software routines added to check for this? I expect the decision to build or buy is what CIS is now weighing. Also, I would imagine that a German could always call a POP outside the country if they wanted to pay for it..... (note that I am still not in favor of the action, but these are probably CIS's considerations.) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:48:55 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: crypto (semi-)export issue Message-ID: <9601032309.AA16448@alpha> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain It's been a while since this went 'round, and my memories are hazy of the details. Isn't it the case that there are loopholes or explicit exceptions in crypto export regulations that allow American businesses to supply their overseas operatives with tools for secure communication back home? We were discussing today some stuff about our web server, and there's some desire to provide secure access for our sales people to internal junk. Nobody was sure whether it'd be OK for our people in the Evil Empire (Europe) to have the 128-bit-RC4 Netscape for that purpose. (If so, I wonder if the exceptions apply to other munitions too? Like, maybe it's OK to take a medium-range missile overseas if you're just going to use it to blow up your manager's office :-) (No, I don't hate my manager.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Nobody's going to listen to you if you just | Mike McNally (m5@tivoli.com) | | stand there and flap your arms like a fish. | Tivoli Systems, Austin TX | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 05:50:31 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups Message-ID: <199601031630.RAA03391@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Vincent Cate, 1/3/96 10:41 AM: >It seems to me that posting this widely on Compuserve (or at least on >alt.online-service.compuserve) and then contacting CNN and making comments >about how "the Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around >it" is the best way to handle this. We want the public to get the idea >that censorship does not work on the Internet. If you do this, you'll find out very quickly just how empty (or at least how slippery) slogans like "the Internet routes around censorship" are: if your efforts pay off and you steer even a fraction of CIS's traffic toward the remaining open newsservers, they'll close faster than you can say "alt." So before you do it, think about how the net will route around sysops closing their servers off from the net. Hieronymous -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMOqvAb3g0mNE55u1AQGG1AH/cGlgviaPIn2oDQ+QS7HJdkyeo0sRmHEO ALtF08CmBIPK4hqcxd/3ESWi7IwoaJtEPyAMvwigPtvdTxO/q4ubMg== =H5rs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: iagoldbe@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca (Ian Goldberg) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:37:30 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Starting an e-cash bank In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <4cf0qb$65h@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain (Just about caught up to 2 week's worth of cypherpunks... That 'J' got quite a workout...) In article <199601031925.NAA02085@proust.suba.com>, Alex Strasheim wrote: >> What does it take to be called a bank? > >Is it necessary to be called a bank? I've got a storefront in Chicago. >What would prevent me from opening up a Mark Twain account and buying and >selling ecash on floppies, in person? Do account holders have to agree >not to do that before Mark Twain gives them an account? Is it illegal? > >The currency exchange model almost seems more appropriate for most users >than the bank model. Isn't that what Sameer announced in his latest(?) press release? c2.org has a MT account. c2.org customers don't. The customers receive ecash payments from the Net (for accessing their |<00|_ web pages) and give the payments to c2.org, which deposits them in its MT acocunt, and credits the customer (minus a percentage? Lower than the customer would otherwise get from MT, but higher than c2.org (a merchant) is charged?). Did I get that right? - Ian From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:46:40 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: <55zqc557z8.fsf@galil.austnsc.tandem.com> Message-ID: <199601032300.SAA15180@opine.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sten Drescher writes: > Since I think that > increasing the RSA keysize is supposed to double the attack time, if a > RSA key size of N takes as much time to break as 1 IDEA key, making the > RSA key N+8 bits makes it better to break the IDEA keys of 200 messages > rather than the RSA key. > > Does anyone know if there are comparisons of estimates of the > time to break the IDEA session keys used in PGP vs time to break RSA > keys of various sizes? Off the top of my head, the figure I have usually heard quoted puts RSA at about 100 times slower than your average symmetric key algorithm. So ignoring key setup, I would expect an extra factor of 100 in the brute forcing time for RSA over IDEA. I don't believe it's worth spending much time worrying about your RSA key size. If you pick some decent size (1-2k), it's likely that RSA itself will have been broken, or your key compromised by some other means, before any direct brute force attack will succeed. Futplex -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMOsKNCnaAKQPVHDZAQHIRgf/ZS29BnGaZ60PeMlhIoniETAtI2VYNstM yFV6tl5w1Kzu9Q2TcJk/tdpW9QVbWOrB2IMdELBrk1urcYBS6YUBXcAlI7UhinA9 sapoZpz3WUCnRdb/64HkGFsOYgEVyVjsrrmu+M2RUUNRnOwWSS0KFAz8GYqj83ry xSpvrRNJPqCNARBsh9VPKgrRS1qNH5Zc1Tyu5Dr/E3OiQkzVCqHhQYYDj/PCESLL Y1Sly6n133Jq8J3TWoXAzeNKAOwy4tLz6TFn63OgbfcnTp1hndsMlIwCN3tzn9el T7b4LBMeVq2hXVkmotE0BURW7Phuckpmk1Xiow3vBXFMRxWPFz6lOg== =Njig -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 07:48:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: New Mitnick Book Message-ID: <199601032306.SAA07090@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Jonathan Littman, an investigative reporter, has published "The Fugitive Game: Online With Kevin Mitnick," Little Brown, 1996. 381 pp. $23.95. ISBN 0-316-52858-7. It is a dramatic recount of Mitnick's exploits; the pursuit by Shimomura, Markoff, telcos and Feds; the bust and Markoff's tales; The Well controversies aand disputes about what really happened; suspicions of Shimomura and Markoff - - their complicity with TLAs, their movie and book dealings, their disputes with hackers and journalists. What Mitnick was telling Littman while a fugitive. Littman ends with this letter from Markoff and Shimomura: October 8, 1995 Jonathan Littman 38 Miller Avenue Suite 122 Mill Valley, California 94941 Dear Jonathan, This is in response to your separate letters to us. We apologize for not being more prompt, Tsutomu was travelling on business and did not receive your September 5 letter until recently. As you know we have a contract with Hyperion for Tsutomu's account of his participation in the arrest of Kevin Mitnick, and at the request of our publisher we have decided not to participate in other books on the same subject. First, in response to your September 7 request to John Markoff, for permission to reprint his March 14 Well posting, he is not willing to give permission. However, we do think it is appropriate to respond to several points where you have received inaccurate information. Our responses are not intended to be a comprehensive answer to your list of questions, but only to protect you from including libelous material in your book. Tsutomu was not asked by any governmental, military or intelligence representative to assist in the capture of Mr. Mitnick. All of his actions were taken in response to requests for assistance from both The Well and Netcom to deal with extensive and persistent break-ins. Tsutomu's decision to tell John Markoff that he was travelling to Raleigh on Sunday morning was done without contact with any law enforcement agency. Markoff flew to Raleigh independently six hours later after discussing the possibility of a story with his editors at the New York Times. Markoff did not at any time assist or participate in any aspect of the investigation into Kevin Mitnick's activities; Markoff was there only as an observer in his role as a newspaper reporter. Moreover, in Raleigh on Sunday evening the Cellscope equipment was never placed in Markoff's car, and there was never any discussion about taking it out of the Cellular One engineer's van or about placing it in Markoff's car. Markoff parked his car near the cell site that night and then later drove back to his hotel. Tsutomu never told anyone from law enforcement that anyone had authorized or cleared Markoff's presence in Raleigh. Tsutomu was informed by the Justice Department that his actions on behalf of the Internet providers and the cellular telephone company during the course of the investigation were covered under their fraud detection and prevention exception granted to these organizations under the ECPA. Tsutomu did have discussions with the National Security Agency about funding computer security research, the results of which were to be placed in the public domain, however no research grant was ever made. Tsutomu was not aware of any statements made in the search warrant until many days after the arrest. Tsutomu did not lure Mitnick or anyone else into breaking-in to his computers. The attack was entirely unprovoked. No copies of any files allegedly stolen by Mitnick were provided by Tsutomu to anyone other than the legitimate owners. The first discussion of the possibility of a book on the subject of Kevin Mitnick's arrest took place on Thursday February 16, when John Markoff received a telephone call from John Brockman, a New York City literary agent, proposing a collaboration between Markoff and Shimomura. You will remember, we hope, that after his July 4, 1994 article about the hunt for Mitnick, Markoff did not wish to pursue the subject of Mitnick's life as a fugitive and referred a free-lance article on the subject proposed by Playboy to you. Also please note that you are inaccurate in stating that Tsutomu requested immunity before testifying before Congress on April 1993. We realize this is a delicate issue for you because of your involvement and communication with Kevin Mitnick during the period he was a fugitive. However, since your questions suggest you believe there may have been something inappropriate in Tsutomu's cellular telephone software development work, if you do include material in your book along this line, journalistic ethics require you to include the following: Tsutomu, unlike Mitnick, in all of his computer security research over a fifteen year period, has always, whenever he has found a vulnerability, made it known to the appropriate people, whether CERT, or a private company at risk, or the United States Congress. Sincerely, (signed) John Markoff Tsutomu Shimomura From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 17:36:31 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla ISPs Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 14:07 1/3/96, Peter Monta wrote: >I'm skeptical about cable modems---few cable providers have adequate >return paths, and everyone competes for the downlink bandwidth. >Broadcast is not the right architecture. Taking a closer look at it, you will find that the cable giants have prepared themselves rather well. In the US, there are about 3300 subs per headend. Each of which is served by about 7 trunks. Moreover, the cable operators have been busy laying fiber to all the headends. In fact, the vast majority of headends, certainly all the ones in the interesting markets have fiber on site today. The bandwidth crunch only happens if most cable subscribers want to use the ISP services. How many of the 3300 subs have PCs and are willing to pay $500-1000 per hookup? If you add switching to the picture, not that switching was necessarily needed, things look even better for cable based ISPs. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Corey Bridges Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:37:08 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: AOL security letter Message-ID: <199601040227.SAA14744@urchin.netscape.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Looks like AOL is being dragged, kicking and screaming, into the world of security. This is a note that AOL subscribers are receiving today: >>>> bj: ALERT: Password Security Date: 95-12-31 07:27:13 EST From: Steve Case Sent on: America Online (using Stratus) Dear Friend of America Online, I want to raise your awareness about an issue that affects us all: the importance of never revealing your password. Recently there have been a few incidents where computer hackers have tried to gain access to passwords by soliciting individuals online. These hackers have increased their level of sophistication so much that they have begun to correspond in a style to make you believe they are representing America Online. Here's an edited excerpt from a recent e-mail attempt: "Dear AOL Community Member: AOL is experiencing major problems...Due to a virus that was recently loaded...onto our main user database, containing most of our member registration information, we are currently experiencing widespread system failure. The problem originated...when our system was illegally breached by a former AOL employee. We believe the employee, who is currently being questioned by authorities, loaded a virus into our database. Because we identified the problem quickly, we were able to stop the problem before the entire database was deleted. The files that were deleted, however, happened to be the database link files...that link a user's password and screen name to the rest of their account. We are currently...working with McAfee Associates (Anti-Virus), to replace the lost files... ...Some of the effects as a result of not having the database link files include: random log-off's, AOLnet runs slower, and Email may accidentally be deleted. These problems are MAJOR inconveniences to our users, so we need your help to fix the problem." The letter continues, outlining the steps you must take to keep your account active, and awarding you free online hours for your troubles. Sending e-mail is just one tactic. Another approach is by using IMs (Instant Messages), where a hacker will notice you are online and try to pass himself off as an employee. Hackers sometimes scan chat areas and the member directory for screen names. Simply put, your passwords are like items in your safety deposit box. They're confidential. YOU are the only person who should know your password. Giving someone (even unintentionally) your password -- especially online -- is like handing over your wallet, keys, and other valuables to complete strangers. There is absolutely no reason why America Online would ever ask you for your password! Be aware: NO EMPLOYEE OR REPRESENTATIVE OF AMERICA ONLINE WILL EVER ASK YOU FOR YOUR PASSWORD, YOUR CREDIT CARD NUMBER, OR TO VERIFY YOUR BILLING INFORMATION ONLINE. IF THEY DO, BE SUSPICIOUS AND TAKE ACTION--REPORT IT IMMEDIATELY. Here are some quick steps to keep your passwords secure: 1) Immediately change your passwords (at keyword PASSWORD) to at least 6 alphanumeric characters -- combination of letters and numbers -- for all of your sub-accounts. Delete unused sub-accounts. 2) NEVER use your screen name, first or last name, town, street, etc. as a password. Do not use a common word. Add a few digits to a word, or misspell it. Hackers use all kinds of programs that search for common words. 3) Inform spouses, children, and others who have access to your account to take the same safety measures, and to NEVER give out passwords. 4) Report suspicious behavior at keyword STAFFPAGER immediately. Computer hacking on America Online is not widespread. But it's an activity -- and an illegal act -- which hinders our ability to conduct business and ensure a safe online community. AOL will pursue all legal action and law enforcement protection within our right to protect the security of our service. We also rely on our members, partners, remote community leaders, and others with overhead accounts much like a neighborhood watch program -- to help crush hacking, to maintain confidentiality of the simplest personal belonging (your password), and to report activity of this kind to AOL immediately. If you have any questions, please discuss them with your contact at AOL. Thank you, and have a Happy New Year. Regards, Steve Case Corey Bridges Security Documentation Netscape Communications Corporation home.netscape.com/people/corey 415-528-2978 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Marc Martinez" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 09:39:55 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article master@internexus.net (Laszlo Vecsey) writes: Are you sure it's a bug in the DOS version? When I did a pgp -kg in my UNIX shell (US version 2.6.2) I also entered 2048 bits and it too created a 2047 bit key instead. Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP doesn't support any size key (within reason). Regarding the unix version, what sort of processor is the machine running? We noticed on a 486 running linux, with a vanilla MIT release pgp, that it made 2047 bit keys when prompted for 2048. However, after compiling the same code on a SunOS 4.1.3 it had no problems making a 2048 key, though it took significantly longer due to differences in the how the operating systems function. Also, most of the unix machines I work on now are running hacked versions which will handle up to 4096 bit keys, so I could handle all of my keys relatively painlessly (and because I was curious about the code in pgp itself). In any case, that's about all I know on the topic, check the architecture of the machine your shell account is on, and if you have access to a sun, you might try it there. If you really want larger keys just poke around in the code, it's not that hard of a feat to accomplish. - ----BEGIN PGP SIGNED HEADERS---- From: "Marc Martinez" To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Date: 03 Jan 1996 18:49:44 -0600 Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQDVAwUBMOskKHutHIVnrGOxAQGvIAYAwU7RJkBu33HXd7g1V1DtH7p8cXTwpral lrYDCQDwRflxJUeNRAGUvL5cnfCGP0SGLcolkw4bsia92JtooyBrPhzNkAvh56O7 r9cXNb7EVnZIhEbgc5aVwa2BBSNgsbXNMYKhXmknrCkIUdBvIAf539xzkq5CXQQS 4ht8zhNku9UhAtuwNKa85zxUW+xmGdHX5kVn+aVAWUByxw5ndXq0aQkGFU7W9PVq Vr/qLVrMheMMgIWw9w86ZQnz7UmWbWht =vl/U -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Marc Martinez "Sleep is unnecessary in the presence of more espresso." lastxit@mindport.net Key fingerprint: PGP public key available 47 AD 25 FF C2 B7 F8 57 C5 B6 2E B3 5E 98 A5 DE by finger or keyserver From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Steve14571@aol.com Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 08:27:27 +0800 To: goerzenj@complete.org Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: <960103185717_83306823@emout04.mail.aol.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In a message dated 96-01-03 00:34:25 EST, you write: >CompuServe is not location-dependant. The network operates exactly the >same regardless of calling location (indeed, the system doesn't even know >where you're calling from I believe). It is a worldwide CompuServe >Network that people use to access it. This network just allows dialups >and then gets the users connected to the CompuServe computers. The main >computers handle all traffic. They don't are location-independant, >making it impossible to block access based on location. I see two possible ways to censor German users only (but I still believe censoring anyone is wrong). First, the "main computers" could be told where they are, and "censored" material could be filtered at that level before it is sent to individual users. Or CompuServe could release a software update for German users. The software would not recognize banned newsgroups. How difficult could that possibly be? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: stevenw@best.com (Steven Weller) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:20:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Kocher timing attack in RISKS Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Reproduced here from RISKS digest: ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Dec 1995 17:23:09 -0100 From: Saso Tomazic Subject: Re: Timing cryptanalysis of RSA, DH, DSS (Kocher, RISKS-17.53) The timing attack presented by Paul C. Kocher in his extended abstract of the paper "Cryptanalysis of Diffie-Helman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems Using Timing Attacks" (ftp://ftp.cryptography.com/pub/kocher_timing_attack.ps) is really worth consideration, however I would like to stress there is no need for panic, mainly for two reasons: 1) Security of practical cryptosystems do not rest solely on security of crypt algorithm. In fact, cryptoanalysis attacks are rare, due to strong crypto algorithms that are presently known. More often cryptosystems are broken using other weak points of cryptosystems as insecurity of keys, bad key management, easy to guess passwords, computer screen radiation, monitoring the keystrokes of computer in network, ... The timing attack can be considered just as one of them, not the most dangerous one. For practical cryptosystem, it would be extremely difficult to measure exact timing of encryption process, at least much more difficult as to monitor keystrokes or to capture entire message from the screen. The intruder, who would be able to measure the exact timing of encryption in a multitasking environment, would probably also have access to everything else (i.e., secret message, secret key, passwords, ...) and thus no need to measure timing. 2.) It is not so difficult to rewrite algorithms to be resistant to timing attacks, i.e., to have execution time independent of secret key. For example, the algorithm to compute R = y^x mod n given in the Kocher paper can be simply rewritten as: Let R = 1. Let A = 1. Let z = y. For i=0 upto (bits_in_x-1): If (bit i of x) is 1 then Let A = (R*z) mod n Else Let B = (R*z) mod n Let y = y^2 mod n. Let R = A. End. to be resistant to timing attacks. ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw@best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:53:31 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Duplicate messages Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960104033750.009219b4@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Has everyone else been getting two messages for the price of one? (Maybe Tim May is getting back at me for the semi-plagerized sig quote...) Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Pat Farrell" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 09:35:05 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: RE: crypto (semi-)export issue Message-ID: <70723.pfarrell@netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) writes: > Isn't it the case that there are loopholes or explicit exceptions in > crypto export regulations that allow American businesses to supply > their overseas operatives with tools for secure communication back > home? We were discussing today some stuff about our web server, and > there's some desire to provide secure access for our sales people to > internal junk. Nobody was sure whether it'd be OK for our people in > the Evil Empire (Europe) to have the 128-bit-RC4 Netscape for that > purpose. At the December NIST Key Escrow/GAK export meeting, Mike Nelson said that there are rules that allow US companies to "easily" export strong encryption to their overseas operations. The important (key :-) idea is that the export is to protect the corporate assetts of US companies. He seemed to imply that exporting, say PGP, for internal corporate use was fine and easily done. Other folks later claimed that this wasn't quite as easy as he claimed. For more, see, http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nist/pdf.nist2.html Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 09:14:32 +0800 To: John Young Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > Also please note that you are inaccurate in stating that > Tsutomu requested immunity before testifying before > Congress on April 1993. I don't know anything about the accuracy of the rest of the post, but I was there at this hearing. Immunity was granted, but it wasn't the same type of immunity granted to someone like Oliver North. My recollection is that the immunity was granted to allow Tsutomu Shimomura to convert an ordinary cellular phone into a scanner by typing in the magic combination of numbers. Ordinarily, this would break the law. The immunity prevented this from happening. The act was simply done to demonstrate just how easy it is to do this. They quickly switched channels several times and then turned off the phone. Nothing salicious or interesting came over the air, alas. It would have been funny if some bribe deal involving the chairman of the committee filled the room, but that only happens in movies. I don't know who requested the immunity. It could have been John Gage of Sun Micro who seemed to be running the show. There were probably transcripts made of the session and for all I know the Government might even have them around. That would allow us to get to the bottom of this important detail. -Peter From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:27:02 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn Message-ID: <199601040042.TAA29802@pipe6.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Jan 03, 1996 14:47:35, 'anonymous-remailer@shell.portal.com' wrote: >My original post, "US calls for measures against Internet porn" was a >satire. The entire point was that, by changing a few words in the >"China calls for measures against Internet porn" story, a statement by >a totalitarian communist regime could be made to look like official US >policy. Obviously, the project was a success, as people are taking it >seriously in spite of the fact that it had telltale clues, and that >the original source was revealed. > I was going to post on this topic, especially on a paraphrase of the (ostensible) original. I still want to, but let me play either the skeptical or responsible journalist (reader's choice of adjectives). Anonymous has *not* revealled the original source as he/it/she claimed. They have asserted it came from Xinhua news agency. Will Anonymous post a pointer to where we can access on the internet the original? News feed, date, and time of posting, as well as message ID should suffice. -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 20:26:50 +0800 To: Peter Monta MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 14:07 1/3/96 -0800, Peter Monta wrote: >I'm skeptical about cable modems---few cable providers have adequate >return paths, and everyone competes for the downlink bandwidth. >Broadcast is not the right architecture. I would be skeptical too, but the cable modems I reviewed in a marketing research focus group were from HP. My view of HP's reputation is that when they claim their equipment does something, it does. Does anyone want to offer counter examples? ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz@netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Douglas F. Elznic" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:33:25 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Re: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: <2.2.16.19960104004641.084f6bfe@terminus.storm.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 01:27 PM 1/3/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >At 10:24 AM 1/3/96 -0800, you wrote: >>At 09:43 AM 1/3/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >> >>>(BTW, I use Eudora, and I have PGP. Could somebody explain how to PGP-sign >>>messages, ideally EASILY?) >> >>I use Eudora as well. It is not as easy as I would like. You have a couple >>of options: >> >>1) Use cut-and-paste into Private Idaho. Private Idaho will allow you to >>paste back into Eudora. (Or you can send out from Private Idaho directly.) >>This option is useful becuase it supports nyms and chaining of remailers. >> >>2) Get one of the standard Windows PGP shells and paste into that. After >>signing, you will have to repaste into Eudora again. >> >>These seem to be the only options. I am not certain if there is a standard >>DDE or OLE interface that could be used to feed message information back and >>forth between Eudora and some other app. There have been a number of >>promises of Eudora/PGP integration, but nothing has materialized yet. > >[sigh] Just what I thought, no easy solutions. Well, for now I'll just >skip signing; I haven't had any problem (that I know of...knock on silicon) >with forged messages, and my normal posts are so enthusiastically anarchical >and inflammatory that the only way anybody could really embarrass me is to >forge a message, ostensibly from me, saying I agreed with some governmental >activity somewhere. > > >>There are no easy answers I know of... >> >>If you need a copy of Private Idaho, I can point you to a web site or bring >>a copy along to the meeting on the 20th. > >Please do... > > > I have heard that their are alpha releases currentky geing worked on at quest/qualcomm. But i would have to say before they come out your best bet to pgp and eudora is either pidaho or just use it in dos. pidaho is a great front end. A lot better than any others out their. I have also heard that ViaCrypt is a good alternative. But I am not sure. Has anyone else out there heard anything good/bad about ViaCrypt? -- ==================Douglas Elznic=================== delznic@storm.net http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/ (315)682-5489 (315)682-1647 4877 Firethorn Circle Manlius, NY 13104 "Challenge the system, question the rules." =================================================== PGP key available: http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/pgpkey.asc PGP Fingerprint: 68 6F 89 F6 F0 58 AE 22 14 8A 31 2A E5 5C FD A5 =================================================== From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Rick Busdiecker Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 17:09:43 +0800 To: "Michael C. Peponis" Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: <199601040009.SAA07299@unique.outlook.net> Message-ID: <9601040052.AA07122@cfdevx1.lehman.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: "Michael C. Peponis" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 05:17:35 +0000 > Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP > doesn't support any size key (within reason). Within reason is the Key Phrase. Even with a Pentium 90, I notice a considerable lag in decrypting messages that have been encrypted with a key larger than 2047/8. Even if you have a fast machine, if the person recieving the message could wait a long time to decrypt you 4096 byte encrypted message. Another point to realize is that PGP uses a combination of ciphers. When encrypting, the RSA key is only used to encrypt an IDEA key. That IDEA key is used to encrypt your message. Somewhere between 2048 and 4096, you're making the RSA key stronger (harder to brute force) than the IDEA key. At that point, the extra time that you're using for super-big RSA keys is totally wasted. A similar argument applies to authentication, but then you're comparing RSA and MD5, although I believe the argument holds for even smaller RSA keys than in the RSA-IDEA comparison. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOsj8JNR+/jb2ZlNAQGcRgP+JONF2g2Nw7SIKvcfCKurvS5WQ0WWjQmd H7NjkVjtjf947o1OKUMDYdKWTjSmvV//hdRloWz3T4kaS9FCLvzFbTZLNRtz33ic kcX0XIDYZ0pohMo98IaeXS/odB+tmo8jPTfZeC2lBuv4PRphSLypxDrR0VmQX2ld EVOl6RUBknw= =l/T7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Rick Busdiecker Please do not send electronic junk mail! net: rfb@lehman.com or rfb@cmu.edu PGP Public Key: 0xDBD9994D www: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/rfb/http/home.html send mail, subject "send index" for mailbot info, "send pgp key" gets my key A `hacker' is one who writes code. Breaking into systems is `cracking'. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 20:28:14 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Duplicate messages Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960104035542.0093e29c@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:40 PM 1/3/96 -0600, you wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >> Has everyone else been getting two messages for the price of one? > >I've gotten several pieces of email from people who are getting two >copies of stuff I post, but I've looked at my mailer (sendmail 8.6.10) >and it's not sending out dups to toad.com, as far as I can tell. > >If people continue to get dups from just me, then I'll have to install a >sendmail front-end to log outgoing email or something... It is not just you. I am getting dups from about half the list. Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Simon Spero Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 12:20:25 +0800 To: Peter Wayner Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Peter Wayner wrote: > I don't know who requested the immunity. It could have been John > Gage of Sun Micro who seemed to be running the show. There were > probably transcripts made of the session and for all I know the > Government might even have them around. That would allow us to > get to the bottom of this important detail. Yes, it was John who set this up (I remember him talking about the arrangements he was making just before the actual session). Simon From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 10:03:05 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book Message-ID: <199601040114.UAA21383@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Responding to msg by pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) on Wed, 3 Jan 7:39 PM Here's Littman on immunity for Shimomura (describing telco tracking Mitnick): Shimomura's brought along his own hacker's scanning rig. It's pretty basic, just an Oki 900 cellular phone and a hardware interface to his tiny HP Palmtop. One of Shimomura's friends -- who happens to be under federal indictment for illegal hacking -- cooked up the interface and helped write the software. Shimomura likes his computer-controlled cellular phone, but its use for tracking is limited. Its main purpose is to lock on a call and eavesdrop. It is illegal to use it to eavesdrop on calls. That's why Shimomura needed immunity from prosecution when he demonstrated his Oki scanner before Congress a couple of years ago. (p. 6) ------ [Still reading ... ] From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 04:11:27 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Compuserve *hasn't* banned newsgroups Message-ID: <199601031920.UAA08670@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Duncan Frissell 1/3/96 1:02 PM: >You mean that the thirty-some odd open news servers listed on >http://dana.ucc.nau.edu/~jwa/open-sites.html might get swamped. Then the >CIS refugees will be forced to pay Sameer the massive $12.50 (?) a month for >a net-access-only account and read off of c2.org's server. (Or any of the >thousands of sites worldwide one can open a shell account on.) CIS refugees aren't the only people who use or need free NNTP servers: > Here's what you can do for $208: get a used XT with two floppy drives for > $70; a 2400-baud internal modem (new at a local computer show) for $18 > (it comes with free communications software); and an e-mail and Usenet > news-reading account for $10 per month. Sound familiar? Hieronymous -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMOrWzb3g0mNE55u1AQEH5AH8D6P1BPIMpLTq0JWiwLz3na4Rgv3QeymK zeNbKnbtyDkJ2h9MW8+GiPKY7uOsdZsU34eOdFtmP7/+OV0naO8AAw== =fAWj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 09:55:24 +0800 To: John Young Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >From the Littman book: > Shimomura likes his computer-controlled cellular phone, but > its use for tracking is limited. Its main purpose is to > lock on a call and eavesdrop. It is illegal to use it to > eavesdrop on calls. That's why Shimomura needed immunity > from prosecution when he demonstrated his Oki scanner > before Congress a couple of years ago. (p. 6) > Well, here's another minor error. At the hearing, Shimomura just used a new, shrink wrapped cell phone. I think it was an AT&T model, but my memory is faint on these details. I'm pretty sure it wasn't an off the shelf Oki 900. Half the point was to show just how easy it was. He didn't even bother to hook the cell phone up to a laptop or palmtop. Just a few button pushes and instant scanner. I tried to get him to tell me the right buttons afterwards, but he was too busy and didn't answer. Sigh. But aside from the brand name of the phone, Littman's sentence seems accurate according to my recollection. The transcript should settle all of this. -Peter From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Joel McNamara Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 20:38:48 +0800 To: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book Message-ID: <199601040434.UAA22197@mail.eskimo.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >Well, here's another minor error. At the hearing, Shimomura >just used a new, shrink wrapped cell phone. I think it was an AT&T >model, but my memory is faint on these details. I'm pretty sure it >wasn't an off the shelf Oki 900. Half the point was to show just >how easy it was. He didn't even bother to hook the >cell phone up to a laptop or palmtop. Just a few button pushes and >instant scanner. I tried to get him to tell me the right buttons afterwards, >but he was too busy and didn't answer. Sigh. The AT&T 3730 model is identical to the Oki 900 and contains the same rich set of features. The key sequences to enter test mode and scan cell channels are the same. The commands are relatively well documented in most cell hacking archive sites. Joel From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:03:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: test Message-ID: <199601040246.UAA14351@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain test, please ignore From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:07:40 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: test Message-ID: <199601040247.UAA14402@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain test, please ignore - 1 copy sent. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:23:33 +0800 To: "Michael C. Peponis" Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 05:17 AM 1/4/96 +0000, you wrote: > >> Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP >> doesn't support any size key (within reason). > >Within reason is the Key Phrase. Even with a Pentium 90, I notice a >considerable lag in decrypting messages that have been encrypted with >a key larger than 2047/8. > >Even if you have a fast machine, if the person recieving the message >could wait a long time to decrypt you 4096 byte encrypted message. It seems to me that the best argument AGAINST supporting (and using) keys greater than 2048 bits is the false sense of security created. Even 1024-bit keys will probably be safe for decades if just the algorithm is concerned. Far more threatening are various other attacks, including RF snooping in combination with specialized viruses, as well as black-bag jobs on hardware. Why build a castle with a front wall a mile high when the back wall is a 5-foot chain-link fence?!? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:23:15 +0800 To: Peter Monta Subject: Re: Guerilla ISPs Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 02:07 PM 1/3/96 -0800, you wrote: >Thomas Edwards writes: > >> [ microcellular nets ] >> >> But how can these things compete with @Home, which is promising 10 Mbps >> in and 128 kbps out of homes with cable modems? > >I'm skeptical about cable modems---few cable providers have adequate >return paths, and everyone competes for the downlink bandwidth. >Broadcast is not the right architecture. > Even admittedly with no evidence, I tend to disagree. I think the world needs cable-driven "mostly-one-way" Internet access for the same reason we need both: 1. Magazines/books (few to many) vs. snail-mail (1-to-1 communication). 2. Television/radio (few to many) vs. telephones (1-to-1 communication). If, as I've heard, you could broadcast 28 mbits per second down a 6-megahertz cable line, that's a lot of "news, weather, and sports" to be broadcast to EVERYONE, similar to newspapers. Imagine the entire contents of USENET, plus a goodly supply of (encrypted) individual mail, etc. The contents of every newspaper in the country, transmitted a few times every day, etc. >Any systems in actual operation? How many users do they support? No idea. Wish I knew. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jyri Kaljundi Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 03:11:29 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Starting an e-cash bank In-Reply-To: <199512302305.SAA20998@netaxs.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Sat, 30 Dec 1995, Ryan Lackey wrote: > What would it take to start an anonymous, private, secure, etc. etc. bank > issuing e-cash, located in a country without taxes/etc.? I think this idea of a new e-cash bank or other kind of financial institution sounds very good. I have been thinking of the same thing here in Estonia, to set up a financial institution issuing e-cash for people here, but I think this would not in any way be an easy task. I am not very familiar with local legislation about financial and credit institutions, but I know that at least for banks the minimum equity capital or what you call it must be 50 million Estonian kroons (4 million US dollars). But I still think that for issuing e-cash and opening e-cash accounts you might not need to have such kind of capital. What does it take to be called a bank? And how easy is it to start a bank in some caribbean country or similar tax haven? What are the minimum requirements? Juri Kaljundi jk@digit.ee Digiturg http://www.digit.ee/ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:30:10 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn Message-ID: <199601040158.UAA10766@pipe6.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Jan 03, 1996 20:54:01, '"Declan B. McCullagh" ' wrote: >Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 3-Jan-96 Re:US calls for measures >ag.. by tallpaul@pipeline.com >> Anonymous has *not* revealled the original source as he/it/she claimed. >> They have asserted it came from Xinhua news agency. Will Anonymous post a >> pointer to where we can access on the internet the original? News feed, >> date, and time of posting, as well as message ID should suffice. > >It's been on the AP and Reuters wires, as well as on the CNN web site. > >-Declan > > "newswires" and "web sites" are not pointers to exact quotations. my question remains unanswered. -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:30:19 +0800 To: liberty@gate.net (Jim Ray) Subject: Re: NYT's _Unmuzzling the Internet_ In-Reply-To: <199601040312.WAA22282@osceola.gate.net> Message-ID: <199601040317.VAA16388@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > The FCC is now proposing a tax on ISP's -- in the name of "universal access" > !?? :O(. > > They claim that since voice can be transmitted over the Internet, it falls > under the jurisdiction of the FCC. This is pretty stupid - I mean, even I know that it's all just data. Besides, it's irrelevent - if the FCC had jurisdiction over the net because it can carry digitized voice, then they could regulate what I scream out my back door. Last time I looked, I didn't need a license to broadcast my voice out over the airwaves with my mouth... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOtGryS9AwzY9LDxAQFR9AP/YI62YWJSwikRgLVibKK0VlQ0iL70nz8J YR5njK2y9r9nN0TZ6B8W+PYxbT3nbhioSHrg1z29U1jOwTaYenwsytTGfRF2S7fe 3j8eZNF0bEnIdZP/7WE11t/t5rXBqdGW8CvvcTDvjBxIgXtsXZtR5bBdnjcObeEF JFEjkW3afKA= =Tckk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 18:16:15 +0800 To: alano@teleport.com (Alan Olsen) Subject: Re: Duplicate messages In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960104033750.009219b4@mail.teleport.com> Message-ID: <199601040340.VAA17921@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Has everyone else been getting two messages for the price of one? I've gotten several pieces of email from people who are getting two copies of stuff I post, but I've looked at my mailer (sendmail 8.6.10) and it's not sending out dups to toad.com, as far as I can tell. If people continue to get dups from just me, then I'll have to install a sendmail front-end to log outgoing email or something... - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOtMRCS9AwzY9LDxAQFbvwQAnIlapjkMlqGc9+DnCfRXBV+OzTzZ39wB 6xq3qiTavHblUsoozvgV9olKFhaBD5xYz9nnt+v8Cms4JyAIOB28DtbMKdRrjcht bpn3C0Mb7jNV7rXG0QZl3v6DLXTs7JzqnL5leVthNgA58J8FgEgMgpnGaHCCM8tQ RjAioEEIaXo= =BJzR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Herb Sutter Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 23:17:34 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Answer: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960104024833.006b10e8@mail.interlog.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Run, don't walk, to check out: Qualcomm's own Eudora support team recommended it, and it works seamlessly. To use it with Eudora, important point: after installing WPGP, go into Options|Select Keystrokes and make sure "Use Capture mode" and "Use Select All" are selected (and "Use Memorizer" should -not- be selected), otherwise you'll get errors about 'no selected text'. That's it; you're up and running. Example of using WPGP: After writing your message as usual in Eudora, to encrypt simply click on WPGP's "Enc" button and then click on the window containing your message; that's it, very slick. Another example: If you get a PGP-encrypted email and want to reply, just hit Eudora's Reply as usual (this will ">"-quote the entire original email as usual including the PGP block), click on WPGP to "Dec"rypt, and click anywhere on your reply window... it will pick out the PGP block, decrypt it, inform you about valid signatures etc., and automatically paste the reply back into your window in the proper place WITH PLAINTEXT PROPERLY QUOTED, as if you'd got the message straight in the clear and hit 'Reply'. Highly recommended. Herb At 13:27 01.03.1996 -0800, jim bell wrote: >At 10:24 AM 1/3/96 -0800, you wrote: >>At 09:43 AM 1/3/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >> >>>(BTW, I use Eudora, and I have PGP. Could somebody explain how to PGP-sign >>>messages, ideally EASILY?) >> >>I use Eudora as well. It is not as easy as I would like. You have a couple >>of options: >> >>1) Use cut-and-paste into Private Idaho. Private Idaho will allow you to >>paste back into Eudora. (Or you can send out from Private Idaho directly.) >>This option is useful becuase it supports nyms and chaining of remailers. >> >>2) Get one of the standard Windows PGP shells and paste into that. After >>signing, you will have to repaste into Eudora again. >> >>These seem to be the only options. I am not certain if there is a standard >>DDE or OLE interface that could be used to feed message information back and >>forth between Eudora and some other app. There have been a number of >>promises of Eudora/PGP integration, but nothing has materialized yet. > >[sigh] Just what I thought, no easy solutions. Well, for now I'll just >skip signing; I haven't had any problem (that I know of...knock on silicon) >with forged messages, and my normal posts are so enthusiastically anarchical >and inflammatory that the only way anybody could really embarrass me is to >forge a message, ostensibly from me, saying I agreed with some governmental >activity somewhere. > > >>There are no easy answers I know of... >> >>If you need a copy of Private Idaho, I can point you to a web site or bring >>a copy along to the meeting on the 20th. > >Please do... > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Herb Sutter (herbs@connobj.com) Connected Object Solutions 2228 Urwin - Suite 102 voice 416-618-0184 http://www.connobj.com/ Oakville ON Canada L6L 2T2 fax 905-847-6019 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brad Huntting Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:14:06 +0800 To: John Young Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book In-Reply-To: <199601040114.UAA21383@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: <199601040453.VAA00416@misc.glarp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > Shimomura likes his computer-controlled cellular phone, but > its use for tracking is limited. Its main purpose is to > lock on a call and eavesdrop. It is illegal to use it to > eavesdrop on calls. That's why Shimomura needed immunity > from prosecution when he demonstrated his Oki scanner > before Congress a couple of years ago. (p. 6) Curious, David Skaggs (R-CO) while arguing against having the Rocky Flats Grand Jury testify before congress on they're findings pointed out that congress can only offer immunity from prosecution for a testimony _about_ crimes they may have committed. In Shimomura's case the crime was committed in front of congress as _part_ of his testimony. One could easily argue, as Skaggs did, that congress oversteped it's bounds by asking a witness to commit a crime. Then again, they're the ones who decide what most of these crimes are in the first place. Sorry to stray off topic. brad From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 03:52:33 +0800 To: Herb Sutter Subject: Re: Answer: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:48 PM 1/3/96 -0500, you wrote: >Run, don't walk, to check out: > > > >Qualcomm's own Eudora support team recommended it, and it works seamlessly. >To use it with Eudora, important point: after installing WPGP, You make it sound so easy. Problem is, installing this thing was clunky. Took me a couple of times to make it even appear to install. >go into >Options|Select Keystrokes and make sure "Use Capture mode" and "Use Select >All" are selected >(and "Use Memorizer" should -not- be selected), At least that seems to work... >< otherwise >you'll get errors about 'no selected text'. That's it; you're up and running. > >Example of using WPGP: After writing your message as usual in Eudora, to >encrypt simply click on WPGP's "Enc" button and then click on the window >containing your message; that's it, very slick. Another example: If you get >a PGP-encrypted email and want to reply, just hit Eudora's Reply as usual >(this will ">"-quote the entire original email as usual including the PGP >block), click on WPGP to "Dec"rypt, and click anywhere on your reply >window... it will pick out the PGP block, decrypt it, inform you about valid >signatures etc., and automatically paste the reply back into your window in >the proper place WITH PLAINTEXT PROPERLY QUOTED, as if you'd got the message >straight in the clear and hit 'Reply'. > >Highly recommended. > >Herb I apreciate your enthusiasm, but it has failed to work a number of times for me. Perhaps you should study your instructions a bit more carefully for errors. After I get to the end of the message on Eudora, I select WPGP and follow your instructions by clicking on the ENC button. At this point, I can't maximize Eudora again to "click on the window containing your message" (as you asked). The system asks me for my password, I type it, but when control is returned to Eudora I see neither a signature nor encryption. Frankly, it appears to me that the biggest threat to our security at this moment are the programs which ostensibly are supposed to protect it. I wish I could be more appreciative. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: liberty@gate.net (Jim Ray) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:26:04 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: NYT's _Unmuzzling the Internet_ Message-ID: <199601040312.WAA22282@osceola.gate.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Vlad" wrote: >I am all for helping congressmen "get a clue" at this moment in time. >the Digital Telephony bill is not a declaration of war. when they try >to tax Cyberspace or get the FCC to regulate it, or outlaw cryptography, >*that* will be a declaration of war. I hate to be the bearer of bad news, and I try to resist forwarding messages from other lists, but on cyberia-L, Mr. Nick Keenan wrote: ____________________________________ The FCC is now proposing a tax on ISP's -- in the name of "universal access" !?? :O(. They claim that since voice can be transmitted over the Internet, it falls under the jurisdiction of the FCC. Read about it in the Dec. 18 issue of Interactive Week ( http://www.zdnet.com/~intweek/print/951218/upfront/doc11.html) >From the article: >FCC Chairman Reed Hundt provided the tip-off earlier this year during a >speech he gave in Washington at the Networked Economy Conference. Hundt said >the commission would issue a Notice of Proposed Rule-Making sometime this >year in order to re-examine how access charges are assigned and universal >service is funded, said Mark Corbitt, Hundt's main technology adviser. > >The Internet community "should wake up [and] pay attention," Corbitt >said. "This issue could hit them before they know it. I don't think >most of them are even aware" that this is bubbling up through the agency. ____End forwarded message____ I would hope that we would flood them with comments during the period after the "Notice of Proposed Rule-Making" appears, not that it will help, as they have already made up their minds. The FCC (like the FDA) should be defunded, not just "cut," whatever that word means anymore. There are good economic reasons why this won't help "universal access" any more than peanut subsidies help minority farmers, despite lies to the contrary by various self-interested bureaucrats. As Republicans said (before they became the majority party) "Cut Their Pay and Send Them Home." JMR Regards, Jim Ray http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray "Hooters GUYS? Washington -- GET A GRIP!" _______________________________________________________________________ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Public Key id. # E9BD6D35 IANAL _______________________________________________________________________ Help Phil! e-mail zldf@clark.net or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMOtDhm1lp8bpvW01AQHwXQP/XLPjBtLj55FUCTIY+F5Jz6+q9Y3a6Ies qLKoMcGbSMZfNxqzS7nenBCwGgyajl2kxea7zjPJkVZiKgAMPTyOYQ7inrIMyLp3 G7OgmroqnqT7NqXJuAzpOVO86QrbT29kJhsTs9HgiD3dBjHLEGZX5uCAhiAxVS/A ZraKvoyZ1ao= =3NjK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 14:33:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: A Mondex like Protocol Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Two Mondex units, upon command of their respective operators, can pass money from one to the other via infra_red signals. I think that this requires tamper proof units. I understand that the Mondex protocol is currently undisclosed. I have no information about that protocol but am merely trying to find a protocol that fits the little that I know about Mondex. Are there other guesses? Here is one way it might work. Upon an operator receive command, the payee unit transmits a DH greeting along with the value of a counter located in the payee unit. (The integrity of the counter value in the greeting is somehow ensured.) It continues to send this greeting while it awaits a greeting. Upon a pay command from its operator, a payer unit transmits a DH greeting and continues to send that while it awaits a greeting. When either unit receives a greeting it computes the shared secret key ala DH. The payer decrements its cash value and generates a pay order enciphered under the secret key. The pay order includes the counter value from the payee's greeting. This order is transmitted repeatedly until an acknowledgement is received or times out. If it times out then the money is lost. When the payee receives a pay order, it verifies that the counter value is correct and then increments the counter, preventing replay. The payee then increments its cash value and sends ciphered acknowledgements for a brief period. The payer may give one final acknowledgement acknowledgement which, if lost, merely means that the receiver will time-out sending acknowledgements. The common DH modulus is known to all units and but otherwise secret. This, of course, requires a extraordinary tamper resistance. Only the state must be kept secret, not the hardware behavior. Here is the money integrity argument for this protocol. The units are collectively responsible for preventing counterfeiting. For counterfeiting to happen some unit must increment its cash value when there was no corresponding decrement in another unit. A unit increments its cash value when it decodes a pay order from someone who knows the global secret DH modulus. That someone must have been a legitimate unit that decreased its cash value. Replay is impossible because each such transaction is uniquely identified by the recipient's counter value. The recipient never increments its cash value twice for the same counter value. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 11:48:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Will the real Anonynous please stand up Message-ID: <199601040332.WAA24066@pipe6.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Herewith is where my confusion developed by Anonymous #1, posted as Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 18:34:56 -0600, Message-Id: <199601010034.SAA07422@tjava.com>: The story as presented by Anon #1, while supposedly from Reuters quotes the Associated Press, something that rarely if even happens. Another story, posted by Anonymous #2 (presumably the same entity as Anonymous #1), posted as Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 01:25:12 +0100, Message-Id: <199601010025.BAA04537@utopia.hacktic.nl> is slugged "BEIJING (AP)_ " and quotes Xinhua News Agency; A reference by Anonymous #3 (presumably the same entity as Anon #1 & #2), posted as Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:47:35 -0800, Message-Id: <199601032247.OAA00603@jobe.shell.portal.com> states that the faked story changed the words "Xinhua news agency" to "the Associated Press." Looking down the list of posts to the cp list for past posts by "Anonymous" the first one I came to was titled "first germany, now china" and not "US calls for measures... " as Anonymous #3 wrote in the referencing post. There were at least two wire service stories: Reuters: China calls for measures against Internet porn Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 9:20:13 PST Message-ID: clari.news.censorship Associated Press: China to Block Internet Porn Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 15:10:29 PST Message-ID: clari.news.censorship Add to this is the confusion that several entities are posting to the cp list using the same name -- "Anonymous" -- without differentiating their posts from any of the other posts by (inferentially) other entities with the same name. I have no problem with people (dolphins, whales, or space creatures, etc.) posting anonymously. I do have *significant* problems with their lack of seriousness that we see in their willingness to be confused by others of the same name. I have even more significant problems with their seeming willingness to expect me to straighten out this confusion that they are either too lazy or too chaotically-oriented to do themselves. Even English monarchs, in centuries past when monarchs like Anonymous only had one name, were given some additional signifier to keep them separate (e.g. "Donald the Fat" vs. "Donald the Terribly Ugly" vs. "Donald the Wonderful With A Really Good Ad Agency"). Scientific discussions to which people wish to contribute anonymously are OK with me; the same discussions that are starting to resemble the confusion of a Month Python skit are not. -- -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 20:30:02 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: bumper stickers Message-ID: <199601040411.XAA29821@pipe6.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Jan 03, 1996 22:25:26, 'liberty@gate.net (Jim Ray)' wrote: > > >> -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong. > > >My bumper sticker says, "Politicians and diapers need to be changed -- >often for the same reason." Politicians keep on proving this analysis >RIGHT, much as I *wish* it were wrong. >JMR >Regards, Jim Ray >http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray >"Hooters GUYS? Washington -- GET A GRIP!" > I am not sure if I understand the political argument that J. Ray believes is so "RIGHT" that he wishes to post it to the cypherpunks list. I infer that the answer he is implying is that they are both "full of shit." I have no problem with humorous bumper stickers. I frequently use parodies of bubble-brained "progressivism" as my .sig files (e.g. "Visualize whirled peas" or "Give pizza chants" but I do not confuse them with detailed social, political, mathematical, philosophical, or especially economic analysis. J.Ray may wish to comment on the anality of politicians; that is an opinion over which I have no desire to comment. But to seriously maintain that one needs to replace an elected official based on the presumed state of his bowels, to post this info publically, and to insist that the analysis is "RIGHT" is rather an example of what I meant. One might define cypherpunks in three areas: a) they write code, *code* and CODE; b) they are concerned about anonymity; c) they are concerned about privacy. The code they write is based on algorythms. They are short, terse, and elegant. The code that the algorythmicly-oriented cypherpunks have written is wonderful and a major contribution to human freedom. They write far better code than I have ever written or will ever be likely to write. And you can put elegant mathematical equations on bumper stickers. They can fit and they are true. The best example might be "E = MC^2". Unfortunately, the other two issues are not subject to the same type of solutions as is encryption code. The time one spends working on the elegant algorythms is time not spent on broader issues of political science, sociology, economics, history, etc. Unfortunately, many do not realize this and so treat complex social issues as if they can be decided with the same type of elegant algorthym as the code. They can not. The English language does not have the compact elegance of C++. Nor is the range of human problems and interrelationships anywhere near as narrow as that of the average instruction set of a CPU. So attempts at solving complex social problems in the same way are *always* wrong, as witness J.Ray's original post to the group. I do not mean to suggest that every algo-oriented individual must, of necessity, miss the larger social issues. Einstein, for example, came up with a mean critique of E. Mach, but only because Uncle AL put a lot of post-1905 time studying complex aspects of philosophy. His critique, by the by, did not fit on a bumber sticker. -- tallpaul -- Gun control means being able to hit your target! From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Michael C. Peponis" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 04:11:53 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: What to do about Germany Message-ID: <199601031913.NAA11851@unique.outlook.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Wed, 3 Jan 1996 11:52:34 +0100 (MET) Cees de Groot wrote >> What the German goverement threatned to do was inexcusable, but >> something can be done about it. >Sorry, but the "German government" did not threaten to do anything at >all. A (conservative-ish) prosecutor started an _investigation_, which >in his eyes was nothing more than executing the law (and sorry, >that's what the guy is paid for). So what does the above paragraph mean, it was not the goverment that threated, it was a procecutor who was acting on behalf of the govement to enforcese the laws of that body which is what he is paid to do. Gee, that's what I said, only alot more complicated and detailed. In the end, the party at fault is the some division of the German goverment, the procecutor is not an individual person acting on his/her own behalf. >If the German government did something wrong, it was accepting a law >for the protection of minors (Jugendschutzgesetz), which says that >minors should not be allowed to have access to booze, dope and porno. But that's a GERMAN law, the Internet is an INTERNATIONAL community. If we have to respect the laws of Germany, and their customs and archaic belief systems, them we have to give the same consideration to anyother countries backwords, morality-based, mentality. There are hundreds of countries on the planet, most of them backwards. Respect everybodys sence of decency and right and wrong and nobody will be able to transmit anything the least be vulgar becasue it would violate some countries law some where on the planet. >Please tell me such laws do not exist in your country... They do exist, but I have been breaking them since 13, I don't care to be protected by some "moral" and "ethical" person, I can decide for myself what I can and can not do. >If anything, this whole bussiness will be one step in the correct >direction: >- Either some modus operandum is found which makes it clear for >everybody > how to offer pornographic material and comply with the law at the > same time (cf. the First Virtual account ID's you have to enter at > all those sites pointing to www.infohaus.com - in the US, this >modus > operandum seems to be ``proof of having a credit card''); That's just brilliant exhange one evil for another. Instead of censorship, we take away people's rights to autonymity and privacy. Sorry, not an option. > Or the German Government learns about the lack of frontiers on the >Net, and gives up (which is highly improbable). Or they can be given consequences for their actions. Let it be known that people will not tolerate them enforcing their laws on everybody. The weaker any goverment, the more ineffective it is in imposing it's will, the better off individuals are. >considering that German prosecutors don't have the option of not >prosecuting when they hear about a felony, like for example Dutch >prosecutors. No the prosecutor does not have a choice, that's why you attact the people that make the laws, or the governing body as a whole. They try to impose there will on me, I will unlease my dirty tricks on them. Fair is fair. I have the ablity to impose my will on ohters, I have done so when certin persons have gotten on my nerves by posting things to newsgroups that were blatently off topic and they had been told and warned about it on serveral occasions. But when you go to a sexualy explicit newsgroup, what do you think you will find, what is the purpose of such a group? Protection of children is a parents responsiblity, if they can't handle that responsiblity, that is thier problem, not mine. Given my experiencewith the German government, >however, it will take some time for them >to realize that they need >a set of rules in this area. Again, that is Germany's problem, not mine, make it an issue and suffer the consequences. -- >OpenLink Software Tell Kinsley I said hello Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 14:08:09 +0800 To: Corey Bridges MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >bj: ALERT: Password Security >Date: 95-12-31 07:27:13 EST >From: Steve Case >Sent on: America Online (using Stratus) >"Dear AOL Community Member: >...Some of the effects as a result of not having the database link files >include: random log-off's, AOLnet runs slower, and Email may accidentally be >deleted. These problems are MAJOR inconveniences to our users, so we need >your help to fix the problem." Are you guys really sure you need me to send in my AOL password? I don't use my AOL account very often, but if you really need it, here it is: Username: Tim May, tcmay@aol.com Passphrase: 42trollsrus I hope this helps. --Tim May, tcmay@aol.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@tjava.com (Anonymous) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:50:41 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn [NOISE] In-Reply-To: <199601040042.TAA29802@pipe6.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: <199601040526.XAA03570@tjava.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain tallpaul writes: > I was going to post on this topic, especially on a paraphrase of the > (ostensible) original. I still want to, but let me play either the > skeptical or responsible journalist (reader's choice of adjectives). > > Anonymous has *not* revealled the original source as he/it/she claimed. > They have asserted it came from Xinhua news agency. Will Anonymous post a > pointer to where we can access on the internet the original? News feed, > date, and time of posting, as well as message ID should suffice. I hope these headers are sufficient. I used the Clarinet news feed on Netcom to get the original copy of the text. No doubt the story is on archive sites elsewhere. I did _not_ post the original to cpunks. From: C-reuters@clari.net (Reuters) Subject: China calls for measures against Internet porn Message-ID: Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 9:20:13 PST Newsgroups: clari.tw.new_media,clari.news.issues.censorship, clari.world.asia.china,clari.tw.issues,clari.news.sex,clari.news.issues.misc, clari.news.censorship,clare.tw.misc Thus, this is the first of the two stories you cited in "Will the real Anonymous please stand up". <199601040332.WAA24066@pipe6.nyc.pipeline.com> tallpaul also writes: > Herewith is where my confusion developed by Anonymous #1, posted as Date: > Sun, 31 Dec 1995 18:34:56 -0600, Message-Id: > <199601010034.SAA07422@tjava.com>: I am the author of that message. > The story as presented by Anon #1, while supposedly from Reuters quotes the > Associated Press, something that rarely if even happens. The original of the story does quote Xinhua. I personally thought it was a nice satirical touch to equate Xinhua and the Associated Press. Apparently, my irony was lost. > Another story, posted by Anonymous #2 (presumably the same entity as > Anonymous #1), posted as Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 01:25:12 +0100, Message-Id: > <199601010025.BAA04537@utopia.hacktic.nl> > is slugged "BEIJING (AP)_ " and quotes Xinhua News Agency; Not the same anonymous. That was the AP story, and I believe is legitimate. > A reference by Anonymous #3 (presumably the same entity as Anon #1 & #2), > posted as Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:47:35 -0800, Message-Id: > <199601032247.OAA00603@jobe.shell.portal.com> states that the faked story > changed the words "Xinhua news agency" to "the Associated Press." That's me, thus the same as #1, but different from #2. > Add to this is the confusion that several entities are posting to the cp > list using the same name -- "Anonymous" -- without differentiating their > posts from any of the other posts by (inferentially) other entities with > the same name. I agree this is confusing. I considered signing my posts "Mallet D'nonymous," but decided that would be too much of a taunt. > Scientific discussions to which people wish to contribute anonymously are > OK with me; the same discussions that are starting to resemble the > confusion of a Month Python skit are not. I _do_ apologize for the confusion. I thought it was going to be a nice clean satire, but the two wire stories made things more complicated, and I perhaps did not step in to clear the confusion when I should have. The only reason I'm being anonymous is to protest the copyright laws. Theoretically, my post may have been a violation of Reuters' copyright. I believe this is the same reason why Anon #2 chose to be anonymous, but of course I have no way of knowing for sure. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Bill Stewart Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 16:26:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: DOS/Windows remailer chaining Message-ID: <199601040811.AAA27446@ix12.ix.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:27 PM 1/2/96 +0100, nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) wrote: >Cypherpunks write code. With that phrase and the wave of attempts to >censor the 'Net, I've embarked on a quest to make remailers easier to use. > >Has anyone written an easy to use Windows or DOS application that will let >someone chain a message through several remailers, perhaps with support >for the mailer at alpha.c2.org? Yup. Private Idaho, www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ does just that, along with calling PGP to do things you commonly want done. >Would the writer of such a program, if in the US fall under the provisions >in ITAR? Obviously, calls to the PGP program would have to be made. I >recall reading that such hooks do fall under the ITAR. If this is true, so >much for a more user friendly version of chain for the masses. Depends on whether it's a "component" of an encryption system or not. But if you're not doing PGP, no problem at all (except of course that _real_ remailers only talk encrypted....) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around.... From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Bill Stewart Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 06:29:13 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: <199601040811.AAA27453@ix12.ix.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >> Are you sure it's a bug in the DOS version? When I did a pgp -kg in my >> UNIX shell (US version 2.6.2) I also entered 2048 bits and it too >> created a 2047 bit key instead. There are some versions that can only do 2047; there are others that have some sort of bug dealing with keys over some number like 2032, so if you're doing a new key around that size, 2000 might be safer. Looking at the distribution of keysizes on the MIT key server was interesting; there are a lot of unique or lightly-used values besides the popular 384, 510, 512, 768, 1024, 2047, 2048.... Something to think about if you're concerned about traffic analysis and anonymity. >> Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP >> doesn't support any size key (within reason). By the time the Bad Guys can factor 2047-bit keys cheaply, you'll have more serious problems to worry about, which may fundamentally change your assumptions about cost-effective cracking and the amount of security you need to provide. Remember that 1024 is currently way beyond crackable, so interesting theoretical things will have to happen before even that much is at risk. Also, there are a _lot_ of things around that tend to get 128-bit MD5 calculations in them - don't get overoptimistic about anything that pretends to be stronger than that. (IDEA's 128-bit keys are about as tough as 3000+bit RSA keys, and anything limited to 128 bits is going to be in that general ballpark.) PGP's random number stuff _is_ stronger than that, but that's still a fundamental limit. As a separate issue, programs do their calculations in data structures which have _some_ sizes to them. They could be assigned dynamically, but large-and-static isn't that bad, and PGP was originally for DOS anyway; if that's the least evil thing you find in the code, be happy :-) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around.... From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Gilmore Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 06:26:54 +0800 To: gnu@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (wireless) Message-ID: <9601040826.AA09122@toad.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain If you want to try a wireless network run by a couple of known cypherpunk types, browse www.fish.com. Your packets will be moving over a 2 Mbit/sec wireless network, using AT&T WaveLan (www.ncr.com/pub/products/wavelan) ISA-bus cards in PC-clone routers built by KarlNet (www.karlbridge.com). I think of it as a NAN (Neighborhood Area Network). The security is only DES at the card level, but we hope to layer IPSEC (RFC 1825) on top. John From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: James Black Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 03:59:00 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Hello, On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, jim bell wrote: > It seems to me that the best argument AGAINST supporting (and using) keys > greater than 2048 bits is the false sense of security created. Even > 1024-bit keys will probably be safe for decades if just the algorithm is > concerned. Far more threatening are various other attacks, including RF > snooping in combination with specialized viruses, as well as black-bag jobs > on hardware. I have been reading this discussion, and I would recommend that someone show the time that Bruce Schneier has in his book "Applied Cryptography" (2nd ED), as he covers the security of different key lengths very well. I would also suggest that people read it if this is a topic that interests them, as it was written very well. I would quote from it, except that I am at work, and the book is in my dorm room. :) Enjoy and have fun. ========================================================================== James Black (Comp Sci/Comp Eng sophomore) e-mail: black@eng.usf.edu http://www.eng.usf.edu/~black/index.html "An idea that is not dangerous is unworthy of being called an idea at all." Oscar Wilde ************************************************************************** From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Edgar Swank Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 22:27:19 +0800 To: Cypherpunks Subject: SecureDrive News Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Overseas FTP site Changes As I thought might happen, the operators of the utopia ftp site have moved SecureDrive 1.4a from the incoming directory to a permanent home, ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/reply/pub/disk/secdr14a.zip ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/crypto/CRYPTOapps/secdr14a.zip It has also appeared on at least one "mirror" site Host ftp.univie.ac.at Location: /security/crypt/mirrors/utopia.hacktic.nl/crypto/CRYPTOapps FILE -r--r--r-- 131174 01-Jan-1996 01:54:57 secdr14a.zip Location: /security/crypt/mirrors/utopia.hacktic.nl/disk FILE -r--r--r-- 131174 01-Jan-1996 01:54:57 secdr14a.zip which turned up in an Archie search. New Utility for use with SecureDrive and Windows 3.1 I have previously recommended EDOS as a mechanism to allow setting PGPPASS under a DOS window of Windows 3.1. A user has brought to my attention that a freeware utility, SETENV, that can be found at ftp://ftp.coast.net/SimTel/msdos/envutil/stnvjw25.zip that has the same function and also has a "password" mode for non-echo entry. I just tried it and it seems to work. SecureDrive and Windows 95 I have gotten many inquiries about SecureDrive and Windows 95. I don't have a copy of Win95 myself, but, based on user reports, I can report that SecureDrive 1.4a does work with Windows 95, but with some restrictions. 1)Always run CRYPTDSK and LOGIN under bare DOS, outside of Windows 95. Do not try to run either in a DOS window under Win95. 2)Run SECTSR and LOGIN x: /S in AUTOEXEC.BAT before other TSR's. 3)Run LOGIN x: (prompts for passphrase) later in AUTOEXEC.BAT, but before entering Windows. Enter the correct passphrase if you anticipate needing access to the encrypted partition. 4)After entering Windows, use the Control Panel to set 16-bit disk access. Use of 32-bit drivers may give direct access to the encrypted data, which is very dangerous for integrity of the data. I'm told step 4 may not be necessary if the encrypted partition has its own physical disk. In this case, Win95 will automatically switch to 16-bit drivers if the correct passphrase is entered to enable access to the encrypted partition. I've also been told of one instance where CRYPTDSK and/or LOGIN failed to find the correct partition from the DOS drive letter. If this happens, use the physical partition parameters, as explained in the documentation. Please continue to report experiences & problems to me. Edgar W. Swank -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOtGRN4nNf3ah8DHAQGzRAP9G6Ct2+pSH23h1GdoWqjCUAVkxs1oWvLU 4qz76NkVUQ9ZnlbSTY8bPvfAZZICBh9TjnBF+T5ph6fLaBEYj+q6od8RvO+HJY+r a7B6/3RSQHKNcAjpn4YZ9wIVimQS7RNLyBCiiuEbuC70OwgezD8p98/aWuRlCDxC ZcTRbkyyEsA= =KFb/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar@Garg.Campbell.CA.US (Edgar Swank) The Land of Garg BBS -- +1 408 378-5108 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: everard@infi.net (M. Scott Everard) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 13:55:10 +0800 Subject: Re: Fred Cohen, PhD In-Reply-To: <9512311818.AA16259@all.net> Message-ID: <4cfl5e$qj9@news.infi.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In article <9512311818.AA16259@all.net>, fc@all.net (Fred Cohen) says: > >> Regarding Fred Cohen, PhD: >> >> Cohen's haughty and bombastic style do nothing good for his reputation. I >> assume he advertises his PhD to highlight his early accomplishments; he has >> done little since. > Anyone that has earned a PhD has EARNED the right to follow his/her name with that distinction. Power to him. It's an accomplishment that we should all strive for if we're so inclined. Dr Cohen: I respect your degree and it doesn't bother me one bit for you to use the title that you deserve. >Apparently you have a reading disability. I haven't used Ph.D. next to my >name on this forum for some time. > >> Let's also consider the granting institution, a second-rank school. Let's consider the cretin that considers USC a "second rank school." > >When you insult me, that's one thing, but insulting my school is >something quite different. The University of Southern California is one >of the finest educational institutions in the world, and is widely >recognized as such. The engineering school at USC (from which I earned >my Ph.D.) is commonly ranked in the top 10 in the US, and in the year >that I graduated, my department was ranked in the top 5 in the US. > >USC, in addition to having a fine athletic tradition, also has many >unique benefits that sets it apart from many other excellent schools. >But I wouldn't want to advertise in this forum - you'll have to contact >them directly for more extensive information. > >> Cohen's thesis broke new ground, but how many people have read it, or any of >> his writings, or know anything about his ideas beyond a single word? How far >> did he carry this work? Where are the conference and journal papers? Cohen's >> reputation faded into obscurity long ago. Now he is building a new reputation >> as a pig-headed loudmouth, threatening his "defamers." Shades of Sternlight. And what, may I ask, have YOU written? >Some people are ignorant because they haven't had a chance to learn, but >other people are ignorant because they choose to be. In your case, it is >apparently the latter. But I will answer your questions nonetheless: > >How many people have read it, or any of his writings, or know anything >about his ideas beyond a single word? > > The thesis has only sold a few hundred copies, however, over > 20,000 people have read my books on the subject. My two > articles in "The Sciences" reached about 25,000 people each. > But I don't think thatr the value of peoples' work is a > function of how many people know about them. > >How far did he carry this work? > > I have published over 30 refereed journal articles on the subject, > about 50 conference papers, about 100 invited talks, and today, > over 1/2 of all computers in the world run virus defense software > using techniques I first published. That's more refereed papers > than anyone else in the world on that particular subject. > >Where are the conference and journal papers? > > They are listed on the Web site listed below. They include > IEEE, ACM, and IFIP papers, invited papers at IEEE, ACM, > DPMA, IFIP, and NIST conferences (as well as many others). > >So, now that we have a very brief history of my work, let us all know >where you went to school, how many journal and conference papers you >have published, how many books you have written. > >We already know that you won't tell people your name because you are >afraid to have it associated with you personally, but maybe you can help >us all understand how expert you are and what you have contributed to >the world so we can appreciate your point of view. > >-> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ >Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236 I really don't understand this guys' hostility toward Dr Cohen. But... it just doesn't matter. To hell with him. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Michael C. Peponis" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 08:17:23 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: <199601032345.RAA06435@unique.outlook.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: > > > CIS always knows where you are dialing in from. Here is the start of a > > typical connection (using the Mac Program NAVIGATOR). > > > > >0001NUH > > > > > >Host Name: CIS > > > > > >User ID: xxxxx,xxx/INT > > >Password: > > >[Navigator: Logged on] > > > > > >Welcome to CompuServe Information ServiceT01NUH @38400! > > > > > >Last access: Mon, Dec 18, 1995 23:11 > > >Connected to port CIS T01NUH @38400 > > > > That NUH identifies that I am calling in via a V34 Node in NYC and the T01 > > says I got the first modem on the Rotory. If CIS wanted to restrict access > > via the NYS nodes, that NUH would be an adequate flag to trigger this > > action. > > Wouldn't this require some software routines added to check for this? I > expect the decision to build or buy is what CIS is now weighing. Also, I > would imagine that a German could always call a POP outside the country if > they wanted to pay for it..... (note that I am still not in favor of the > action, but these are probably CIS's considerations.) Well, this could be away for compuserve to cover it's rear in a realy slick fashion. If they chose to do it this way. Most CIS subscribers use their proprietary interface, which puts a GUI front end over what is going on with them modem, what they amount to are scripts. Anyways, CIS could add a script that would check the NUH identifier, if it is in Germany, it goes to one newsfeed, if it's outside of Germany, it would go to another newsfeed. They could even market the service here in the US to those who like censorship. What could be "Accidentaly" leaked is a different version of the same file, that would not contain the check. That way, Compuserve could claime that the offending parties tampered with the software, and they can not be help responsible for the tampering. I highly doubt that Compuserve would go for such a resolution, but it's worth throwing into the mix Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server Key fingerprint = DD 39 66 3D AE DE 71 C2 B6 DA B2 3F 47 2A EB AC From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Michael C. Peponis" Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 16:23:48 +0800 To: Laszlo Vecsey Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: <199601040009.SAA07299@unique.outlook.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP > doesn't support any size key (within reason). Within reason is the Key Phrase. Even with a Pentium 90, I notice a considerable lag in decrypting messages that have been encrypted with a key larger than 2047/8. Even if you have a fast machine, if the person recieving the message could wait a long time to decrypt you 4096 byte encrypted message. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMOs4u0UffSIjnthhAQEfigP9GQvgcyuCUxkrPqX/3yDdtwxDGajKbbhY j90px4tr1Q1sNQue8ywBDdBIQakirTr95QDeGMrC1n0NjSh5+dotUUWiChWLCLS+ AMIsA3LCJr5BzeCOni8bYyz7+alt617cIIYZs0Unt26BKJVI20hU8OgD0oC9K/uR 7WN3YIKff0k= =TuOD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server Key fingerprint = DD 39 66 3D AE DE 71 C2 B6 DA B2 3F 47 2A EB AC From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 21:07:32 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: test In-Reply-To: <199601040247.UAA14402@dal1820.computek.net> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" writes: > test, please ignore - 1 copy sent. Ed, I've pointed out to you during our mini-flame war that I've been getting 4 copies of your every e-mail: 2 via the cpunks list, 2 directly from your box cc:'d to me. You _know_ that I've been getting 2 copies of cc:'s not passing through toad.com, that the problem is at your end, and not at toad.com, and you should _not_ send test posts to cypherpunks. I'm sorry if your recent posting flurry was provoked by my question about what you have contributed to this discussion besides puerile flames of Fred Cohen. None of the following: * your test posts * your lack of understanding of anonymous remailers * your inability to configure sendmail have any cryptographic relevance (other than to discredit your technical knowledge, which you have done quite thoroughly :) Please stop polluting this mailing list with test messages. Thank you. (I wish I could set up procmail on this box.) --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 22:16:14 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: "Concryption" Message-ID: <9601041355.AA16880@alpha> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Did I miss something in here about the alleged "Concryption" patent awarded Security Dynamics Technologies? Supposedly a press release was posted to sci.crypt. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Nobody's going to listen to you if you just | Mike McNally (m5@tivoli.com) | | stand there and flap your arms like a fish. | Tivoli Systems, Austin TX | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: liberty@gate.net (Jim Ray) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 21:44:57 +0800 To: tallpaul@pipeline.com Subject: Re: bumper stickers--WANNA BET??? Message-ID: <199601041329.IAA41784@osceola.gate.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- tallpaul@pipeline.com *posted* to the entire list! >I am not sure if I understand the political argument that J. Ray believes >is so "RIGHT" that he wishes to post it to the cypherpunks list. Er...did I post it to the list, and if I did, why didn't it appear there? This was a *private* message to you, according to my logs. Perhaps you should take a bit more care in responding to look at the message headers before hitting the entire list automatically. Private e-mail is, after all, still a possibility, even for the cypherpunks... >So attempts at solving complex social >problems in the same way are *always* wrong, as witness J.Ray's original >post to the group. Again, an offer of *proof* of my posting would be appropriate here. The message you got wasn't PGPsigned, which is a good clue I did not send it to the list. I hereby bet $10,000.00 e-cash [hell, I need the money!] that I made NO such posting to the cypherpunks list. I believe an apology (or a bet) is in order. Of course, I'm hoping for the bet. Switch to decaf, tallpaul! JMR PS. to the list. Please try to learn the big difference between their, they're, there, etc. The ghost of my former English teacher groans and moans inside my head when I see these errors. Strunk & White is short and to the point on the subject. The Ghost and I thank you. Regards, Jim Ray http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray "Hooters GUYS? Washington -- GET A GRIP!" _______________________________________________________________________ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Public Key id. # E9BD6D35 IANAL _______________________________________________________________________ Help Phil! e-mail zldf@clark.net or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMOvUHG1lp8bpvW01AQHbvgP+JR1gSBQvHu286IiWG+K4OGJi9NNcAHeY u5DLnloHF8UvZ8D1b4uKB85z17iZVvSjGA1HS8SkZ6sxgwsHsv5ZrzI65Nenqb2d vLbE1Ds9USmNBQAOtTs+dVUKkelpgbSLE9a2o8B866vT3lRPwluYSaHNX7CTHS67 /ZbTJ5qiP7E= =X2kk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: sameer Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 12:13:59 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES PROMOTION FOR UNCENSORED ACCESS TO THE INTERNET Message-ID: <199601041701.JAA09953@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Newsgroups: alt.censorship,comp.org.eff.talk,news.admin.censorship,alt.privacy,comp.privacy Subject: COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES PROMOTION FOR UNCENSORED ACCESS TO THE INTERNET From: Community ConneXion For Immediate Release - January 4, 1996 Contact: Sameer Parekh 510-601-9777x3 COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES PROMOTION FOR UNCENSORED ACCESS TO THE INTERNET Berkeley, CA - In response to recent restrictions on Usenet material made available to CompuServe customers, Community ConneXion, an Internet privacy provider, today announced that has begun a promotion to offer uncensored access to Usenet newsgroups at a discount to users who have experienced censorship at the hands of their Internet service provider, employer, or university. "'The Internet views censorship as damage, and routes around it,'" said Community ConneXion President Sameer Parekh, quoting a famous saying on the net, "While a network provider, university, or employer may want to limit the access their customers, students, or employees may have to potentially controversial material on the Internet, people need to realize that it is still possible for them to access controversial material through alternative means. We're making available services to make this fact obvious." Community ConneXion offers full Internet access to its customers, with no content-based restrictions on materials its customers may read or make available on the Internet. Community ConneXion has made available one free month of service to users signing up for services with Community ConneXion who are doing so in order to avoid content- based restrictions instituted by their net provider, university, or employer. Customers who would like to take advantage of Community ConneXion's uncensored access may continue to use their current provider for their basic access, but to access the previously-unavailable materials they may proxy through to the Community ConneXion servers. Parekh commented on the ease with which people can bypass censorship instituted by their provider or employer, "Providers, employers, and universities may think that they are restricting access through their sites, but given the ease with which people can set up an account with us, the organizations trying to restrict access will soon realize that censorship is hopeless." Community ConneXion, founded in June of 1994, is the leading provider of privacy on the Internet. They provide anonymous and pseudonymous Internet access and web pages in addition to powerful web service, virtual hosts, and web design consultation. Information is available from their web pages at http://www.c2.org/. More information on the uncensored promotion is available at http://www.c2.org/uncensored/. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 02:12:56 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: "Deterrence" Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Recently, Kevin Wheeler (on NWLIBERTARIANS@TELEPORT.COM) expressed what I consider to be odd (at least for him; I can easily deal with Benneth's crap) (and a bit belated) objections to my desire to use technology to prevent government from oppressing the public. If anybody "out there" wants to know "where I come from" on the subject of using technology to thwart the state, it would be difficult to find a better statement of the reasoning than the following, an essay written in 1987 by Chuck Hammill titled "FROM CROSSBOWS TO CRYPTOGRAPHY: THWARTING THE STATE VIA TECHNOLOGY. It is interesting to note, I think, that this essay predates both the "fall of Communism" in 1989 as well as the writing of the first version of PGP later. It it further interesting to observe that in the intervening time period, the main focus of the apparent threat to freedom has shifted from those ex-communist nations to "Western" and ostensibly "free nations'" governments. I downloaded my copy from FIDOnet about 2.5 years ago, which due to the limitations of that medium was cut up into chunks about 150 lines long. The message was originally signed with PGP, but due to this chopping operation it is certain the signatures can't possibly match. I also credit the person who uploaded it to FIDO, Russell Whitaker. +++++++++++++ re-print follows +++++++++++++ Area: Liberty Msg#: 480 Date: 04-28-93 04:06 From: Libernet (russell E. Whit Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: From Crossbows to Cryptog From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker) Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 23:51:02 BST Cc: ecfp@demon.co.uk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Please note that the following speech was made by Chuck Hammill in 1987. Address all letters to his address, given at the end of this document. -- Russell FROM CROSSBOWS TO CRYPTOGRAPHY: THWARTING THE STATE VIA TECHNOLOGY Given at the Future of Freedom Conference, November 1987 You know, technology--and particularly computer technology--has often gotten a bad rap in Libertarian cir- cles. We tend to think of Orwell's 1984, or Terry Gilliam's Brazil, or the proximity detectors keeping East Berlin's slave/citizens on their own side of the border, or the so- phisticated bugging devices Nixon used to harass those on his "enemies list." Or, we recognize that for the price of a ticket on the Concorde we can fly at twice the speed of sound, but only if we first walk thru a magnetometer run by a government policeman, and permit him to paw thru our be- longings if it beeps. But I think that mind-set is a mistake. Before there were cattle prods, governments tortured their prisoners with clubs and rubber hoses. Before there were lasers for eavesdropping, governments used binoculars and lip-readers. Though government certainly uses technology to oppress, the evil lies not in the tools but in the wielder of the tools. In fact, technology represents one of the most promis- ing avenues available for re-capturing our freedoms from those who have stolen them. By its very nature, it favors the bright (who can put it to use) over the dull (who can- not). It favors the adaptable (who are quick to see the merit of the new (over the sluggish (who cling to time- tested ways). And what two better words are there to de- scribe government bureaucracy than "dull" and "sluggish"? One of the clearest, classic triumphs of technology over tyranny I see is the invention of the man-portable crossbow. With it, an untrained peasant could now reliably and lethally engage a target out to fifty meters--even if that target were a mounted, chain-mailed knight. (Unlike the longbow, which, admittedly was more powerful, and could get off more shots per unit time, the crossbow required no formal training to utilize. Whereas the longbow required elaborate visual, tactile and kinesthetic coordination to achieve any degree of accuracy, the wielder of a crossbow could simply put the weapon to his shoulder, sight along the arrow itself, and be reasonably assured of hitting his tar- get.) Moreover, since just about the only mounted knights likely to visit your average peasant would be government soldiers and tax collectors, the utility of the device was plain: With it, the common rabble could defend themselves not only against one another, but against their governmental masters. It was the medieval equivalent of the armor- piercing bullet, and, consequently, kings and priests (the medieval equivalent of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Crossbows) threatened death and excommunication, respec- tively, for its unlawful possession. Looking at later developments, we see how technology like the firearm--particularly the repeating rifle and the handgun, later followed by the Gatling gun and more advanced machine guns--radically altered the balance of interpersonal and inter-group power. Not without reason was the Colt .45 called "the equalizer." A frail dance-hall hostess with one in her possession was now fully able to protect herself against the brawniest roughneck in any saloon. Advertise- ments for the period also reflect the merchandising of the repeating cartridge rifle by declaring that "a man on horseback, armed with one of these rifles, simply cannot be captured." And, as long as his captors were relying upon flintlocks or single-shot rifles, the quote is doubtless a true one. Updating now to the present, the public-key cipher (with a personal computer to run it) represents an equiv- alent quantum leap--in a defensive weapon. Not only can such a technique be used to protect sensitive data in one's own possession, but it can also permit two strangers to ex- change information over an insecure communications channel--a wiretapped phone line, for example, or skywriting, for that matter)--without ever having previously met to exchange cipher keys. With a thousand-dollar com- puter, you can create a cipher that a multi-megabuck CRAY X-MP can't crack in a year. Within a few years, it should be economically feasible to similarly encrypt voice communi- cations; soon after that, full-color digitized video images. Technology will not only have made wiretapping obsolete, it will have totally demolished government's control over in- formation transfer. I'd like to take just a moment to sketch the mathemat- ics which makes this principle possible. This algorithm is called the RSA algorithm, after Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman who jointly created it. Its security derives from the fact that, if a very large number is the product of two very large primes, then it is extremely difficult to obtain the two prime factors from analysis of their product. "Ex- tremely" in the sense that if primes p and q have 100 digits apiece, then their 200-digit product cannot in gen- eral be factored in less than 100 years by the most powerful computer now in existence. The "public" part of the key consists of (1) the prod- uct pq of the two large primes p and q, and (2) one fac- tor, call it x , of the product xy where xy = {(p-1) * (q-1) + 1}. The "private" part of the key consists of the other factor y. Each block of the text to be encrypted is first turned into an integer--either by using ASCII, or even a simple A=01, B=02, C=03, ... , Z=26 representation. This integer is then raised to the power x (modulo pq) and the resulting integer is then sent as the encrypted message. The receiver decrypts by taking this integer to the (secret) power y (modulo pq). It can be shown that this process will always yield the original number started with. What makes this a groundbreaking development, and why it is called "public-key" cryptography," is that I can openly publish the product pq and the number x , while keeping secret the number y --so that anyone can send me an encrypted message, namely x a (mod pq) , but only I can recover the original message a , by taking what they send, raising it to the power y and taking the result (mod pq). The risky step (meeting to exchange cipher keys) has been eliminated. So people who may not even trust each other enough to want to meet, may still reliably ex- change encrypted messages--each party having selected and disseminated his own pq and his x , while maintaining the secrecy of his own y. Another benefit of this scheme is the notion of a "dig- ital signature," to enable one to authenticate the source of a given message. Normally, if I want to send you a message, I raise my plaintext a to your x and take the result (mod your pq) and send that. However, if in my message, I take the plaintext a and raise it to my (secret) power y , take the result (mod my pq), then raise that result to your x (mod your pq) and send this, then even after you have normally "decrypted" the message, it will still look like garbage. However, if you then raise it to my public power x , and take the result (mod my public pq ), so you will not only recover the ori- ginal plaintext message, but you will know that no one but I could have sent it to you (since no one else knows my secret y). And these are the very concerns by the way that are to- day tormenting the Soviet Union about the whole question of personal computers. On the one hand, they recognize that American schoolchildren are right now growing up with com- puters as commonplace as sliderules used to be--more so, in fact, because there are things computers can do which will interest (and instruct) 3- and 4-year-olds. And it is pre- cisely these students who one generation hence will be going head-to-head against their Soviet counterparts. For the Soviets to hold back might be a suicidal as continuing to teach swordsmanship while your adversaries are learning ballistics. On the other hand, whatever else a personal computer may be, it is also an exquisitely efficient copying machine--a floppy disk will hold upwards of 50,000 words of text, and can be copied in a couple of minutes. If this weren't threatening enough, the computer that performs the copy can also encrypt the data in a fashion that is all but unbreakable. Remember that in Soviet society publicly ac- cessible Xerox machines are unknown. (The relatively few copying machines in existence are controlled more inten- sively than machine guns are in the United States.) Now the "conservative" position is that we should not sell these computers to the Soviets, because they could use them in weapons systems. The "liberal" position is that we should sell them, in the interests of mutual trade and cooperation--and anyway, if we don't make the sale, there will certainly be some other nation willing to. For my part, I'm ready to suggest that the Libertarian position should be to give them to the Soviets for free, and if necessary, make them take them . . . and if that doesn't work load up an SR-71 Blackbird and air drop them over Moscow in the middle of the night. Paid for by private sub- scription, of course, not taxation . . . I confess that this is not a position that has gained much support among members of the conventional left-right political spectrum, but, af- ter all, in the words of one of Illuminatus's characters, we are political non-Euclideans: The shortest distance to a particular goal may not look anything like what most people would consider a "straight line." Taking a long enough world-view, it is arguable that breaking the Soviet govern- ment monopoly on information transfer could better lead to the enfeeblement and, indeed, to the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet empire than would the production of another dozen missiles aimed at Moscow. But there's the rub: A "long enough" world view does suggest that the evil, the oppressive, the coercive and the simply stupid will "get what they deserve," but what's not immediately clear is how the rest of us can escape being killed, enslaved, or pauperized in the process. When the liberals and other collectivists began to at- tack freedom, they possessed a reasonably stable, healthy, functioning economy, and almost unlimited time to proceed to hamstring and dismantle it. A policy of political gradualism was at least conceivable. But now, we have patchwork crazy-quilt economy held together by baling wire and spit. The state not only taxes us to "feed the poor" while also inducing farmers to slaughter milk cows and drive up food prices--it then simultaneously turns around and sub- sidizes research into agricultural chemicals designed to in- crease yields of milk from the cows left alive. Or witness the fact that a decline in the price of oil is considered as potentially frightening as a comparable increase a few years ago. When the price went up, we were told, the economy risked collapse for for want of energy. The price increase was called the "moral equivalent of war" and the Feds swung into action. For the first time in American history, the speed at which you drive your car to work in the morning be- came an issue of Federal concern. Now, when the price of oil drops, again we risk problems, this time because Ameri- can oil companies and Third World basket-case nations who sell oil may not be able to ever pay their debts to our grossly over-extended banks. The suggested panacea is that government should now re-raise the oil prices that OPEC has lowered, via a new oil tax. Since the government is seeking to raise oil prices to about the same extent as OPEC did, what can we call this except the "moral equivalent of civil war--the government against its own people?" And, classically, in international trade, can you imag- ine any entity in the world except a government going to court claiming that a vendor was selling it goods too cheaply and demanding not only that that naughty vendor be compelled by the court to raise its prices, but also that it be punished for the act of lowering them in the first place? So while the statists could afford to take a couple of hundred years to trash our economy and our liberties--we certainly cannot count on having an equivalent period of stability in which to reclaim them. I contend that there exists almost a "black hole" effect in the evolution of nation-states just as in the evolution of stars. Once free- dom contracts beyond a certain minimum extent, the state warps the fabric of the political continuum about itself to the degree that subsequent re-emergence of freedom becomes all but impossible. A good illustration of this can be seen in the area of so-called "welfare" payments. When those who sup at the public trough outnumber (and thus outvote) those whose taxes must replenish the trough, then what possible choice has a democracy but to perpetuate and expand the tak- ing from the few for the unearned benefit of the many? Go down to the nearest "welfare" office, find just two people on the dole . . . and recognize that between them they form a voting bloc that can forever outvote you on the question of who owns your life--and the fruits of your life's labor. So essentially those who love liberty need an "edge" of some sort if we're ultimately going to prevail. We obvi- ously can't use the altruists' "other-directedness" of "work, slave, suffer, sacrifice, so that next generation of a billion random strangers can live in a better world." Recognize that, however immoral such an appeal might be, it is nonetheless an extremely powerful one in today's culture. If you can convince people to work energetically for a "cause," caring only enough for their personal welfare so as to remain alive enough and healthy enough to continue working--then you have a truly massive reservoir of energy to draw from. Equally clearly, this is just the sort of ap- peal which tautologically cannot be utilized for egoistic or libertarian goals. If I were to stand up before you tonight and say something like, "Listen, follow me as I enunciate my noble "cause," contribute your money to support the "cause," give up your free time to work for the "cause," strive selflessly to bring it about, and then (after you and your children are dead) maybe your children's children will actu- ally live under egoism"--you'd all think I'd gone mad. And of course you'd be right. Because the point I'm trying to make is that libertarianism and/or egoism will be spread if, when, and as, individual libertarians and/or egoists find it profitable and/or enjoyable to do so. And probably only then. While I certainly do not disparage the concept of poli- tical action, I don't believe that it is the only, nor even necessarily the most cost-effective path toward increasing freedom in our time. Consider that, for a fraction of the investment in time, money and effort I might expend in try- ing to convince the state to abolish wiretapping and all forms of censorship--I can teach every libertarian who's in- terested how to use cryptography to abolish them unilaterally. There is a maxim--a proverb--generally attributed to the Eskimoes, which very likely most Libertarians have al- ready heard. And while you likely would not quarrel with the saying, you might well feel that you've heard it often enough already, and that it has nothing further to teach us, and moreover, that maybe you're even tired of hearing it. I shall therefore repeat it now: If you give a man a fish, the saying runs, you feed him for a day. But if you teach a man how to fish, you feed him for a lifetime. Your exposure to the quote was probably in some sort of a "workfare" vs. "welfare" context; namely, that if you genuinely wish to help someone in need, you should teach him how to earn his sustenance, not simply how to beg for it. And of course this is true, if only because the next time he is hungry, there might not be anybody around willing or even able to give him a fish, whereas with the information on how to fish, he is completely self sufficient. But I submit that this exhausts only the first order content of the quote, and if there were nothing further to glean from it, I would have wasted your time by citing it again. After all, it seems to have almost a crypto-altruist slant, as though to imply that we should structure our ac- tivities so as to maximize the benefits to such hungry beggars as we may encounter. But consider: Suppose this Eskimo doesn't know how to fish, but he does know how to hunt walruses. You, on the other hand, have often gone hungry while traveling thru walrus country because you had no idea how to catch the damn things, and they ate most of the fish you could catch. And now suppose the two of you decide to exchange information, bartering fishing knowledge for hunting knowledge. Well, the first thing to observe is that a transaction of this type categorically and unambiguously refutes the Marxist premise that every trade must have a "winner" and a "loser;" the idea that if one person gains, it must necessarily be at the "expense" of another person who loses. Clearly, under this scenario, such is not the case. Each party has gained some- thing he did not have before, and neither has been dimin- ished in any way. When it comes to exchange of information (rather than material objects) life is no longer a zero-sum game. This is an extremely powerful notion. The "law of diminishing returns," the "first and second laws of thermodynamics"--all those "laws" which constrain our possi- bilities in other contexts--no longer bind us! Now that's anarchy! Or consider another possibility: Suppose this hungry Eskimo never learned to fish because the ruler of his nation-state had decreed fishing illegal. Because fish contain dangerous tiny bones, and sometimes sharp spines, he tells us, the state has decreed that their consumption--and even their possession--are too hazardous to the people's health to be permitted . . . even by knowledgeable, willing adults. Perhaps it is because citizens' bodies are thought to be government property, and therefore it is the function of the state to punish those who improperly care for govern- ment property. Or perhaps it is because the state gener- ously extends to competent adults the "benefits" it provides to children and to the mentally ill: namely, a full-time, all-pervasive supervisory conservatorship--so that they need not trouble themselves with making choices about behavior thought physically risky or morally "naughty." But, in any case, you stare stupefied, while your Eskimo informant re- lates how this law is taken so seriously that a friend of his was recently imprisoned for years for the crime of "pos- session of nine ounces of trout with intent to distribute." Now you may conclude that a society so grotesquely oppressive as to enforce a law of this type is simply an affront to the dignity of all human beings. You may go far- ther and decide to commit some portion of your discretion- ary, recreational time specifically to the task of thwarting this tyrant's goal. (Your rationale may be "altruistic" in the sense of wanting to liberate the oppressed, or "egoistic" in the sense of proving you can outsmart the oppressor--or very likely some combination of these or per- haps even other motives.) But, since you have zero desire to become a martyr to your "cause," you're not about to mount a military campaign, or even try to run a boatload of fish through the blockade. However, it is here that technology--and in particular in- formation technology--can multiply your efficacy literally a hundredfold. I say "literally," because for a fraction of the effort (and virtually none of the risk) attendant to smuggling in a hundred fish, you can quite readily produce a hundred Xerox copies of fishing instructions. (If the tar- geted government, like present-day America, at least permits open discussion of topics whose implementation is re- stricted, then that should suffice. But, if the government attempts to suppress the flow of information as well, then you will have to take a little more effort and perhaps write your fishing manual on a floppy disk encrypted according to your mythical Eskimo's public-key parameters. But as far as increasing real-world access to fish you have made genuine nonzero headway--which may continue to snowball as others re-disseminate the information you have provided. And you have not had to waste any of your time trying to convert id- eological adversaries, or even trying to win over the unde- cided. Recall Harry Browne's dictum from "Freedom in an Unfree World" that the success of any endeavor is in general inversely proportional to the number of people whose persua- sion is necessary to its fulfilment. If you look at history, you cannot deny that it has been dramatically shaped by men with names like Washington, Lincoln, . . . Nixon . . . Marcos . . . Duvalier . . . Khadaffi . . . and their ilk. But it has also been shaped by people with names like Edison, Curie, Marconi, Tesla and Wozniak. And this latter shaping has been at least as per- vasive, and not nearly so bloody. And that's where I'm trying to take The LiberTech Project. Rather than beseeching the state to please not en- slave, plunder or constrain us, I propose a libertarian net- work spreading the technologies by which we may seize freedom for ourselves. But here we must be a bit careful. While it is not (at present) illegal to encrypt information when government wants to spy on you, there is no guarantee of what the fu- ture may hold. There have been bills introduced, for exam- ple, which would have made it a crime to wear body armor when government wants to shoot you. That is, if you were to commit certain crimes while wearing a Kevlar vest, then that fact would constitute a separate federal crime of its own. This law to my knowledge has not passed . . . yet . . . but it does indicate how government thinks. Other technological applications, however, do indeed pose legal risks. We recognize, for example, that anyone who helped a pre-Civil War slave escape on the "underground railroad" was making a clearly illegal use of technology--as the sovereign government of the United States of America at that time found the buying and selling of human beings quite as acceptable as the buying and selling of cattle. Simi- larly, during Prohibition, anyone who used his bathtub to ferment yeast and sugar into the illegal psychoactive drug, alcohol--the controlled substance, wine--was using technol- ogy in a way that could get him shot dead by federal agents for his "crime"--unfortunately not to be restored to life when Congress reversed itself and re-permitted use of this drug. So . . . to quote a former President, un-indicted co- conspirator and pardoned felon . . . "Let me make one thing perfectly clear:" The LiberTech Project does not advocate, participate in, or conspire in the violation of any law--no matter how oppressive, unconstitutional or simply stupid such law may be. It does engage in description (for educa- tional and informational purposes only) of technological processes, and some of these processes (like flying a plane or manufacturing a firearm) may well require appropriate li- censing to perform legally. Fortunately, no license is needed for the distribution or receipt of information it- self. So, the next time you look at the political scene and despair, thinking, "Well, if 51% of the nation and 51% of this State, and 51% of this city have to turn Libertarian before I'll be free, then somebody might as well cut my goddamn throat now, and put me out of my misery"--recognize that such is not the case. There exist ways to make your- self free. If you wish to explore such techniques via the Project, you are welcome to give me your name and address--or a fake name and mail drop, for that matter--and you'll go on the mailing list for my erratically-published newsletter. Any friends or acquaintances whom you think would be interested are welcome as well. I'm not even asking for stamped self- addressed envelopes, since my printer can handle mailing la- bels and actual postage costs are down in the noise compared with the other efforts in getting an issue out. If you should have an idea to share, or even a useful product to plug, I'll be glad to have you write it up for publication. Even if you want to be the proverbial "free rider" and just benefit from what others contribute--you're still welcome: Everything will be public domain; feel free to copy it or give it away (or sell it, for that matter, 'cause if you can get money for it while I'm taking full-page ads trying to give it away, you're certainly entitled to your capitalist profit . . .) Anyway, every application of these principles should make the world just a little freer, and I'm certainly willing to underwrite that, at least for the forseeable fu- ture. I will leave you with one final thought: If you don't learn how to beat your plowshares into swords before they outlaw swords, then you sure as HELL ought to learn before they outlaw plowshares too. --Chuck Hammill THE LIBERTECH PROJECT 3194 Queensbury Drive Los Angeles, California 90064 310-836-4157 hammill@netcom.com [The above LiberTech address was updated December 1992, with the permission of Chuck Hammill, by Russell Whitaker] Those interested in the issues raised in this piece should participate in at least these newsgroups: alt.privacy alt.security.pgp comp.org.eff.talk sci.crypt A copy of the RSA-based public key encryption program, PGP 2.1 (Pretty Good Privacy), can be obtained at various ftp sites around the world. One such site is gate.demon.co.uk, where an MS-DOS version can be had by anonymous ftp as pgp22.zip in /pub/pgp. Versions for other operating systems, including UNIX variants and Macintosh, are also available. Source code is also available. Here's the blurb for PGP, by the way: - ---------------------- Quote ---------------------------------------- PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) ver 2.2 - RSA public-key encryption freeware for MSDOS, protects E-mail. Lets you communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of keys. Well featured and fast! Excellent user documentation. PGP has sophisticated key management, an RSA/conventional hybrid encryption scheme, message digests for digital signatures, data compression before encryption, and good ergonomic design. Source code is free. Filenames: pgp22.zip (executable and manuals), pgp22src.zip (sources) Keywords: PGP, Pretty Good Privacy, RSA, public key, encryption, privacy, authentication, signatures, email - ---------------------- End Quote ------------------------------------- Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk Communications Editor AMiX: RWhitaker EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI) +++++++++++++ End of quoted material re-printed from FIDOnet. Back to Jim Bell, here. While I've tried to remove the various reformatting that FIDOnet did, there is of course no way that I can return this file to its original state matching the PGP signature. I assume that most of the people/addresses listed have changed, or could have changed, but the idea is the important thing. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 23:00:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: An apology to Jim Ray Message-ID: <199601041437.JAA19955@pipe8.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Jan 04, 1996 08:28:11, 'liberty@gate.net (Jim Ray)' wrote a critique of my post to the list concerning what turned out to be a private message to me. J. Ray's points made in his critique are on-target and correct. My actions were not. I apologize to the people on the list for eating up their bandwidth in a public response to a private e-message. I especially apologize to J.Ray for whatever inconvience I may have caused him. -- -- tallpaul -- "Let's All Visualize HappyNet!" From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: thomas@inch.com (Thomas Massengale) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 23:14:04 +0800 To: "Mark M." MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 3:17 PM 1/3/96, Mark M. wrote: >I really don't see the point of using a key larger than 2048 bits. Any larger >key would actually be harder to factor than brute forcing the IDEA keyspace. the world will never need more than 640K of RAM? <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> the Forest will always be there...and anybody who is Friendly with Bears can find it. - A. A. Milne From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Tom Weinstein Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 03:11:24 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <30EC164A.2781@netscape.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Ian Goldberg wrote: > > Order of magnitude check: > > There is a very well-defined limit to the size of key that can be > broken by brute force, independent of your "wildest dreams" as to the > growth of technology. It's the Laws of Thermodynamics. > > For a symmetric algorithm for which any value of the appropriate > length n is a possibly valid (and equally likely) key, there are 2^n > keys to try in a brute-force search. From Applied Crypto, 2nd ed, > pp157-158, setting or clearing one bit takes at _least_ 4.4*10^-16 erg > of energy. For symmetric keys of size 256, then, you would need more > than 10^61 erg (that's 10^45 GJ) of energy just to _enumerate_ the > states. For comparison, this about 10 billion times larger than the > output of a typical supernova. > (Ibid.) Although your point is quite valid, there is always the possibility of some technological advance that invalidates these calculations. It is possible that quantum crypto will some day make brute forcing 256 bit keys practical. (Of course, my knowledge about quantum crypto couldn't fill a thimble, so maybe I'm wrong.) These results also apply only to symmetric key ciphers and have no relation to the difficulty of breaking RSA. The techniques for factoring large numbers have come a long way in the recent past and it would not be much of a surprise for them to take another large leap. All that being said, I believe that 128 bits is sufficient for a symmetric key and 2048 for a public key. Our paranoia would be far better directed at as yet unknown attacks on the algoritms involved or the specific implementations of cryptographic systems. Paul Kocher's recent timing attack is a perfect example of what we should be afraid of. -- Sure we spend a lot of money, but that doesn't mean | Tom Weinstein we *do* anything. -- Washington DC motto | tomw@netscape.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: netdog@dog.net (netdog) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 23:17:45 +0800 To: "Mark M." MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >I really don't see the point of using a key larger than 2048 bits. Any larger >key would actually be harder to factor than brute forcing the IDEA keyspace. >Very little security would be gained from using a key larger than 3000 bits. >Of course, one can always argue that improved factoring methods would require >that an RSA public key be longer than 3000 bits to have equal security to >IDEA. However, I doubt that factoring methods will improve that much. nobody will ever need more than 640K or RAM? i wouldn't underestimate the ability of technology to grow at a pace that is beyond our wildest dreams-especially with this network serving as a virtual office/lab. of course, ymmv. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> the Forest will always be there...and anybody who is Friendly with Bears can find it. - A. A. Milne From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Andrew Meredith Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 18:40:51 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <30EBA97C.41C67EA6@ecid.cig.mot.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain jim bell wrote: > And as you pointed out, this is especially important if RF is the > medium-of-choice for connections. We should definitely make a > serious amount of contact with people working on the PCS standards > to ensure that GOOD encryption is included. If by PCS you mean the GSM derived 2GHz system, then I believe that they use the A5 algorithm, the same as GSM. Unless they are using one of deliberately crippled versions, then I think you'll find that this is quite tough stuff. Seeing as the rest of the planet seems to have gone with GSM 900, it's a shame you guys didn't do likewise, you'd have had proper international roaming and decent airlink encryption for years by now ;) As a semi-aside, I'm not sure if anyone here has mentioned it yet, but the DCS 1800 (another GSM variant) based "Orange" UK cellphone operator, recently announced that they have linked their MSC direct with the Demon ISP (biggest UK ISP), so that you can now get a 9600 baud encrypted pure digital Internet link. It's not exactly as cheap as a local call, and 9600 baud isn't exactly flying, but ... Andy M PS Ok then, maybe I _am_ biased towards GSM, see .sig ;) -- Andrew Meredith Senior Systems Engineer Tel: (direct) +44(0) 1793 545377 Network Engineering Tools Group Tel: (main) +44(0) 1793 541541 Motorola, GSM Products Division Fax: +44(0) 1793 512618 16, Euroway, Blagrove SMTP: meredith@ecid.cig.mot.com Swindon, SN5 8YQ, UK X400: Andrew_Meredith-QSWI016@email.mot.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:22:05 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <199601041851.KAA27062@netcom5.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:43 1/4/96 -0600, Jason Rentz wrote: >Previous exchanges deleted... >> >>With a tightly focused beam (light is easy, I don't know about lower >>frequencies), you can prevent interception except by very obvious physical >>devices. (e.g. Someone in a cherry picker truck.) You may be able to >>avoid the need to encrypt the link (and all the paranoia about key >>management, advances in factoring etc. that that implies.) >> >>Bill > >The problem with this comes when you start creating links between much >taller buildings like in San Fran. Any give building over 30 stories might >sway a foot or so at any given time. Combine that with the other building >and you might get a few feet of movement. (movement not including during an >earthquake) :) (1) No single communication technology is appropriate for every problem. (2) A technical fix could include having the receiver send steering orders to the transmitter. This solution would, of course, be a long way from the low tech scavenged lens and 1/2 meter cardboard mailing tube technology I was thinking of. Bill From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: andr0id@midwest.net (Jason Rentz) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 02:52:03 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: <199601041743.LAA25788@cdale1.midwest.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Previous exchanges deleted... > >With a tightly focused beam (light is easy, I don't know about lower >frequencies), you can prevent interception except by very obvious physical >devices. (e.g. Someone in a cherry picker truck.) You may be able to >avoid the need to encrypt the link (and all the paranoia about key >management, advances in factoring etc. that that implies.) > >Bill The problem with this comes when you start creating links between much taller buildings like in San Fran. Any give building over 30 stories might sway a foot or so at any given time. Combine that with the other building and you might get a few feet of movement. (movement not including during an earthquake) :) (andr0id@midwest.net callsign: N9XLM) ( Computer Consulting & Management ) (P.O. 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‹]üÉÃisa_dmacascade: impossible request ÉÀâˆÑ€ÉÀˆÈæÖˆÐæÔÉÃisa_dmastart: impossible request é§ ‰ð$ D됐‰ð$ HæÖ0Àæ؍µðÿÿÿ‰Uü‰ÑÁÀ NMI ISA %x, EISA %x ‰Møƒûw ƒûtƒþ v ¸ èåŒÿÿ‰òì"Eø¶ÈƒÄ¶Eü9ÁtKuâ¶Eü9Á"À%ÿ ÇEü fƒ¹Ôð €f÷Vèç÷ÿeø[^ÉÃlpclose QèD öFt€Neø[^ÉÃinterrupt-driven " ì4¸$ø8EètI"" ‰ Ø^ðë ¡Ü^ð‰H‰ Ü^ðÿà^ð¡( EôPèêÿÿ‹U‹R‰UìƒÄú°ÿæ!ƒÂ‰Uè°€î° ‹Uìî‰×G0À‰úî°‹Uèîh,E 1Àé3/4 ŠC ˆC ÿC‹Eô€ €}ü fƒ"" ¸ Ç`ýð  $ ‹uЁÆÔ ‹}ЊO€á¿ˆO‹]̃ÈȉÚîé( j‹Uÿ2ÿuÐèÕ B‰Uø¨-t(¨tÉ ¸ ÇEü ë*ƒûtë#ŠA$‰òÐ됉ð A됉ðöÐ"AˆA‹Qlîû1Àeø[^ÉÃU‰åƒìVSj ‹ƒàƒøu&÷B ˆ è‹Oÿÿä`ƒÄëìèCL èqOÿÿä`ˆÁƒÄ€ùút€ùît€ùþt CûŸ† è5OÿÿƒÄäd¨tðj è%Oÿÿä`¶ÐˆÁƒÄ€ùútÚ€ùªt RhÊ ðè:æ÷ÿ¸ ðèä÷ÿƒÄ€=d3ð ðë"hË ð됁=`3ð´ ðëhâ ðèÊã÷ÿƒÄÿ5X3ðjhê ðèµã÷ÿ1Àeô[^_Éà ...Àt"é c À"H K f‹Cf‰G‹C@% ›þÿéÒöÿÿŠ"Ét €ùté-ýÿÿ€KH é¸öÿÿ9,²ðu)ƒ{H u#Æi3ð ¸  Æ\3ð ƒøMtQé­ ...öté. ...ötéF ‰Gé" ƒ%X3ðýöG(t € X3ðë7ƒ%X3ðûé­ ‰Y‹ÀYð‰r¡ÀYð£,²ð¹ ƒú8tié¥ QèÞ¹þÿ‹5,²ð‹F À‰Eô† ‡M  Æi3ð è#ÿÿƒÄKƒûÿuê‹]üÉà èãÿÿä`¶ÐƒÄúú ºÅ ‹UôîAƒù~Þ‹`3ðƒÂì1ɐˆÈºÀ ¸ ð됐‹EäÈŠ"1 ð‹]ˆA9MøÌGÿÿ ÆT4𠶆î 1Àéé öG"z ƒÄ ‹Uø€z F‹MIÁàÇ€|Zð ...À"Æ "ž €Oéù tO‹UR‚Áà"HZðÿD8ƒ|8 ÇD4 $X MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain It looks to me as if Microsoft has a way to go on e-mail. Every message I send to the list generates long bounce messages sent back to me. I assume others are getting the same thing. For example, just the latest one, sent from Postmaster : The following recipient(s) could not be reached: Zeke Lucas on 01/03/96 22:50:19 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] Bruce E. Johnson on 01/03/96 22:50:19 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] Christopher Carper on 01/03/96 22:50:19 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] John Douceur on 01/03/96 22:50:19 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] Mike Montague on 01/03/96 22:50:19 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] Etc. Either Microsoft handles undeliverable mail different from most other places, or they don't want employees getting the Cypherpunks list (:-}). I suspect the former. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:59:58 +0800 To: Tony Iannotti Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: <199601042002.MAA04835@netcom5.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 13:55 1/4/96 -0500, Tony Iannotti wrote: >On Thu, 4 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: > >> Yes it would require that the Node be checked in the Software. What I was >> responding to was a claim that there is no way of telling where I am >> connecting from (which I disproved). As to calling a non-German Node, that >> is always an option. > >Yes, I agree. I think the real difference is that they really cannot tell >where you are calling from, even though they know where you are >connecting. Caller ID could tell them where you are calling from. They can also use their billing information and user profile information to decide where you live and/or how old you are. I wonder if any of these filters will keep the German prosecutors off their necks, given that they can be bypassed. I feel sorry for them given the situation they are in, and want to kick their butts for just rolling over dead instead of fighting for free access. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz@netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Scott Brickner Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 03:22:32 +0800 To: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Subject: Re: Will the real Anonynous please stand up In-Reply-To: <199601040332.WAA24066@pipe6.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: <199601041808.NAA06944@universe.digex.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain tallpaul writes: >Even English monarchs, in centuries past when monarchs like Anonymous only >had one name, were given some additional signifier to keep them separate >(e.g. "Donald the Fat" vs. "Donald the Terribly Ugly" vs. "Donald the >Wonderful With A Really Good Ad Agency"). Get a grip. Those monarchs didn't make those names. Others did. You're free to make up your own relative clauses to attach to "Anonymous" --- if they're good enough maybe others'll start using them. Meanwhile, *you* need to consider what reputation statements from anonymous sources are worth. One needs some degree of reputation to make a useful comment on another's. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Gordon Campbell Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 01:39:49 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Cypherpunks List Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960104170925.00686904@limestone.kosone.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 09:27 PM 1/2/96 +0100, Anonymous wrote: > >Cypherpunks write code. With that phrase and the wave of attempts to >censor the 'Net, I've embarked on a quest to make remailers easier to use. > >Has anyone written an easy to use Windows or DOS application that will let >someone chain a message through several remailers, perhaps with support >for the mailer at alpha.c2.org? What about Private Idaho? It's fairly simple to use and even has built-in routines to setup and use accounts at C2. http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm > >Would the writer of such a program, if in the US fall under the provisions >in ITAR? Obviously, calls to the PGP program would have to be made. I >recall reading that such hooks do fall under the ITAR. If this is true, so >much for a more user friendly version of chain for the masses. It boggles the mind the number of goofy rules and regs you yanks have to deal with. The various branches of your government can't get along enough to pass a budget, yet they're worried about the rest of the world using strong encryption. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Help! Help! The paranoids are after me! iQEVAwUBMOar8HNDC2/K0TjxAQHEGwf/UiZfiB0pWpVmF+jaDWTFjXCMBqTRMToH kLsSvag40WCrCDgAWxbG92WjArTcyMyexkMnz+VLnZ7rqJC1ZYvgWHVkiGtbDsOi Unpm7PP/D3M9qUP3QIHGuRM3WmZcXk/sUuyd3le/ggEgpYGqr+/ISA199NbKNb5v aXb9YiPr3abHiRyFe2IC4a5aYCn4PTbusG5qygu5wY3UCtynkrEwqB5yccmpfQhG 4paCoww5zB0c9LQBEunbDtDKw4KgIck8o6G3AmNANAXYsCOIhUUuzn3dLuAJyCdg JO3+hO1+b3G4vbemJFrOQ3u+kVNqyGOYBtq6CDVb9OiB3KIu8VnPPQ== =8gvf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics P.O. Box 1902, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 5J7 Ph: (613) 542-4087 Fax: (613) 542-1139 2048-bit PGP key available on request. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:12:17 +0800 To: Rudi Raith Subject: No Subject In-Reply-To: <199601041317.OAA04812@aws26.muc.feilmeier.de> Message-ID: <199601042010.MAA00405@netcom6.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >I suppose that there is a predicate indecent_p(n), which is true if n >represents something indecent, false otherwise. (Some implementation >of such a predicate could be a police officer arresting you upon >presentation of the number to him, yielding true. :-) ) Such numbers >may be called "Indecent Numbers", their "posession", "transfer", >etc. be banned. interesting idea. but I suspect you could prove there is no such function indecent_p(n) by other ideas you present in your article, namely diagonalization and the use of encryption schemes. rough sketch: it would be easy to create an "encryption" or encoding scheme that maps 'n' for which indecent_p(n) is true onto 'm' for which indecent_p(m) is false, and vice versa, for sufficiently complex indecent_p(n) ("insufficiently complex" versions of the function would be e.g. versions that are true or false for only a finite number of cases, or other situations). hence you get a contradiction. this all is under the heading of "steganography" of course. it seems to me some interesting basic theorems in steganography such as the above are waiting to be explored, in the way that Shannon explored some of the very basic information theory areas without really giving a lot of practical results. in fact what annoys me about people is that they talk about various functions as if they can even exist, when it is transparently obvious they cannot; another common example here: - "detect_encryption(n)" where n is a message. endlessly assumed in various messages here on the list of people who fear a police state. - "detect_randomness(n)" where n is a sequence. presumably used by a police state to outlaw random strings. (similar to above) this ties in with another point I like to make in this line of thinking: Shakespeare once said, "there is nothing good or evil, but thinking makes it so". I would say, "there are no tyrannical laws, but thinking makes it so". it seems to me a lot of people here do the hard intellectual labor of trying to figure out/anticipate how a police state could exist in the 20th century of cyberspace. be careful what you think about, because thinking can make it so. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:18:51 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: I don't proofread...sorry. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 5:30 PM 1/4/96, Jim Ray wrote: >As to the "English lesson," I feel that proofreading messages to >1200+ people is more important than proofing private e-mail, but >some folks evidently disagree with me. For an example of posts >which I feel are properly proofed, please see Tim's posts. They >aren't perfect English (mine aren't either) but there's evidence >that he takes the time to proofread them. This not only makes ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >his posts easier to read, it makes them [IMO] more convincing. >Of course, I usually agree with Tim anyway. [Hi Tim] I'll shut Thanks for the positive comments, but I need to clear the air about this "proofreading" business: I usually don't proofread my posts. I write 'em as fast as I think 'em, then I send 'em! A few of my longer essays I've proofed, reworked, etc., but mostly I just respond by typing directly and then sending. I no longer even use a spelling checker, in fact. This can probably be guessed by some of you, as I sometimes leave out words, which careful proofing would normally catch. I figure that informal communications are tolerant to such informal usages. I also tend to write in a conversational style, so the agonized structuring and restructuring that some writers apparently feel they must go through does not enter in to my own writing. (I'm a relatively fast typist, and am comfortable composing at the keyboard, which not everone is, of course.) One thing I try to scrupulously check are the distribution list and the other message headers, usually because I edit down the distribution list and sometimes to change the thread title to something more closely related to my actual message (as I have done here). --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Brad Shantz" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:16:56 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Microsoft has a way to go on E-Mail Message-ID: <199601042026.MAA29553@alaska.nwlink.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Hi, I've just installed the Microsoft Exchange Server release candidate at the office. I am firmly convinced that the bounce messages Tim just mentioned are from an Exchange server that has not been set up correctly. Things I've noticed: If the client sends a message to an invalid address on the same LAN the server returns an error saying that there is no transport available. If the mail is from an oustide source, the recipient is not recognized. It's really easy to make mistakes because there is no consistency whatsoever between Exchange Server and MS-Mail Server. Brad From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: liberty@gate.net (Jim Ray) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 02:43:31 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: [NOISE]Apologies accepted. Message-ID: <199601041732.MAA07216@osceola.gate.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- All apologies accepted. As to the "English lesson," I feel that proofreading messages to 1200+ people is more important than proofing private e-mail, but some folks evidently disagree with me. For an example of posts which I feel are properly proofed, please see Tim's posts. They aren't perfect English (mine aren't either) but there's evidence that he takes the time to proofread them. This not only makes his posts easier to read, it makes them [IMO] more convincing. Of course, I usually agree with Tim anyway. [Hi Tim] I'll shut up now and resume lurking mode. Please e-mail me privately if you feel the urge to comment on this distinctly non-cypherpunk subject. TIA. JMR Regards, Jim Ray http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray "Hooters GUYS? Washington -- GET A GRIP!" _______________________________________________________________________ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Public Key id. # E9BD6D35 IANAL _______________________________________________________________________ Help Phil! e-mail zldf@clark.net or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMOwN9m1lp8bpvW01AQEk2QP/YRYyPgPjeq6CTa0vhCcsgujIonn2yJLC zU2wUjVZiACLMtugCQzG5kzjmR4S176QKsowaNrAx9LhPV2xHym+pyJpsK9zA6gp iZskqymulqjF43Q/rOTzmFoVZfcHhAQdJSeEcit1kp/wERbCIOX80RuL1ZX2WD8p 89BVlhp0zaY= =+LFM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Scott Brickner Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 03:52:57 +0800 To: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Subject: Re: Starting an e-cash bank In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601041841.NAA08502@universe.digex.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Lucky Green writes: >At 13:25 1/3/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >>I've got a storefront in Chicago. >>What would prevent me from opening up a Mark Twain account and buying and >>selling ecash on floppies, in person? >You touched on a very important issue: the party converting currency into >Ecash does not have to be the Ecash bank. There have been discussions that >in the future one should be able to buy Ecash on floppy at the local >supermarket, similar to today's prepaid calling cards. I certainly would >like to see that happen rather sooner than later. Wait a minute. I can see how one needn't be a bank to convert ecash into pcash, but going the other way requires that the cash be transferrable in ways that Digicash isn't. If I withdraw ecash from the bank, it's marked so I'm the one who's identified if it's double-spent. If I give the cash to someone else (different from paying it to them, which requires they have an account) they're free to double-spend with (relative) impugnity. What'd I miss? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:30:17 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Hammill 1987 speech In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601042043.MAA03161@netcom6.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain the Hammill 1987 speech is interesting and prescient but also contains some of the subtle mind-biases and prejudices of rabid libertarians that are easy for outsiders to spot. some day I might write a more ambitious essay on this, but for now I'll list a few items and suggest some counterclaims that will fry any libertarians brain. all these ideas have analogues to cryptography which I'll elucidate as best I can. 1. weaponry is good in the hands of individuals, tyrannical in the hands of the state. the analogy is with the crossbow and other weapons. as a logical consequence of these ideas, it seems libertarians think that utopia could be achieved if everyone could build their own backyard nukes. they are obsessed with the idea of "deterrence" which is a fancy word for MAD feer, mutual assured destruction fear. the analogy to cryptography is: cryptography is good in the hands of individuals, tyrannical in the hands of the state. again the idea is that the stronger the cryptography available to the individual, the better. however I don't want to get into any of the guns == crypto arguments.. 2. the world is screwed up because governments have made it that way. this is such a silly premise but vast masses have subscribed to it since the beginning of time. it's easy to say that any problem you have with your finances or your pet poodle is the fault of the Government, Big Business, or whatever. libertarians are especially clever in constantly inventing new terms, synonymous with "enemy" but not quite so coarse and vulgar ("statist" is the current favorite epithet), to name their endless list of bogeymen who prevent them from supposedly achieving their full potential in life. why is it that libertarians have not created their own state long ago, but continue to stay in countries that they claim oppress them? I have never heard a satisfactory response to this. the real answer of course is that the rabid libertarians will never find a system they like, they will criticize anything that exists, and never work to find a better alternative through constructive, positive means, but are happy to try to sabotage whatever has been built by others in the name of some noble and holy guerrilla war. the analogy to crypto: any technology such as crypto that helps people avoid governments, and hide their dealings, promotes utopia. governments are the root of all evil, and anything that destroys them destroys evil. 3. the government vs. the people dichotomy endlessly, even in a system that is expressly designed to present this polarization, libertarians subscribe to the idea of "us vs. them" in every avenue of reality. this thinking is entirely the same as that held by the NSA and cold war defense contractors. what's the difference? none. we have a system in which the designers said it was "of, by, and for the people", but a libertarian cannot handle this unity, nor can apparently any other citizen in the US that criticizes their government as if it is something apart from themselves. cryptography helps people preserve these illusions of separation. there are people who are "in" and "out" and those "out" cannot read your messages. what prevents leaks from "in" to "out"? libertarians would like to have you believe they have solved this problem with technology. but it is not a technological problem. it is an issue of trust, something that cannot be formalized or preserved by any invention. but don't tell this to a libertarian, who has dedicated his entire ideology to attempting to prove that one can actually achieve human integrity & utopia through technology alone and insisting that anything else is wholly superfluous. 4. egalitarianism: libertarians are always saying that we don't have it and ranting about this injustice. but in their arguments, such as Hammill's, you will always find subtle arguments that they don't really want egalitarianism: some individuals should have an "edge" with their technology over those who seek to oppress them. they would be all for it if individuals had the capability to create atom bombs but somehow governments did not. the philosophy is inherently desiring inequality at its root. the implication with crypto is that governments should have to reveal everything but individuals can have total secrecy. -- beware of someone who tells you that utopia cannot currently be realized because 1. governments ("they") do not allow it for "us". 2. there are a lot of people preventing it from being realized, and we have to *get*rid* of them first. 3. the correct technology does not yet exist. once it is invented, however, all problems will be solved. I'm not actually going to rebut any of these outright other than to the degree I have, and point out that history is ample evidence they are all false. of course I don't expect any of the libertarians to understand my points, but frankly I think I am going to enjoy watching obtuse and angry flames for pushing the hot buttons. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Declan B. McCullagh" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:26:07 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: AP: Compuserve Will Lift Newsgroup Ban Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Compuserve's original statement from last week is at: http://www.compuserve.com/at/pressbox/newsgrps.html Attached are excerpts from today's AP article. -Declan ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Columbus, Ohio (AP) -- The on-line service CompuServe says it hopes to reopen access to 200 sexually oriented Internet forums to all but its German customers by the end of the month... CompuServe spokesman Jeff Shafer said Wednesday the Columbus-based company is working on a software fix that will prevent Germans from accessing the newsgroups while allowing access to customers in the rest of the world... Munich's senior public prosecutor, Manfred Wick, said this week his office did not order a ban or provide CompuServe with any list as part of its investigation of child pornography. But he acknowledged that police asked CompuServe to scrutinize a list last month. `The decision on whether and to what extent the groups on the list would be blocked was left to CompuServe,'' Wick's statement said. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:33:24 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Using lasers to communicate Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 5:43 PM 1/4/96, Jason Rentz wrote: >Previous exchanges deleted... >> >>With a tightly focused beam (light is easy, I don't know about lower >>frequencies), you can prevent interception except by very obvious physical >>devices. (e.g. Someone in a cherry picker truck.) You may be able to >>avoid the need to encrypt the link (and all the paranoia about key >>management, advances in factoring etc. that that implies.) >> >>Bill > >The problem with this comes when you start creating links between much >taller buildings like in San Fran. Any give building over 30 stories might >sway a foot or so at any given time. Combine that with the other building >and you might get a few feet of movement. (movement not including during an >earthquake) :) Just a couple of points on this optical idea. We were linking buildings a mile apart in the 70s, at Intel. We needed to ship CAD data back and forth, and PacBell rates for a dedicated line were outrageous, slow to be installed, etc. So, a commercially available laser and modulator/demodulator (modem, but it bears sometimes using the longer version, to remind people of what it is doing in general) were mounted on the roofs of our buildings. I'm sure various packages are commercially available to do this. As to buildings swaying in earthquakes, somehow I don't think transient loss of channel capacity during a quake is going to be a pressing concern! :-} Swaying in ordinary wind is an easily-handled problem. (Any good engineer can think of several fixes: paraboloidal dish receivers are cheap (not even optical quality, just to get light pulses), compensation for sway, acceptance of slightly reduced data rates as modem error correction handles sway-induced dropouts, movement of the transmitters and receivers to lower levels, etc.) Also, nearly all high-tech buildings (or at least more than 95% of all high-tech floorspace in the U.S.) are less than 3-4 stories tall; most are 1-2 stories. Building sway is nonexistent. And building sway only approaches the multiple meter level in the highest floors of the tallest buildings. I would guess that fewer than 1% of all offices are affected; for them, a lower data rate is acceptable. I'm actually more positive on low-level (below safety regs get interested in) light than on free space RF, for bypassing of the local cable/phone monopolies. There's just not enough "bandwidth of free space" available. Do the math. (Footnote: Some years back some of us got interested in the idea of using lasers to communicate between San Diego/Chula Vista and Tijuana. Ordinary phone lines turned out to be cheaper.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Don Gaffney Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 03:51:53 +0800 To: Thomas Massengale Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Thu, 4 Jan 1996, Thomas Massengale wrote: > At 3:17 PM 1/3/96, Mark M. wrote: > > >I really don't see the point of using a key larger than 2048 bits. Any larger > >key would actually be harder to factor than brute forcing the IDEA keyspace. > > the world will never need more than 640K of RAM? A paraphase of Bill Gates in 1981: "640K ought to be enough for anybody." However, DRAM technology and use can't really be compared to the fundamental mathematical problem posed by factoring prime composites. Stuffing more gates on a chunk of silicon is just an engineering problem. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think much has happened with primes since Legendre (1752-1833). _____________________________________________________________________ Don Gaffney Engineering, Mathematics & Business Administration Computer Facility University of Vermont 237 Votey Building Burlington, VT 05405 (802) 656-8490 Fax: (802) 656-8802 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: geoff klein Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 00:04:17 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Trying to init security channel Message-ID: <9601041111.AA25508@commtouch.co.il> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain This message was sent by Pronto Secure Mail. Without Pronto you can not establish a secure channel. Please send a reply manually. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:49:42 +0800 To: Scott Brickner Subject: Re: Starting an e-cash bank Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 12:41 1/4/96, Scott Brickner wrote: >Wait a minute. I can see how one needn't be a bank to convert ecash >into pcash, but going the other way requires that the cash be >transferrable in ways that Digicash isn't. > >If I withdraw ecash from the bank, it's marked so I'm the one who's >identified if it's double-spent. If I give the cash to someone else >(different from paying it to them, which requires they have an account) >they're free to double-spend with (relative) impugnity. Present day Ecash is bases on online clearing. I does not encode any user idendifiying information into the coin. You are thinking of offline Ecash. Besides, wherer users get the Ecash from, be it by putting money into their account at MT or buying it from you doesn't matter. They still need an account with MT. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 03:55:16 +0800 To: Tony Iannotti Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 16:30 1/3/96, Tony Iannotti wrote: >On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: > >> CIS always knows where you are dialing in from. Here is the start of a >> typical connection (using the Mac Program NAVIGATOR). >> >> >0001NUH [snip] >> That NUH identifies that I am calling in via a V34 Node in NYC and the T01 >> says I got the first modem on the Rotory. If CIS wanted to restrict access >> via the NYS nodes, that NUH would be an adequate flag to trigger this >> action. > >Wouldn't this require some software routines added to check for this? I >expect the decision to build or buy is what CIS is now weighing. Also, I >would imagine that a German could always call a POP outside the country if >they wanted to pay for it..... (note that I am still not in favor of the >action, but these are probably CIS's considerations.) Yes it would require that the Node be checked in the Software. What I was responding to was a claim that there is no way of telling where I am connecting from (which I disproved). As to calling a non-German Node, that is always an option. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Tony Iannotti Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:14:57 +0800 To: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Thu, 4 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: > Yes it would require that the Node be checked in the Software. What I was > responding to was a claim that there is no way of telling where I am > connecting from (which I disproved). As to calling a non-German Node, that > is always an option. Yes, I agree. I think the real difference is that they really cannot tell where you are calling from, even though they know where you are connecting. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: rah@shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:19:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Microsoft has a way to go on E-Mail Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) said, >Either Microsoft handles undeliverable mail different from most other >places, ... I believe that this is what Mr. Bill called "Eating your own dog food." ;-) Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah@shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf@clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<< From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Kurt Buff (Volt Comp)" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 06:41:29 +0800 To: "nobody@REPLAY.COM> Subject: RE: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain OK, I'm game. What is the story behind your .sig? Given the obvious reluctance state it fully, perhaps someone else can reply? |We Jurgar Din |(that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) ---------- From: nobody@REPLAY.COM[SMTP:nobody@REPLAY.COM] Sent: Thursday, January 04, 1996 9:07 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "L. Malthus" wrote: > I was told that Belize is offering passports for the next > two years for $50,000 and that might be even less if offers > were made to the government to provide low cost Internet > access to the citizens of Belize. > > http://www.belize.com/citzdoc.html > > Belize has always been known as a home for pirates, A > wonderful Cypherpunk candidate for an offshore data haven! Belize is a shit hole that is as willing as many other slimeball countries to deny someone entry and force them kicking and screaming onto the next flight to the U.S. on request from U.S. authorities. In principle, that is kidnaping. They use the technicality that the person never entered their territory. No- man's lands of port zones where the most basic rights may be violated without regard to a country's constitution are another class of abuse that will have to go. Belize is also the place where Bob White, publisher of The Duck Book and sponsor of some of the largest hard-money conferences ever held, was murdered. The usual suspects were not even rounded up. Someone once wrote that the principle cash crop of Belize is lice. In reality it may be principles. At least the Hondurans got angry when a citizen was kidnaped by the U.S. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMOt2E0jw99YhtpnhAQHa7gH/Z4cjIcT50+0lxJTF7lHCfcPvSPzXW5BU Yuea9C5s+1KgNDUYDe2ItTfOf3TTb+2deJGbDgf2TEP+A/q5S+9JHw== =H46M -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:25:41 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Microsoft has a way to go on E-Mail In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601041910.OAA00206@jekyll.piermont.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Timothy C. May writes: > It looks to me as if Microsoft has a way to go on e-mail. Every message I > send to the list generates long bounce messages sent back to me. I assume > others are getting the same thing. The problem is that microsoft has made the mistake of using their own software, which doesn't understand the distinction between envelope and header addresses. I've been on the phone with contacts there and I'm going to start threatening going to the press soon. Virtually every mailing list I use has this problem, by the way -- they are a big place. Perry From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Cedric Tefft Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:10:59 +0800 To: "'smtp:cypherpunks@toad.com> Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: <30EC5109@ms-mail.datastorm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > From: owner-cypherpunks > To: cypherpunks > Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP > Date: Thursday, January 04, 1996 11:29AM > > In article , > netdog wrote: > >nobody will ever need more than 640K or RAM? i wouldn't underestimate the > >ability of technology to grow at a pace that is beyond our wildest > >dreams-especially with this network serving as a virtual office/lab. of > >course, ymmv. > > Order of magnitude check: > > There is a very well-defined limit to the size of key that can be broken by > brute force, independent of your "wildest dreams" as to the growth of > technology. It's the Laws of Thermodynamics. [snip] No law says the attack has to be brute force. What about the birthday attack, differential cryptanalysis, etc? True, I believe neither of those examples are applicable to RSA, but factoring is, and it's _much_ more efficient than brute force searches. There might be other algorithems out there (or as yet undiscovered) that are more efficient than current factoring algorithms are (or ever hope to be). If your attacker has an algorithm whereby he has to search less than the full keyspace, he has effectively reduced the size of your key. Essentially, his attack is the same order of magnitude as a brute force search of this new reduced keyspace (call it "effective" keyspace for convenience). The greater difference between the effective keyspace and the real keyspace (determined by his cracking algorithm), the larger I need to make my real key to compensate. If his algorithm effectively cuts my keyspace in half, I need to make it twice as large as I would need if my attacker's best algorithm were brute force. >And they strongly imply that brute-force attacks against 256-bit keys will be infeasible > until computers are built from something other than matter and occupy > something other than space." Hmmm... Well, the 384-bit Blacknet PGP key was cracked in just a few months. How? Certainly parallelism helped, but the main reason is that they were factoring keys rather than searching the full keyspace by brute force. I don't know about you, but I'm certainly not going to stop increasing the size of my key simply because it can't be cracked by brute force. - Cedric From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Rudi Raith Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 21:35:30 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: No Subject Message-ID: <199601041317.OAA04812@aws26.muc.feilmeier.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Some thoughts on the possibility or well-definedness of banning specific (indecent?) contents on the net (or elsewhere): 1) All contents (files) can be seen as natural numbers. (Use your favourite encoding function.) 2) I suppose that there is a predicate indecent_p(n), which is true if n represents something indecent, false otherwise. (Some implementation of such a predicate could be a police officer arresting you upon presentation of the number to him, yielding true. :-) ) Such numbers may be called "Indecent Numbers", their "posession", "transfer", etc. be banned. 3) Every natural number n can be perceived as the encryption of every other one m (including itself) by some function enc. n = enc(m). (Proof by cardinality) Examples: Trivial enc: "If the number is n, return m." Not so trivial enc: "Take m as a one time pad to encrypt n." 4) As a consequence, every natural number can be perceived as the encryption of an Indecent Number, hence should be banned, shouldn't it? 5) The decimal representation of any irrational number (e.g. pi, e) contains the decimal representation of every natural number somewhere. (Proof by diagonalization.) Hence the algorithm for creating this decimal representation should be banned, too, shoudn't it? 6) Finally I hope this shows what great an achievement to legislation and jurisdiction such banning might become, once established. This creates a universal crime (or vice?), everybody is guilty of automatically without the tedious procedure of seeking evidence. (maybe those not knowing about numbers at all be exempt?) Virtually Yours, Rudi Raith (raith@feilmeier.de) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Matt Blaze Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 04:39:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: USENIX anyone? Message-ID: <199601041931.OAA04745@nsa.tempo.att.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I'm going to be at the USENIX conference in San Diego later this month, as are, I suspect, many other crypto/cypherpunk types. Any interest in a crypto BOF? 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‹]üÉÃisa_dmacascade: impossible request ÉÀâˆÑ€ÉÀˆÈæÖˆÐæÔÉÃisa_dmastart: impossible request é§ ‰ð$ D됐‰ð$ HæÖ0Àæ؍µðÿÿÿ‰Uü‰ÑÁÀ NMI ISA %x, EISA %x ‰Møƒûw ƒûtƒþ v ¸ èåŒÿÿ‰òì"Eø¶ÈƒÄ¶Eü9ÁtKuâ¶Eü9Á"À%ÿ ÇEü fƒ¹Ôð €f÷Vèç÷ÿeø[^ÉÃlpclose QèD öFt€Neø[^ÉÃinterrupt-driven " ì4¸$ø8EètI"" ‰ Ø^ðë ¡Ü^ð‰H‰ Ü^ðÿà^ð¡( EôPèêÿÿ‹U‹R‰UìƒÄú°ÿæ!ƒÂ‰Uè°€î° ‹Uìî‰×G0À‰úî°‹Uèîh,E 1Àé3/4 ŠC ˆC ÿC‹Eô€ €}ü fƒ"" ¸ Ç`ýð  $ ‹uЁÆÔ ‹}ЊO€á¿ˆO‹]̃ÈȉÚîé( j‹Uÿ2ÿuÐèÕ B‰Uø¨-t(¨tÉ ¸ ÇEü ë*ƒûtë#ŠA$‰òÐ됉ð A됉ðöÐ"AˆA‹Qlîû1Àeø[^ÉÃU‰åƒìVSj ‹ƒàƒøu&÷B ˆ è‹Oÿÿä`ƒÄëìèCL èqOÿÿä`ˆÁƒÄ€ùút€ùît€ùþt CûŸ† è5OÿÿƒÄäd¨tðj è%Oÿÿä`¶ÐˆÁƒÄ€ùútÚ€ùªt RhÊ ðè:æ÷ÿ¸ ðèä÷ÿƒÄ€=d3ð ðë"hË ð됁=`3ð´ ðëhâ ðèÊã÷ÿƒÄÿ5X3ðjhê ðèµã÷ÿ1Àeô[^_Éà ...Àt"é c À"H K f‹Cf‰G‹C@% ›þÿéÒöÿÿŠ"Ét €ùté-ýÿÿ€KH é¸öÿÿ9,²ðu)ƒ{H u#Æi3ð ¸  Æ\3ð ƒøMtQé­ ...öté. ...ötéF ‰Gé" ƒ%X3ðýöG(t € X3ðë7ƒ%X3ðûé­ ‰Y‹ÀYð‰r¡ÀYð£,²ð¹ ƒú8tié¥ QèÞ¹þÿ‹5,²ð‹F À‰Eô† ‡M  Æi3ð è#ÿÿƒÄKƒûÿuê‹]üÉà èãÿÿä`¶ÐƒÄúú ºÅ ‹UôîAƒù~Þ‹`3ðƒÂì1ɐˆÈºÀ ¸ ð됐‹EäÈŠ"1 ð‹]ˆA9MøÌGÿÿ ÆT4𠶆î 1Àéé öG"z ƒÄ ‹Uø€z F‹MIÁàÇ€|Zð ...À"Æ "ž €Oéù tO‹UR‚Áà"HZðÿD8ƒ|8 ÇD4 $X MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Cambridge, MA, Jan 3 -- Security Dynamics plans to license "Concryption," a just patented technology combining encryption and compression, to outside companies for use with a variety of security and compression protocols, revealed Kenneth Weiss, chairman and chief technical officer. "It is my belief that Concryption will solve the two biggest problems that exist today: the need for privacy and more available bandwidth," Weiss said. "Compression has been catching on. It takes less time today to send a whole page of fax than it used to, for example, and part of that is because of better data compression. But encryption has not caught on in the way it should, because of time and expense issues and the hassles of key management." Still, though, available bandwidth for data storage and transmission is diminishing all the time, in arenas ranging from fax to satellite technology, networked information, and the World Wide Web, according to the company chairman. Compression will become an even more significant requirement in the future, with an anticipated explosion of multimedia applications, he predicted. Security Dynamics has been awarded US Patent No. 5,479,512 for Concryption. The Cambridge, Massachusetts-based company now holds a total of 14 patents from the US Patent Office, most related to its "core business" of computer security, he reported. One of the company's other patents, for instance, is for a biometric technology designed to enable "voice fingerprinting." Security Dynamics also produces the SecureID Card, ACE/Server, and ACM series of user authentication products. Security Dynamics' newly patented Concryption technology is based on mathematical synergies between the processes of encrypting and compressing data. Both procedures call for analyzing arrays of binary patterns, "seeing where the spaces are," and then applying rules to the data. Weiss added that encryption and compression are both highly intensive in terms of CPU (central processor unit) cycles and disk accesses. As a result, he asserted, integrating the two technologies into a "single set of operations" will bring cost reductions in CPU usage as well as faster encryption times. "The time to compress might increase a little bit, but on the other hand, the time to encrypt goes to zero. Whatever the disk accesses are for compression, there would be no other disk accesses for encryption." Security Dynamics sees Concryption as a "concept pattern" suited to use with a variety of data types, network transports, and security protocols, according to Weiss. "This is a new enabling technology that we believe should have an impact on the way information is communicated in the future." The company intends to work with outside licensees on integrating different compression and encryption methods. "Big users have already optimized compression for their unique technologies. We use a different form of compression for fax than we would for satellite data or TV pictures. Beyond that, companies might employ different compression algorithms. Similarly, people like to have control over the type of encryption used," Weiss maintained. Although forthcoming multimedia applications will require much greater compression than text, conventional needs for "privacy" may not be as high, since many video offerings of the future will be geared to entertainment, Weiss acknowledged. "But we will probably be seeing 'economic privacy,' " the company chairman noted, pointing to a trend, already well established in the cable TV industry, toward providing "high demand" fare such as first-run movies only on separately priced, encrypted, "premium channels." Contact: Security Dynamics, 617-547-7820 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Rich Salz Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:34:39 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: CACM Jan 96 "Inside Risks" column Message-ID: <9601042046.AA02968@sulphur.osf.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Peter G. Neumann has a very good column this month on risks and the "worldwide rush [to] digital commerce." Summarizes problems with our infrastructure, gives some concrete examples, and discusses importance of privacy as a commodity, and how "We need, among other things, ... consistent use of good cryptography in operating systems and application software." /r$ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: FreeBSD user Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:45:42 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: hi peter! 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‹]üÉÃisa_dmacascade: impossible request ÉÀâˆÑ€ÉÀˆÈæÖˆÐæÔÉÃisa_dmastart: impossible request é§ ‰ð$ D됐‰ð$ HæÖ0Àæ؍µðÿÿÿ‰Uü‰ÑÁÀ NMI ISA %x, EISA %x ‰Møƒûw ƒûtƒþ v ¸ èåŒÿÿ‰òì"Eø¶ÈƒÄ¶Eü9ÁtKuâ¶Eü9Á"À%ÿ ÇEü fƒ¹Ôð €f÷Vèç÷ÿeø[^ÉÃlpclose QèD öFt€Neø[^ÉÃinterrupt-driven " ì4¸$ø8EètI"" ‰ Ø^ðë ¡Ü^ð‰H‰ Ü^ðÿà^ð¡( EôPèêÿÿ‹U‹R‰UìƒÄú°ÿæ!ƒÂ‰Uè°€î° ‹Uìî‰×G0À‰úî°‹Uèîh,E 1Àé3/4 ŠC ˆC ÿC‹Eô€ €}ü fƒ"" ¸ Ç`ýð  $ ‹uЁÆÔ ‹}ЊO€á¿ˆO‹]̃ÈȉÚîé( j‹Uÿ2ÿuÐèÕ B‰Uø¨-t(¨tÉ ¸ ÇEü ë*ƒûtë#ŠA$‰òÐ됉ð A됉ðöÐ"AˆA‹Qlîû1Àeø[^ÉÃU‰åƒìVSj ‹ƒàƒøu&÷B ˆ è‹Oÿÿä`ƒÄëìèCL èqOÿÿä`ˆÁƒÄ€ùút€ùît€ùþt CûŸ† è5OÿÿƒÄäd¨tðj è%Oÿÿä`¶ÐˆÁƒÄ€ùútÚ€ùªt RhÊ ðè:æ÷ÿ¸ ðèä÷ÿƒÄ€=d3ð ðë"hË ð됁=`3ð´ ðëhâ ðèÊã÷ÿƒÄÿ5X3ðjhê ðèµã÷ÿ1Àeô[^_Éà ...Àt"é c À"H K f‹Cf‰G‹C@% ›þÿéÒöÿÿŠ"Ét €ùté-ýÿÿ€KH é¸öÿÿ9,²ðu)ƒ{H u#Æi3ð ¸  Æ\3ð ƒøMtQé­ ...öté. ...ötéF ‰Gé" ƒ%X3ðýöG(t € X3ðë7ƒ%X3ðûé­ ‰Y‹ÀYð‰r¡ÀYð£,²ð¹ ƒú8tié¥ QèÞ¹þÿ‹5,²ð‹F À‰Eô† ‡M  Æi3ð è#ÿÿƒÄKƒûÿuê‹]üÉà èãÿÿä`¶ÐƒÄúú ºÅ ‹UôîAƒù~Þ‹`3ðƒÂì1ɐˆÈºÀ ¸ ð됐‹EäÈŠ"1 ð‹]ˆA9MøÌGÿÿ ÆT4𠶆î 1Àéé öG"z ƒÄ ‹Uø€z F‹MIÁàÇ€|Zð ...À"Æ "ž €Oéù tO‹UR‚Áà"HZðÿD8ƒ|8 ÇD4 $X Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 08:53:47 +0800 To: Tom Weinstein Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 10:02 AM 1/4/96 -0800, you wrote: >All that being said, I believe that 128 bits is sufficient for a >symmetric key and 2048 for a public key. Our paranoia would be far >better directed at as yet unknown attacks on the algoritms involved >or the specific implementations of cryptographic systems. Paul Kocher's >recent timing attack is a perfect example of what we should be afraid >of. Exactly! I agree. There is plenty of work that can be directed towards the hardware arena, for example. Better filters (AC, telephone, keyboard cable), untamperable hardware (keyboards come to mind, for instance: Design one whose RF "signature" can't be read remotely), a push towards the use of thin-film-type displays that don't radiate (much) in the RF spectrum, automatic over-write of unused data areas in hard/floppy disks (including the (unallocated) space at the ends of files), etc. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Thomas Grant Edwards Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 05:36:48 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: @Home cable modem systems Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain See URL http://www.home.net/home2/speed.html Some tidbits: @Home is a high-speed network that provides real-time multimedia news, information, entertainment and advertising content, access to the Internet, e-mail and other services to consumers via cable systems and their personal computers. The Mountain View, Calif.-based company is a joint venture between (between Tele-Communications Inc. and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers )venture capital firm. The @Home network will provide consumers with a significant increase in speed and quality over current online connections. The service will use a customized version of the popular Netscape browser that will run on most Microsoft Windows, Windows 95, Macintosh OS and UNIX personal computers. @Home will employ an open platform architecture that will make its features available to the widest possible number of users and content providers. The @Home network will operate over a high-speed backbone and existing cable systems and will be linked to home computers via cablemodems and standard Ethernet connections. @Home will include a wide variety of content. In addition to providing connections to the global Internet, the World Wide Web and e-mail, the service will enable content providers to create multimedia content that takes advantage of the high-speed network, as well as extensive local news and information. Deployment of the @Home service will begin in 1996 in select national markets, starting with Sunnyvale, Calif. The monthly charge for @Home is expected to be $30-$50 for unlimited use of basic services. ... Cable modems are almost 700 times faster than 14.4 modems and nearly 80 times faster than ISDN connections. Cable modems do not require an extra phone line, and they eliminate the time and potential trouble involved in dialing a service. Cable-based Internet services offer an even richer multimedia experience than CD-ROM technology, including real-time delivery and updating of content. And cable offers a direct connection to the online world--when you turn on the computer, you are on the network. @Home's network is based on a distributed model that makes extensive use of caching and replication to minimize traffic on the system's backbone and maintain high levels of speed. @Home will operate its own global network infrastructure connecting to the Internet at multiple locations. The @Home backbone will connect regional data centers together via a multi-megabit switched data system. These regional centers would serve limited geographic areas, such as individual cities, and would be connected to local servers located at cable system headends. @Home users would be connected to the headends via local area networks operating over the cable system, which is a two-way hybrid fiber-optic/coaxial cable configured asymmetrically. Many cable companies have upgraded their systems to handle such two-way connections or are in the process of doing so. At the home, the service would arrive over the same cable that delivers television signals, which would not be affected by the addition of data services. The cable modem, which would be supplied by the cable company, would be connected to the subscriber's computer with a standard 10-Base-T Ethernet cable. Many computers now include Ethernet connections or can easily be upgraded. The software required to use the service would be provided to the subscriber by @Home and will include a TCP/IP stack and Internet browser software with built-in e-mail and multimedia capabilities. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Cedric Tefft Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 06:36:31 +0800 To: Scott Brickner Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: <30EC6B75@ms-mail.datastorm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > From: Scott Brickner > To: Cedric Tefft > Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP > Date: Thursday, January 04, 1996 3:41PM > > Return-Path: > Message-Id: <199601042141.QAA15905@universe.digex.net> > X-Authentication-Warning: universe.digex.net: Host localhost didn't use HELO > protocol > To: Cedric Tefft > Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP > In-Reply-To: (Your message of Thu, 04 Jan 1996 14:12:00 PST.) > <30EC5109@ms-mail.datastorm.com> > Date: Thu, 04 Jan 1996 15:41:51 -0600 > From: Scott Brickner > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- > Cedric Tefft writes: > > If his algorithm effectively cuts my keyspace in half, I need to make it > >twice as large as I would need if my attacker's best algorithm were brute > >force. > > Um. No. If his algorithm cuts the keyspace in half, you only need to > make it one bit larger. > You are correct. I'm afraid I was thinking one thing and typing another. What I meant to say is that the attacker has an algorithm that effectively cuts my keySIZE (instead of keyspace) in half, i.e. his algorithm requires him to try on average only 2^1023 keys (instead of 2^2047 for a brute force attack) to crack my key of 2048 bits. Thanks for pointing this out. "Who needs encryption when their thoughts are unclear in plaintext?" - Cedric From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: turner@TeleCheck.com Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 07:17:33 +0800 To: FreeBSD user Subject: Re: hi peter! In-Reply-To: <199601041557.PAA09665@sponsor.octet.com> Message-ID: <9601042207.AA32619@mercury.telecheck.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Is it my imagination or is someone posting a FreeBSD kernel configuration binary to the list? fb@sponsor.octet.com said: > > cosmos@sponsor.octet.com:/usr/src/sys/compile/SPONSOR > fb@sponsor.octet.com said: > FreeBSD Kernel Configuration Utility - Version 1.0 Type "help" for > help or "visual" to go to the visual configuration interface > (requires MGA/VGA display or serial terminal capable of displaying > ANSI graphics). From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Sten Drescher Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 07:18:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: FreeBSD user In-Reply-To: <199601041557.PAA09665@sponsor.octet.com> Message-ID: <5568er602z.fsf_-_@galil.austnsc.tandem.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Am I the only one who has received three unreadable messages from this address on cypherpunks? -- #include /* Sten Drescher */ To get my PGP public key, send me email with your public key and Subject: PGP key exchange Key fingerprint = 90 5F 1D FD A6 7C 84 5E A9 D3 90 16 B2 44 C4 F3 Unsolicited email advertisements will be proofread for a US$100 fee. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Marshall Clow Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 10:01:19 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: \"Concryption\" Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain A little birdie (anonymous@freezone.remailer) said: >Does anyone understand what this "Concryption" really is? Reading the >press blurbs, it could be nothing more than simply compressing the >stream before encrypting it. A patent on that idea would be rather >awkward. > I doubt that it could be awkward, given that my employer, Aladdin Systems, has been shipping a software package that implements this since 1986. :-) -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems "Eternal vigilance is the price of PostScript" -- MacUser Jan 96 DTP and Graphics column From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon)" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 02:53:00 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On 4 Jan 1996, Ian Goldberg wrote: > in a brute-force search. From Applied Crypto, 2nd ed, pp157-158, > setting or clearing one bit takes at _least_ 4.4*10^-16 erg of energy. I thought reversible computing could use an arbitarily small amount of energy in computations ? Or is it that you can use it to get down to this level of energy loss, but not below ? I'm not sure. Mark From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Lou Zirko" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 08:38:19 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: FreeBSD user Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain No, got three myself. The third did seem a little different from the first two though, but I didn't study them that closely. ]> > Am I the only one who has received three unreadable > messages from this address on cypherpunks? > > -- > #include /* Sten Drescher */ Lou Zirko (615)851-1057 Zystems lzirko@isdn.net "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzBLJocAAAEEAMlDzYJPYq0pvfMuSiKU0Y65L2nJql+qEJHYGjO5Pys4prDw YW1ooPWaqrPQAy/eyqrM7I9KNFDCtmaPxtgcPw2oEDfc/w6cPkrVzvovKLfHQvtg V/hHUekptSf6j525omrVAoM9MxVL3sEGCjn9VrTeC3h9upkfntHOJeL88i2NAAUR tB5Mb3UgWmlya28gPHppcmtvbEBkYXRhdGVrLmNvbT4= =Qlxm -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 01:42:27 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: <199601041707.SAA20110@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "L. Malthus" wrote: > I was told that Belize is offering passports for the next > two years for $50,000 and that might be even less if offers > were made to the government to provide low cost Internet > access to the citizens of Belize. > > http://www.belize.com/citzdoc.html > > Belize has always been known as a home for pirates, A > wonderful Cypherpunk candidate for an offshore data haven! Belize is a shit hole that is as willing as many other slimeball countries to deny someone entry and force them kicking and screaming onto the next flight to the U.S. on request from U.S. authorities. In principle, that is kidnaping. They use the technicality that the person never entered their territory. No- man's lands of port zones where the most basic rights may be violated without regard to a country's constitution are another class of abuse that will have to go. Belize is also the place where Bob White, publisher of The Duck Book and sponsor of some of the largest hard-money conferences ever held, was murdered. The usual suspects were not even rounded up. Someone once wrote that the principle cash crop of Belize is lice. In reality it may be principles. At least the Hondurans got angry when a citizen was kidnaped by the U.S. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMOt2E0jw99YhtpnhAQHa7gH/Z4cjIcT50+0lxJTF7lHCfcPvSPzXW5BU Yuea9C5s+1KgNDUYDe2ItTfOf3TTb+2deJGbDgf2TEP+A/q5S+9JHw== =H46M -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: m5@dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 09:36:13 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: FreeBSD user In-Reply-To: <9601050000.AA09148@rpcp.mit.edu> Message-ID: <9601050011.AA17233@alpha> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Joseph M. Reagle, Jr. writes: > I consider it to be an attack. He's either a live nutcase, newbie of the year, or a no-life out trolling. I strongly recommend against sending him/it mail, helpful or hateful. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Nobody's going to listen to you if you just | Mike McNally (m5@tivoli.com) | | stand there and flap your arms like a fish. | Tivoli Systems, Austin TX | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 02:46:40 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers Message-ID: <199601041732.SAA20749@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 2 Jan 96 at 16:32, Jeff Simmons wrote: > Jim Bell writes: > > >At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could > >easily be "guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious > >trenching, etc. The phoneco would still be involved, but in > >a far lower-profit mode, as the supplier of a single T1 to a > >multi-block area. > > That's assuming the phoneco cooperates. Why shouldn't they? What does a hotel do, if not act as a local communication concentrator for guests? What about multi-company PBX installations? Most PBX's have for years supported the facility to handle entirely separate groups of trunks, often called "tenants." This facility is used in shared-receptionist, shared-PBX scenarios. Each incoming trunk call identifies the "tenant" or company to which the call is addressed, so the receptionist may answer appropriately. I even seem to vaguely remember hearing of apartments or co-ops that use a PBX instead of having direct subscriber lines to each apartment. Aggregation of communication facilities within the boundaries of public rights of way seems to be a long-standing practice, at least in the voice field. Voice and data are increasingly indistinguishable, the latest move in that direction being the practice of supporting a PBX with all-ISDN trunks. > Punknet is a 'Guerilla ISP'. Twenty of us share a 128k ISDN > line, distributed via high-speed modems. It's been running > fine for over a year now, but Pacific Bell has evidently > decided to get rid of us. I have to think there is something in the way you have gone about it that leaves you with a defect in the kinds of recourse any of the above examples would have and would not hesitate to use. Maybe you should organize the effort in some formal manner. Some states allow legal standing for unincorporated associations. Maybe a cooperative? Maybe (shudder) a corporation? > We've been told that what they're doing is probably illegal, > but it's the old problem: Where does an 800 lb. gorilla > sleep? Far enough off the ground to make it interesting. 800 lbs makes a satisfying crunch when it hits the ground. Maybe if you poke around you can find a few dozen other groups in similar situations, and make it far more expensive for the telco to harrass you than to deliver service as it is supposed to do. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMOuHBkjw99YhtpnhAQFG1gH5AQ+b/TXmddMcd/GzoqACnhLGW1Bv6v3Q wW+WnIVPWCL/qZpV6mLcACG9TSQtDJ0Sy1bk4Y9J22bL4/E7aogoNQ== =KjPD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 02:44:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis Message-ID: <199601041734.SAA20843@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky, are you just the cynic's cynic, a farther-gone revolutionary than you seem, or did you just have a bad month? shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) wrote (on various occasions): - ---------- Prepare to see "felony Internet access" on the books before long. - ---------- Nothing new here. Pornography and the other Three Horsemen will be use to ban the spread of 'dangerous' thoughts on the Internet. This was clear years ago. Let me emphasize a few facts: o Non-GAK Encryption will be outlawed. o 'Immoral' texts and pictures will be banned. o The dissemination of 'dangerous ideas' will become a felony. At best, Cypherpunks can hope to provide the infrastructure that will allow an underground to communicate semi-securely. We are unable to stop the global tidal wave of fascism. Let's not waste our time on bemoaning the freedoms crushed in its path. We have more important work to do. - ---------- But how many of them will be willing to forward certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison term? Hint: count the number of narcotics dealers that advertize in your local yellow pages. - ---------- Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of owner. - ---------- o Outer space: not very realistic o Offshore boats: see the fate of drug trafficers in international waters after the Coast Guard is through with them. o Stable dictatorships: Not stable enough to withstand an humanitarian mission by the US Army. - ---------- Wrong. Only 0.03% of the home PCs have to be seized and the owners incarcerated. The remaining users will cease to carry controlled data on their own. - ---------- Seems to me that the laws are becomming unified on a global scale. The people in power all over the world have the same interests. To stay in power. The 'unregulated' Internet is in direct confilict with this interest. Since these powers make the laws, they will use the laws to reduce the threat the present day Internet presents. Will C2 carry certain newsgroups/info after doing so has become a felony? Who wants to be an 'illegal data' kingpin and face execution? (Kingpins are 'data trafficers' that carry more than 1.5 Megs of 'controlled information'.) - ---------- That is called a conspiracy. The consequence is that all machines involved will be confiscated and their respective owners jailed. - ---------- Well, you can seize the machine running the OS for the crimes it committed. I am serious. No prosecution needed. - ---------- Prosecution followed by conviction is what will happen to the owner of the computer on which the OS was running. - ---------- Time to bring up my favorite CP invention of the last years: Wai Dai's Pipenet. Of course running Pipenet would be a felony in the future I forsee, but it sure is a great idea. - ---------- Pretty hard. That's why the corporate officers will be jailed instead. Not that this would be necessary to stop the corporation from operating. The authorities can just confiscating all the equipment and thereby put the corporation out of business. Saves time and trial costs. They just haul off the computers and declare that they are now property of the government. - ---------- Only to have the box impounded within a few days after going on-line. A very costly and likely short lived hobby. - ---------- All participants in this network are clearly guilty of conspiracy. Their assets will be confiscated under RICO. As Brian mentioned, the law enforcement agencies are creating a surplus by such seizures. The costs associated with more prosecutions are more than offset by the revenue generated. Your computer will make a welcome addition to their budget. - ---------- Inevitably, a DC net or the Token Ring approach described earlier will be used for illegal purposes. Once, not if, that comes to pass all participants will be guilty of conspiracy and their property subject to forfeiture. No trial needed and it will happen to the applause of the general public. ======================================== The answer to much of what you write off without a fight is fairly obvious, but not yet being mentioned in open conversation. Without intending this to be a flame, I'd respectfully suggest that giving up the living room and den in the hope of a back- bedroom campaign against a home invader is probably not a workable strategy (if you'll allow a metaphor uncomfortably close to the subject matter). One rule of these types of things is to carry the battle to the opponent's ground. Allowing the battle on your own ground is hard on the furniture. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMOuAJEjw99YhtpnhAQFdHAIAiaIBOIVVTU1sQwPCDbRgY5Acmg+9oQiL SwLItL4dVz4xPoo6OU3AwDbQvbENuYb2bL7EdUrg6GG4/TRFv1zuiA== =x7j7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jonathan Zamick Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 10:43:33 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Apologies for my absense Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sorry I've been so absent from the list recently. I've been variously flying back and forth to different conferences, working on putting new things together for RSAREF, and finally going on a much needed vacation (I'm feeling much better now.) Actually, after recovering from blood loss from the hoards of mosquitos which greeted me at the airport, I've finally gotten ready to wade through my Cpunk backlogs. Some news: 1. Come to the RSAREF conference, and say hi at the Consensus booth. Its rumored I'll be wearing a white shirt 2 of the 3 days and maybe a jacket, while wearing a tie and boxers one one of the days. (The tie is a bit unusual I have to admit.) You all gave me a number of nifty wishlists when I stuck the option out there before and I think life is good. I can't tell you about it now, or at least I'm not going to because suspense is fun. However, in seriousness stop by. We'll have at least 3 major announcements to make which will be of moderate interest to y'all. Besides, I'm spending the next two weeks panicking about the booth and will need some peer support once I collapse. (We just wanted a room for an hour to get a little roundtable.) 2. Please give some comment on our RSAREF web pages. I've just started pouring some info into them to answer questions people have about the licensing and such. If there are questions you have that aren't answered, let me know. (If the question is, where do I send my flame... you don't really need me to answer do you? :) Anyway, who else is going to be at the conference? (Also who is going to be at MacWorld?) Lastly, I'd like to plan a Cpunk party. I'm thinking about March 15th perhaps in the Berkeley area. Its going to be a Sake party, in the Takara Sake factory, so we can be really droll and mix the Cyber/Cypher punk motif. :) That sound like a good night? Any major conferences causing a problem? Jonathan ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ..Jonathan Zamick Consensus Development Corporation.. .. 1563 Solano Ave, #355.. .. Berkeley, CA 94707-2116.. .. o510/559-1500 f510/559-1505.. ..Mosaic/WWW Home Page: .. .. Consensus Home Page .. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Corey Minter Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 11:00:33 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Concription [NOISE] Message-ID: <199601050244.VAA02095@zws388.sc.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain anonymous@freezone.remailer wrote: > Does anyone understand what this "Concryption" really is? Reading the > press blurbs, it could be nothing more than simply compressing the > stream before encrypting it. A patent on that idea would be rather > awkward. if there is nothing more to concription, then it sounds like a bogus patent since PGP documents and implements the technique already. Maybe it would make a nice trademark though. Does anyone know if macaroni and cheese combined in one meal is patented? If not, maybe I can go out and patent it. :) -- ______________________________________________________________________ Corey Minter | cminter@mipos2.intel.com | (408) 765-1714 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 02:59:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Duplicate messages Message-ID: <199601041745.SAA21208@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 4 Jan 96 at 7:00, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote (to Ed Carp): > Please stop polluting this mailing list with test messages. > Thank you. > > (I wish I could set up procmail on this box.) I find it to be less work to scan messages marked for deletion by the Cohen/Alice/Hallam/Vulis/Nuri filter for the occasional meaningful one than to have to scan the main body of messages to delete the meaningless ones. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMOv240jw99YhtpnhAQHHfwIAgJU+MoL4jhk9Lv+H8U/ZpNOwaGVlC0Mr 1ij6fjrw3fnvYsd8ChoxxvWGjV30t2/ZagPHbuHezQLI/mHZy9fYwg== =AK3i -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin]" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 09:13:19 +0800 To: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Subject: Re: test In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601050049.SAA19801@dal1820.computek.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Ed, I've pointed out to you during our mini-flame war that I've been getting > 4 copies of your every e-mail: 2 via the cpunks list, 2 directly from your > box cc:'d to me. You _know_ that I've been getting 2 copies of cc:'s not > passing through toad.com, that the problem is at your end, and not at toad.com, > and you should _not_ send test posts to cypherpunks. The problem is *not* at my end, your ignorance is showing. If it were, then everyone would be getting 2 copies of everything I send, and that's simply not true. Some people are getting two copies, but some are only getting one copy. > None of the following: > * your test posts > * your lack of understanding of anonymous remailers > * your inability to configure sendmail > have any cryptographic relevance (other than to discredit your technical > knowledge, which you have done quite thoroughly :) My understanding of anonymous remailers has nothing to do with this - I've not posted or emailed through one, so I don't know where this comment is coming from. As for configuring sendmail, I would not be afraid to estimate that I've probably configured sendmail for more systems than you've ever seen in your entire life, so if my technical qualifications are in doubt, they are in doubt only in your own mind. My employer (and all of my employers for the last 16 years) have paid relatively well for my technical shills, and continue to do so. > Please stop polluting this mailing list with test messages. Thank you. I would suggest that it is *your* lack of technical expertise that is at the root of your not neing able to set up procmail. Besides, if you want to filter my posts or email, filter will do the job, and it's so fast and easy to set up that I taught an ex- to do it in about 10 minutes - and she has trouble finding the on/off switch to her computer. Please stop polluting the list with your flames. - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744@anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOx1jSS9AwzY9LDxAQFpMAP/WZv/JrA6WIagfL12Jxni+HQH/4lsOMFc gK51Jeb1HTE7+gPf03yPSFqkW6fp3jZzIN6Mr3PuaB0cOk92irRU9RHd3L4rtyPE 1IJ/KKaoluMO0dOq4duFvpJO1ximKQD7TPyMKDlBZSLbZ5nP6yXogOrH7Aep5fJ+ DkXnkhWVKiw= =crDC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: reagle@rpcp.mit.edu (Joseph M. Reagle Jr.) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 08:26:17 +0800 To: dreschs@austnsc.tandem.com Subject: Re: FreeBSD user Message-ID: <9601050000.AA09148@rpcp.mit.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I consider it to be an attack. Certainly seems like it to me when it bungs up my poor eudora dial-up connection and I can't get mail. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 11:39:40 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Net Censorship Story on All Things Considered Message-ID: <199601050311.TAA27573@netcom5.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain This evening I heard a story on Internet censorship on All Things Considered. They said that Compuserve was close to deploying technology to keep only Germans out of the 200 news groups. (Compuserve and the Germans still disagree about where the list came from.) They also interviewed Denise Curaso (sp?) who provided some reality about the how censorship could quickly move to political views that certain countries don't like and how a Compuserve user could easly bypass Compuserve censorship. The story ended with the comment that in the past, many net people have said that since the Internet was designed to survive atomic war, the net would just bypass around censorship, but between the Germans and Exon, fewer of them are saying it now. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz@netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 13:28:46 +0800 To: Robbie Gates Subject: Representations of Pi, etc. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:39 AM 1/5/96 +1100, you wrote: >> The decimal representation of any irrational number (e.g. pi, e) >> contains the decimal representation of every natural number >> somewhere. (Proof by diagonalization.) >What you say here isn't quite true. Right. But BTW, isn't it interesting, that news item from a few weeks ago, on an algorithm for determining individual bits in Pi, regardless of whether you've calculated all the previous ones. Only problem is, it only works in hexadecimal (and, obviously, binary, etc, not decimal. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 10:09:56 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Double Messages from Ed Carp Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 12:49 AM 1/5/96, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >> Ed, I've pointed out to you during our mini-flame war that I've been getting >> 4 copies of your every e-mail: 2 via the cpunks list, 2 directly from your >> box cc:'d to me. You _know_ that I've been getting 2 copies of cc:'s not >> passing through toad.com, that the problem is at your end, and not at >>toad.com, >> and you should _not_ send test posts to cypherpunks. > >The problem is *not* at my end, your ignorance is showing. If it were, >then everyone would be getting 2 copies of everything I send, and that's >simply not true. Some people are getting two copies, but some are only >getting one copy. I have also been getting two copies of most or all of your messages, at least for the past few weeks (since you became active on the list again, I think). I have not been complaining, just deleting the extra copies. In looking at the detailed headers of a pair of such duplicates I see that there may have been some kind of "fork" (not a technical term, just a description) where the two messages (called Blue and Red) differ as follows: Blue Message: Received: from dal1820.computek.net by toad.com id AA01149; Thu, 4 Jan 96 16:49:35 PST Received: (from erc@localhost) by dal1820.computek.net (8.6.10/8.6.10) id SAA19801; Thu, 4 Jan 1996 18:49:29 -0600 Red Message: Received: from dal1820.computek.net by toad.com id AA01148; Thu, 4 Jan 96 16:49:36 PST Received: (from erc@localhost) by dal1820.computek.net (8.6.10/8.6.10) id SAA19801; Thu, 4 Jan 1996 18:49:29 -0600 Only a one-second difference, but the difference grows in later headers. The point is that there were already two slightly difference versions of the message before toad.com was reached. Other subtle differences exist, too. For example: Blue Message: X-UIDL: 820809984.020 Red Message: X-UIDL: 820809984.018 I don't even know what X-UIDL is, but this is a notable difference between the two versions. I suggest you carefully examine the full headers and go from there. It appears that toad.com is only sending two messages because it _received_ two messages. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 08:55:13 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: Kocher timing attack in RISKS In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601050027.TAA03963@thor.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [via Steven Weller] > Reproduced here from RISKS digest: > > ------------------------------ > > Date: Tue, 26 Dec 1995 17:23:09 -0100 > From: Saso Tomazic > Subject: Re: Timing cryptanalysis of RSA, DH, DSS (Kocher, RISKS-17.53) [...] > 2.) It is not so difficult to rewrite algorithms to be resistant to timing > attacks, i.e., to have execution time independent of secret key. For > example, the algorithm to compute R = y^x mod n given in the Kocher paper > can be simply rewritten as: > > Let R = 1. > Let A = 1. > Let z = y. > For i=0 upto (bits_in_x-1): > If (bit i of x) is 1 then > Let A = (R*z) mod n > Else > Let B = (R*z) mod n > Let y = y^2 mod n. > Let R = A. > End. > > to be resistant to timing attacks. This appears to be a version of something Hal and I and others initially suggested that doesn't really defeat the timing attack. In particular, the variable size of R in iteration k affects the time taken to compute either A or B in iteration k+1. Futplex *** Welcome to Cypherpunks -- Now Go Home *** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMOxwKCnaAKQPVHDZAQEapwf+IcCBI6ksBOftZ/ASB7azlmNXAT2Gzvlw /1ifFUPNY3nF1G2KWOVUi7tfke0W9xzPDM9G5oG4lJ+SoRcalnO9sVcL5UaxQT0d 9mpskePCgyhQhYfYlVcRL7DglcY+7y451TSkHihRCyyUxxV5xfy9PDBPNDlXBwnR y9JSsEwuB9Amv2BrX/fwI5m6nuGNvRytSNrqFeLw1X8XTXknwx89KIlIlyOTPGYa ntS90pJ+bbiYnr3caOLrwAzSBsDnHduFA+0IKa66dOZNahF+1OiCC/roOE4lAxfl vQ8hOH6Y2EMdJ5If3IchnuunC10xBE+PQhRepBoSQCuTxqfbItaDGw== =izhc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 09:09:30 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: [NOISE] Trying to init security channel Message-ID: <199601050040.TAA06237@thor.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 4 Jan 96 13:11:36 IST > From: geoff klein > To: cypherpunks@toad.com > Subject: Trying to init security channel > X-Potpinitrequest: AwAAAAAAAADhi+swAQAAAPqPQh4AACoAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAARjMwMzBGRjIyMTFENTBEMABnZW9mZkBjb21tdG91Y2guY28uaWwAY3lwaGVycHVua3NAdG9hZC5jb20A Another satisfied "Power One Time Pad" user, it would appear.... > > This message was sent by Pronto Secure Mail. > Without Pronto you can not establish a secure channel. > > Please send a reply manually. Futplex *** Welcome to Cypherpunks -- Now Go Home *** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMOxzMinaAKQPVHDZAQGcIwf+KYlU8PiutVTduMG2Jxt7KDsEhDvjjiDi p+kBKw0y2Tj+Z/LGoCTSu2egMxFf9L9mWg8ulNCXPu92Bg1PWNPFJpTeXYcQfHnz fQfQlbnixwo1gU1DW0AVpeq5iIdBwOOqh2TEa5m7LQXiCU3RDS0Q0+muDzvncykC UkF+uzPvxrZW88LFnxSmYez3o/Xj0V39gvKANkZvqOotm90g5bYb6TY8qCUFfSUh hNPPA1irtYc96a73WXRYciW4T1H8cfsmmlwMxbCbILer6MPH+2CZMD1DP5eIu0cd 4vvN6n3pPgBs7YAp4RANf6HKHZpJwB/MG+TOt2ngolsPt5JFvrUKuQ== =wXVD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: MMac102754@aol.com Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 09:19:05 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: re: FreeBSD user Message-ID: <960104195738_106753282@mail02.mail.aol.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I've gotten thee posting from fb@sponsor.octet.com that are greek to me. Or is it code? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: anonymous@freezone.remailer Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 09:27:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: \"Concryption\" In-Reply-To: <199601041435.PAA16631@utopia.hacktic.nl> Message-ID: <199601050105.UAA29900@light.lightlink.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Does anyone understand what this "Concryption" really is? Reading the press blurbs, it could be nothing more than simply compressing the stream before encrypting it. A patent on that idea would be rather awkward. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 09:52:19 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: CryptoPessimism (Was: Foiling Traffic Analysis) In-Reply-To: <199601041734.SAA20843@utopia.hacktic.nl> Message-ID: <199601050134.UAA06813@thor.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anonymous claiming to be "We Jurgar Din" [perhaps truthfully, I didn't check the PGP sig against previous ones] writes: > Lucky, are you just the cynic's cynic, a farther-gone > revolutionary than you seem, or did you just have a bad month? Lucky usually defines the pessimistic extreme of cypherpunk views of the future (with Duncan at the other end). I tend to agree with Lucky's side, but then I _am_ an inveterate cynic. But to be annoyingly cute about it, inveterate != invertebrate. I don't envision a rosy scenario, but I'm not giving up. [various quoted Lucky lines elided] > The answer to much of what you write off without a fight is > fairly obvious, but not yet being mentioned in open conversation. Well, let's talk about it openly! I'm not terribly interested in answers of the form "God moves in mysterious ways" or "If you knew what I knew, you'd support the government's proposal to do this", although most of the world seems to find such answers enthralling. > Without intending this to be a flame, I'd respectfully suggest > that giving up the living room and den in the hope of a back- > bedroom campaign against a home invader is probably not a > workable strategy (if you'll allow a metaphor uncomfortably > close to the subject matter). - From where I sit, Lucky seems to have been quite active on the front lines, in spite (or perhaps because) of his rhetoric. Futplex *** Welcome to Cypherpunks -- Now Go Home *** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMOyAGSnaAKQPVHDZAQEU4wf+IlcCtj9mofE4bDVfcQXoGDk3qjT8JhQ+ yHrPgtEl2zrnzD8d9pX7X8M03brBlWHkr68PkOwh+V0XRDvNISs3KOt4vzK41+jt Z5BW7oIGaFBU1lVV8d9KAxynFrv/mMegyAjZ49vLnm/+wyyZGme08QkoHZeyTbxK F/i6+pbtSu3cFWVwNH+urf+ySeCV61wEDBkN4vmxiFCkcJYZ90jDOC8jJKBhXkzX wg5DNAcpN7CKm2PJiU/H7Eu6Edjnj234aVlYQy2sPAN8JuA8whdxzPuNC/5ZPdu7 PuAAkE2eR+iN1KxYXA2Qv8lKgsiznyR6cBvx1sdkaG3Pd/obokoKAQ== =EMdm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: sameer Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 13:13:32 +0800 To: ecarp@netcom.com Subject: Re: test In-Reply-To: <199601050049.SAA19801@dal1820.computek.net> Message-ID: <199601050446.UAA24423@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > The problem is *not* at my end, your ignorance is showing. If it were, > then everyone would be getting 2 copies of everything I send, and that's > simply not true. Some people are getting two copies, but some are only > getting one copy. This mail arrived twice. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777x3 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer@c2.org From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Daniel C. Cotey" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 12:22:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: FreeBSD Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I was wondering if anyone else with pine observed wierd behaviour when reading that message. My pine exported the file, started a message, then fired up a shell, at which point I killed it before anything else happened. --- --- Daniel Cotey dccotey@serf.uccs.edu From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 14:53:53 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Double Messages from Ed Carp Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105050514.0096c610@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 07:19 PM 1/4/96 -0800, Tim May wrote: >In looking at the detailed headers of a pair of such duplicates I see that >there may have been some kind of "fork" (not a technical term, just a >description) where the two messages (called Blue and Red) differ as >follows: > [Weirdness deleted] I am seeing the duplicates with another user as well. Received: (from lastxit@localhost) by arrakis.alphachannel.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) id SAA10251; Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:52:35 -0600 To: cypherpunks@toad.com From: "Marc Martinez" In-Reply-To: master@internexus.net's message of 3 Jan 1996 13:44:30 -0500 Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP Received: (from lastxit@localhost) by arrakis.alphachannel.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) id SAA10237; Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:50:10 -0600 Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:50:10 -0600 To: cypherpunks@toad.com From: "Marc Martinez" In-Reply-To: master@internexus.net's message of 3 Jan 1996 13:44:30 -0500 This might be an isolated problem with this user or someplace between here and there is duping mail messages... I thought there were more but it turned out to be a bunch of messages I was cc:ed on and it got caught in the filter. Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 15:03:49 +0800 To: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Subject: Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 10:54 AM 1/4/96 -0800, you wrote: >At 11:43 1/4/96 -0600, Jason Rentz wrote: >>Previous exchanges deleted... >>> >>>With a tightly focused beam (light is easy, I don't know about lower >>>frequencies), you can prevent interception except by very obvious physical >>>devices. (e.g. Someone in a cherry picker truck.) You may be able to >>>avoid the need to encrypt the link (and all the paranoia about key >>>management, advances in factoring etc. that that implies.) >>> >>>Bill >> >>The problem with this comes when you start creating links between much >>taller buildings like in San Fran. Any give building over 30 stories might >>sway a foot or so at any given time. Combine that with the other building >>and you might get a few feet of movement. (movement not including during an >>earthquake) :) > >(1) No single communication technology is appropriate for every problem. > >(2) A technical fix could include having the receiver send steering orders >to the transmitter. This solution would, of course, be a long way from the >low tech scavenged lens and 1/2 meter cardboard mailing tube technology I >was thinking of. I think you guys (further up the reply chain) are missing the point. While IR does have stealth advantages in, say, wartime, for routine network usage everyone can be assumed to know where everyone else is, and where all the optical links are, etc. There's no point trying to use link-location secrecy. And presumably, encryption will provide all the message-secrecy/anti-spoofing functions required. Simply ASSUME that the beams can be intercepted (although probably not intentionally cut). That's why we're "cypherpunks," right?!? Secondly, IR beams can be plenty narrow enough to avoid inter-link interference, but at the same time wide enough to avoid beam-steering problems. Note: I'm assuming link distances of under, say 300 meters here. Previously, a point was made about the effects of fog cutting links: Due to scattering, one of the reasons automobile fog lamps are 550 nanometer yellow/orange is to minimize the scattering that shorter wavelengths (400 nm blue, 450 nm green) are more prone to. I would imagine that near IR at, say, 890 nm would be dramatically less sensitive to such scattering. 1400 nm might be even better. Rain might be a different story. But then again, if we're limiting the links to around 300 meters, the total amount of water between "here" and "there" CAN'T be all that great. And in addition, one of the advantages of computer networking over telephone-type networking is that we can "tolerate" (although, not LIKE) the occasional necessity of re-transmitting data. And dynamic re-routing is probably far easier than for real-time telephone-type data. >From the standpoint of computer networking, the main benefit of IR is to cross rights-of-way without permission or trenching (or stringing cables from telephone poles) in urban and suburban areas, allowing data transfer near-fiber speeds. In an urban setting, a single tall building could become a central hub for most of its nearest neighbors. I don't anticipate IR being used "to the home" (especially since residential areas have trees, etc); rather, I would imagine that it would be used to feed the occasional top-of-the-telephone-pole microcell, with very-low-milliwatt (or high microwatt) RF going the last 100 meters or so to the home. This would allow a non-phoneco, non-cableco company to offer bidirectional networking in an entire residential area with an absolute minimum of costs/rights aquisition. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: MMiller224@gnn.com (Matthew Miller) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 23:15:40 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Please take me off your mailing list Message-ID: <199601040240.VAA03543@mail-e1a.gnn.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Please take me off your mailing list...I can't keep up with all this mail. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 23:13:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: testing WPGP Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm trying to test out version 1.5.0.10 of the program WPGP that I downloaded a day ago. So far, I am able to sign messages and (probably?) encrypt them, but decrypting fails me. Below is my 1024-bit public key; could somebody verify the proper signing, and send something encrypted to me? (Also include your public key and I'll see if I can successfully reply.) - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAi1zvWcAAAEEAKmSqngLWK2N2gOJKPtjF9VCfSkXY+XUZBRCbbFU71uH/dLX C2Uq6wFS8alRgMc3rp90JnnJ/6eJqXwMjCunogwucWOaU7S/w+OwjOG9fUqsXIA6 2j25Wtjce65mbp0TKLAzwMb/P/Qq7BlclqhuKzfVBH7dIHnVAvqHVDBboB2dAAUR tBFKYW1lcyBEYWx0b24gQmVsbA== =G3LA - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOzCPvqHVDBboB2dAQGHDgP6ApIYzoZs2LBK5c8p3H+BHzMevgf2zuWy oTt9kiMrirrzsZQ+aGfKTEk3HaEcg9c2bgbM4JjfeZQLXI53edYl5DNuh4newvry PwRLf7eYOtPsxfEMAsmcJkuiwvk1czOZZ/fW+dK5mbsZQ/c5fgcWILvFuey9uOd2 lZ7zqD/Kt54= =/qXq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 14:04:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Forcible Concryption of Data Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >anonymous@freezone.remailer wrote: >> Does anyone understand what this "Concryption" really is? Reading the >> press blurbs, it could be nothing more than simply compressing the >> stream before encrypting it. A patent on that idea would be rather >> awkward. "Concryption" is the process by which your secret data gets enlisted in service to the government, as with Clipper and GAK. The original term when people got pressed into military service was "conscription," but times change. Thus, one might say, "My secrets have been concrypted--the government now has them." (After all, why do you think so many software releases are called "drafts"?) --Klaus! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Bill Stewart Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 01:03:10 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: <199601050721.XAA01227@ix6.ix.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >>>1) Use cut-and-paste into Private Idaho. Private Idaho will allow you to >>>paste back into Eudora. (Or you can send out from Private Idaho directly.) >>>This option is useful becuase it supports nyms and chaining of remailers. ... >>[sigh] Just what I thought, no easy solutions. Private Idaho's pretty easy - if you're replying to a message, you'll need to do a cut&paste to move the original into PI, but it follows all the standard Windows cut&paste clipboard stuff, and after that you can send the message directly (from newer versions of PI) or pick a menu item that hands it back to your mailer (Eudora or several others are supported) for delivery. Inside PI, you can pick menu items to call PGP, add remailer headers, etc. At 07:46 PM 1/3/96 -0500, "Douglas F. Elznic" wrote: > I have also heard that ViaCrypt is a good alternative. But I am not sure. >Has anyone else out there heard anything good/bad about ViaCrypt? I've got the ViaCrypt Windows package, as well as their DOS versions. It's really nice for key management (which Private Idaho doesn't do much of), though some of the other PGP Windows frontends also do that. Its encryption/decryption/signing functions are mainly oriented towards files rather than Clipboards - the big advantage of this is that there aren't any silly 64KB or 640KB limits anywhere, but it's a bit clumsier. I usually use Private Idaho as a front-end to ViaCrypt as well; it's faster and prettier to have ViaCrypt handling the Windows interfaces than to have PI pop up a DOS window to run Real PGP in. The PGP 3.0 stuff, when it comes out, will help the process a lot. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around.... From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Dan Harmon Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 19:57:58 +0800 To: Alan Olsen Subject: Re: Double Messages from Ed Carp In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960105050514.0096c610@mail.teleport.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I have been seeing duplicates also, but it seems to be random. Some from Ed, and some from others. Dan On Thu, 4 Jan 1996, Alan Olsen wrote: > At 07:19 PM 1/4/96 -0800, Tim May wrote: > > >In looking at the detailed headers of a pair of such duplicates I see that > >there may have been some kind of "fork" (not a technical term, just a > >description) where the two messages (called Blue and Red) differ as > >follows: > > > [Weirdness deleted] > > I am seeing the duplicates with another user as well. > > Received: (from lastxit@localhost) by arrakis.alphachannel.com > (8.6.12/8.6.12) id SAA10251; Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:52:35 -0600 > To: cypherpunks@toad.com > From: "Marc Martinez" > In-Reply-To: master@internexus.net's message of 3 Jan 1996 13:44:30 -0500 > Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP > > Received: (from lastxit@localhost) by arrakis.alphachannel.com > (8.6.12/8.6.12) id SAA10237; Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:50:10 -0600 > Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 18:50:10 -0600 > To: cypherpunks@toad.com > From: "Marc Martinez" > In-Reply-To: master@internexus.net's message of 3 Jan 1996 13:44:30 -0500 > > This might be an isolated problem with this user or someplace between here > and there is duping mail messages... > > I thought there were more but it turned out to be a bunch of messages I was > cc:ed on and it got caught in the filter. > > > > Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction > `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key > http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ > "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay > > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Rick Busdiecker Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 13:00:12 +0800 To: Cedric Tefft Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: <30EC5109@ms-mail.datastorm.com> Message-ID: <9601050442.AA25099@cfdevx1.lehman.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain From: Cedric Tefft Date: Thu, 04 Jan 96 14:12:00 PST >And they strongly imply that brute-force attacks against 256-bit >keys will be infeasible until computers are built from something >other than matter and occupy something other than space." Hmmm... Well, the 384-bit Blacknet PGP key was cracked in just a few months. How? Factoring a 384-bit number is not equivalent to searching a 384-bit keyspace. Consider that there are 78498 primes less than 1000000. This means that you can do a brute force search of a keyspace of under 17-bits to find a prime factor of any composite number less than 1000000000000 -- a bit under 40 bits. I've done this to verify the results of an implementation of the Rabin-Miller primality test on relatively small numbers. I'm not sure how many primes there are with 192 or fewer bits, but it's far fewer than 2^384. There are better techniques around for factoring large numbers than this sort of brute force testing. While I didn't follow the thread very closely, they probably used the quadratic sieve or number field sieve algorithm. See Schneier's _Applied_Cryptography_ for more on factoring, including references to more detailed works. -- Rick Busdiecker Please do not send electronic junk mail! net: rfb@lehman.com or rfb@cmu.edu PGP Public Key: 0xDBD9994D www: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/rfb/http/home.html send mail, subject "send index" for mailbot info, "send pgp key" gets my key A `hacker' is one who writes code. Breaking into systems is `cracking'. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 23:22:26 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Representations of Pi, etc. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 3:19 AM 1/5/96, jim bell wrote: >But BTW, isn't it interesting, that news item from a few weeks ago, on an >algorithm for determining individual bits in Pi, regardless of whether >you've calculated all the previous ones. Only problem is, it only works in >hexadecimal (and, obviously, binary, etc, not decimal. ^^^^^^^^^^^ ??? I didn't see this result you mention, but it surprises me. The part about how it works in some bases, but not in decimal. The "hand-waving" (motivational/informal) explanation for why I am surprised is that "Nature doesn't care about bipeds with 10 digits vs. bipeds, or whatever, with 2 digits or 16 digits." That is, results applicable in base 16, hexadecimal, should be easily applicable in base 10. And there is are interesting properties about the distribution of digits in "random" numbers. Pi is of course not random by many definitions, but shares certain important properties with random numbers. (Or sequences, if you wish.) One of these is properties is that of _regularity_, the frequency of digits. A regular number is one whose expansion has in the limit the same frequency for all digits, and this is so in any base. Thus, a regular number has an equal frequency (in the limit, blah blah) of 0s, 1s, 2s, 3s, etc. And switching to another base will not change this. I recollect that pi has been proved to me regular, i.e., that pi has an equal frequency of all digits, in the limit, in all bases. (This is the sense in which we can argue that pi is "random." in the sense that there are no correlations, no dependence of the n+1th digit on the nth digit, and "no apparent order." Furthermore, there is no effective compression of pi, except by some tricks, such as _naming_ it (a dictionary compression, of sorts) or by specifying a program which computes it. Lots of interesting issues about the real meaning of randomness and compressability, about the "logical depth" of certain computations, etc. I recommend "The Universal Turing Machine" (ed. by Haken, as I recall) for a nice set of articles on these fascinating issues.) In summary, I would be surprised to find that a method for calculating the Nth digit of pi works for base N but not for base M (modulo some minor efficiency factors related to machine architecture, etc.). Any pointers to this result would be appreciated. --Tim May (By the way, randomness and regularity, real or only apparent, are some of my favorite topics. Numbers which _appear_ to be regular, but which actually aren't, are said to be "cryptoregular" (hidden regular). The connection with cryptography is more than tangential: a text block or number which _appears_ to be random or regular (the same frequency definition applies to letters as well as digits) may be transformed by application of a key to a nonrandom or nonregular thing. The connection with entropy and randomness is right there, of course, and is left for the interested folks to think about.) We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jack Hammer Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 16:46:47 +0800 To: jim bell Subject: Re: "Deterrence" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Thu, 4 Jan 1996, jim bell wrote: > Recently, Kevin Wheeler (on NWLIBERTARIANS@TELEPORT.COM) expressed what I > consider to be odd (at least for him; I can easily deal with Benneth's crap) > (and a bit belated) objections to my desire to use technology to prevent > government from oppressing the public. Well I'm really pleased to hear that you're considering actually dealing with someone's objections to your insane ideas, rather than hiding out like a little crybaby. But really, there's not much to object to. No one is taking you seriously Mr. Bell. If anyone did, you'd probably be in jail by now. In part, I must thank you for helping me to see what the actual Libertarian mindset is capable of. That more people haven't immediately and unequivocably confronted you on your murderous plans to institute a new regime of terror and lawlessness indicates to me that the average Libertarian is philosophically bankrupt. The best that could be said for them is that they're humoring you. BTW, my show is being scheduled to go daily for North American broadcast via the TVRO satellite, and I may be doing drive time daily from Vancouver to Portland. So consider each waking day a new opposition from Jack Hammer. When you roll out of your fart sack each evening (or whenever you rise from yhour grave) consider that I will have been already up making statements against your plans for assassination, and consider that, should you ever manage to actually be awake at such an early hour, you can meet me in verbal combat simply by reachning over and picking up your phone. Of course you won't do it. You've had numerous opportunities to give voice to your maniacal plans on my show, but you've chickened out then, you'll chicken out now. -jac jh@teleport.com FLASHNEWSHAMMERNET- Honoring the tradition of Emerson, Thoreau, and Ghandi, Hammer World Radio goes on the air daily 2-3pm PST beginning on Reverend Doctor Martin Luther King Junior's birthday, January 15, 1997, with a MESSAGE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE TO THE WRONG WORLD ORDER. HOW TO JOIN THE HAMMERNET. Receive the most interesting e-mail and get to know the best writers on the Internet. Saints and flamers, they're on the Hammernet! Here's how to join. Send the following message in the body of your text space to majordomo@teleport.com : subscribe hammernet-l It's as easy as that! From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "David K. Merriman" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 23:20:33 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960104183919.00677094@arn.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 07:46 PM 01/3/96 -0500, Douglas F. Elznic" wrote: ... ... >I have heard that their are alpha releases currentky geing worked on at >quest/qualcomm. But i would have to say before they come out your best bet >to pgp and eudora is either pidaho or just use it in dos. pidaho is a great >front end. A lot better than any others out their. > > I have also heard that ViaCrypt is a good alternative. But I am not sure. >Has anyone else out there heard anything good/bad about ViaCrypt? I've gotten ahold of the WPGP mentioned here a couple days ago, and it seems to be working just fine, for me. Even easier to use than PIdaho, though not quite as 'full-featured' (ie, remailer support, etc). Using it to sign this message, FWIW :-) - - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOwCBMVrTvyYOzAZAQGpVgQApdkjY9KoiI4TYhd6h8at6R1DfEFldE0M y9iY3lcUjGuCn6RASVUxbDXVYWtbeCPGveaAfIri6ccM2Fcw6WboS2YXM7Xmpubr 7j6o48IwKB0YZadwtxRXQWddE3RUwbIa52xmmywdlshLGy7IEAJ+NHgrlZZk/sdR SilciAe65Hs= =0izb - - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOwCPsVrTvyYOzAZAQEjzAP/bEK4Q/uJgbXY9/HMp+Cu1YF/1x1/tlI5 T3b1Vb4WvsZCUbGlMzqzNKFO6qJoMxGGQoVi3LzWixGEVeaD93QJGQXtR3p/v2HS fogEk5bVFr6+ljreuhLDhl4sQpNx+fnibXg013zb2dKv0btwTst+vh7Vm1vYZ84T uJFMVZPxL+I= =xUTN - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOwCasVrTvyYOzAZAQFY5wP9HdMiDu1cqShuz6GPjNNzNwtEbXaxfDsQ sWZq0tcSkIVaY7vix8X02PxV7tqMqdbyBBnO9n6unRhitJfuTtJ1Fh7lGB/6/TtU o2/7510JcwyfVXB3Lb6tenvu0G9aQrkGqzoHcSXr854GzsU2KfjGEM9l9xpczj+B O5wiYXU00yc= =tkkz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954), U.S. Judge <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geopages.com/CapitolHill/1148 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Sudduth, Larry" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 20:02:08 +0800 To: "'Bill Frantz'" Subject: Compuserve grovels to foreign censors Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 15:05 1/4/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >Caller ID could tell them where you are calling from. They can also use >their billing information and user profile information to decide where you >live and/or how old you are. I wonder if any of these filters will keep >the German prosecutors off their necks, given that they can be bypassed. I don't know whether or not one can presume the existence of Caller ID over in Germany. When I lived there (albeit several years ago), it was a frustrating mixture of old technology (no records of any calls, just a counter that registered message units, so one could get a monster phone bill, and not even contest it) and new (ISDN and the German Post's version of BTX, Bildschirmtext). >I feel sorry for them given the situation they are in, and want to kick >their butts for just rolling over dead instead of fighting for free access. Feeling much the way you do about CompuServe's actions, I voted with my wallet, and canceled my membership. More and more vendors are offering equivalent support through the I'net anyway. The vision of a tin horn prosecutor in Munich being successful will only fuel the zeal of the would-be censors here and elsewhere in the World. (I wonder if the Revolutionary Guards in Iran are discussing what they next want censored.) BTW, I've never been an alt.* group reader, etc. That being said, who is CompuServe to try to control access to it. CompuServe is transport-only, and not a content originator. Since the Una-bomber used Fed-Ex to kill his victims should Fed-Ex no longer deliver to US addresses? begin 600 WINMAIL.DAT M>)\^(AX%`0:0" `$```````!``$``0>0!@`(````Y 0```````#H``$%@ ,` M#@```,P'`0`%````. `)``4`'P$!"8 !`"$```!%1C8U,# Y0S8X-#9#1C$Q M.$$P,# P-C X0S8X13)S=&5M`H,SMP+D!Q,"@S02S!3(-0/&713%?0J ",\)V3L8SS(\-34" M@ J!#;$+8&YG&#$P,Q10"P-L:3.^-@WP"U46\@P!$U!O$]!Z8P5 005 `% + M515B,G42L&,`0" 6\!S_'@,Z+QZ?'Z ')!V*L R(2\%L6B^;P?@!O I MP"KE+"%))_#W`B $@3%09C(1+( RT"HB?Q&P*] #$!/0$: G\"7B:ST)X' U M+S8_+X\J0"!'SP20`X(=T1&P8W4S\#P!ES+0.S,PL6X%D&MS)("^9SA1,]$1 M@#!C+(1B*L#<8GD*L 00"8 N/,T=9*X@"H\>[#H@9 (@)P5 _&MN.1$J@2HQ M!< %L4A WP5 `B K0D!R!Y!U!X _T\QE> 0`$]!N8RK .R%U*.AO.&!R1<4+ M@$ 5>?TL(58' MD'/_4# JP%8@3R!",2T!27,ID]]8,%7"!& `@%9"<#D`28'_,.(D@#(B23)/ M80.@!:!6,3M5L4\@*47%6T,'T2A)6%-$3C(3/^E00+!T/B<$($PQ`) Q\3LA M0E2^6"2 )=%4@!%P,+!M$]#]4G I1%9%RQR;/;\^SSH1SF8)X ,@+0!R
=O@3LA,N!G:%&39H(#4-L)X"L08TL@ M!! N:I\?H,UA?$9EX2NB;741<#_3_U# +( JXD?0*Q &X$#P2W#Y`W!P=09A M.&!?00#0,=)[0C$Z('8=\6E!3R!TL&V_+(!A[V+_'Y%0P"D!=%LD_RRA2R I M$"G >%$'@ ;0._'U8-!P+"%-!; X$*P+IY1<5'9^!4]O@ 20)( 1P&,L(T+AA?7]"W!D)( J@"T0! !%Q78H_S/B46 L@#/Q7!)N MD7%U,^)_3R L(9B)! "940!Q@*(M_X=26R-%Q4DR5>)6,6F!!;#?<' +@#' M!; L(5,+@$LA_3_B58XPB4 #<'R!+2(IP/-T`(DP17AII"7Q8-!?4?MI\#'0 M;9@&?+ IDZ$55 &_&& ;T&\S.$)682T0507PS6^ 9$H!$;!S/VHO'S8O'<>F M+W*>%_$`JI! `#D`(+FB@C+;N@$"`4<``0```#(```!C/553.V$](#MP/5-E M8W5R94,R.VP]4')I=F%T92!-1$(M.38P,3 U,#4U-C$P6BTY````0 `', #( MA.$PV[H!0 `(,.!,WXXRV[H!'@`]``$````!``````````(!%#0!````$ `` 3`%24H< I?Q ;I8<(`"LJ)1=K< `] ` end From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 22:00:11 +0800 To: jimbell@pacifier.com (jim bell) Subject: Re: cyphernomicon FTP site? Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 12:58 AM 12/20/95, Harry Bartholomew wrote: .... > When using lynx from my shell account, I like to grab the whole > thing at once at net speed. Just now this took 65 seconds for > the 1.28 Mb with obvious pauses ( I've seen it twice as fast). .... I was using Lynx just now to do something like this (Mediacity was kaput). I couldn't find out how to tell lynx to save the file. Do you know how? Thanks From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Deranged Mutant" Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 15:49:04 +0800 To: Cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Visual Correlations of RNGs useful for cryptanalysis? Message-ID: <199601050740.CAA26664@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Somebody passed an interesting article to me, "Random number generators: pretty good ones are easy to find", Clifford Pickover (IBM Watson Research Ctr, NY), The Visual Computer (1995) 11:369-377. The article does NOT deal with cryptographically secure RNGs, however the author discusses some interesting methods for visualizing correlations in RNGs that probably can be applied to crypto. One is the "Noise Sphere", which involves plotting the last three numbers generated by the RNG (Xn, Xn+1, Xn+2, where 0 Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) for a copy of my PGP key. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jay Sulzberger Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 23:27:17 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Three recent posts on usenet about getting far hex digits of pi. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain For Timothy C. May and all the cypherists on this list: Here are three recent posts to usenet on the beautiful, and partly new results on getting digits far out in pi, without explicitly getting all the nearer to the heximal point digits. > From sci.math Wed Dec 20 05:16:17 1995 > Path: panix!news.denver.eti.net!imci3!imci2!newsfeed.internetmci.com!uwm.edu!msunews!netnews.upenn.edu!red.seas.upenn.edu!jimmosk > From: jimmosk@red.seas.upenn.edu (Jim J Moskowitz) > Newsgroups: sci.math > Subject: nth digit of pi calculable? > Date: 18 Dec 1995 03:29:08 GMT > Organization: University of Pennsylvania > Lines: 29 > Message-ID: <4b2n64$s27@netnews.upenn.edu> > NNTP-Posting-Host: red.seas.upenn.edu > Status: RO > X-Status: > > I've seen the recent reports about the discovery of a formula for pi > of the form > infinity > ----- > \ (- n) / 4 2 1 1 \ > ) 16 (------- - ------- - ------- - ------- ) > / \8 n + 1 8 n + 4 8 n + 5 8 n + 6 / > ----- > n = 0 > > which is said to tell you in a simple manner what the nth digit in the > hexadecimal expansion of pi is. I don't see why. Yes, the ith term of > this series does include 16^-i, which is the ith place in said expansion, > but the term in parentheses (sorry; they look more like angle brackets) > isn't an integer, so it's not giving you the value of the number in that > ith place. Instead, it gives you several digits which are in places further > along in pi, with no guarantee that other terms in this sigma won't also > include digits in those places, forcing you to calculate and add up many > terms.... > > Taking an incautious plunge into the world of computational math, > Jim > > > -- > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Jim Moskowitz (jimmosk@eniac.seas.upenn.edu) > Visit the Unknown Composers Page: > http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~jimmosk/TOC.html > > >From sci.math.pi Fri Jan 5 04:08:06 1996 > From sci.math Wed Dec 20 05:16:57 1995 > Path: panix!cmcl2!oitnews.harvard.edu!purdue!lerc.nasa.gov!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!EU.net!peer-news.britain.eu.net!lyra.csx.cam.ac.uk!cet1 > From: cet1@cus.cam.ac.uk (Chris Thompson) > Newsgroups: sci.math > Subject: Re: nth digit of pi calculable? > Date: 18 Dec 1995 15:21:18 GMT > Organization: University of Cambridge, England > Lines: 46 > Message-ID: <4b40te$r02@lyra.csx.cam.ac.uk> > References: <4b2n64$s27@netnews.upenn.edu> > NNTP-Posting-Host: grus.cus.cam.ac.uk > Status: RO > X-Status: > > In article <4b2n64$s27@netnews.upenn.edu>, jimmosk@red.seas.upenn.edu > (Jim J Moskowitz) writes: > |> I've seen the recent reports about the discovery of a formula for pi > |> of the form > |> infinity > |> ----- > |> \ (- n) / 4 2 1 1 \ > |> ) 16 (------- - ------- - ------- - ------- ) > |> / \8 n + 1 8 n + 4 8 n + 5 8 n + 6 / > |> ----- > |> n = 0 > |> > |> which is said to tell you in a simple manner what the nth digit in the > |> hexadecimal expansion of pi is. I don't see why. Yes, the ith term of > |> this series does include 16^-i, which is the ith place in said expansion, > |> but the term in parentheses (sorry; they look more like angle brackets) > |> isn't an integer, so it's not giving you the value of the number in that > |> ith place. Instead, it gives you several digits which are in places further > |> along in pi, with no guarantee that other terms in this sigma won't also > |> include digits in those places, forcing you to calculate and add up many > |> terms.... > > You certainly have to add up a large number of terms. It is the ease with > which these terms can be computed that has attracted interest to this and > similar formulae. > > Think in terms of trying to find the fractional part of 16^N * pi to reasonable > accuracy, which is what is really meant by "finding the (N+1)'th hexadecmal > digit" here -- you might always get unlucky and find only that this fractional > part was between .2fffff and .300001, say. The terms with n >= N are of > absolute value less than 1, and form a rapidly converging series, so their > contribution is easy to compute. The term with n < N contribute terms of > the form > > fractional part ( 16^a(i) * b(i) / i ) > > where i < 8N, a(i) < N, and the b(i) are small integers. So it is sufficient > to compute 16^a(i) mod i. If you don't already know, you can find out how to > do this in time logarithmic in a(i) in, say, Knuth ACP Vol 2. > > This is all explained in detail in the Borwein/Borwein/Plouffe paper, available > from http://www.cecm.sfu.ca/~pborwein/PAPERS/P123.ps, which should be pretty > comprehensible even by an amateur. > > Chris Thompson > Email: cet1@cam.ac.uk > > >From sci.math.pi Fri Jan 5 04:08:06 1996 > From sci.math Wed Dec 20 05:17:20 1995 > Path: panix!bloom-beacon.mit.edu!gatech!psuvax1!news.math.psu.edu!chi-news.cic.net!uwm.edu!lll-winken.llnl.gov!apple.com!apple.com!not-for-mail > From: rjohnson@apple.com (Robert Johnson) > Newsgroups: sci.math > Subject: Re: nth digit of pi calculable? > Date: 19 Dec 1995 13:01:28 -0800 > Organization: Apple Computer, Inc., Cupertino, California > Lines: 57 > Message-ID: <4b7978$cj1@apple.com> > References: <4b2n64$s27@netnews.upenn.edu> > NNTP-Posting-Host: apple.com > Status: RO > X-Status: > > > In article <4b2n64$s27@netnews.upenn.edu>, > Jim J Moskowitz wrote: > >I've seen the recent reports about the discovery of a formula for pi > >of the form > > infinity > > ----- > > \ (- n) / 4 2 1 1 \ > > ) 16 (------- - ------- - ------- - ------- ) > > / \8 n + 1 8 n + 4 8 n + 5 8 n + 6 / > > ----- > > n = 0 > > > >which is said to tell you in a simple manner what the nth digit in the > >hexadecimal expansion of pi is. I don't see why. Yes, the ith term of > >this series does include 16^-i, which is the ith place in said expansion, > >but the term in parentheses (sorry; they look more like angle brackets) > >isn't an integer, so it's not giving you the value of the number in that > >ith place. Instead, it gives you several digits which are in places further > >along in pi, with no guarantee that other terms in this sigma won't also > >include digits in those places, forcing you to calculate and add up many > >terms.... > > The full article can be found in PostScript form at > > http://www.cecm.sfu.ca/personal/pborwein/PAPERS/P123.ps > > and a text announcement can be found at > > http://www.mathsoft.com/asolve/plouffe/scimath.txt > > Yes indeed, you have to add up many terms. However, the amount of > computation to find the n^th digit is on the order of n. Whereas, > to compute n digits would require computation on the order of n^2. > > The idea that drastically reduces the work here is that it is very easy > to compute the n^th hex digit of 1/k. This is accomplished by raising > 16 to the n-1^st power modulo k. Dividing the remainder by k gives the > hex expansion of 1/k starting at the n^th hex digit. Raising 16 to the > n-1^st power modulo k is done by squaring and multiplying based on the > binary expansion of n-1 (the method of repeated squaring). > > Thus, to get 16^{-k} 4/(8k+1) starting at the nth hex digit, > compute 4*16^(n-1-k) mod 8k+1. Divide this remainder by 8k+1. > For example, take n = 1000000000 and k = 1257894: > > 4*16^998742105 mod 10063153 = 4894450 > > and 4894450/10063153 = .7C82F7B089CCA729... (hex) > > It will still entail around billion terms to compute the billionth > digit of pi, but that's better than computing a quintillion digits. > > Rob Johnson > Apple Computer, Inc. > rjohnson@apple.com > > > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 00:37:35 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Market Earth Wins Another Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105111646.008fb73c@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain NEW YORK (Reuter) - AT&T Corp. said Thursday that its embryonic online service AT&T Interchange Online Network would become part of the Internet's World Wide Web within a year instead of being a proprietary system. ``The Interchange platform as we know it will phase out over a year or so. That platform will be dissolved into the World Wide Web,'' Michael Kolowich, president of AT&T New Media Services told journalists on a conference call. AT&T said it would be able to take advantage of the best electronic commerce and navigation software for the Internet, most of which are not compatible with Interchange. In doing so AT&T is taking a leaf out of Microsoft Corp.'s book which in December changed tack to open its online service for free to Internet users. The move may be replicated in other online companies, analysts say. ****************** Now if Microsoft and AT&T can't fight open market information networks, what chance do the Feds have to impose their proprietary system on the Net? The Feds are even worse at marketing than AT&T. DCF "If AT&T owned KFC they'd advertize that they are selling 'hot, dead, chicken'. No, I'm afraid they'd advertize 'lukewarm, dead, chicken'." -- Stolen from Jerry Pournelle From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 19:55:46 +0800 To: Rudi Raith MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 02:26 PM 1/4/96 +0100, Rudi Raith wrote: >2) > >I suppose that there is a predicate indecent_p(n), which is true if n >represents something indecent, false otherwise. (Some implementation >of such a predicate could be a police officer arresting you upon >presentation of the number to him, yielding true. :-) ) Such numbers >may be called "Indecent Numbers", their "posession", "transfer", >etc. be banned. Fortunately or unfortunately, "decency" and "indecency" are incapable of exact mapping to words. Location, context, tone of voice, year, time of day, recipient of communication, etc. all affect "indecency." "That girl is attractive." "The bitch is in heat." "Our President -- William Jefferson Blythe Clinton." "Jesus Christ is the Son of God." All of these statements are sometimes decent and sometimes indecent/blasphemous. It depends purely on a host of factors. That is the point of using the "indecency" standard. Consider the similar problem of defining the crime of Blasphemy: Christian: "Jesus Christ, the Messiah is God" Blasphemy because it claims that a man as God. Jew: "The Messiah has not yet come." Blasphemy because it denies the divinity of Jesus. We solved this problem in the US by legalizing all such speech. That is the only way to handle the similar decency/indecency definition problems. DCF "Government is not established for the benefit of the governed." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 07:56:42 +0800 To: Cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: More Noise Sphere Noise (simple source code) Message-ID: <199601051236.HAA28251@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Ok, no language holy wars. This was quickie to test out the Noise Sphere plotting. It's in Pascal, but it's understandable. { Simple demo of a Noise Sphere in Turbo Pascal } { (If only I had a really awful RNG to test it with...) } program NoiseSphere; uses Graph, Crt; const BGIPath = ''; { where those silly Borland *.BGI drivers are } var GraphMode, GraphDriver: Integer; type Polar = record r, theta, phi: Real; end; Cartesian = record x,y,z: Real; end; procedure PolarToCartesian(var P: Polar; var C: Cartesian); begin C.x := P.r * Sin(P.phi) * Cos(P.theta); C.y := P.r * Sin(P.phi) * Sin(P.theta); C.z := P.r * Cos(P.phi); end; procedure Plot(var C: Cartesian); begin with C do begin PutPixel(100+(Round(100*y)), 200-(Round(120*z)), Yellow); PutPixel(320+(Round(100*x)), 200-(Round(120*y)), Red); PutPixel(540+(Round(100*x)), 200-(Round(120*z)), Blue); end; Delay(1); end; function ByteToReal(b: Byte): Real; begin ByteToReal := b / 256; end; function InitScreen: Integer; begin GraphMode := VGAHi; GraphDriver := EGA; InitGraph(GraphDriver,GraphMode,BGIPath); InitScreen := GraphResult; end; var n: LongInt; X: Array [ 0..2 ] of Real; P: Polar; C: Cartesian; begin InitScreen; Randomize; for n := 0 to 2 do X[n] := {$ifdef USEDEV} {$else} ByteToReal(Random(256)); {$endif} n := 0; repeat with P do begin r := Sqrt(X[(n+2) mod 3]); theta := pi * X[(n+1) mod 3]; phi := 2 * pi * X[n]; end; PolarToCartesian(P,C); Plot(C); X[n] := {$ifdef USEDEV} {$else} ByteToReal(Random(256)); {$endif} n := (n + 1) mod 3; until KeyPressed; ReadKey; RestoreCrtMode; end. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: stevenw@best.com (Steven Weller) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 02:09:27 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Representations of Pi, etc. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Tim May wrote: >In summary, I would be surprised to find that a method for calculating the >Nth digit of pi works for base N but not for base M (modulo some minor >efficiency factors related to machine architecture, etc.). > >Any pointers to this result would be appreciated. See Peter Borwein's home page: http://www.cecm.sfu.ca:80/personal/pborwein/ under _Calculating Pi and Other matters_. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw@best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: attila Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 16:20:38 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: \"Concryption\" In-Reply-To: <199601050105.UAA29900@light.lightlink.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Thu, 4 Jan 1996 anonymous@freezone.remailer wrote: > Does anyone understand what this "Concryption" really is? Reading the > press blurbs, it could be nothing more than simply compressing the > stream before encrypting it. A patent on that idea would be rather > awkward. > thought that myself when I first read it -- did that at least 15 years with the standard unix compress --broke compress into a single library module, fed itfrom the input buffer and directly fed it to an RSA style paired key unit and streamed it out whereever specified --yes, it was far more efficient than two programs --and that was on my VAXEN (780)! however, I guess they think they have reinvented the world and no one ever tried to patent the process. patents are not worth the paper they are printed on in general --I stopped filing in 1975. I was supporting ignorant patent lawyers who could not even write the claims! That, and feds took away a nuber of patents in the national interest, which of course they deny as they scrubbed the rcords clean.... so, let's see if he can enforce it! __________________________________________________________________________ go not unto usenet for advice, for the inhabitants thereof will say: yes, and no, and maybe, and I don't know, and fuck-off. _________________________________________________________________ attila__ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: goedel@tezcat.com (Dietrich J. Kappe) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 09:36:39 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Representations of Pi, etc. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: >I didn't see this result you mention, but it surprises me. The part about >how it works in some bases, but not in decimal. > >The "hand-waving" (motivational/informal) explanation for why I am >surprised is that "Nature doesn't care about bipeds with 10 digits vs. >bipeds, or whatever, with 2 digits or 16 digits." That is, results >applicable in base 16, hexadecimal, should be easily applicable in base 10. Since we're talking about digits rather than numbers, I can see why base to some power of 2 might turn out to be significant. The trivial base 2 or 16 to base 10 conversion isn't useful if you're working with a single digit. A well, its fruitless to guess without looking at the result. Let me close by saying that in decimal notation, not a single digit of Klarner's Konstant is known. Not really relevant, but its as close a chance as I get to mentioning my research. :-) Dietrich J. Kappe | Web Publishing: http://www.redweb.com Red Planet, L.L.C. | Chess Space: http://www.redweb.com/chess 1-800-RED 0 WEB | MS Access: http://www.redweb.com/cobre RedPlanet@redweb.com | Comics: http://www.redweb.com/wraithspace From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Michael Paul Johnson Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 08:52:10 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Ruby Block Cipher Mark 5 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Ruby Block Cipher, Mark 4, had some problems with slow avalanche with a worst-case input, as well as some really amateurish reference code bugs that I apologize for. The good news is that these things have (I hope) all been corrected in the Ruby Block Cipher, Mark 5. The biggest change to the algorithm is that the "family key" is no longer simply added (modulo 2) to the input blocks, but is used in add and multiply steps to eliminate the old worst case avalanche patterns. The Ruby Block Cipher is not a general block cipher in that it cannot be used in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode. It is a cryptographic hash function with a block size of only 64 bits. Of course, 64 bits is too short for a cryptographic hash function intended for digital signature use, but it is just fine for a quick block cipher. This may be a good reference for those folks who want a quick & easy encryption algorithm that need not withstand nuclear attack but can provide something better than common weak encryption methods in use in the software industry. The small amount of code, fast operation, and lack of the need for a lengthy key setup time are definite advantages where computing resources are at a premium. On the other hand, fast key setup time substantially reduces the cost of a brute force attack on the key, so use of the full 64 bits of the key is essential. Your comments and suggestions on this rather strange little cipher are welcome and encouraged. I'm particularly interested in any ideas as to how many rounds (the STRENGTH constant in the source code) are appropriate for well-balanced security. Information on the Ruby Block Cipher is available as ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/ruby_m5.ps.gz or ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/ruby_m5.rtf.gz and, if you are in the USA or Canada, a reference implementation and a sample file encryption program with free source code is in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/mpj/ruby_m5.zip where the ??????? is revealed in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README ruby_m5.zip is also available on the Colorado Catacombs BBS at 303-772-1062. I urge caution in using such a new cipher in actual applications, but if you feel the need to, you might consider asking me if any known weaknesses have been reported before you do. Note: this is not a product for sale (it is free and probably worth at least as much as you pay for it). It is also not a prepublication (it is THE publication in electronic form with no paper publication anticpated in the near future). ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj@csn.net aka mpj@netcom.com m.p.johnson@ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | http://www.csn.net/~mpj -. --- ----- .... | | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 iQCVAgUBMO1VgvX0zg8FAL9FAQECzQP/fD9dLLeixfZAtKXM2tDXrGgrashiqEsn jU9ohnNsou9MMU+PUmNj8RJCRHSXy4HMskV5BhnILUYaSI5ztJjZYvhBcIbBcR8J ecGl5++iaj4vRAb1vs32Y6LVsQm7hsMvy0byaszOWUKDpn+ZJrFCwMiKgD50ecXW y+XlpkdOhiA= =FQec -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Please include my address on followups, since I don't read all mail on this wonderful (but high volume) list. Thanks! mpj@netcom.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Julian Assange Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 07:49:25 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: FreeBSD user Message-ID: <199601042215.JAA03077@suburbia.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text I've just had my 3rd Freebsd kernel. Enough is enough. --Proff -- +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ |Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has | |FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest | |EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon | +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Robbie Gates Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 07:00:45 +0800 To: Rudi Raith Subject: Re: In-Reply-To: <199601041317.OAA04812@aws26.muc.feilmeier.de> Message-ID: <30EC571A.41C6@maths.su.oz.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > The decimal representation of any irrational number (e.g. pi, e) > contains the decimal representation of every natural number > somewhere. (Proof by diagonalization.) What you say here isn't quite true. The number with decimal rep 0.10100100000010000000000000000000000001.... where the number of zero's is going 1!, 2!, 3!, 4!, ... is transcendatal, and hence irrational, but clearly doesn't contain the decimal representation of every natural number. i'm sure the above fact is believed about e, pi & other such ``important transcendentals'' - i can't recall if there is a proof or how it goes. diagonalization is used to prove that there are uncountably many irrationals. if you want to argue the ludicrosity of trying to ban certain numbers, just consider the function f(n) = n + 1. Iterating this function yields all natural numbers, so the increment operation should clearly be banned. I'm not sure how much programming you can do without increment. - robbie -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- robbie gates | it's not a religion, it's just a technique. apprentice algebraist | it's just a way of making you speak. pgp key available | - "destination", the church. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "baldwin" Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 09:02:11 +0800 Subject: RSA's Art gallery is now on the web Message-ID: <9600058208.AA820864531@snail.rsa.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Are you tired of the clip art you downloaded last week? Do you need a new background screen for you PC? Does your cubicle need something to give it character? Look no further. Visit the RSA Data Security Art Gallery and download to your hearts content. We have such classics as the "Sink Clipper" T-shirt image, and our latest "We Hear You" poster by the famous political cartoonist, Dan Perkins (a.k.a. Tom Tomarrow). Don't miss the our rendition of the NSA logo ("We read your mail, so you don't have too"). More art will be coming soon. Feel free to send us your favorite images, or ideas (webmaven@rsa.com). --Bob Baldwin RSA Data Security From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 23:39:44 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: ZAP_law Message-ID: <199601051521.KAA15505@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain 1-5-96. W$Jaw: "High Tech Zaps German Privacy Laws. CompuServe Case Shows Difficulty of Enforcement." The growing popularity of the Internet and other multimedia services poses a major challenge to Germany's tough data-protection legislation. The personal information that is freely given and used for marketing purposes in the U.S. is off limits in Germany. The CompuServe case demonstrates just how difficult it is becoming for national regulators to control the flow of information. This is particularly true in Germany, where a raft of legislation is in force designed to avoid-any repeat of the Nazi-era abuse of data, as well as the dissemination of pornography and extremist propaganda. The nation's internal security services are already struggling to combat the sophisticated use of computers by neo-Nazi groups. Following a recent ban on several such organizations, right-wing extremists have been sending coded messages of racial hatred to one another through a system of computer mailboxes known as the Thule network. "CompuServe Seeks a High-Tech Answer To Fracas Over Bar on Adult Material." Industry executives said the move sets a bad precedent that could invite still more countries to demand their own diverging standards of what is acceptable. Critics further maintained that the approach simply won't work. In addition, critics voiced concern that CompuServe's efforts will lead to on-line services being forced to take responsibility for information they didn't create. 1-5-95, WashPo: "Worldwide Net, Worldwide Trouble" [Editorial] The borderless quality of the Internet, one of its great strengths, can now be seen also as a source of unprecedented and unnerving international liability. Just as "community standards" were used in Tennessee to prosecute two California-based bulletin board operators on obscenity charges a few years back, big commercial providers like CompuServe or America Online could find themselves facing charges based on the very different legal systems of a Germany or France or, for that matter, an Iran. Trio: ZAP_law From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 23:47:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: ISD_eny Message-ID: <199601051524.KAA15888@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain 1-5-96. NYP: "2 Large Phone Companies Seek Higher Digital Rates. Critics See Damage to a Fast Internet Link." The proposal has angered people who use the ISDN service to work from home. Phil Karn, an engineer at Qualcomm, argued that the new tariff would cost him about $100 more a month. He said he was upset by the proposal to lift rates and was anxious to switch to cable service when it became available. ISD_eny --------- On cable modems: the 12-27 W$J reported on a test at Boston College, and provided comparisons with other systems. GEY_ser From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: iagoldbe@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca (Ian Goldberg) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 03:04:31 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Starting an e-cash bank In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <4cjg0c$rm5@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In article , Lucky Green wrote: >Besides, wherer users get the Ecash from, be it by putting money into their >account at MT or buying it from you doesn't matter. They still need an >account with MT. Huh? Why? If I'm an ecash seller, I take a customer's paper money, withdraw ecash from _my_ MT account, give the ecash to the customer (_not_ a payment: I just give him the coin -- the pair (n,f(n)^(1/h))) and the customer is free to use it at will. It's Digicash's slogan: the numbers _are_ the money. - Ian From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Peter Monta Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 03:11:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Representations of Pi, etc. In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601051850.KAA01175@mage.qualcomm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Tim May writes: > > [ individual bits of pi ] > > I didn't see this result you mention, but it surprises me. The part about > how it works in some bases, but not in decimal. It's an open question as to whether there's a version that works in base 10. There's a nice summary at "http://www.mathsoft.com/asolve/plouffe/plouffe.html". > In summary, I would be surprised to find that a method for calculating the > Nth digit of pi works for base N but not for base M (modulo some minor > efficiency factors related to machine architecture, etc.). It does seem strange, but radix conversion can be much more expensive than the baseline algorithm. I vaguely remember hearing that the billion-digit pi computations done with AGM techniques haven't dealt with base 10 recently. Cheers, Peter Monta pmonta@qualcomm.com Qualcomm, Inc./Globalstar From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: rah@shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 03:39:51 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: DCSB: Digital Commerce: Living Room ExIm, Retail Replacement, or Mail-Order Redux? Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston (Formerly The Boston Society for Digital Commerce) Presents Fred Hapgood Digital Commerce: Living Room ExIm, Retail Replacement, or Mail-Order Redux? Tuesday, February 6, 1995 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Fred says: >So far Web commerce has largely been a speciality export story. >(www.activmedia.com says that web commerce is half exports.) This >reflects the obvious strengths of the medium: webstores are >globally accessible and can support information resources to any >depth customers require. > >However, the meat and potatoes of the $2 trillion American retail >market lie not in specialty exports but in geographically >structured markets built on access to local traffic and >characterized by low-information transactions. If web commerce >has no role to play in commerce on this level, it will end up >little more than an extension and enhancement of direct mail. >(Which is of course not to be dismissed entirely: direct mail did >$55 billion last year.) > >My talk will address the compatibility of these segments with the >web, now and later. Fred Hapgood has written on internet commerce for _CIO_ and _Webmaster_ magazines. He has written on associated subjects for _Wired_ and _Inc-Technology_. The February talk will be based on research for an article on the web and franchising. This meeting of the Boston Society for Digital Commerce will be held on Tuesday, January 2, 1995 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have a jacket and tie dress code. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, February 2 , or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for the following few months are: February Fred Hapgood Freelance Author March Glenda Barnes X.9 Electronic Commerce Security Group April Donald Eastlake CyberCash May Perry Metzger Security Consultant and Cypherpunk June Dan Shutzer FSTC July Pete Loshin Author, "Electronic Commerce" We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah@shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo@ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo@ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMO1H9vgyLN8bw6ZVAQGPyAQAkJeE0VtJXMQ58uUss1hvW0Xtf5FBvAM8 3uNGxQIjLT48rkSPRtmqxsx8KLoirdbCdARwbwStewVVvehvUIByYTCGmUWXBxPH OKhCM/iuEqZ0oZR7RNcTHu2/rduIBdpC53CwyiUmaomj8tAgM5fry9H5h/mjJVu8 aRu36l8isH8= =+lq2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah@shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf@clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<< From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: pjb@ny.ubs.com (Paul J. Bell) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 01:46:47 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Internet Gateway for Bletchly Park Trust Message-ID: <9601051554.AA09438@sherry.ny.ubs.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I am trying to setup an Internet gateway for BP Trust. I will either convience Sun to donate a SparcStation for this purpose, or I will donate one myself. What I need is a contact in the UK for some ISPs, or a University or somesuch that would consider hosting their domain/address. Will anyone having any information that might be of use to me in this endevour please email me at: pjb@ny.ubs.com and/or pjb@23kgroup.com. I have just returned from a trip to BP, and there are many new and exciting things going on there. I will (RSN) post an article re: the current state of affairs at BP. Cheers, paul From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: thad@hammerhead.com (Thaddeus J. Beier) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 03:27:41 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: US cryptographic patents, 1995 Message-ID: <199601051906.LAA13100@hammerhead.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain lull@acm.org (John Lull) said: > This data was extracted from a free database maintained by the > EDS Shadow Patent Office at http://www.spo.edo.com/ That's really http://www.spo.eds.com thad -- Thaddeus Beier thad@hammerhead.com Technology Development 408) 286-3376 Hammerhead Productions http://www.got.net/~thad From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Daniel Leeds Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:36:54 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: recent garbage posts Message-ID: <199601051114.LAA13949@sponsor.octet.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text The user in question has been talked to. DO NOT mailbomb root or any other account any more, this will be seen as hostile activities. We apologize for your inconvenience, but please, the death threats, physical bomb threats, and other nonsense is not called for. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Laszlo Vecsey Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 05:11:10 +0800 To: "Daniel C. Cotey" Subject: Re: FreeBSD In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > I was wondering if anyone else with pine observed wierd behaviour > when reading that message. My pine exported the file, started a message, > then fired up a shell, at which point I killed it before anything else > happened. I have pine, but the FreeBSD message just showed up as garbage. I deleted the message and that was the end of it. How did it execute a shell when you read the message? I didn't think pine had those capabilities... I'm using version 3.91 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:26:04 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Portland Cypherpunks Meeting Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105193942.009413c0@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here is the final(?) information on the Portland Cypherpunks meeting. Date: Jan 20, 1996 Time: 5:23pm (discordian time) Location: The Habit Internet Cafe 2633 S.E. 21st Av., Portland OR 97202 SE 21st @ Clinton in Portland, OR (503)235-5321 For more information on the location, visit: http://www.teleport.com/~habit/ We will be having a key signing and other activities, as well as general socializing. Bring information on projects you are pursuing or questions you would like to ask. Please leave your cameras and other photographic equiptment at home as some of the people attending are pretty camera shy. (And not shy about informing you of it...) It looks like we will be getting people outside of the Portland metro area attending as well. (I have heard from at least one person from the Bay area and one from Seattle, so who knows how many will show up.) If you want to be on the information list for this, just send me e-mail at alano@teleport.com. If all goes well, this may turn into a regular thing... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO19CuQCP3v30CeZAQGi+wf+N7HUDRpgP40SDZHcHlGLk2ApMrQhfAKM 9zxYzphkuqNqNfQB1+b+EFb4dYGOJUcE+DScCbmZMFdy4k9xY78z3Lc3aGFQz4uS ALuPh2T4jbe3rqqJq0aqM/mHlYD63oMi1/aZNMLRmGb7UVMUiGvulYaWI6GBiZVz rMTrmKdQ/2jEzZRpCWbyVCa8X04QY3XnH2nP2s/nDgWyZl9Y87KXN44BizRKfde/ 9x/vWf3mceVa1e09YHwQEwzZNFBvIGlpM4XWLkxh12QeQGCu08CvfJo3dSL0OU/u nRlaBO7IqLH90Ejv0/bLRuI0G3jKXb6yZxexORl6+PUbmwusIeaWIA== =qpD8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:34:29 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: RSA's Art gallery is now on the web Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105194639.0096ea60@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:57 AM 1/5/96 PST, you wrote: > Are you tired of the clip art you downloaded last week? Do you >need a new background screen for you PC? Does your cubicle need something >to give it character? > Look no further. Visit the RSA Data Security Art Gallery and >download to your hearts content. BTW, the URL for this is: http://www.rsa.com/rsa/gallery/gallery.htm Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 05:13:17 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Representations of Pi, etc. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:45 PM 1/4/96 -0800, you wrote: >At 3:19 AM 1/5/96, jim bell wrote: > >>But BTW, isn't it interesting, that news item from a few weeks ago, on an >>algorithm for determining individual bits in Pi, regardless of whether >>you've calculated all the previous ones. Only problem is, it only works in >>hexadecimal (and, obviously, binary, etc, not decimal. > ^^^^^^^^^^^ >??? > >I didn't see this result you mention, but it surprises me. And practically everybody else, I'm sure! It was written up in Science News magazine, BTW. >The part about how it works in some bases, but not in decimal. Well, by definition if it works in hex, it'll work in octal, "quadal" (?), binary, etc. That's ASSUMED, since they would be subsets (co-sets?) of each other. >The "hand-waving" (motivational/informal) explanation for why I am >surprised is that "Nature doesn't care about bipeds with 10 digits vs. >bipeds, or whatever, with 2 digits or 16 digits." That is, results >applicable in base 16, hexadecimal, should be easily applicable in base 10. Yeah, well, I understand your frustration, but to me the really amazing part is that the elephant flies at all, and not how well he flies () (In other words, the amazing thing is that there is a predictable relationship in ANY base system) Chances are the thing WON'T work in base 3,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, and any other non 2**n base. Or, at least, it will take a DIFFERENT equation to work in those other bases, if they work at all. >And there is are interesting properties about the distribution of digits in >"random" numbers. Pi is of course not random by many definitions, but >shares certain important properties with random numbers. (Or sequences, if >you wish.) One of these is properties is that of _regularity_, the >frequency of digits. A regular number is one whose expansion has in the >limit the same frequency for all digits, and this is so in any base. Thus, >a regular number has an equal frequency (in the limit, blah blah) of 0s, >1s, 2s, 3s, etc. And switching to another base will not change this. Not "regular," you used the wrong term. As a mathematician's term of art, this is called "normal." In other words, equal numbers of digits 0-9, equal numbers of digit pairs 00-through 99, equal number of digit triplets 000-999, etc. A series of random numbers, by definition, must be "normal." But "Normal" numbers do not necessarily have to be random. As you might expect, however, testing for "normality" is a good first test of "randomness." (I'm not a mathematician, and I don't play one on TV. Don't be overly impressed with the preceeding knowledge; I'm sure there are dozens if a hundred people reading cypherpunks who know more math than I do. I only got a 780 on the math portion of my SAT, 20 years ago... 790's and 800's weren't all that uncommon.) >I recollect that pi has been proved to me regular, i.e., that pi has an >equal frequency of all digits, in the limit, in all bases. Yes, pi is apparently "normal." (at least four the first 4 billion or so digits...) >(This is the sense in which we can argue that pi is "random." in the sense >that there are no correlations, no dependence of the n+1th digit on the nth >digit, and "no apparent order." Furthermore, there is no effective >compression of pi, except by some tricks, such as _naming_ it (a dictionary >compression, of sorts) or by specifying a program which computes it. Lots >of interesting issues about the real meaning of randomness and >compressability, about the "logical depth" of certain computations, etc. I >recommend "The Universal Turing Machine" (ed. by Haken, as I recall) for a >nice set of articles on these fascinating issues.) Of course, I'm not sure of the ramifications of this new discovery (individual-digit computability of pi) on the facts you list... (for example, inter-digit dependence) However, if the digital representations of the digits of pi were indeed still individually "random" and they could be individually computed rapidly enough, at least hypothetically you could use the digits of pi as a "one-time-pad". Obviously, everyone would know (at least, conceptually) the ENTIRE CONTENT of the pad; the only issue would be the location where you started. If the starting point was the key, and could be defined by a number of at least, say, 256-bits long, it might be a replacement for IDEA whose current length is fixed at 128 bits. I suppose the problem with this technique will probably be that it would take too long to calculate the (a number somewhere around 2**256) bit of pi, and for an n-bit message you'd have to do this n times. >In summary, I would be surprised to find that a method for calculating the >Nth digit of pi works for base N but not for base M (modulo some minor >efficiency factors related to machine architecture, etc.). I'm sure somebody else will have seen it. It was in Science News in the last couple of months, as I recall. Some kind soul will probably type it in. Maybe I can even retrieve my copy from my sister. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Rich Salz Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 08:57:38 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/ Message-ID: <9601051755.AA04835@sulphur.osf.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain FYI. ---------- Begin Forwarded Message ---------- From: Message-ID: <30ED605E-00000001@wotan.gte.com> Date: Fri, 05 Jan 1996 12:31:08 EST Subject: Recent cryptographic findings To: ietf-pkix@tandem.com For those who may not have seen it, the most recent issue of CryptoBytes (Vol1, No. 3) put out by RSA Laboratories has a wealth of information in it. I have not had the time to fully digest the importance of all of the articles, but in the first one Adi Shamir has proposed an "unbalanced RSA" variant of RSA which "makes it possible to increase the modulus size from 500 bits to 5,000 bits without any speed penalty." Another article discusses means of deliberately constructing collisions (due to Hans Dobbertin of the German Information Security Agency) when using MD4, and concludes that "where MD4 is in use, it should be replaced." So far, at least, it appears that MD5, RIPEMD, and SHA-1 would resist this kind of attack, but a certain amount of nervousness might be in order. (Hugo Krawczyk of IBM Research and I considered some of these possibilities in conjunction with work we did on the SEPP protocol, which uses a salted hash function as a means of confirming the knowledge of a secret to a third party without having to use encryption. We were concerned that collisions might be possible, and also that it might be possible to partially reverse a hash function and glean at least information about the message that was being hashed, (the credit card number) in the case of a very short message. We ended up proposing a combination 140-bit hash function which includes both MD5 and SHA-1, assuming that it would be much more difficult to break both algorithms than just one. I will post the analysis to this list in a subsequent message.) Finally, Burt Kalisky provides a compendium of some of the possible attacks against RSA, and discusses simple and practical countermeasures. It seems to me that the most important of the various attacks involve the encryption and decryption of small messages. Since small messages are frequently generated for key exchange and for signature purposes, it is important that we consider these issues carefully. In particular, the use of pseudo-random padding for both encryption (a la the Bellare-Rogaway Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) seems very beneficial, and padding is also important in the signature block. This group certainly ought to examine these issues very carefully, and we should probably give serious consideration to adopting OAEP for message encryption and key exchange. I believe we should also give serious consideration to a increased length message digest function such as SHA-1, and perhaps incorporate the use of multiple message digest algorithms for particularly important signatures , e.g., CA certificates. The back issues of CryptoBytes are available at http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/. Bob ---------------------------- Robert R. Jueneman GTE Laboratories 1-617-466-2820 Office "The opinions expressed are my own, and may or may not reflect the official position of GTE, if any." ----------- End Forwarded Message ----------- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 05:17:52 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Idiot's Guide to News via Compuserve Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105181132.006a4c74@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Idiots Guide to Reading Banned Newsgroups via CompuServe CompuServe (alone among the Big Three) gives all subscribers a PPP connection to the Net through any CIS node (including those in Germany). This is a real Net connection that makes it possible to use CIS to fully access all the Net's resources including "banned" newsgroups. A Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) connection makes your computer just another machine on the Net for the time you are connected. Anything that any Net-connected machine can do, you can do. The CompuServe Dialer (formerly CompuServe Internet Dialer) software that has been included with WINCIM at least since version 1.4 gives you a PPP connection but you need additional newsreading software to dodge CompuServe restrictions. So for real beginners, here is how you can use your CompuServe account to access banned newsgroups as well as the rest of the Internet. These instructions are for Windows users. MAC users can do the same things but I don't know the available MAC software. 1) Get the latest copy of WINCIM. GO WINCIM (hit Ctrl-G and type WINCIM in the dialog box) from within CIS. Download is free. Install it according to the instructions and make sure that you can log on to CIS. 2) Next, let's get a copy of Freeagent which is a free usenet newsreader which works with CompuServe's own Internet connection software. Log on to CIS. GO FTP or: Click the Internet icon, click the File Downloads (FTP) icon and proceed to the main FTP screen. Click the Access a Specific Site button. 3) Enter ftp.forteinc.com in the Site Name box and /pub/free_agent in the Directory box. Click OK and you should see some site login information. Click OK again and you should see a check box next to the file name fagent10.zip. Click the check box and then click the Retrieve button. Wincim will show you that it will save the file in the Compuserv\download directory on your hard drive. (Remember where it's going.) 744279 bytes later, you will have a copy of Freeagent. 4) Move the file fagent.zip into a directory by itself (C:\AGENT for example). Unzip it with Pkunzip or one of the many zip utilities available on CIS. 5) What you are going to do is to connect directly to the Internet via CompuServe and read usenet newsgroups using Freeagent. In order to do that, you will need to find a site somewhere on the Net that will let you read Usenet News for free or you will have to obtain an account on another Internet-connected machine. 6) Community ConneXion (c2.org) will give a month of free service to CompuServe members suffering from censorship. For information send email to uncensored@c2.org. After your free month, c2.org costs only $7.50 a month for accounts accessed via the Internet. 7) There are some news servers out there that are open to the public. A news server is just a machine connected to the Internet that stores and forwards Usenet news. The IP addresses of two of the open news servers are 198.70.185.5 and 205.139.39.1. Once you become a sophisticated user of the nets, you can use your Web Browser to pick up a longer list of open news servers at http://dana.ucc.nau.edu/~jwa/open-sites.html. 8) Now back to Free Agent to grab those banned newsgroups. In your WINCIM directory (maybe in a subdirectory called \cid), click cid.exe to start CompuServe (Internet) Dialer or find the phone-shaped dialer icon in your CompuServe group window. Inside the Dialer, hit dial to log on to the Internet. 9) Start Free Agent. Click Accept to accept the license agreement. It will prompt you to enter various information including the address of the news server you want to use, your email address, and other info. All that you have to enter is the address of a news server. In the box labeled "News (NNTP) Server:" enter one of the IP addresses of open news servers (198.70.185.5, 205.139.39.1, or another from the list) or the address of the news server of a system you've opened an account on (news.c2.org, for example). 10) Freeagent will ask you if it's OK to retrieve a list of news groups from the server. Click Yes. Free agent will then tell you that it is Retrieving complete List of Groups. Once that's finished you'll be ready to read all the newsgroups you want and neither CompuServe nor the Bavarian prosecutor will have anything to say about it. "The Internet belongs to no one except its users." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: mpd@netcom.com (Mike Duvos) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 06:37:19 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Pi Stuff Message-ID: <199601052115.NAA17798@netcom17.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Various amazed people on the Pi thread wrote: > But BTW, isn't it interesting, that news item from a few > weeks ago, on an algorithm for determining individual bits > in Pi, regardless of whether you've calculated all the > previous ones. Only problem is, it only works in > hexadecimal (and, obviously, binary, etc, not decimal. > I didn't see this result you mention, but it surprises me. > Yeah, well, I understand your frustration, but to me the > really amazing part is that the elephant flies at all, and > not how well he flies () (In other words, the amazing > thing is that there is a predictable relationship in ANY > base system) Chances are the thing WON'T work in base > 3,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, and any other non 2**n base. > Or, at least, it will take a DIFFERENT equation to work in > those other bases, if they work at all. A few quick comments. The notion that one might be able to compute digits of Pi efficiently at any starting point in the number is not late-breaking news. The Chudnovsky brothers developed a formula which permitted them to do this a number of years ago, and used it to compute Pi to several billion digits. Prior to that time, the Borweins' quartic interation based on Ramanujan's modular identities and AGM techniques was the existing state of the art. Given a base, d, and an finite ordinal, i, the function which computes the ith digit of the Pi in the base d is certainly a computable one. If we can find an algorithm for computing this function whose time as a function of "i" does not include the time required to compute all previous digits, then we are to a certain extent evaluating individual digits of Pi without calculating the previous ones. One should keep in mind, however, that the degree to which such things are true for algorithms lies on a continuum, with a near-constant number of arithmetic operations at one end, and a geometric progression at the other. So it is not the classic either/or situation. Good algorithms whose times are tractable functions of "i" are certainly desirable, and have been discovered. Someone suggested that radix conversion was a time-consuming operation. Modern FFT-based algorithms can do multiplication, division, Nth root, reciprocal, and base conversion in near-linear time. Doubtless good algorithms to compute the Nth digit of Pi in any base do exist, but their form may not be as obvious as those for trivial bases, such as powers of two. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd@netcom.com $ via Finger. $ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Raph Levien Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 07:04:07 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: An open letter to Commtouch Message-ID: <199601052139.NAA20363@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Hi Commtouch people, I am intrigued and hopeful about your secure e-mail product, Pronto Secure. However, I am puzzled about its support for POTP encryption. The other encryption protocols (PGP, PEM, MOSS, and S/MIME) have all been reviewed carefully by outside experts, and there is general consensus that these protocols embody state-of-the-art cryptographic technology, and that there are no known major security flaws. POTP stands out on your list because such a review has not been carried out. In fact, grave doubts have been raised regarding its security, and (to my taste, anyway) not satisfactorily answered. I do not wish to raise those points here, nor do I wish to claim here that POTP is insecure. However, I believe the reputation of your product is drawn into question by association. Should POTP be definitively demonstrated to be weak, then it would not be the case that using your product according to the instructions would provide "security." Further, I would consider it slightly misleading to describe it as "mission-critical." I feel the situation is analogous to that of a hypothetical networking company claiming that their product delivers high bandwidth by offering the choice of ATM, Myrinet, 100Mbps Ethernet, or string and tin cans. That said, I applaud your multiprotocol approach in general. In fact, I feel it is the future of Internet security tools. I hope your product gains widespread acceptance, and helps to further the cause of deployment of strong crypto. Raph Levien From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Kevin L Prigge Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:30:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Scaling Web-of-Trust Message-ID: <30ed7ecd005b002@noc.cis.umn.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sorry for the noise, someone had emailed a while ago with the URL for a paper on scaling the web of trust for PGP, and I've lost the email. If whomever it was could resend the information, I'd be most appreciative. Thanks. -- Kevin L. Prigge |"Have you ever gotten tired of hearing those UofM Central Computing | ridiculous AT&T commercials claiming credit email: klp@tc.umn.edu | for things that don't even exist yet? 010010011101011001100010| You will." -Emmanuel Goldstein From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Gordon Campbell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 03:11:14 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Compuserve grovels to foreign censors Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105184756.00681e94@limestone.kosone.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 12:56 AM 1/5/96 -0500, Larry Sudduth wrote: >Attachment Converted: C:\WORK\WINMAIL.DAT What, pray tell, is this? ----- Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics P.O. Box 1902, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 5J7 Ph: (613) 542-4087 Fax: (613) 542-1139 2048-bit PGP key available on request. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brian Davis Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:20:03 +0800 To: John Young Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book In-Reply-To: <199601032306.SAA07090@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, John Young wrote: > Jonathan Littman, an investigative reporter, has published > "The Fugitive Game: Online With Kevin Mitnick," Little > Brown, 1996. 381 pp. $23.95. ISBN 0-316-52858-7. > > It is a dramatic recount of Mitnick's exploits; the pursuit > > Littman ends with this letter from Markoff and Shimomura: > > October 8, 1995 > Jonathan Littman > 38 Miller Avenue Suite 122 > Mill Valley, California 94941 > > Dear Jonathan, > > Tsutomu's decision to tell John Markoff that he was > travelling to Raleigh on Sunday morning was done without > contact with any law enforcement agency. Markoff flew to > Raleigh independently six hours later after discussing the > possibility of a story with his editors at the New York > Times. Markoff did not at any time assist or participate in > any aspect of the investigation into Kevin Mitnick's > activities; Markoff was there only as an observer in his > role as a newspaper reporter. > > Tsutomu never told anyone from law enforcement that anyone > had authorized or cleared Markoff's presence in Raleigh. > FWIW: When Markoff showed up with Tsutomu, the FBI agents "assumed" that he was there with Tsutomu as a fellow researcher/grad student/assistant/whatever. They had no idea (initially) that he was with the media. ... From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:21:14 +0800 To: Gordon Campbell MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 01:47 PM 1/5/96 -0500, Gordon Campbell wrote: >At 12:56 AM 1/5/96 -0500, Larry Sudduth wrote: > >>Attachment Converted: C:\WORK\WINMAIL.DAT > >What, pray tell, is this? > When a MS Mail attachment wanders around the world, it is accompanied by a data file of some kind. That is winmail.dat. So every MS MAIL attachment is really two attachments. Try to ignore it. DCF "Windoz. It may not be an operating system but at least it's out there on the hardware." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:49:59 +0800 To: Brian Davis Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105200208.006a8900@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 02:36 PM 1/5/96 -0500, Brian Davis wrote: >FWIW: When Markoff showed up with Tsutomu, the FBI agents "assumed" that >he was there with Tsutomu as a fellow researcher/grad >student/assistant/whatever. > >They had no idea (initially) that he was with the media. > >... > I take it that you were in the vicinity? Or is this just what you've heard? Any more iside tidbits on the bust? DCF From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brian Davis Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 04:50:59 +0800 To: Duncan Frissell Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960105200208.006a8900@panix.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > At 02:36 PM 1/5/96 -0500, Brian Davis wrote: > >FWIW: When Markoff showed up with Tsutomu, the FBI agents "assumed" that > >he was there with Tsutomu as a fellow researcher/grad > >student/assistant/whatever. > > > >They had no idea (initially) that he was with the media. > > > >... > > > > I take it that you were in the vicinity? Or is this just what you've heard? > Any more iside tidbits on the bust? > I spoke to one of the case agents who was in on the bust while at a Computer Crime Conference at Quantico. I don't recall any other tidbits at the moment, but I'll think about it again. They were fairly closemouthed about the whole thing because it was reasonably soon after the arrest and the case was just getting going (that is, the "case" in court, not the "matter" under investigation -- U.S. Attorney-speak). EBD > DCF > > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Ng Pheng Siong Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 23:34:14 +0800 To: "David K. Merriman" Subject: Re: Windows Eudora and PGP In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960104183919.00677094@arn.net> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, David K. Merriman wrote: > I've gotten ahold of the WPGP mentioned here a couple days ago, and it seems > to be working just fine, for me. Even easier to use than PIdaho, though not > quite as 'full-featured' (ie, remailer support, etc). Aegis, which was mentioned on this list some months ago, is the best of the lot, IMHO. No remailer support: You can talk to a remailer from an email program. ;) - PS -- Ng Pheng Siong NetCentre Pte Ltd * Singapore Finger for PGP key. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Duncan Frissell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 05:16:20 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Idiot's Guide to News via Compuserve Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960105203138.006a306c@panix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Idiots Guide to Reading Banned Newsgroups via CompuServe CompuServe (alone among the Big Three) gives all subscribers a PPP connection to the Net through any CIS node (including those in Germany). This is a real Net connection that makes it possible to use CIS to fully access all the Net's resources including "banned" newsgroups. A Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) connection makes your computer just another machine on the Net for the time you are connected. Anything that any Net-connected machine can do, you can do. The CompuServe Dialer (formerly CompuServe Internet Dialer) software that has been included with WINCIM at least since version 1.4 gives you a PPP connection but you need additional newsreading software to dodge CompuServe restrictions. So for real beginners, here is how you can use your CompuServe account to access banned newsgroups as well as the rest of the Internet. These instructions are for Windows users. MAC users can do the same things but I don't know the available MAC software. 1) Get the latest copy of WINCIM. GO WINCIM (hit Ctrl-G and type WINCIM in the dialog box) from within CIS. Download is free. Install it according to the instructions and make sure that you can log on to CIS. 2) Next, let's get a copy of Freeagent which is a free usenet newsreader which works with CompuServe's own Internet connection software. Log on to CIS. GO FTP or: Click the Internet icon, click the File Downloads (FTP) icon and proceed to the main FTP screen. Click the Access a Specific Site button. 3) Enter ftp.forteinc.com in the Site Name box and /pub/free_agent in the Directory box. Click OK and you should see some site login information. Click OK again and you should see a check box next to the file name fagent10.zip. Click the check box and then click the Retrieve button. Wincim will show you that it will save the file in the Compuserv\download directory on your hard drive. (Remember where it's going.) 744279 bytes later, you will have a copy of Freeagent. 4) Move the file fagent.zip into a directory by itself (C:\AGENT for example). Unzip it with Pkunzip or one of the many zip utilities available on CIS. 5) What you are going to do is to connect directly to the Internet via CompuServe and read usenet newsgroups using Freeagent. In order to do that, you will need to find a site somewhere on the Net that will let you read Usenet News for free or you will have to obtain an account on another Internet-connected machine. 6) Community ConneXion (c2.org) will give a month of free service to CompuServe members suffering from censorship. For information send email to uncensored@c2.org. After your free month, c2.org costs only $7.50 a month for accounts accessed via the Internet. 7) There are some news servers out there that are open to the public. A news server is just a machine connected to the Internet that stores and forwards Usenet news. The IP addresses of two of the open news servers are 198.70.185.5 and 205.139.39.1. Once you become a sophisticated user of the nets, you can use your Web Browser to pick up a longer list of open news servers at http://dana.ucc.nau.edu/~jwa/open-sites.html. 8) Now back to Free Agent to grab those banned newsgroups. In your WINCIM directory (maybe in a subdirectory called \cid), click cid.exe to start CompuServe (Internet) Dialer or find the phone-shaped dialer icon in your CompuServe group window. Inside the Dialer, hit dial to log on to the Internet. 9) Start Free Agent. Click Accept to accept the license agreement. It will prompt you to enter various information including the address of the news server you want to use, your email address, and other info. All that you have to enter is the address of a news server. In the box labeled "News (NNTP) Server:" enter one of the IP addresses of open news servers (198.70.185.5, 205.139.39.1, or another from the list) or the address of the news server of a system you've opened an account on (news.c2.org, for example). 10) Freeagent will ask you if it's OK to retrieve a list of news groups from the server. Click Yes. Free agent will then tell you that it is Retrieving complete List of Groups. Once that's finished you'll be ready to read all the newsgroups you want and neither CompuServe nor the Bavarian prosecutor will have anything to say about it. "The Internet belongs to no one except its users." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: geoff klein Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 22:14:02 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Fw: Re: [NOISE] Trying to init security channel Message-ID: <9601051337.AA26973@commtouch.co.il> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On 4 Jan 1996 19:40:39 futplex posted the message included below: 1. My apologies to all for the original accidental posting to this list. 2. futplex: "Another satisfied "Power One Time Pad" user, it would appear...." Things are not always quite the way they appear, Commtouch are the developers of Pronto Secure, - a pretty good Windows e-mail client providing security services using PGP (or POTP). Lookout for a beta release announcement in early February. Geoff Klein Product Manager - Pronto Secure http://www.commtouch.com *Welcome to the post of Cypherpunk censor - Now Go Home & change your sig.* -----Begin Included Message ----- Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 19:40:39 -0500 (EST) From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Cc: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 4 Jan 96 13:11:36 IST > From: geoff klein > To: cypherpunks@toad.com > Subject: Trying to init security channel > X-Potpinitrequest: AwAAAAAAAADhi+swAQAAAPqPQh4AACoAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAARjMwMzBGRjI yMTFENTBEMABnZW9mZkBjb21tdG91Y2guY28uaWwAY3lwaGVycHVua3NAdG9hZC5jb20A Another satisfied "Power One Time Pad" user, it would appear.... > > This message was sent by Pronto Secure Mail. > Without Pronto you can not establish a secure channel. > > Please send a reply manually. Futplex *** Welcome to Cypherpunks -- Now Go Home *** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMOxzMinaAKQPVHDZAQGcIwf+KYlU8PiutVTduMG2Jxt7KDsEhDvjjiDi p+kBKw0y2Tj+Z/LGoCTSu2egMxFf9L9mWg8ulNCXPu92Bg1PWNPFJpTeXYcQfHnz fQfQlbnixwo1gU1DW0AVpeq5iIdBwOOqh2TEa5m7LQXiCU3RDS0Q0+muDzvncykC UkF+uzPvxrZW88LFnxSmYez3o/Xj0V39gvKANkZvqOotm90g5bYb6TY8qCUFfSUh hNPPA1irtYc96a73WXRYciW4T1H8cfsmmlwMxbCbILer6MPH+2CZMD1DP5eIu0cd 4vvN6n3pPgBs7YAp4RANf6HKHZpJwB/MG+TOt2ngolsPt5JFvrUKuQ== =wXVD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . ---- End of forwarded message ---- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: lmccarth@cs.umass.edu Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 05:40:55 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: Idiot's Guide to News via Compuserve In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960105203138.006a306c@panix.com> Message-ID: <199601052055.PAA24269@opine.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Duncan Frissell writes: > Idiots Guide to Reading Banned Newsgroups via CompuServe [...] I have just put an HTMLized version of the full text on my web pages at http://www.cs.umass.edu/~lmccarth/cypherpunks/banned.html Feel free to distribute this URL widely. Please send any comments on the HTMLizing etc. to me; comments on the content of the guide to Duncan. Lewis McCarthy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMO2QI2f7YYibNzjpAQF1pgQAyNnUHYiNQunBRdwW81oDNbfV1ybvxZeK yiUHrB8dz+vF3O09Kh2xBEyyBv+ly7nrRD1Ki/tY2DlRHUY7kLWe6Cl5jbvluMIv SdltRmAjLspP13LlgY7r43n+ymk+4qQCFumYVBPN+7NprFc2zMiSDtZNQpLUeLjX oNHaHYUNa+c= =m9ul -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 14:23:23 +0800 To: mpd@netcom.com (Mike Duvos) Subject: Re: Pi Stuff Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:15 PM 1/5/96 -0800, you wrote: >Various amazed people on the Pi thread wrote: > > > But BTW, isn't it interesting, that news item from a few > > weeks ago, on an algorithm for determining individual bits > > in Pi, regardless of whether you've calculated all the > > previous ones. Only problem is, it only works in > > hexadecimal (and, obviously, binary, etc, not decimal. >A few quick comments. The notion that one might be able to >compute digits of Pi efficiently at any starting point in the >number is not late-breaking news. The Chudnovsky brothers >developed a formula which permitted them to do this a number of >years ago, and used it to compute Pi to several billion digits. While I'm not an expert at this, I think you're misrepresented the Chudnovsky result. They formulated an equation that allowed "you" to continue the calculation past "N" digits as long as you had the result that far. As far as I know, they DID NOT generate any formula for the generation of isolated digits of pi, the more recent news. I'm signing this message after having turned off word-wrap in Eudora. I'm told this my help my clearsigning process. Could somebody verify this? - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAi1zvWcAAAEEAKmSqngLWK2N2gOJKPtjF9VCfSkXY+XUZBRCbbFU71uH/dLX C2Uq6wFS8alRgMc3rp90JnnJ/6eJqXwMjCunogwucWOaU7S/w+OwjOG9fUqsXIA6 2j25Wtjce65mbp0TKLAzwMb/P/Qq7BlclqhuKzfVBH7dIHnVAvqHVDBboB2dAAUR tBFKYW1lcyBEYWx0b24gQmVsbA== =G3LA - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMO3ArPqHVDBboB2dAQFXfQP+OhdkTw+3TFF4x97Or4hBRGSCd015+ZfJ 1wTov5MuKgfHlVEqml02mi3RJQSD1WYryysMkcQKrGS+X6IULolxtasKrXEUBw5P fIiEAc+ueY68XZULGTL0IpsUDhUYXTWRaP9l64iELrdtmvtDQAd0zxfGDAoeyhvO goZCWxWXUqs= =ZGyP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 08:32:18 +0800 To: Subject: Re: More Noise Sphere Noise (simple source code) Message-ID: <199601051644.LAA01347@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Fri, 05 Jan 96 07:24:03, I wrote: >Ok, no language holy wars. This was quickie to test out >the Noise Sphere plotting. It's in Pascal, but it's >understandable. >{ Simple demo of a Noise Sphere in Turbo Pascal } >{ (If only I had a really awful RNG to test it with...) } Odd... That came through on the mail/news gateway but the preceeding article that explains what that was about didn't.... did anyone receive it? In case no, it's based on Clifford A. Pickover's paper "Random Number Generators: Pretty Good Ones are Easy to Find" which doesn't deal with useful RNGs for crypto sense, but the paper does explain ways to visually represent RNGs so that seemingly good RNGs show their awful correlations, etc. My previous post that should have showed up mentioned that these methods might be useful for checking out crypto functions (hashes, pRNGs, ciphers). The full reference is The Visual Computer (1995) 11:369-377, Springer Verlag, 1995. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 06:57:56 +0800 To: Tony Iannotti Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 13:55 1/4/96, Tony Iannotti wrote: >On Thu, 4 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: > >> Yes it would require that the Node be checked in the Software. What I was >> responding to was a claim that there is no way of telling where I am >> connecting from (which I disproved). As to calling a non-German Node, that >> is always an option. > >Yes, I agree. I think the real difference is that they really cannot tell >where you are calling from, even though they know where you are >connecting. Since the German Government (or the local "DA" who is claiming to represent the National Government ) is talking about delivery of banned items in Germany, I think that the relevant location is the node that is being used not where the other end of the call to that node is located. What is being requested is that CIS refrain for delivering the stuff to the Nodes in Germany (they are not being told to monitor someone in Germany who is trying to get it by calling LD to a node in France (or the US for that matter). From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Marc J. Wohler" Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 07:05:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: No Subject Message-ID: <199601052142.NAA22262@ix6.ix.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anyone know of the staus of the Phil Zimmermann Grand Jury investagation? Is there a Statuate of Limitations or what? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMO2XK2eikzgqLB7pAQE6wgQAg7bs/b9qkayCQSUz8Ql8vcVNF74cSAl+ TRs/HQWA8g99x5j0Boircf7kpO8LR8orFkHdsSApYWCOCTDTHpiQNmcLYcSbTiFn td3cJsponuKLa0qTjRpo3e+yIo8ebDC1tCrJaFXTZD8hHGLchr+rz8CLJR8R7pLS LxYr3TFMM3s= =x1Al -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ***Preserve, Protect and Defend the private use of Strong Crypto*** * * * PGP for the masses * * * Finger mjwohler@netcom.com for Marc Wohler's public key fingerprint= F1 70 23 13 91 B5 10 63 0F CF 33 AD BE E6 7B B6 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 08:54:30 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP In-Reply-To: <199601051026.VAA20257@sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au> Message-ID: <199601052219.RAA24875@opine.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jiri Baum writes: > This is not really the case. The way PGP is set up, the operations > that take a long time are those that involve the secret key - signing > and decrypting. Encrypting and checking signatures are much quicker. > > In other words, the person that chooses the key is the one that'll > be most delayed. > > (I think it's something to do with the relative sizes of the exponents.) Right. We can (generally) make a "small" choice of the public exponent e, with a corresponding "large" choice of the private exponent d, rather than having them both "medium-sized". A "small" choice of d, however, would be easy to guess, which is a Bad Thing (tm). Futplex *** Welcome to Cypherpunks -- Now Go Home *** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO2jkinaAKQPVHDZAQF7BAf/XrZ+abVfAw2Vle/8yomUZkC1Ol35g2yf gx6QKEkPDwEhw2B1qUJPA0veJmU4wGoXO5dOjsDkUtPtCU4StBVu2Axo2Hf1cknz raBWi/htN7xxKdeZ9+xiYduN3QQxwAhot8yTuaXqwswgjDwWjS4JJvfMG49lEqEN PGVHbYHKYlIumjzgLE5TbQ58EkNWmOw/BqojniTDyf98+5tZz0t2gx+ezLMG1S9C b12uCrw+EMmS7JDM+197xP+7JenXJUL41REVUAOVlcKh4TBLVFkRtzWa8Bt6vbPk A7XiFKE9PdjzaOOUo1M2lI8ocz5nq7PysghSt8UzBGDDvUmIWd+0RQ== =h4Li -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jiri Baum Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 14:41:30 +0800 To: cman@communities.com (Douglas Barnes) Subject: Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601050621.RAA19851@sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Duncan Frissell and cman@communities.com (Douglas Barnes) and cypherpunks@toad.com ... > A quote from Star Wars (which I'm just now incorporating into my .sig) ... > ------ , ------ > Douglas Barnes "The tighter you close your fist, Governor Tarkin, > cman@communities.com the more systems will slip through your fingers." > cman@best.com --Princess Leia Perhaps not the most comforting quote you could have used... If I remember my Star Wars correctly, Tarkin's reply consisted largely of blasting Alderaan out of existence. Jiri - -- If you want an answer, please mail to . On sweeney, I may delete without reading! PGP 463A14D5 (but it's at home so it'll take a day or two) PGP EF0607F9 (but it's at uni so don't rely on it too much) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMOzDRyxV6mvvBgf5AQGwzAP/RSujB74fLHKzgTQOISNzEWBhZwzL4jrV sS0B/K32osfy911ahWuUeq7RO5s4WDum4+8ptC65IQDwmZ4xEYz+lNANb5I2MKso 4ICZjeKi5Mfb/vzI0RnGxhTGPQsrlvs32qXtE066hw7QibjAY3wRC08OFsqullR9 oL6RPrfgVCQ= =uMhK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Steve14571@aol.com Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 07:33:34 +0800 To: dreschs@austnsc.tandem.com Subject: Re: FreeBSD user Message-ID: <960105181333_32916749@mail02.mail.aol.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In a message dated 96-01-04 18:44:46 EST, you write: > Am I the only one who has received three unreadable >messages from this address on cypherpunks? No, I have them too... What is going on? Pvt Stephen Herbert United States Marine Corps From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Greg Rose Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 15:34:38 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Representations of Pi, etc. In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 3:19 AM 1/5/96, jim bell wrote: >But BTW, isn't it interesting, that news item from a few weeks ago, on an >algorithm for determining individual bits in Pi, regardless of whether >you've calculated all the previous ones. Only problem is, it only works in >hexadecimal (and, obviously, binary, etc, not decimal. ^^^^^^^^^^^ ??? I didn't see this result you mention, but it surprises me. The part about how it works in some bases, but not in decimal. I assume it really works only in binary, and hexadecimal follows, not the other way around. The "hand-waving" (motivational/informal) explanation for why I am surprised is that "Nature doesn't care about bipeds with 10 digits vs. bipeds, or whatever, with 2 digits or 16 digits." That is, results applicable in base 16, hexadecimal, should be easily applicable in base 10. Sorry, but it is quite possible for this to be the case. (I don't know for sure whether this is one of them or not, though, having not seen the result myself.) But assume for the moment that the formula, or algorithm, or whatever it is, really does tell you exactly the value of a contiguous chunk of "bits", real honest-to-god binary digits. You cannot translate these to a decimal representation without knowing all of the bits leading up to them. For example, you know the last four bits of an eight bit string: XXXX0011 In Hex the last digit is 3. But what is the last digit in decimal? If the 'X's are all 0, it is 3, but if the last X is a 1 (making the number 00010011 = 19), it is not 3 but 9. If only the first X is a one, it is 1. There are plenty of places in information theory where a log base 2 shows up, so I don't doubt that there might be an algorithm for determining a particular "bit" of Pi. But just to prove I have a more concrete example, suppose you have an encrypted bank transfer, with the numbers expressed in binary. Further suppose you know it is encrypted with a one-time-pad (just to be contraversial) where you know a particular n-bit chunk of the pad. Given this you can recover the corresponding n-bit chunk of the amount, but unless this spans the entire number you can't express this unambiguously in decimal digits. This is a simple consequence of the fact that log(2) and log(10) are not integer multiples of each other (you know what I mean). The same goes the other way, of course. Given a string of decimal digits extracted from the middle of a number, I can't unambiguously decide what string of bits these would become without knowing the rest of the number. The result is fascinating, assuming it is real. Greg. Greg Rose INTERNET: greg_rose@sydney.sterling.com Sterling Software VOICE: +61-2-9975 4777 FAX: +61-2-9975 2921 28 Rodborough Rd. http://www.sydney.sterling.com:8080/~ggr/ French's Forest 35 0A 79 7D 5E 21 8D 47 E3 53 75 66 AC FB D9 45 NSW 2086 Australia. co-mod sci.crypt.research, USENIX Director. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 07:53:52 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: New Mitnick Book Message-ID: <199601052331.SAA07024@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Responding to msg by bdavis@thepoint.net (Brian Davis) on Fri, 5 Jan 3:4 PM Here's Littman on what the Feds knew about Markoff at Raleigh (Orsak and Murphy are with Sprint Cellular; Kent Walker was US Attorney in San Francisco): Monday afternoon, Special Agent LeVord Burns sits by the coffee pot and vending machine at the Sprint switch and debates the legal issues with Shimomura. "Tsutomu wanted us to kick his door down," recalls Orsak, who along with Murphy, listened in. "Burns was talking about what warrants had been issued, what the FBI was going to do." Burns impresses Orsak. A well-built, bespectacled black man in a suit and tie, Burns looks like the kind of FBI agent that doesn't miss details. As Burns recounts Mitnick's background, Orsak is surprised by what the agent says about Mitnick. "Burns said there were a lot of guys that as far as national security went were a lot more dangerous than Mitnick -- that a lot of professional hackers are a lot more dangerous." To Orsak, cyberspace's Most Wanted Hacker doesn't sound all that threatening. "One of the more interesting things, I thought, was the FBI goes, 'As far as hackers go,' Mitnick was 'benign.' They didn't have evidence he was in it for the money." A little later, John Markoff and Shimomura's girlfriend, Julia Menapace, who just flew in, arrive at the switch. Orsak and Murphy invite Shimomura's team, Burns, and two other FBI agents from Quantico, Virginia, out to Ragazzi's, a casual Italian restaurant nearby. Orsak spreads out a Raleigh street plan on the checkered tablecloth and pinpoints Mitnick's location. "LeVord was telling us what his involvement was for the FBI," recalls Murphy. "It was light banter. LeVord assumed like we all did, that Markoff was just another guy out of California. Just another egghead. One of Tsutomu's." Markoff gets everyone's ear when he mentions Mitnick inspired the hit movie WarGames. "Markoff was filling us in on Mitnick's typical behavior, the different people Mitnick had run-ins with," recalls Murphy. "A guy in England, a guy in Princeton, one at Digital." Then, Markoff runs through some of Mitnick's aliases. One of the phony names rings a bell with Murphy. After dinner, the whole crew heads back to the switch, and just as Murphy suspected, he finds a memo describing a recent attempt by someone using the alias to social engineer a new bunch of MINs. Meanwhile, the FBI is bumping up against a technical problem. The agents had planned to install the FBI's own bulky scanning equipment in a rental van, but they can't find one. Murphy suggests using his co-worker Fred's minivan. Burns gives the idea the green light, and Orsak helps the agents set up and calibrate their equipment in Fred's van. Around midnight, Fred chauffeurs the two agents to circle the cell site to calibrate their scanning equipment. Fred and the FBI agents get to talking. "He [Fred] let the cat out of the bag," confides Murphy. "We didn't tell him not to say anything. We weren't trying to hide it, but we were also not trying to convey it. He told them Markoff wrote a book on this guy." The boys from Quantico aren't happy. "They freaked," recalls Murphy. "They thought Markoff would tip the guy [Mitnick] so he could write another book." One of the Quantico agents phones the Sprint switch to confirm Markoff's identity. "Me, Markoff, Tsutomu, and Julia were at the switch," remembers Murphy. "One of the Quantico guys was on the phone. He wanted to talk to Tsutomu." Murphy passes the phone to Shimomura. "He [Shimomura] wasn't about to lie," says Murphy of the tense moment. "He [Shimomura] was trying to evade a little bit. He said that Kent Walker knew about Markoff being there, which of course Walker did." Murphy, Markoff, and Menapace listen to Shimomura. "Kent knows about it," insists Shimomura to the agent from Quantico. "He's cleared through Kent." But Kent Walker later denied ever giving Shimomura such approval or knowing John Markoff was in Raleigh. Shimomura later disputed Murphy's account and said he "never told anyone from law enforcement that anyone had authorized Markoff's presence in Raleigh." (pp. 357-58) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jiri Baum Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 16:02:43 +0800 To: groundfog@alpha.c2.org Subject: Re: For the New Year: A Symbol for Information Freedom In-Reply-To: <199601010311.WAA12624@mail.FOUR.net> Message-ID: <199601050739.SAA19965@sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello groundfog@alpha.c2.org and cypherpunks@toad.com > In talk.politics.crypto, ptupper@direct.ca (Peter Tupper) wrote: > > A Symbol for Information Freedom ... > > The symbol I have chosen is the paper clip. ... If you want to put one on your web page but can't be bothered drawing it, I've got one at http://www.cs.monash.edu.au/~jirib Take care! Adiau - Jiri - -- If you want an answer, please mail to . On sweeney, I may delete without reading! PGP 463A14D5 (but it's at home so it'll take a day or two) PGP EF0607F9 (but it's at uni so don't rely on it too much) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMOzVsyxV6mvvBgf5AQFZqwP/Yj/Gb0W5YqgTbHu99zPxOpyAFa7UC4NY M7SCo8DSbnHsb13gT78Rm34irQtmzW5B9wJ97L+FeTFRBmqe8CX9dghjSDwNHdW/ yKKpnu9HtYXWkb6bNPbfDEexPq4Qs1q5DIukeGVIDeedOMQwUtOlsoLNVnyHExvV zzYYPKPzjjY= =RW1K -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Adam Shostack Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 08:18:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Mixmaster In a Box Message-ID: <199601060006.TAA20848@homeport.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Towords the goal of making Mixmasters in a box, I've written an installer script for mixmaster. If you're running on one of the supported platforms (alpha, bsdi, hpux, linux, sunos, solaris), the script will walk you through everything from the make to setting up cron jobs & /etc/aliases. If you've been putting off setting up a remailer because its a pain, give this a shot. Lance will probably be including it in the next release of mixmaster, but you can get it now by sending me a message with the Subject: get mix-installer. Comments, bugs, bug fixes are welcome. Thanks to Rich $alz for a extensive comments & suggestions for portability. Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 10:21:24 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Big Bill: "You will be assimilated" Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 7:37 PM 1/5/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >At 01:47 PM 1/5/96 -0500, Gordon Campbell wrote: >>At 12:56 AM 1/5/96 -0500, Larry Sudduth wrote: >> >>>Attachment Converted: C:\WORK\WINMAIL.DAT >> >>What, pray tell, is this? >> > >When a MS Mail attachment wanders around the world, it is accompanied by a >data file of some kind. That is winmail.dat. So every MS MAIL attachment >is really two attachments. Try to ignore it. You know, between Microsoft Mail, Microsoft Exchange, and other weirdnesses associated with Microsoft, it's almost as if Big Bill (the guy in Washington, but not D.C.) is trying to tell us be assimilated or face continued pseudo-spamming. (No insult to Microsoft intended, but other companies seem to understand it is up to them to make efforts to comply with conventional Internet standards, while MS seems to relish doing things its own way, the rest of us be damned.) I hate the thought of putting all Microsoft domain addresses in my kill file, but at least it solves the problem. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 10:39:41 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: get mix-installer. (fwd) Message-ID: <199601060223.UAA04181@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: > From adam@lighthouse.homeport.org Fri Jan 5 19:52:45 1996 > Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 20:55:25 -0500 > From: Adam Shostack > Message-Id: <199601060155.UAA21106@homeport.org> > To: ravage@ssz.com > Subject: Re: get mix-installer. > References: <199601060152.TAA04065@einstein.ssz.com> > In-Reply-To: <199601060152.TAA04065@einstein.ssz.com> > Precedence: junk > > I followed the request information per the original posting by Adam and received this in reply. This leads me to believe that Mr. Shostack is basicaly unwilling to fulfill his own promises. My advice, avoid like the plague. Caviat emptor. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 10:39:34 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: get mix-installer. (fwd) Message-ID: <199601060224.UAA04211@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: >From adam@lighthouse.homeport.org Fri Jan 5 20:23:21 1996 From: Adam Shostack Message-Id: <199601060225.VAA21165@homeport.org> Subject: Re: get mix-installer. To: ravage@ssz.com (Jim Choate) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 21:25:59 -0500 (EST) In-Reply-To: <199601060152.TAA04065@einstein.ssz.com> from "Jim Choate" at Jan 5, 96 07:52:17 pm X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL24 ME8b] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 367 Jim Choate wrote: | I would like a copy to use in my consulting business as well as put on the | Austin Cypherpunks ftp site. Both are fine. I assume that a copy was auto mailed to you; let me know if there is a problem. May I ask who pays to get mixmasters installed? -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Aleph One Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 20:07:46 +0800 To: John Young Subject: Re: Crypto Rules Report In-Reply-To: <199601060141.UAA21362@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I'll be happy to provide an http site. On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, John Young wrote: > In response to the December Financial Times article > "Encryption Rules Coming," about an international > cryptography meeting in Paris, and our request for > additional information, we have received from nobody: > > Report of the Business-Government Forum on Global > Cryptogoraphy Policy > > Held on 19-20 December 1995 in Paris > > Detailed Report > > The report includes meeting background information, notes > on the speakers articulation of the positions of industry > and governments, and four annexes: > > 1. List of participants (EU, US, Japan -- biz and gov); > > 2. Statement of Eurobit-ITAC-ITI-JEIDA which sets out > 20 principles of global cryptographic policy; > > 3. Statement by the Infosec Business Advisory Group (IBAG) > on 17 principles of international cryptography; > > 4. The Mike Nelson Policy Problem (last point: "No one > trusts anyone.") > > > It would be great if someone would provide an FTP site. It > is about 31 kb. > > > > > > > > > Aleph One / aleph1@dfw.net http://underground.org/ KeyID 1024/948FD6B5 Fingerprint EE C9 E8 AA CB AF 09 61 8C 39 EA 47 A8 6A B8 01 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 10:57:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: get mix-installer. (fwd) Message-ID: <199601060231.UAA04264@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: > From adam@lighthouse.homeport.org Fri Jan 5 20:23:21 1996 > From: Adam Shostack > Message-Id: <199601060225.VAA21165@homeport.org> > Subject: Re: get mix-installer. > To: ravage@ssz.com (Jim Choate) > Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 21:25:59 -0500 (EST) > In-Reply-To: <199601060152.TAA04065@einstein.ssz.com> from "Jim Choate" at Jan 5, 96 07:52:17 pm > X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL24 ME8b] > Content-Type: text > Content-Length: 367 > > Jim Choate wrote: > > | I would like a copy to use in my consulting business as well as put on the > | Austin Cypherpunks ftp site. > > Both are fine. I assume that a copy was auto mailed to you; let me > know if there is a problem. > > > May I ask who pays to get mixmasters installed? > > -- > "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." > -Hume > In a earlier message I received from Adam I mistook his auto-remailers scripts responce as a refusal to supply the afformentioned code. I apoligize for my ignorance and retract any negative statements or implications that I may have made. In the last year I have had a couple of local business people and about a dozen individuals ask about remailers and using PGP. I currently have a couple of state political activists in the gun lobby who have begun using it for internal communications. I am hoping to have another machine installed in the next couple of weeks with mixmaster available. It is my intention to run a remailer here in Texas with the help of the local cpunks (I hope) in order to demonstrate what the technology is capable of. I see this script as a major advance in making the software more palatable to the general populace. My current business plan is to educate several international translaters I work with about the technology. They work with foreign patents being applied for here in the US and they typicaly must sign non-disclosure agreements to get the contracts. Such technology may be something they find useful. Jim Choate From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Aleph One Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 20:52:38 +0800 Subject: Re: Crypto Rules Report In-Reply-To: <199601060141.UAA21362@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sorry for the SPAM it was meant to go to John only. Typing to fast again.... Aleph One / aleph1@dfw.net http://underground.org/ KeyID 1024/948FD6B5 Fingerprint EE C9 E8 AA CB AF 09 61 8C 39 EA 47 A8 6A B8 01 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 20:10:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: get mix-installer. (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601060232.VAA09545@thor.cs.umass.edu> Message-ID: <199601060236.UAA04326@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Who the fuck elected you reputation monitor. You should chill. Please refrain from sending any more posts to me privately that are not directly crypto related. I have better things to do than listen to your rantings and raving. If Adam and I have a problem then we will work it out without! your involvment. Jim Choate > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Jim Choate writes: > > I followed the request information per the original posting by Adam and > > received this in reply. > > > > This leads me to believe that Mr. Shostack is basicaly unwilling to fulfill > > his own promises. My advice, avoid like the plague. > > > > Caviat emptor. > > Chill the fuck out (this obscenity brought to you by the U.S. Congress). > > Adam has already posted an earlier version of the script to the Mixmaster > mailing list. It's not vaporware. > > Besides, Adam has been around and contributing for quite a while. Smearing > his rather excellent c'punk reputation because of (probably) a malfunctioning > procmail recipe isn't terribly productive, or neighborly. > > Futplex > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQEVAwUBMO3fBinaAKQPVHDZAQE3PQf/WbzMM67+nvUKyHzoeuFzk0/OCL/CxAFR > 3BClrig/4CYZvEGLbaqZbhzjsQQ04Wgl39T4nntclU9TZpbvyvRPnat+rZuEl0xK > cefKyfMCGvU1Ia92MdXzTYZYM5/7DHjVKo+rMBbKHiolrEKsTTsP7oo4Cgju25OQ > ekPCqTyPeY+mO8e3pQd29h/oFJMte8hi8k9AJ88AhpEKlORETNx/mRYz17PtSHwF > yUg82YbYY1YLGKXRnUON+FIgmSQo9VeFK1VQouvmX+7JA5BDwdrbz731ZZd4nvpj > /JXK0zG5x2rkJgDmrNK4/HKEhnkS6lR/4NubojXFdJmv6UA+Cw++dQ== > =1xgH > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 10:22:20 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Crypto Rules Report Message-ID: <199601060141.UAA21362@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In response to the December Financial Times article "Encryption Rules Coming," about an international cryptography meeting in Paris, and our request for additional information, we have received from nobody: Report of the Business-Government Forum on Global Cryptogoraphy Policy Held on 19-20 December 1995 in Paris Detailed Report The report includes meeting background information, notes on the speakers articulation of the positions of industry and governments, and four annexes: 1. List of participants (EU, US, Japan -- biz and gov); 2. Statement of Eurobit-ITAC-ITI-JEIDA which sets out 20 principles of global cryptographic policy; 3. Statement by the Infosec Business Advisory Group (IBAG) on 17 principles of international cryptography; 4. The Mike Nelson Policy Problem (last point: "No one trusts anyone.") It would be great if someone would provide an FTP site. It is about 31 kb. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 10:20:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? Message-ID: <199601060155.UAA13574@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Jan 05, 1996 19:06:21, 'Adam Shostack ' wrote: > Towords the goal of making Mixmasters in a box, I've written >an installer script for mixmaster. If you're running on one of the >supported platforms (alpha, bsdi, hpux, linux, sunos, solaris), the >script will walk you through everything from the make to setting up >cron jobs & /etc/aliases. > > If you've been putting off setting up a remailer because its a >pain, give this a shot. Lance will probably be including it in the >next release of mixmaster, but you can get it now by sending me a >message with the Subject: get mix-installer. > > Comments, bugs, bug fixes are welcome. Thanks to Rich $alz >for a extensive comments & suggestions for portability. > >Adam > I've reports that the latest version of SyQuest's external parallel port EZ135 "floppy" drive is due on the shelves this month. Also reported is the ability to effectively boot off the thing, and thus run whatever OS resides on the SyQuest "floppy" rather than an OS that has to be on the host's hard drive partition. Weight, under two pounds. Price ~$US250. Capacity 135 Mb formatted. Price of spare disks: $US 20. Take it off a computer. Put it in a briefcase. Carry it with you nicely out of public view. Hook it up to another machine and .... Question 1: Can you fit linux, pgp, mixmaster, etc. on the 135 Mb disk and have enough useful space left over for a useful amount of data? Question 2: Anybody want to speculate on what traffic analysis is like when encrypted data comes INTO one known Mixmaster site but goes OUT on one or more "unknown" or (partially) random Mixmaster sites? Question 3: Anyone want to speculate on what data recovery is like when encrypted data and the horse it rode in (and out) on has all been physically destroyed at a replacement cost of only $US20? -- -- tallpaul -- "If they think you're crude, go technical; if they think you're technical, go crude." William Gibson "Johnny Mnemonic" From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: mpd@netcom.com (Mike Duvos) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 13:52:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Pi Stuff In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601060513.VAA12559@netcom21.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain jim bell writes: > While I'm not an expert at this, I think you're > misrepresented the Chudnovsky result. They formulated an > equation that allowed "you" to continue the calculation > past "N" digits as long as you had the result that far. That property would be possessed by any self-correcting iteration which converged in a neighborhood of Pi. It would not be necessary to repeat ones earlier calculations at increased precision in order to determine Pi to additional digits. One could just use the previous calculations as a starting point and continue to iterate, doing the new calculations to extended precision. I believe the Chudnovskys proved a much stronger result than this, although precisely what it was escapes me at the moment. [Please hum the theme to "Final Jeopardy" while I look up Chudnovsky's formula] Good - it's in the sci.math FAQ. Set k_1 = 545140134 k_2 = 13591409 k_3 = 640320 k_4 = 100100025 k_5 = 327843840 k_6 = 53360; Then pi = (k_6 sqrt(k_3))/(S), where S = sum_(n = 0)^oo (-1)^n ((6n)!(k_2 +nk_1))/(n!^3(3n)!(8k_4k_5)^n) This converges linearly at about 14 digits a term, and carries forward a sufficiently small amount of state that one can iterate into the billions of digits without the CPU requirements becoming painful. So it basically functions as a digit generator for Pi, which, when appropriately initialized, will work on any part of the number and emit the appropriate output. The denominator simplifies in a special way which keeps the computation localized to a small neighborhood of the place where the new digits are appearing. > As far as I know, they DID NOT generate any formula for the > generation of isolated digits of pi, the more recent news. I guess you're right about it not having the specific form of a function which takes "i" as input and emits the "ith" bit. Nonetheless, the discovery of this particular formula and the way in which its computational requirements expand tastefully with increasing numbers of digits hints strongly at the existence of the aforementioned closed solution. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd@netcom.com $ via Finger. $ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 11:05:58 +0800 To: ravage@ssz.com (Jim Choate) Subject: Re: get mix-installer. (fwd) In-Reply-To: <199601060223.UAA04181@einstein.ssz.com> Message-ID: <199601060232.VAA09545@thor.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jim Choate writes: > I followed the request information per the original posting by Adam and > received this in reply. > > This leads me to believe that Mr. Shostack is basicaly unwilling to fulfill > his own promises. My advice, avoid like the plague. > > Caviat emptor. Chill the fuck out (this obscenity brought to you by the U.S. Congress). Adam has already posted an earlier version of the script to the Mixmaster mailing list. It's not vaporware. Besides, Adam has been around and contributing for quite a while. Smearing his rather excellent c'punk reputation because of (probably) a malfunctioning procmail recipe isn't terribly productive, or neighborly. Futplex -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO3fBinaAKQPVHDZAQE3PQf/WbzMM67+nvUKyHzoeuFzk0/OCL/CxAFR 3BClrig/4CYZvEGLbaqZbhzjsQQ04Wgl39T4nntclU9TZpbvyvRPnat+rZuEl0xK cefKyfMCGvU1Ia92MdXzTYZYM5/7DHjVKo+rMBbKHiolrEKsTTsP7oo4Cgju25OQ ekPCqTyPeY+mO8e3pQd29h/oFJMte8hi8k9AJ88AhpEKlORETNx/mRYz17PtSHwF yUg82YbYY1YLGKXRnUON+FIgmSQo9VeFK1VQouvmX+7JA5BDwdrbz731ZZd4nvpj /JXK0zG5x2rkJgDmrNK4/HKEhnkS6lR/4NubojXFdJmv6UA+Cw++dQ== =1xgH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: lmccarth@cs.umass.edu Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 11:14:24 +0800 To: aleph1@dfw.dfw.net (Aleph One) Subject: Re: Crypto Rules Report In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601060259.VAA27843@thor.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain (John and Aleph, strike my last message) A copy of the report John mentioned is now on http://www.cs.umass.edu/~lmccarth/cypherpunks/icl.txt From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jiri Baum Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 19:30:14 +0800 To: mianigand@unique.outlook.net (Michael C. Peponis) Subject: Re: What to do about Germany In-Reply-To: <199601031913.NAA11851@unique.outlook.net> Message-ID: <199601051104.WAA20347@sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello "Michael C. Peponis" and cypherpunks@toad.com M.C.P. wrote: ...[in reply to someone Re: Compu$erve vs Germany]... > But that's a GERMAN law, the Internet is an INTERNATIONAL community. > If we have to respect the laws of Germany, and their customs and > archaic belief systems, them we have to give the same consideration > to anyother countries backwords, morality-based, mentality. There ... What if the laws actually contradict each other? Eg if there was a country that forbade women speaking on the net, and another that forbade distinctions between men and women to be made? (Sorry about the example, ladies, but it's one that comes to mind...) I guess at that stage one or the other of the countries will cut itself off the net. BTW, in the January 96 *Australian Personal Computer*, an opinion column draws a comparison between the attitude to the Internet and the (ancient) obligation for a motor car to be preceeded by someone carrying a red flag... Not such a bad metaphor, I thought. ... > But when you go to a sexualy > explicit newsgroup, what do you think you will find, what is the ... Prayers? Adiau - Jiri - -- If you want an answer, please mail to . On sweeney, I may delete without reading! PGP 463A14D5 (but it's at home so it'll take a day or two) PGP EF0607F9 (but it's at uni so don't rely on it too much) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMO0FsSxV6mvvBgf5AQGArgP9ERnp79miefBoDlaVrVSFILG7nsFAh3l3 54S54voFHhBUowAYXET8ZaNbN+ZxNcAJYjft+pELIXo2iCQtexYKdfY2fEPDh8Vu L2UcWMuV/WOBJ4U75YiHHUcZUE4rdqeeyW9A5NIqTv84NYzOAF28LI921I4Nq2/T E8o5m8AaIvQ= =6GVd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Chris Claborne Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 23:23:14 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Compuserve grovels to foreign censors Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106033904.00352520@opus.SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 01:47 PM 1/5/96 -0500, you wrote: >At 12:56 AM 1/5/96 -0500, Larry Sudduth wrote: > >>Attachment Converted: C:\WORK\WINMAIL.DAT > >What, pray tell, is this? If a MSMail for Windows user attaches a file to her message, it also sends along the icon for the ride. This file could also be a picture that someone pasted in to their message. ... __o .. -\<, Chris.Claborne@SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 http://bordeaux.sandiegoca.attgis.com/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "James A. Donald" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 10:01:03 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: \"Concryption\" Message-ID: <199601061852.KAA00797@blob.best.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 07:13 PM 1/4/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: > What I interpreted their press release as saying was that they had patented > the idea of doing the compression AND the encryption in one pass over the > data. If they got a patent for this, then the patent office has totally > lost the concept that in order to be patentable, the idea must not be > obvious to those well versed in the state of the art. All bureaucracies act in to extend their power, regardless of the laws and the official purpose of the bureacracy. We will soon have a patent on bicycles. > > >----------------------------------------------------------------- >Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting >(408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. >frantz@netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd@echeque.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Douglas F. Elznic" Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 12:12:29 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: WIRE TAP ON NET Message-ID: <2.2.16.19960106040018.259fb770@terminus.storm.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain E-MAIL-TAP NETS CRIMINALS The first-ever court-approved wiretap of an e-mail account has resulted in the arrest of three people charged with running a sophisticated cellular-fraud ring. The alleged mastermind, a German electrical engineer, advertised his illicit wares on CompuServe, where they caught the attention of an engineer at AT&T's wireless unit. The Secret Service and the Drug Enforcement Agency then got into the act and obtained the Justice Dept.'s permission to intercept e-mail messages between the alleged perpetrator and his accomplices. "This case represents the challenges in the future if we can't get ahead of the curve in technology," says a U.S. attorney, whose office is prosecuting the case. (Wall Street Journal 2 Jan 96 p16) -- ==================Douglas Elznic=================== delznic@storm.net http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/ (315)682-5489 (315)682-1647 4877 Firethorn Circle Manlius, NY 13104 "Challenge the system, question the rules." =================================================== PGP key available: http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/pgpkey.asc PGP Fingerprint: 68 6F 89 F6 F0 58 AE 22 14 8A 31 2A E5 5C FD A5 =================================================== From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Bruce Baugh Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 23:25:56 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106070719.00694cc8@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot therefore create a revocation certificate? In my case the problem is medical: thanks to autoimmune problems, I get random memory loss from time to time. Sometimes it's big - like an entire semester of my sophomore year of college. Sometimes it's small - like three old pass phrases. So there are keys of mine floating around the key servers that I don't want used, and which are just taking up space. Others will have more mundane problems, like creating a key years ago and just plain not using it. But as PGP use moves out of essentially pure-geek communities into the surrounded net.world, accidents and other carelessness _will_ happen. I'm curious as to what thoughts, if any, y'all have about how to deal with it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMO4fZH3AXR8sjiylAQHOqwfPbvjHnfM7WlbjjUrrmYQ6Diba2aJb0g2K KjsgTAZ3hyUGcnSBRsMPAb+GTkf440SRvX3JxBsRKn0X0lzHvM6ejKducQPrlJyM ter8C8kiwhZXLcNQiAVpOthrarO7qYqs9JBXmEIm2JwAXtO2SwhB8KsUxvHJpf5R v2036MQb2DSpz1VwmPw6yJYSCy5WrvyT/bRCgJ1Tukx2N0AJ3+tEBeXO9BhpwkjZ oGQPa1XtvcgUGsR1a+HKytz9RrBcgh8voXOBz3LmP1EZH0YEG0VA0a2ej/JUkwza et55dxK8LuuwOz6qo/9QJ2kyGqo641nRLowCdjXI29wITQ== =Asuu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Bruce Baugh bruceab@teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Mark M." Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 21:11:38 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? In-Reply-To: <199601060155.UAA13574@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, tallpaul wrote: > I've reports that the latest version of SyQuest's external parallel port > EZ135 "floppy" drive is due on the shelves this month. Also reported is the > ability to effectively boot off the thing, and thus run whatever OS resides > on the SyQuest "floppy" rather than an OS that has to be on the host's hard > drive partition. > > Weight, under two pounds. Price ~$US250. Capacity 135 Mb formatted. Price > of spare disks: $US 20. > Take it off a computer. Put it in a briefcase. Carry it with you nicely out > of public view. Hook it up to another machine and .... > > Question 1: Can you fit linux, pgp, mixmaster, etc. on the 135 Mb disk and > have enough useful space left over for a useful amount of data? > I have PGP, mixmaster, and several other crypto programs as well as X, Netscape, the entire Linux kernel, and several other huge programs and files that I never even use on my Linux system, and all of that takes up ~137 Mb. A base Linux system takes up between 10 and 80 Mb, so Linux would fit quite nicely on one of these disks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMO3zeLZc+sv5siulAQFW9AP/c9Bq1jzpb7pL7eTdhngLGJ9OOmDzWJ8u CMI+dJkvhpPCOTfFf22RAO/LE/9x2wxYedmLMPniZfMQ3UIph1esibz8VbN8+IAI IABbeU3pKVdOQEDG5w6QafBNvaiXlSx6EvFyaRf3n0y1pSriV3u1dBeB9If+TVHG MOb3ftp56F0= =e+Ey -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- finger -l markm@voicenet.com for PGP key http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ Fingerprint: bd24d08e3cbb53472054fa56002258d5 Key-ID: 0xF9B22BA5 -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GAT d- s:- a? C++++ U+++>$ P+++ L++(+++) E--- W++(--) N+++ o- K w--- O- M- V-- PS+++>$ PE-(++) Y++ PGP+(++) t-@ 5? X++ R-- tv+ b+++ DI+ D++ G+++ e! h* r! y? ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: mpd@netcom.com (Mike Duvos) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 16:32:40 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Pi Code....... Message-ID: <199601060817.AAA07878@netcom2.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In case anyone wants to play with the little program that emits bits of Pi, a Fortran version is available on the Web at... http://www.cecm.sfu.ca/~pborwein/PISTUFF/FORTRAN -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd@netcom.com $ via Finger. $ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 16:06:07 +0800 To: Bruce Baugh MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 7:07 AM 1/6/96, Bruce Baugh wrote: >I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which >I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. > >The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no >longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot >therefore create a revocation certificate? Basically, you are screwed. Any revocation you attempt will not be trusted, as we will suspect the new "you" to be an attacker, perhaps an agent of the NSA or the Illuminati. In the view that "you are your key," the old you no longer exists. Perhaps you could just move to a different city, change your name, and create a new key. (However, be sure you write down your passphrase and other salient information to handle your next memory loss.) > >In my case the problem is medical: thanks to autoimmune problems, I get >random memory loss from time to time. Sometimes it's big - like an entire >semester of my sophomore year of college. Sometimes it's small - like three >old pass phrases. So there are keys of mine floating around the key servers >that I don't want used, and which are just taking up space. Pardon me for being politically incorrect (*), but anyone who has these sorts of memory lapses should certainly write down the passphrases! While it is true that writing down a passphrase increases the risk slightly that a black bag operative will sneak into one's house and use his Minox to record the passphrases, in practice this is a minor risk. Especially compared to the immediate risk of losing or forgetting the passphrase. (* I said I was being "politically incorrect" because I've found that people these days don't want their defects and weaknesses commented upon by others, even when they mention them themselves. Thus, cripples don't want anyone to comment on their handicaps, and so on. Someone on this list with "Multiple Personality Disorder" got mightily offended when someone else mentioned MPD in a joking way in a post. Others freak out at innocent remarks, seeing their own demons.) So, if you are losing entire semesters worth of memory, you might want to start writing a lot of stuff down. Seriously, this is an example where "escrow" works. Seal an envelope with your passphrase and any other stuff you want to remember, and leave it with your lawyer or escrow agency with instructions to only turn it over to you. Same as a safe deposit box, unless you forget the key. (You could forget you have a lawyer, so better write that down somewhere, too.) I've not forgotten my PGP passphrase, but then I've only had one PGP key in the last several years and I've written a note to myself someplace which describes what the passphrase is in terms I think would only be meaningful to me. Not fully secure, but nothing really is. And secure enough. If you've had several keys in several years, and yet you are risk of forgetting entire semesters, maybe you ought to think about whether encryption is all that necessary for you. (I rarely see the need to encrypt, even as I cherish the ability and present right to encrypt, so I naturally wonder what it is all these people who seem to be encrypting nearly every private message they send are really concerned about....just my opinion.) I hope all turns out well, and I hope my candid answers to your questions are not too politically incorrect. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 17:32:59 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106092022.009408f0@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03:10 AM 1/6/96 +0000, Michael C. Peponis wrote: >On 5 Jan 96 , Bruce Baugh wrote: >Another problem, let's say I get your public key from Bob, who signed >your key, and Bob knows you have revoked your key, but I don't, so >what happens to my copy of your key? > >Since there is no revokation certificate, I am forced to take Bob's >word that you have indeed want to revoke your key, but have no way of >verifying that without talking to you, and agin I have to go through >the same verification process that Bob did. I know Bruce and his problem is quite real. I happened to have the three keys that he is wanting to revoke in my keyring. (And one of them he had forgotten he had made at all.) It would be nice if there was a way to use the "web of trust" to certify a key revokation in the same way that one signs a key. Basically get a couple of your friends who are accepted in the crypto community and have them vouch for the actual loss of the key(s). It would certainly help patch the problem. (It might open up things for spoofing anyways. There would have to be a way of overriding such a thing with the real key, but that would require the passphrase. (Which should be available if not lost.)) An idea at least... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO495OQCP3v30CeZAQHObQf/VtMoPzpBqx9wU2rsrHkMc5K4LF2PbZdj QboPyoR0c56zIGPiDDoRed4aiy8ylBlPjEGdSeLjoVysbY+yfWz1GDzsrmsdNw9G tAE7DxX88kk9ym4ixy+3CIsFqKrHn1CBh64DAsoJzXRLgwEhPENLmqf0VXgRkYnI Dd7UE3fF15sMEEVdGYXBqEy7r3e83R9dW7ap/z8wy/sM5U8pzo0SwRrqEFVNe2/g 8rYDF8uFgDjbCrU60UVqFq3ipRbGDBGMI9xSLqpSkBHuSOk0si3sNqvSM09WuWFE LjkrVWPvZNaw1DbuQT7v2FTXNrNnfBsVH9MicM2fednOV0Fe7ZIoZg== =sT8b -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 17:44:35 +0800 To: Ng Pheng Siong Subject: Re: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106093243.00968ed0@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 03:04 PM 1/5/96 +0800, Ng Pheng Siong wrote: >On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, David K. Merriman wrote: >> I've gotten ahold of the WPGP mentioned here a couple days ago, and it seems >> to be working just fine, for me. Even easier to use than PIdaho, though not >> quite as 'full-featured' (ie, remailer support, etc). > >Aegis, which was mentioned on this list some months ago, is the best >of the lot, IMHO. No remailer support: You can talk to a remailer from >an email program. ;) I use Aegis right now and I have only one major problem with it. It does not have a facility to do word wraps in the program before signing. This means that if you use it with Eudora and word wrap is on, all of your sigs are going to be bad. (And hitting return on every line before feeding it through is a pain in the ass.) On the other hand, I have heard that WPGP is not very stable under Win95. Can't win for losing... Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 16:28:10 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: "Microsoft.com" added to my KILL file Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain After getting another batch of bounce messages from Microsoft's Postmaster, I have reluctantly decided to filter out all messages from Microsoft.com until they fix this problem with Microsoft Exchange. Their latest message was: ***** Your message did not reach some or all of the intended recipients. To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Foiling Traffic Analysis Sent: 01/05/96 08:51:18 The following recipient(s) could not be reached: Ron Murray on 01/05/96 08:51:18 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] ***** Rather than fight their misconfigured mail system, or try to convince them to change their ways so as to conform to accepted practices, I'll just use technology. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 18:29:01 +0800 To: "Frank O'Dwyer" Subject: RE: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106101559.00919d9c@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 09:47 AM 1/6/96 -0000, Frank O'Dwyer wrote: >On Saturday, January 06, 1996 09:18, Timothy C. May[SMTP:tcmay@got.net] wrote: >>At 7:07 AM 1/6/96, Bruce Baugh wrote: >>>I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which >>>I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. >>> >>>The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no >>>longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot >>>therefore create a revocation certificate? >> >>Basically, you are screwed. Any revocation you attempt will not be trusted, >>as we will suspect the new "you" to be an attacker, perhaps an agent of the >>NSA or the Illuminati. In the view that "you are your key," the old you no >>longer exists. > >This is true, but the "old you" can be resurrected if you can get enough >people to believe your new key using any out-of-band means available >to you. You can also put a comment in your new key's uid explaining the >problem and how to verify the new key. You will find it very hard to use this >new key for a while, though, during the transition period. Many people will take >the existence of two keys with the same uid as suspicious in itself, since it at >least indicates some kind of attack (even if only a denial of service attack). There are times when you want multiple keys with the same ID. I have two key sizes becuase one is an older key. I keep it around for use with people who are using versions that do not support the larger keys. (I have run into this once from a sometimes user of PGP. He finally upgraded.) To aleviate the suspicion, I have the two keys sign each other. >This is really a usability flaw with current PGP. Only if you use the name to refer to the key and not the hex ID. (I found out the hard way that some front ends use either the last key created or whatever they feel like for signing keys and/or signing messages. I am still trying to straighten out some of the weird results of that.) Fortunatly, some programs will use the hex ID to refer to the key so there is no confusion. >The PGP formats do allow for a 'revocation' certificate, but PGP doesn't >implement it (yet, I guess). In any case, it's not really strong enough, >since what it says is "I retract all my previous statements that this key is >related to this user". This'd mean that you'd have to visit everyone who'd ever >signed your key and get them to issue this retraction. What would be needed >for this problem is either an "anti-certificate" ("This key does not belong to this >user"), or else some convention. For example, if two _trusted_ keys are found for the >same uid, the most recent one could be chosen, and the earlier one be purged >from keyservers, etc. This may be possible with current PGP. I haven't tried it, >but since I have some keys which have fallen into disuse, I will need to do so >sometime.). Revocations are supported, but they require the passphrase. (I have a number of revokations on my keyring from various folks.) The problem here is occasions where you have forgotten the passphrase. (I have an old keyring that I need to go and revoke all of the old keys on it. I have not used them in a year or two. I doubt if they are even on the keyserver...) Eventually there will be a way of revoking keys in the circumstance. Something similar to a notary (or a combination of notaries) who can vouch and say "hey, this guy really did lose his keys". Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 18:43:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: A couple of ideas for PGP-based programs Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106103250.00947438@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am posting these ideas here before I annoy the people who will probibly implement them just to see if they have much merit... (If this is incoherent it is because of the late night posting, but I want to get it done while the thoughts are still there...) Maybe some of this will occur after PGP 3.0 is released. (That is, if the universe has not cooled down into a small lump of coal before then...) 1) Something I would like to see on the keyservers for PGP is a way of retreving all of the key revokations since x date without having to get all of the keys since that date. I hate having to check each key every so often to see if it is revoked. It would make it alot easier to avoid using compromised or old unused keys. 2) I would like to see a program like private Idaho have the ability to send mail to the key server and grab all of the "unknown signator" keys. This would have the interesting effect of building a more complete keyring, while using the "web of trust" to weed out alot of the bogus keys that tend to crop up on the key servers. After n number of itenerations you would have more of the "important keys" and the ones that have little or no signage would be left to grab when needed. This would avoid the need to grab the entire key database. (In fact, it would make it desirable NOT to...) More later when I am not so tired... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO5PTOQCP3v30CeZAQET8wf/WI8o18pAol3HcN8j+EZyM7aIkPRFg/EQ IYU+J8c5UrXrHDyUY+lZI11Ip2CgXfL/9ER6+vJ/xKPRfNOYnzOe+53FIOKbhJ0U VPGCJYi7tbIpqBB+SHJe555fijEeGAORMvGqCVosb+KKsZQvQP5SHGK3zsy9rBP+ ojkM3AyJs5uyia4pAjV1Zz3DfxEgMPvBPtqXObN32FVbAq7hGmscDKNHEJ7ifO7H xQiMWyzPJgWdUttdoi9ko7kFYLzze4472hEGNV9DbFZMlpVn6Eex9Hhz/wq20j4i mgfyjU3GF+6+OY8KgkXU79FYKkZYqa019uCuPk50cgRdUZsI1BLyHA== =ImCD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 16:10:31 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? In-Reply-To: <199601060155.UAA13574@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: <199601060756.CAA08977@thor.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- tallpaul writes: > Weight, under two pounds. Price ~$US250. Capacity 135 Mb formatted. Price > of spare disks: $US 20. > Take it off a computer. Put it in a briefcase. Carry it with you nicely out > of public view. Hook it up to another machine and .... [...] > Question 2: Anybody want to speculate on what traffic analysis is like when > encrypted data comes INTO one known Mixmaster site but goes OUT on one or > more "unknown" or (partially) random Mixmaster sites? The "ultimate" traffic analysis problem, as others have observed, is the correlation between messages sent by A and received by B via the overall network. Hence the utility of a Dining Cryptographers' Net, PipeNet, etc. in which the apparent bandwidth variation between any two points is eliminated. A and B are effectively folded into the network. I suppose that a site that escapes detection as a Mixmaster will throw off the correlation stats (i.e. because a message from that site to B won't be identified as a remailed message). But such sites are elusive objects I think. On the one hand, the site can't endure for long, or else its throughput traffic will likely give it away as an anonymizer (i.e. it gets lots of mail from the Mix network, and sends out similar amounts of mail to all sorts of people and the network). On the other hand, it had better last, or else it will look suspicious as a transient account receiving mail from the Mix network, sending a few messages, and quickly vanishing. Futplex "Dammit Jim, I'm a doctor, not a bricklayer!" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO4q/SnaAKQPVHDZAQHO/Qf+Jck8iHbDUw82+9vpuSL69u/Rz071/2fj ni0ubl1pceBYDar+xYumo9FclIt9mr9P/D/as/5NxQ94vCLsomle88SvtOsGyZxE +10uKlMevp3L3Q7FKYuXqjxb5Np1qrbLHxZvkeaA1llCGdaZMiohyIJGUKyJhqEw M0br/9wLrux4IrTNR6Gj53MUdNwjQFwHnESfKtInZbKBKWYtPfL9LMCNttb8EUBg vCcq3V1lEW3ykxnRMrFyc53+j3DfL0U1npuO5JgbyCrFjIIviWDTM+r8bV9VXiK7 ZBbrQbDCigSoeWT7kYYxI6iw28NtlVEnsz39qEafKWlNnQemswVyHQ== =Uo6y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Mr. Nobody" William Bennet Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 17:21:30 +0800 To: frantz@netcom.com.cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: None In-Reply-To: <199601050311.TAA27567@netcom5.netcom.com> Message-ID: <199601060905.DAA21075@fuqua.fiftysix.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In article <199601050311.TAA27567@netcom5.netcom.com> frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) writes: > From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) > Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 19:13:58 -0800 > > At 20:05 1/4/96 -0500, anonymous@freezone.remailer wrote: > >Does anyone understand what this "Concryption" really is? Reading the > >press blurbs, it could be nothing more than simply compressing the > >stream before encrypting it. A patent on that idea would be rather > >awkward. > > What I interpreted their press release as saying was that they had patented > the idea of doing the compression AND the encryption in one pass over the > data. If they got a patent for this, then the patent office has totally > lost the concept that in order to be patentable, the idea must not be > obvious to those well versed in the state of the art. Unfortunately, the patent office has totally lost that concept, with rather disastrous consequences for people who can't afford to fight bogus patents in court. http://www.lpf.org for more info. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Michael C. Peponis" Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 22:40:55 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <199601060759.BAA03401@unique.outlook.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 5 Jan 96 , Bruce Baugh wrote: > I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which > I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. > > The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no > longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot > therefore create a revocation certificate? It's an administrative nightmare. I assume that you mean if the key is widley distributed. If it's only circulating among a small group of people that know each other, no problem. If it's widley distributed, or on a keyserver, that becomes hard. First you would have to be authenticated as the origional key owner, ie how do I realy know that you are you, and not somebody saying you are the orgional key owner? Another problem, let's say I get your public key from Bob, who signed your key, and Bob knows you have revoked your key, but I don't, so what happens to my copy of your key? Since there is no revokation certificate, I am forced to take Bob's word that you have indeed want to revoke your key, but have no way of verifying that without talking to you, and agin I have to go through the same verification process that Bob did. Good topic. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMO2+BkUffSIjnthhAQFPuQP7BOBJTkqInT4nIAQ7ity4/AutSn9QusFx FdG6iPQVG11fp2BbGtDeQMSgaFUDxXm99Oim/VINGWDmbMWhcWTAXDPpYrd2+bjH Q9/SNs+5akQc+bbojqIjDoXas/5LL4VvbrEeSOvklpKg+GrCleJYqN+Mh2aY35ZL 04GLVJJLzSo= =Xr5x -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server Key fingerprint = DD 39 66 3D AE DE 71 C2 B6 DA B2 3F 47 2A EB AC From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: James Black Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 17:23:36 +0800 To: Bruce Baugh Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960106070719.00694cc8@mail.teleport.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Hello, On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, Bruce Baugh wrote: > The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no > longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot > therefore create a revocation certificate? If there is someone that you trust (or several people), just make a revocation certificate and possibly cut it into pieces, and just let those know when to send it out, so that you don't have to rely on a faulty memory, and by having it in several hands they can't just send it out, as they don't know the other people. Just a thought. ========================================================================== James Black (Comp Sci/Comp Eng sophomore) e-mail: black@eng.usf.edu http://www.eng.usf.edu/~black/index.html "An idea that is not dangerous is unworthy of being called an idea at all." Oscar Wilde ************************************************************************** From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Don M. Kitchen" Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 23:35:54 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Forgetting passphrase/escrow/pgp 3 Message-ID: <199601061403.HAA00239@wero.cs.byu.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain As has been mentioned, this is a good situation for the use of some kind of escrow. Not meaning to talk about crypto or anything, but it seems to me that there's already some good shamir sharing code out there, I hope the overworked, underpaid PGP 3.0 people put shamir sharing capabilities. I see it as a slight modification of the split/merge code, which PGP already has, plus already written shamir code that hopefully need only be cut-and-pasted into PGP. This is what non-GAK escrow people want, right? Easy-to-use strong-crypto escrow? Don -- fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Junk mail to root@127.0.0.1 * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company * From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:55:35 +0800 To: rsalz@osf.org (Rich Salz) Subject: Re: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/ In-Reply-To: <9601051755.AA04835@sulphur.osf.org> Message-ID: <199601061616.IAA10646@netcom13.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain >lynx http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/ CryptoBytes (p2 of 4) Back issues available in electronic form: Volume 1 Number 1 - Spring 1995 ... Alas thats all there is. No later volumes yet. Preserving the value of the $90 annual subscription I guess. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "David K. Merriman" Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 22:51:48 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Windows Eudora and PGP Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106023946.0068c404@arn.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:32 AM 01/6/96 -0800, Alan Olsen wrote: >At 03:04 PM 1/5/96 +0800, Ng Pheng Siong wrote: >>On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, David K. Merriman wrote: >>> I've gotten ahold of the WPGP mentioned here a couple days ago, and it seems >>> to be working just fine, for me. Even easier to use than PIdaho, though not >>> quite as 'full-featured' (ie, remailer support, etc). >> >>Aegis, which was mentioned on this list some months ago, is the best >>of the lot, IMHO. No remailer support: You can talk to a remailer from >>an email program. ;) > >I use Aegis right now and I have only one major problem with it. It does >not have a facility to do word wraps in the program before signing. This >means that if you use it with Eudora and word wrap is on, all of your sigs >are going to be bad. (And hitting return on every line before feeding it >through is a pain in the ass.) > >On the other hand, I have heard that WPGP is not very stable under Win95. >Can't win for losing... > I'm running WPGP under Win95, and so far it's been as stable as Win95. On my machines, that's been pretty darn stable - YMMV :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMO3EV8VrTvyYOzAZAQGrLwP+M2Sol133Vg329ImG39utW+kxhjcg9Ctc nEPZl9hqPXGG/tPbRG7UMbNi8TBW8/Qqw4oWV6hNb/aOLlYuQ5hrxOogFCSzUn4w 0smLGwrc1siWa1YEWiBgbgrzY7nP0thCgM7jiVbkbaNLAn01+Rj8ZzuSxWP/1sxW l6E7+pZ7Rx8= =5lv3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954), U.S. Judge <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geopages.com/CapitolHill/1148 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 22:04:23 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: CelBomb Message-ID: <199601061349.IAA11236@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Can anyone in IL, or elsewhere, report more on the head-job of The Engineer: Any crypto used to authenticate the target for the boombox, or to obscure links to the assassin? How was the blast specifically targeted at him and not a phone borrower? How it was set off -- by user-dialing, remote control, some other means? Any fishy smelling brand names to immediately run from? Answers urgent. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Frank O'Dwyer" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 07:00:50 +0800 To: "'cypherpunks@toad.com> Subject: RE: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <01BADC1C.309CFE20@dialup-080.dublin.iol.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Saturday, January 06, 1996 09:18, Timothy C. May[SMTP:tcmay@got.net] wrote: >At 7:07 AM 1/6/96, Bruce Baugh wrote: >>I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which >>I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. >> >>The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no >>longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot >>therefore create a revocation certificate? > >Basically, you are screwed. Any revocation you attempt will not be trusted, >as we will suspect the new "you" to be an attacker, perhaps an agent of the >NSA or the Illuminati. In the view that "you are your key," the old you no >longer exists. This is true, but the "old you" can be resurrected if you can get enough people to believe your new key using any out-of-band means available to you. You can also put a comment in your new key's uid explaining the problem and how to verify the new key. You will find it very hard to use this new key for a while, though, during the transition period. Many people will take the existence of two keys with the same uid as suspicious in itself, since it at least indicates some kind of attack (even if only a denial of service attack). This is really a usability flaw with current PGP. The PGP formats do allow for a 'revocation' certificate, but PGP doesn't implement it (yet, I guess). In any case, it's not really strong enough, since what it says is "I retract all my previous statements that this key is related to this user". This'd mean that you'd have to visit everyone who'd ever signed your key and get them to issue this retraction. What would be needed for this problem is either an "anti-certificate" ("This key does not belong to this user"), or else some convention. For example, if two _trusted_ keys are found for the same uid, the most recent one could be chosen, and the earlier one be purged from keyservers, etc. This may be possible with current PGP. I haven't tried it, but since I have some keys which have fallen into disuse, I will need to do so sometime.). Cheers, Frank O'Dwyer fod@brd.ie http://www.iol.ie/~fod From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Steve14571@aol.com Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 01:34:57 +0800 To: goerzenj@complete.org Subject: Fwd: Undeliverable: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: <960106095457_108133691@mail04.mail.aol.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Something else I want to know... Why is my mail going through microsoft.com? --------------------- Forwarded message: From: postmaster@microsoft.com (Postmaster) To: Steve14571@aol.com (Steve14571@aol.com) Date: 96-01-05 19:32:00 EST Your message did not reach some or all of the intended recipients. To: goerzenj@complete.org Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Sent: 01/04/96 18:43:35 The following recipient(s) could not be reached: David Tagliani on 01/04/96 18:43:35 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] Eric S. Hanson (NT RPC) on 01/04/96 18:43:35 The recipient name is not recognized [MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:northamerica:RED-70-MSG] Original Message Follows ======================== From: "Steve14571@aol.com" To: "goerzenj@complete.org" Cc: "cypherpunks@toad.com" Subject: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 18:43:35 -0800 In a message dated 96-01-03 00:34:25 EST, you write: >CompuServe is not location-dependant. The network operates exactly the >same regardless of calling location (indeed, the system doesn't even know >where you're calling from I believe). It is a worldwide CompuServe >Network that people use to access it. This network just allows dialups >and then gets the users connected to the CompuServe computers. The main >computers handle all traffic. They don't are location-independant, >making it impossible to block access based on location. I see two possible ways to censor German users only (but I still believe censoring anyone is wrong). First, the "main computers" could be told where they are, and "censored" material could be filtered at that level before it is sent to individual users. Or CompuServe could release a software update for German users. The software would not recognize banned newsgroups. How difficult could that possibly be? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Mark Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:15:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Mitnik: latest? Message-ID: <199601061547.KAA13440@tipper.oit.unc.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I was curious where Kevin is now and what he is doing or waiting for? Anyone got a timeline of whats in store for him? Cheers, Mark From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:04:54 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Internet & Porno on A&E tonite Message-ID: <199601061654.KAA05672@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Hi, Just saw an add for a Investigative Reports show tonite on A&E dealing with the Internet and some of the current issues relating to porno and privacy. Jim Choate From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:00:22 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 9:10 AM 1/6/96, James Black wrote: >Hello, > >On Fri, 5 Jan 1996, Bruce Baugh wrote: > >> The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no >> longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot >> therefore create a revocation certificate? > > If there is someone that you trust (or several people), just make a >revocation certificate and possibly cut it into pieces, and just let >those know when to send it out, so that you don't have to rely on a >faulty memory, and by having it in several hands they can't just send it >out, as they don't know the other people. Just a thought. If one can safely and securely store a revocation certificate for later use, why not just store the much shorter passphrase? --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:21:15 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: RE: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 9:47 AM 1/6/96, Frank O'Dwyer wrote: >On Saturday, January 06, 1996 09:18, Timothy C. May[SMTP:tcmay@got.net] wrote: >>Basically, you are screwed. Any revocation you attempt will not be trusted, >>as we will suspect the new "you" to be an attacker, perhaps an agent of the >>NSA or the Illuminati. In the view that "you are your key," the old you no >>longer exists. > >This is true, but the "old you" can be resurrected if you can get enough >people to believe your new key using any out-of-band means available >to you. You can also put a comment in your new key's uid explaining the Could you explain how "enough people" can get around a basic feature/limitation of the current PGP web of trust? Who, besides the originator, can revoke an old key? How many does it take? If a bunch of the "alleged" friends of Bruce could do this, could they not revoke the key of someone they simply wish to hassle? I agree that a new key can be generated, and a new "Please use this key, not the other one" message sent, and this may work, but I don't believe this revokes the old key and removes it from the keyservers. I could be wrong, as I am certainly no expert on the keyservers. The question is: is there a "majority vote" mode on the keyservers that causes them to remove a key if enough people claim it is no longer valid? --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: blanc Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 03:31:08 +0800 To: "'Steve14571@aol.com> Subject: FW: Undeliverable: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: <01BADC29.B54CF780@blancw.accessone.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain From: Steve14571@aol.com Something else I want to know... Why is my mail going through microsoft.com? ....................................................................................................... There is an email 'alias' at Microsoft which was subscribed to the cpunk list, to receive and distribute the cpunk list to members of that alias. A new beta version of Exchange is being used on a test basis by some departments (apparently all of the cpunks at MS are using it), and the programmers recently encountered a "little complication" (to use a phrase from the movie 'Brazil'). I'm told that the problems were corrected, but that now the spoolers are releasing messages which were backed up while mail delivery was put on hold. I hate to agree with Timothy C. May, but it is probably best to "use technology " to deal with it for a day or so. .. Blanc From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Matt Blaze Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 00:34:31 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601061626.LAA06345@crypto.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Timothy May wrote: > At 7:07 AM 1/6/96, Bruce Baugh wrote: > > >I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which > >I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. > > > >The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no > >longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot > >therefore create a revocation certificate? > > Basically, you are screwed. Any revocation you attempt will not be trusted, > as we will suspect the new "you" to be an attacker, perhaps an agent of the > NSA or the Illuminati. In the view that "you are your key," the old you no > longer exists. > ... > > Seriously, this is an example where "escrow" works. Seal an envelope with > your passphrase and any other stuff you want to remember, and leave it with > your lawyer or escrow agency with instructions to only turn it over to you. > Same as a safe deposit box, unless you forget the key. (You could forget > you have a lawyer, so better write that down somewhere, too.) Escrow is orthogonal to the underlying problem here, which is that the PGP revocation model is completely wrong. Since the trust properties and other semantics of a key originate with the certificates attached to the key, and not from the key owner per se, it makes little sense to make the key owner responsible for revoking that trust. Far more sensible would be a scheme in which the certificate issuers themselves could revoke their certificates when they believe a key is no longer trustworthy. (A practical decentralized system like PGP could provide a facility for certifiers to "pre-revoke" their certificates at the time they are issued so that the key owner could distribute the revocation certificates himself if he discovers his own key to have been compromised or lost.) Note that the problem here is in the basic trust model, not just the certificate distribution model (which is a separate problem). The lack of ability for a certifier to revoke his own certification, plus the lack of a facility to put limits on the duration and meaning of the certification, make PGP certificates of very limited practical value. -matt From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alex Strasheim Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:12:10 +0800 To: mab@crypto.com (Matt Blaze) Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys In-Reply-To: <199601061626.LAA06345@crypto.com> Message-ID: <199601061748.LAA06159@proust.suba.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text > Note that the problem here is in the basic trust model, not just the > certificate distribution model (which is a separate problem). The lack of > ability for a certifier to revoke his own certification, plus the lack of a > facility to put limits on the duration and meaning of the certification, > make PGP certificates of very limited practical value. Isn't the last bit here, the part about duration and meaning, the practical answer to the problem? Especially duration? The stuff that's been going on lately with Netscape's browsers, Sameer's apache ssl server, and the difficulty of getting CAs like verisign to approve keys underscores the importance of this issue. This is probably sort of half-baked, but is it possible to come up with a formal grammar that would allow us to describe trust models in general? What if we had a prolog-like system that allowed you to set up rules like: "x is a student if x has got a signature from a school" "x is a school if x has got a signature from the accredation authority" "x belongs to the secret society of x has signatures from 3 other people who have belonged to the society for more than a year, and if x is a certified owner of a duck." Wouldn't something like this give us the flexibility to use a PGPish model of trust or an X.509ish model, or whatever else we wanted to do? It seems to me that the rules that govern when you can accept which signature ought to be data objects in a more flexible system, just as the signatures themselves are data objects. That means that the rules themselves ought to be subject to change, revokation, or revision. The constitution wouldn't have survived if it didn't contain a mechanism for ammendment. Wouldn't a model of trust with the same ability for revision and extension be a lot more robust, and a lot more resistent to centralized control? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 04:25:39 +0800 To: post@why.net (post) Subject: Re: Why can't I get PGP from MIT Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960106200842.0095e840@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 12:47 PM 1/6/96 -0600, post wrote: >MIT won't let me get PGP or PGPhone. I know their server >went down awhile back but, I have tried them several times >and sent several e-mail requests. I thought maybe I was >missing something obvious or maybe they are just really >busy. I keep being told I'm not in the U.S. There was a posting (either on the server or somewhere else) that claimed that the MIT site was having problems with .net and .org sites. (As well as a couple of others if I remember correctly.) The posting claimed that they had fixed the problem, but i guess not... | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano@teleport.com | From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 01:31:08 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Mitnik: latest? -- Long, watch it Message-ID: <199601061716.MAA01565@pipe2.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Perhaps Brian Davis will comment with the latest but here's Littman on Mitnick (and scans of Shimomura/Media/Feds) through October, 1995: As Tsutomu Shimomura launched his new careers as pitchman, author, movie subject, and video game designer, Kevin Mitnick sat in a Southern county jail. Mitnick wrote to me nearly every week on yellow legal paper in longhand, bemoaning the lack of a word processor as he recounted the hardships of jail. He told me he had been attacked and robbed by two inmates and barely avoided fights with several others. When he complained that the vegetarian diet he requested was limited to peanut butter sandwiches, and that his stress and stomach medication prescriptions weren't filled, he was moved to a tougher county jail. His grammar wasn't perfect, but his writing was surprisingly frank and descriptive. Mitnick punctuated his letters with Internet shorthand, noting the precise minute he began each letter, as if he were still online. He was bitter, but he hadn't lost his sense of humor. When his jailers admitted they'd read the letter Mike Wallace wrote him, inviting him to appear on 60 Minutes, Mitnick admitted the irony of him, of all people, complaining about other people reading his mail. "Poetic justice, eh? ..." Once in a while he'd slip in a tantalizing comment about his case. One week he'd appear to trust me, the next he'd wonder whether I would betray him. It was strange corresponding with the man the media and our government had cast as a twenty-first-century Frankenstein. Mitnick himself didn't seem sure of who or what he was. He asked whether I felt he should be given a long prison sentence. Did I think he was evil? Dangerous? When he was sent to his second jail, as a matter of policy the U.S. Marshals confiscated his books, his underwear, his toiletries. Mitnick was doing the worst prison "time" possible, because the Eastern District of North Carolina had no federal detention center. That meant he would have to defend himself without access to a law library, required by law in federal institutions. The nurse in Mitnick's second county jail cut his medication again, and on June 18, his attorney filed a motion in federal court stating that Mitnick "was taken to the hospital and diagnosed with esophageal spasms." The attorney argued that the "deliberate indifference" to Mitnick's "serious medical needs" violated constitutional standards. Before a federal judge could order a hearing on the medical issues, Mitnick was transferred to his third North Carolina jail in as many months. "He [Mitnick] overextended his welcome," explained a deputy U.S. Marshal in Raleigh who preferred to remain anonymous. "It was time for a change of scenery. This happens with a lot of them. They get where they think they're running the place." Mitnick's third county jail was his worst yet. He shared a cell with seven other men. There was no law library, radio or television, and each inmate was allowed only two books at a time. Mitnick's were the Federal Criminal Code and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The eight men in Mitnick's cell were forced to share a single pencil stub that was taken away in the afternoon. Mitnick was allotted one sheet of paper a day. On April 10, 1995, John Dusenberry, Mitnick's public defender, filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the indictment. He argued that the blank search warrants and the warrantless search of Mitnick's apartment violated the Fourth Amendment, which specifically prohibits unreasonable search and seizure. In the government's response, John Bowler, the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Raleigh, defended the blank search warrants, not an easy proposition in a free country. Bowler prefaced his argument by claiming, despite evidence to the contrary, that Shimomura tracked Mitnick on his own until February I4, just hours before his capture. The government's response to the issue of the blank search warrants was to blame Magistrate Wallace Dixon. Bowler asserted that the FBI had wanted to execute the search properly, but the magistrate had "upon his own initiative" insisted on signing the blank search warrants. But a judge never ruled on these arguments. The twenty-three-count indictment the Associated Press had hypothesized could land Mitnick 460 years in jail fell apart. The government abandoned its case in Raleigh, dismissing all but one of the counts in accepting a plea bargain from Mitnick that would likely get him time served, or at most eight months. The tiny story was buried in the back pages of the New York Times. "Kevin is going to come and face the music in L.A., where, of course, the significant case has always been," David Schindler, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, told the L.A. Times. The newspaper said the prosecutor believed Mitnick would receive stiffer punishment "than any hacker has yet received," a sentence greater than Poulsen's four years and three months. Mitnick's letters revealed how Schindler planned to win the record prison term. Schindler was claiming losses in excess of $80 million, the amount that would garner the longest possible sentence for a fraud case according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Nor would Schindler have to substantiate his claim. The government only had to "estimate" the loss. Mitnick's attorneys said the figure was grossly exaggerated, and added that the case rested on source code allegedly copied from cellular companies. There was no proof that Mitnick had tried to sell the code, and there was no evidence it could be sold for an amount approaching $80 million. But under the guidelines the absence of a profit motive was no obstacle to a long jail term. David Schindler was seeking an eight-to-ten-year sentence for Kevin Mitnick, about the same prison time doled out for manslaughter. The jailed hacker wasn't the only one whose feats were being hyped. By August of 1995, the advertisement in Publishers Weekly for Shimomura's upcoming book featured Mitnick's New York Times photo stamped with the caption HE COULD HAVE CRIPPLED THE WORLD. Declared the ad, "Only One Man Could Stop Him: SHIMOMURA." The hyperbole made me flash on what Todd Young had done in Seattle. The bounty hunter had tracked Kevin Mitnick down in a few hours with his Cellscope. Unauthorized to arrest him, he'd kept Mitnick under surveillance for over two weeks as he sought assistance. But the Secret Service didn't think the crimes were significant. The U.S. Attorney's Office wouldn't prosecute the case. Even the local cops didn't really care. When I met Young in San Francisco a couple of weeks after Mitnick's arrest, he was puzzled by the aura surrounding Shimomura and his "brilliant" capture of Kevin Mitnick. We both knew from independent sources that Shimomura had never before used a Cellscope. Young asked why the FBI would bring an amateur with no cellular tracking skills to Raleigh for the bust. If Shimomura's skill was measured by his ability to catch the hacker, then he was on a par with Todd Young, a thousand-dollar-a-day bounty hunter who never had the help of the FBI. The simple, unglamorous truth was that Kevin Mitnick, whatever his threat to cyberspace and society, was not that hard to find. I tried to get the government to answer Young's question about Shimomura's presence. I asked the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office and they suggested I ask the FBI. But the FBI had no comment. I asked Schindler, the Assistant U.S. Attorney in L.A., and he didn't have an answer. I asked Scott Charney, the head of the Justice Department's Computer Crime group, and he said he couldn't comment. I asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney who would logically had to have approved sending Shimomura three thousand miles to Raleigh, North Carolina. But Kent Walker oddly suggested I ask Shimomura for the answer. The response reminded me of what John Bowler, the Raleigh prosecutor, had said when I asked him how John Markoff came to be in Raleigh. He, too, had suggested I ask Shimomura. Shimomura seemed to be operating independently. outside of the Justice Department's control. Or was he running their show? The media appeared captivated by Shimomura's spell. Except for the Washington Post and The Nation, most major publications and the television networks accepted John Markoff's and Tsutomu Shimomura's story at face value. Kevin Mitnick's capture made for great entertainment. Not one reporter exposed the extraordinary relationship between Shimomura and the FBI. Most seemed to ignore the conflict of interest raised by the financial rewards Shimomura and Markoff received by cooperating with the FBI. A Rolling Stone magazine story condoned Markoff's actions, saying he had merely done what any journalist would do when presented with the possibility of a big scoop. The media critic for Wired suggested only that Markoff should have advised New York Times readers earlier of his personal involvement in capturing Mitnick. The media functioned as a publicity machine for Shimomura and the federal government, quickly churning out a round of articles arguing for tougher laws and greater security on the Internet. But the fury over what Assistant U.S. Attorney Kent Walker described as Mitnick's "billion dollar" crimes simply distracted the public from the real issues. Privacy intrusions and crime in cyberspace were old news, and a series of Internet break-ins after Mitnick's arrest proved the capture of cyberspace's most wanted criminal had changed little. The real story was that Internet providers, the new equivalent of phone companies on the information superhighway, appeared naive about how to investigate break-ins while protecting the privacy of their subscribers. After an FBI computer child-pornography investigation was made public in September of 1995, the Bureau revealed that it had read thousands of e-mail correspondences, and invaded the privacy of potentially dozens of citizens in the course of its investigation. Privacy activists complained that constitutional rights were being bulldozed, but the FBI announced the public should expect more of the same. "From our standpoint, this investigation embodies a vision of the type of investigatory activity we may be drawn to in the future," said Timothy McNally, the special agent in charge. The government seemed to be promoting a hacker dragnet to make sure the Internet was crime free for the millions of dollars of commerce on its way. Kent Walker, the Assistant U.S. Attorney who left the Justice Department within weeks of Mitnick's arrest for a job with a Pacific Telesis spin- off, was one of the many government officials who claimed the FBI couldn't crack high-tech cases without people like Shimomura. Perhaps prosecutions would increase if the FBI bolstered its force with nonprofessionals. But where would that leave the law and the Constitution? (pp. 368-73) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Laszlo Vecsey Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 03:22:03 +0800 Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? In-Reply-To: <4cmg14$682@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > >Question 1: Can you fit linux, pgp, mixmaster, etc. on the 135 Mb disk and > >have enough useful space left over for a useful amount of data? > > [snip snip snip] > > But if I can squeeze everything I need to turn an arbitrary PC > into a secure (modulo hardware) login session into 1.44 MB + boot image, > I don't think there's a problem putting all the stuff you want on a > 135MB disk. Hell, the _hard disk_ on my Linux box is only 80MB... Someone can get one of those tiny devices that slips on the end of a keyboard connector and captures all the scan codes - you're better off bringing the whole computer (laptop) along with your floppy. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: loki@obscura.com (Lance Cottrell) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 04:49:27 +0800 To: Matt Blaze MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:31 AM 1/4/96, Matt Blaze wrote: >I'm going to be at the USENIX conference in San Diego later this month, >as are, I suspect, many other crypto/cypherpunk types. > >Any interest in a crypto BOF? I have organized a Remailers and other "Cypherpunkish" topics BOF. I think it is scheduled for Thursday at 6:30 - 8:30 -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki@obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ---------------------------------------------------------- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: post@why.net (post) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 03:52:15 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Why can't I get PGP from MIT Message-ID: <19960106184748728.AAA262@tar176.why.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain MIT won't let me get PGP or PGPhone. I know their server went down awhile back but, I have tried them several times and sent several e-mail requests. I thought maybe I was missing something obvious or maybe they are just really busy. I keep being told I'm not in the U.S. I have tried two different Internet service providers and my Unix account at Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems. I understand why I would be denied when trying to get PGP from a commercial site but, under my personal accounts I get the same results. I requested that my providers be put on the "approved" list of domestic sites but still get the same results. My original e-mail request to MIT was sent roughly 3 months ago. All I want is clean copy of PGP for personal use. I have considered purchasing a commercial system but still would like to try PGP with the big keys. Thanks, Sid Post post@why.net From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:32:21 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199601061803.NAA17075@thor.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May writes: > If one can safely and securely store a revocation certificate for later > use, why not just store the much shorter passphrase? Well, you're dealing with very different threats in the two cases AFAICS. With your passphrase and private key, someone can forge your signature, read your encrypted incoming mail, etc. With your revocation certificate and private key, about all they can do is revoke your key and force you to create a new one. I certainly find the latter prospect much less alarming -- by far the lesser of two evils. Heck, it's good to update keys periodically, so they might even be doing me a favor of sorts ;) Futplex -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO65WSnaAKQPVHDZAQEIngf+OnXNLpkc4MlE+F0O24lCgso29k0cYRiW jOHKJJfl9ryfaM/WT8eyRLIbWhO7A2qMGSF9nlRUCuhLBgQuX6tmboTwDPW3RPzq jKbZ6LO615w0xPhZpDQO/B963sF0UOcIc0v49k1Ua6biUeEQ/0luYn7nQPD9RVDV pb0qkk201qgVDkXXxPR+hN/HXstI0mc2+HjQjAhHiIOLyiMN3aPwGDH1XmHP5UiE TVw+M9cAqyC863KMg+WEkIGXvdwLJ2or6QQ07i50Zwl905mSFd9+nHVx5HLbkKFa UZvwU46zZXx069MIKHLFY2hX1ZqgR5eGGHUa6bZbMkeIjSl50IzILA== =ssJd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 04:09:28 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Why can't I get PGP from MIT Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 6:47 PM 1/6/96, post wrote: >MIT won't let me get PGP or PGPhone. I know their server >went down awhile back but, I have tried them several times >and sent several e-mail requests. I thought maybe I was >missing something obvious or maybe they are just really >busy. I keep being told I'm not in the U.S. As I recall, they don't tell you you're "not in the U.S.," they tell you they cannot conclude in the affirmative that you _are_ in the U.S. This has to do with whether they have a record (DNS) of your site, blah blah. And the message about sending them e-mail affirming your status, etc., points out that the mail is handled manually and may not be gotten to for a while. This happened to me, with PGPhone, when they could not confirm my ISP (got.net) to be a U.S.-based service. I simply grabbed one of the "otherwise available" copies (it was either posted publically, or available at an offshore site, I forget which). This was several months ago, the day after it was released. I fired it up, concluded I was missing some pieces needed to make it work, and put it aside for the time being. For PGP, I always go to the offshore sites anyway, on principle. These sites are listing with numbing frequency in all the usual places. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Matt Blaze Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:34:23 +0800 To: Alex Strasheim Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys In-Reply-To: <199601061748.LAA06159@proust.suba.com> Message-ID: <199601061822.NAA06999@crypto.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > > Note that the problem here is in the basic trust model, not just the > > certificate distribution model (which is a separate problem). The lack of > > ability for a certifier to revoke his own certification, plus the lack of a > > facility to put limits on the duration and meaning of the certification, > > make PGP certificates of very limited practical value. > > Isn't the last bit here, the part about duration and meaning, the > practical answer to the problem? Especially duration? > > The stuff that's been going on lately with Netscape's browsers, Sameer's > apache ssl server, and the difficulty of getting CAs like verisign to > approve keys underscores the importance of this issue. > > This is probably sort of half-baked, but is it possible to come up with a > formal grammar that would allow us to describe trust models in general? > What if we had a prolog-like system that allowed you to set up rules like: > > "x is a student if x has got a signature from a school" > "x is a school if x has got a signature from the accredation authority" > "x belongs to the secret society of x has signatures from 3 other people > who have belonged to the society for more than a year, and if x is > a certified owner of a duck." > > Wouldn't something like this give us the flexibility to use a PGPish model > of trust or an X.509ish model, or whatever else we wanted to do? > > It seems to me that the rules that govern when you can accept which > signature ought to be data objects in a more flexible system, just as the > signatures themselves are data objects. That means that the rules > themselves ought to be subject to change, revokation, or revision. > > The constitution wouldn't have survived if it didn't contain a mechanism > for ammendment. Wouldn't a model of trust with the same ability for > revision and extension be a lot more robust, and a lot more resistent to > centralized control? > Indeed, I agree that's the right approach. In fact, I agree so much that I've spent the last few months (with Joan Feigenbaum and Jack Lacy) developing the principles and structure for just such a "trust management" system. Watch this space for details of our system, called "PolicyMaker", which I expect to release a paper about shortly and a reference implementation around April or May. -matt From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: iagoldbe@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca (Ian Goldberg) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 03:02:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? In-Reply-To: <199601060155.UAA13574@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: <4cmg14$682@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In article <199601060155.UAA13574@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com>, tallpaul wrote: >Question 1: Can you fit linux, pgp, mixmaster, etc. on the 135 Mb disk and >have enough useful space left over for a useful amount of data? Yes. I have a pair of standard 1.44 MB floppies, one of which has a Linux kernel (boot disk), the other has a filesystem containing just enough stuff to be able to stick the disk in an arbitrary PC, use PPP to connect to the net, and use kerberos to log in. I'm going to use the new ramdisk features in the 1.3 kernels to put more useful stuff on the disk, too, like file utils, maybe... :-) But if I can squeeze everything I need to turn an arbitrary PC into a secure (modulo hardware) login session into 1.44 MB + boot image, I don't think there's a problem putting all the stuff you want on a 135MB disk. Hell, the _hard disk_ on my Linux box is only 80MB... - Ian From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "David E. Smith" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 04:11:41 +0800 To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <199601062000.OAA20579@cdale1.midwest.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:11 AM 1/6/96 -0800, tcmay@got.net wrote: >If one can safely and securely store a revocation certificate for later >use, why not just store the much shorter passphrase? If the security of the safely-stored passphrase is violated, a lot of trouble can be caused. There's not nearly as much that can be done with a stored revocation certificate. dave --- Sorry for any delayed replies, but business trips are so seldom announced. David E. Smith, dsmith@midwest.net, PGP ID 0x92732139 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Laszlo Vecsey Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 04:38:38 +0800 To: Alan Olsen Subject: Re: Why can't I get PGP from MIT In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960106200842.0095e840@mail.teleport.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Sat, 6 Jan 1996, Alan Olsen wrote: > At 12:47 PM 1/6/96 -0600, post wrote: > >MIT won't let me get PGP or PGPhone. I know their server > >went down awhile back but, I have tried them several times > >and sent several e-mail requests. I thought maybe I was > >missing something obvious or maybe they are just really > >busy. I keep being told I'm not in the U.S. > > There was a posting (either on the server or somewhere else) that claimed > that the MIT site was having problems with .net and .org sites. (As well as > a couple of others if I remember correctly.) The posting claimed that they > had fixed the problem, but i guess not... I believe I had a problem when I wanted to get PGP coming from internexus.net (New Jersey). I just e-mailed them about it and I think they just added the site to their 'acceptable' list. I did a traceroute to why.net and noticed that it is very close to me, coming off of SprintNet... probably the same situation. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 08:00:07 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: RE: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <199601062342.PAA04578@netcom6.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Perhaps if keys could be made with expiration dates (certificates too), this problem might be reduced to managable proportions. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz@netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Lou Zirko" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 06:02:52 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Why can't I get PGP from MIT Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I have sent two requests myselt in the last two months that have gone unanswered. The request was to have isdn.net added to the allowed list. I know the initial rejection was the .net domain, but the location should not be hard to look up - just a basic whois. I got PGP from alternative locations, but still have not been able to get PGPhone. > MIT won't let me get PGP or PGPhone. I know their server > went down awhile back but, I have tried them several times > and sent several e-mail requests. I thought maybe I was > missing something obvious or maybe they are just really > busy. I keep being told I'm not in the U.S. > All I want is clean copy of PGP for personal use. I have considered > purchasing a commercial system but still would like to try PGP with > the big keys. > > Thanks, > Sid Post > post@why.net > > > Lou Zirko (615)851-1057 Zystems lzirko@isdn.net "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzBLJocAAAEEAMlDzYJPYq0pvfMuSiKU0Y65L2nJql+qEJHYGjO5Pys4prDw YW1ooPWaqrPQAy/eyqrM7I9KNFDCtmaPxtgcPw2oEDfc/w6cPkrVzvovKLfHQvtg V/hHUekptSf6j525omrVAoM9MxVL3sEGCjn9VrTeC3h9upkfntHOJeL88i2NAAUR tB5Mb3UgWmlya28gPHppcmtvbEBkYXRhdGVrLmNvbT4= =Qlxm -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: mrm@netcom.com (Marianne Mueller) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 08:05:45 +0800 To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com Subject: Jan 13 Mountain View CA meeting Message-ID: <199601062350.PAA18983@netcom20.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Hi all, happy new year. The Jan 13 Mountain View, California meeting will be held again at Sun Microsystems, at Sparcy's cafeteria. That's building 21, in the set of Sun buildings near Shoreline Park in Mountain View. Take 101 to Amphitheater Parkway exit, turn left onto Charleston at the light (this street is also named Garcia at its far end) and follow the purple Sun signs for building 21. You'll drive down Charleston (Garcia) for about 1/3 mile and then turn right onto a road that in about 3 blocks takes you to B21. Please send mail if you have a topic you would like to speak about, and I'll send out a speaking agenda towards the end of the week. Marianne mrm@netcom.com mrm@eng.sun.com p.s. I'll bring bagels again but since I never got reimbursed last time around I think I will put out the donation jar this time ...! From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 05:15:51 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? Message-ID: <199601062050.PAA04925@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Jan 06, 1996 12:16:57, 'Laszlo Vecsey ' wrote: >> >Question 1: Can you fit linux, pgp, mixmaster, etc. on the 135 Mb disk and >> >have enough useful space left over for a useful amount of data? >> >> [snip snip snip] >> >> But if I can squeeze everything I need to turn an arbitrary PC >> into a secure (modulo hardware) login session into 1.44 MB + boot image, >> I don't think there's a problem putting all the stuff you want on a >> 135MB disk. Hell, the _hard disk_ on my Linux box is only 80MB... > >Someone can get one of those tiny devices that slips on the end of a >keyboard connector and captures all the scan codes - you're better off >bringing the whole computer (laptop) along with your floppy. > First, I am not convinced that such devices exist in the real, practical world. They would require either storage hardware or radio transmitters, all in a package small enough to be undetectable to the naked eye. Second, I do not think it practicable that the cosmic-nasties (of one's chosen social bias) could, in the real, practical world, run black-bag jobs on tens of thousands of surburban garages as a prophylactic measure against teenagers "playfully" setting up Mixmaster sites. The software costs of quality crypto approach nil thanks to the terrific folks who brough us things like linux and pgp. It is, I think, easy for us to miss the giantic steps forward that these technologies represent. Imagine talking to an IBM-mainframe priest of not-too-many years ago about the idea of something like linux; imagine the same thing with an NSA bureaucrat about the development cost of a security concept/package like pgp! Move hardware costs downward and user-interface upward, and Mixmaster isn't a "black art" of cypherpunks. It is a parlor game for teenage slumber parties. That's the type of world I want to see. -- -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 13:40:09 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: RE: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 15:45 1/6/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >Perhaps if keys could be made with expiration dates (certificates too), >this problem might be reduced to managable proportions. I would very much like to see expiration dates on public keys. Is PGP 3.0 offering this feature? -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Matt Blaze Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 06:42:51 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: "trust management" vs. "certified identity" Message-ID: <199601062232.RAA12812@nsa.tempo.att.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain The discussions here of the limits of PGP's certification and revocation model are close to the core of some work I've been doing (with Joan Feigenbaum and Jack Lacy) on what we call the "trust management" problem. Essentially we consider the consequences of abandoning the notion of "certified identity" implicit in systems like X.509 and PGP and subsuming identity under the more general umbrella of specifying and determining what a key is trusted to do. We've built a system, called "PolicyMaker", that allows the certifier of a key to specify what the key is trusted to do rather than to whom the key is trusted to belong. The same mechanism is also used to specify and interpret local policies. The PolicyMaker system is designed to be called as a service by local applications, which could be email systems like PGP or network-layer security protocols or any other application that requires complex trust relationships. Some early, local experience suggests that this approach is a good one. It's easy to specify X.509- and PGP-style policies and certificates, but you can also say things like "valid for transactions over $500 only if countersigned" in a fairly natural way. I'll be happy to send a (very early) draft of our paper, "Decentralized trust management" to anyone who's interested. I've made the draft available in the CFS-users email archive server. To request a copy (PostScript format) by email: echo get cfs-users pmdraft.ps | mail cfs-users-request@research.att.com (For non-unix shell people, just send a message to cfs-users-request@research.att.com With the line: get cfs-users pmdraft.ps in the BODY of the message (NOT on the subject line).) Comments and discussion appreciated. This is an early draft, and I'd appreciate it if it not be directly quoted, cited, or re-distributed. -matt PS We expect to give away our reference implementation, too. (Probably by May or so.) Note that this is just research, and does not represent any current, past, or future product or service offering on the part of AT&T or anyone else. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: belize@ix.netcom.com (GENERAL STEVEN WALZ) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 09:57:03 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: ssn Message-ID: <199601070144.RAA23014@ix3.ix.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Send info on ssn# belize@ix.netcom.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 07:42:19 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: please stop the Mitnick stuff Message-ID: <199601062331.SAA05063@jekyll.piermont.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain This is cypherpunks, not Mitnick punks, Shimomura punks, or anything similar. I personally don't care about Kevin Mitnick, and he most certainly has little to no cryptography relevance at this point. Take it elsewhere. Perry From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: David Vincenzetti Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 02:17:43 +0800 To: hfinney@shell.portal.com Subject: (cpx) Re: mental cryptography (fwd) Message-ID: <199601061748.AA216460533@idea.sec.dsi.unimi.it> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text > I have read one paper which attempts to solve this problem, called "Human > Identification through Insecure Channel". Unfortunately my papers are in > a mess right now so I don't have the reference handy. It was by some > Japnese researchers, published in one of the proceedings books. I > believe a follow-on paper was published within the last year or two which > had some improvements or corrections to their algorithm. Sorry to be so > vague, I'll try to dig out more info over the weekend. > > Basically they used a challenge-response system which was intended to > be simple enough that people could do it in their heads. The card > would display a random challenge string, some characters of which were > special to the user and others which he would ignore. He would then > input a response string, where it didn't matter what corresponded to > the "ignore" slots, but in the special slots he had to produce certain > symbols corresponding to the other symbols, with the rules changing as > you move along. The intention was that even by capturing and analyzing a > great many challenge-response pairs you couldn't create a response to a > challenge you hadn't seen before. > > I coded this up, and frankly, I couldn't do the required manipulations in > my head, at least not without taking a very, very long time, and thinking > very carefully. Maybe it would get easier with practice, I don't know. > But my overall feeling was that this would be at the limits of human > capability even for fairly bright people. (OTOH I suppose learning to > read and write might seem pretty tough if you'd never done it. Maybe > the 1st grade classes of the future will spend months training the kids > on how to use these kinds of algorithms.) The paper can be found in the proceedings of Eurocrypt '91, D.W. Davies (Ed.), Springer-Verlag. The author is Hideki IMAI, . I found the above paper very interesting, and I am actually going to code it up. Eventually, I would be highly interested in giving a glance at your code. Is your code available? Ciao, David From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Lynne L. Harrison" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 08:13:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Internet & Porno on A&E tonite Message-ID: <9601070002.AA26160@mhv.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 10:05 PM 1/6/96 GMT, Mutatis Mutantdis wrote: > >>Just saw an add for a Investigative Reports show tonite on A&E dealing with >>the Internet and some of the current issues relating to porno and privacy. > >What time?!? 9:00 P.M. E.S.T. ******************************************************* Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; E-mail: | - Survive; lharrison@mhv.net | - Go to bed." ******************************************************* From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jerry Whiting Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 13:49:50 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: carrick demo revisited Message-ID: <199601070327.TAA04424@igc4.igc.apc.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Please note that the carrick demo that is available on www.encryption.com is just that; a DEMO. As the documentation states, the file format is NOT what is in the full retail product. The files that the demo generates are NOT compatible with the full retail version. The demo is a marketing-driven effort. The shipping version will have a different UI, a different file structure, a different file header, etc. Azalea Software will make full source code available to those who wish to review carrick under nondisclosure agreement. We have written an FAQ that details carrick's API's and file header. It will answer many questions that some cryptographically sophisticated users may have. We apologize for any misunderstanding or inconvenience the demo may have caused. Again, the demo is a marketing piece to accompany the press release that we are distributing. Ver 1.0 should be going out the door any day now and we invite all cypherpunks and other encryption fans to look it over. Azalea Software, Inc. 1 800 ENCRYPT www.encryption.com carrick@azalea.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 09:00:02 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff In-Reply-To: <199601070023.BAA04907@utopia.hacktic.nl> Message-ID: <199601070042.TAA05199@jekyll.piermont.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Anonymous writes: > > At 06:31 PM 1/6/96 -0500, Perry Metzger wrote: > > > >This is cypherpunks, not Mitnick punks, Shimomura punks, or anything > >similar. I personally don't care about Kevin Mitnick, and he most > >certainly has little to no cryptography relevance at this point. Take > >it elsewhere. > > C'mon, Perry, give it a break. Mitnick's case has to do with security > issues as well as the violations of privacy and/or search and seizure > the government used to arrest him. This isn't Libernet-d or something similar. This isn't where we discuss violations of search and seizure laws or thing of that kind. The world is full of injustice -- but this isn't the place to discuss it. Mitnick's case has very little (certainly at this point) to do with security, and never had anything to do with cryptography. > I found it interesting. If you didn't, then all you had to do was > delete it. When there are one or two small items posted on a topic thats no big deal. When its a lot of stuff, it becomes an enormous pain. Multiply the few seconds to read and digest enough of a message to know you should delete it by dozens of messages per mailing list per day and by a dozen mailing lists and you suddenly have an untenable waste of your time. Perry From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 12:06:18 +0800 To: John Young MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 21:16 1/6/96, John Young wrote: > Also, crypto-related: The fact that Shimomura's supposedly > secret files were not protected by encryption or other > security is what causes Littman and others to think there > was a sting (perhaps with TLA help) rather than foolish > vanity of the security wizard. [I do belive this has CP relevance.] Of course it was a set-up. Mitnick got into Shimomura's computer by impersonating the IP address of one of Shimomura's machines. The router should have never let packets in from outside that have an IP address that is supposed to be inside. That a 'security expert' would overlook such a blatant and well publicized hole in his _own_ router is inconceivable. Shimomura was trying to get someone to break into his system. If the bait was specifically for Mitnick, we may never know. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: srw134@psu.edu (Sean Wilkins) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 09:22:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: No Subject Message-ID: <199601070102.UAA91196@r04n12.cac.psu.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain unsubscibe Sean Robert Wilkins Student , Staff , And The MAN (SRW134@PSU.EDU) ---LTR--- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Matt Blaze Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 09:13:47 +0800 To: "Frank O'Dwyer" Subject: Re: "trust management" vs. "certified identity" In-Reply-To: <01BADC99.C7034FE0@dialup-169.dublin.iol.ie> Message-ID: <199601070103.UAA13065@nsa.tempo.att.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain ... >That's not to say that the certification approach can't be general, though. >It occurred to me that a very general certificate format would >simply be to sign some assertions (predicates), and then >feed all available signed predicates plus some axioms (the analogue >of root keys) into a theorem prover. Sounds slow though. More >practically perhaps, you could sign some kind of (safe) interpreted code, >and have the verifier execute it on some initial variable set to come up with >some access decision. > Yes. That's pretty much PolicyMaker in a nutshell. -matt From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 09:22:37 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Crypto Rules Report Message-ID: <199601070103.UAA25559@pipe2.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Thanks to MH, The report is available by anon ftp from ftp.wimsey.com in /pub/crypto/Doc/crypto_policy_report.12.95 or from a WWW browser via URL: ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto/Doc/crypto_policy_report.12.95 From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 09:40:11 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? Message-ID: <199601070127.UAA26984@pipe2.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On small boxes, John Dvorak in Jan 23 PC Mag: "Other Things of Interest Dept: Virtual I-0, the Seattle company that brings you those nifty 3-D LCD eye-glasses, was showing [at Comdex] a complete hard disk-based computer the size of a beta video cassette. The idea was that you could plug in a keyboard and the video headset and finally have that computer-without-a-screen concept that we've been promised. Perfect for someone wanting genuine privacy, although I think once we start seeing a plane load of people all wearing virtual reality headsets, the world becomes a little creepier. Most Interesting Rumor Dept: Supposedly, Microsoft is quietly wooing Hitachi and has secretly ported Windows 95 to the Hitachi 32-bit RISC processor. It hopes to have Casio build and market a small RISC computer about half the size of the Newton in an attempt to open up the market for those little hand-held, do-all gizmos that seem to be attracting a lot of attention in Japan. This is being developed by the same group who did the Timex/Microsoft watch, I'm told. When I pressed on whether this will really be Windows 95 or Windows NT with a Windows 95 shell, I was told it will be plain-vanilla Windows 95 stripped down to fit on a smaller platform. If Microsoft ports plain Windows 95 to other chips, this will not sit well with Intel. Maybe this thing is the wallet computer that Gates keeps mumbling about in his more recent speeches." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 13:36:01 +0800 To: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 03:50 PM 1/6/96 -0500, you wrote: >>Someone can get one of those tiny devices that slips on the end of a >>keyboard connector and captures all the scan codes - you're better off >>bringing the whole computer (laptop) along with your floppy. >> > >First, I am not convinced that such devices exist in the real, practical >world. They would require either storage hardware or radio transmitters, >all in a package small enough to be undetectable to the naked eye. As a ham I can tell you that such devices will ALMOST CERTAINLY exist, at least in arbitrarily small quantities against high-value, rare targets. All that's needed is an VHF/UHF/microwave oscillator whose frequency is varied slightly in response to a change in control voltage (which in this case would be the data line voltage). The antenna would be the data line itself. Commercially, they are called VCO's (voltage controlled oscillator) or VCXO's (voltage controlled crystal oscillator). Historically, many were/are built in packages the size of large oscillator modules, with pinouts compatible with 14-bit dips. These are the dinosaurs of the current era. More modern are surface-mount parts substantially smaller than a TO-92 transistor case. It is probably possible to put a VCO in an SOT-23 package, which is so small that unless your vision is good it's hard to see! Embedding these in a custom, one-off cable for a black-bag job would be rather easy, even for an organization far less sophisticated than the NSA/CIA. Another option would be to make the thing look like a surface-mount resistor or capacitor, and replacing an existing bias/decoupling component in an existing keyboard product. I think chances are very good that the NSA/CIA buys at least "one of" EVERYTHING sold (especially keyboards) to plan for just such jobs. >Second, I do not think it practicable that the cosmic-nasties (of one's >chosen social bias) could, in the real, practical world, run black-bag jobs >on tens of thousands of surburban garages as a prophylactic measure against >teenagers "playfully" setting up Mixmaster sites. _THAT_ is probably true, given "tens of thousands." But individual hardware can indeed be attacked. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jim Choate Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 10:56:20 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? (fwd) Message-ID: <199601070243.UAA06855@einstein.ssz.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text Forwarded message: > From: John Young > Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 20:27:02 -0500 > Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? > > "Other Things of Interest Dept: Virtual I-0, the Seattle > company that brings you those nifty 3-D LCD eye-glasses, > was showing [at Comdex] a complete hard disk-based computer > the size of a beta video cassette. The idea was that you > could plug in a keyboard and the video headset and finally > have that computer-without-a-screen concept that we've been > promised. Perfect for someone wanting genuine privacy, > although I think once we start seeing a plane load of > people all wearing virtual reality headsets, the world > becomes a little creepier. Anyone looking for small 486 compatible pc's should check out the system that scuba divers have been using for the last couple of years. They strap on your tank, have a cable with one-hand keyboard (usually hangs on the R. since your console is on the L.) that emulates a standard 101 and uses a small display that hangs off your mask. They run standard windows apps and are not too expensive. Check your local dive shop for specifics. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 10:31:14 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff Message-ID: <199601070216.VAA02580@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Perry's askance leads me to propose stealing Littman's book. It's as techno-thrilling as cypherpunks in describing the melodrama of unexpected human/technology malfunctions. True, only a bit of bare crypto in it, with Kevin advising Littman to use PGP so his Well mail could not be read -- as Kevin's e-mail to Littman was by Shimomura and Markoff. Littman says that was how Markoff learned of Kevin's and Littman's exchanges and why Markoff started hustling Littman for leads on Kevin to feed the trackers. Also, crypto-related: The fact that Shimomura's supposedly secret files were not protected by encryption or other security is what causes Littman and others to think there was a sting (perhaps with TLA help) rather than foolish vanity of the security wizard. Best, the book provides Clancy-like fun in deciphering the question of why humans abuse technology to mask their own frailty. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 12:20:57 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 3:45 AM 1/7/96, Lucky Green wrote: >Of course it was a set-up. Mitnick got into Shimomura's computer by >impersonating the IP address of one of Shimomura's machines. The router >should have never let packets in from outside that have an IP address that >is supposed to be inside. That a 'security expert' would overlook such a >blatant and well publicized hole in his _own_ router is inconceivable. > >Shimomura was trying to get someone to break into his system. If the bait >was specifically for Mitnick, we may never know. I've met Shimomura several times, and I don't think he was trying to get someone to break into his system. I tend strongly to believe his basic story, that he found someone entering his system. (Shimomura as I have met him is not some kind of Junior G-Man, intent on catching minor criminals. He's about as counter-cultural as any of us. Thus, his account that he found Mitnick breaking into his systems and stealing things as a taunt rings more true than some view that he is an FBI or BATF narc in training.) As to whether a security expert should have seen this coming, there are a couple of factors at work. First, being a security expert/consultant doesn't mean one has perfect security oneself (the shoes of the cobbler, etc.). Second, new attack modes are often involved. Third, Shimomura _did_ ultimately find the attack. As to what really happened with Shimomura, Markoff, Mitnick, and the Feds, I have no idea. The Littman account is one side of the story. The Shimomura-Markoff book will be another. The various movies and other deals will further complicate the picture. (There are some mighty strange characters involved. Katie Hafner, former wife of Markoff, wrote a piece for one of various weeklies or monthlies (maybe "Esquire," as I recall) about a former prostitute living in a trailer in Nevada--do former prostitutes ever live anywhere else?--who was badmouthing Shimomura and praising her buddy Mitnick...bizarre stuff...maybe it's make it into the movie. I understand that Christian Slater has agreed to play Mitnick, John Lone will play Shimomura, and Richard Drefuss will get the role of Markoff.) Knowing Markoff, Shimomura, and (vaguely) Menapace, and not knowing either Littman or Mitnick, I am somewhat biased toward the M-S-M view of things. While I don't think news of Mitnick is utterly alien to our group, I think people need to be discriminating in ascribing pro-Mitnick views to the Cypherpunks, at least as individuals. Supporting Mitnick just because he is a "hacker" or a "cracker" or a "cyber-outlaw" is wrong-headed. Also, I'm not persuaded that the Feds used blatantly illegal search and seizure tactics to arrest Mitnick. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 06:20:23 +0800 To: Jim Choate Subject: Re: Internet & Porno on A&E tonite Message-ID: <199601062218.RAA12597@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Sat, 6 Jan 1996 10:54:55 -0600 (CST), you wrote: >Hi, >Just saw an add for a Investigative Reports show tonite on A&E dealing with >the Internet and some of the current issues relating to porno and privacy. What time?!? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 15:17:15 +0800 To: Michael Handler Subject: Re: Domains, InterNIC, and PGP (and physical locations of hosts, to boot) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:15 PM 1/6/96 -0500, you wrote: >ObGPS/cpunk/physical-location-of-machines: A recent IETF proposal would >create a new DNS record that encoded the physical location of a >machine, encoded in latitude and longitude. This would solve the >problem MIT has had in distributing PGP, i.e. where exactly is >unix5.netaxs.com? However, there's nothing to stop you from adding >records that say your machines are at the latitude and longitude of, >say, Fort Meade... ;-) > > ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1876.txt > >Again, I'm not too sure of the viability of this proposal. Not on >effectiveness of proving true location -- it is more geared toward >"visual 3-D packet tracing" -- but simply because I have _no_ fricking >idea where our machines are (in terms of lat and long) to any degree >of accuracy. Question: Do we really WANT to advertise the location of machines? Especially to an accuracy commensurate with current technology? And if lying is possible, what's the point?!? >("They're somewhere in PA." Brilliant, you can find that >out via WHOIS.) The document suggests using GPS to locate your true >location, but I'll be damned if my boss is going to spend $1,000 just >so I can have more DNS entries to maintain... BTW, the cheapest GPS receivers (Magellan 2000's, as I recall) at $200 at the local marine supply shop. Excellent price. Even so, I won't buy one when I get my first GPS reciever, for two reasons: 1. No differential capability. (will improve accuracy to typically 2 meters) 2. Only two digits past the "minutes" decimal point resolution. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: loki@obscura.com (Lance Cottrell) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 14:44:17 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy? Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The second paragraph of this post seems to address a different issue than the first. The problem of correlations between a certain sender sending and a certain receiver receiving, is well known and understood. The best defense against this (as a sender) is to send messages into the remailer network with a period equal to or less than the the time required for a message with your typical chain length to pass through the remailer net. If these are sent at random intervals, then your real mail will blend with the cover traffic, and mail from you will correlate with all message receipts by all message recipients. The second paragraph seems to deal with the issue of being known as an anonymous remailer or regular remailer user. I am not sure exactly what the concern with that is. -Lance At 11:56 PM 1/5/96, Futplex wrote: >The "ultimate" traffic analysis problem, as others have observed, is >the correlation between messages sent by A and received by B via the overall >network. Hence the utility of a Dining Cryptographers' Net, PipeNet, etc. in >which the apparent bandwidth variation between any two points is eliminated. >A and B are effectively folded into the network. > >I suppose that a site that escapes detection as a Mixmaster will throw off >the correlation stats (i.e. because a message from that site to B won't be >identified as a remailed message). But such sites are elusive objects I >think. On the one hand, the site can't endure for long, or else its >throughput traffic will likely give it away as an anonymizer (i.e. it gets >lots of mail from the Mix network, and sends out similar amounts of mail to >all sorts of people and the network). On the other hand, it had better last, >or else it will look suspicious as a transient account receiving mail from >the Mix network, sending a few messages, and quickly vanishing. > >Futplex >"Dammit Jim, I'm a doctor, not a bricklayer!" > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO9nDfPzr81BVjMVAQF1YQgAo08ndnu7Lcok3O12hCYz57j+PClp8ulk LRRGGejhTNerums+FInio2IUQK3YvWLsIUj+UkZZkYPGAV292AsKnQROzBAYZ2kd V8MdVUqolZQfFzR7VYS2n+6ARlplff0E+58X2NDHgw25welmg7Id/xJmjiIwHI8J U6eGUw0BhMKrQuXCv4NpUsYGC2ux2abOs+Y2f4pjzSSyJhLuAXJbzlr0eRYWPOj7 AU2AAs/l4xTGbErYc2F5D9pfTJe6sMkUCseIyVpsoLUMsg24LItlDOUq1feT2ppq X1LJQRu05ERt3LIhjB5JHFClxecQyw31JDZV8E2H19mawK1LIkgKNA== =MU1s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki@obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ---------------------------------------------------------- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: steve@aztech.com Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 14:03:16 +0800 To: nobody@replay.com (Anonymous) Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff In-Reply-To: <199601070023.BAA04907@utopia.hacktic.nl> Message-ID: <9601070542.AA01803@Mail.AZTech.Net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I don't usually rant, but nobody@replay.com (Anonymous) said: #C'mon, Perry, give it a break. Mitnick's case has to do with security #issues as well as the violations of privacy and/or search and seizure #the government used to arrest him. #It may not be cryptography per se, but are you going to seriously argue #that security, etc. is not encompassed in crypto issues? #I found it interesting. If you didn't, then all you had to do was #delete it. No one needs to read your personal crusade as *The One* #who tells us what's relevant and what's not. I too found it interesting reading (agreeing with your position). I too found it to be off-topic/off-charter (agreeing with Perry's position.) It really torques me when someone suggests: (in response to someone else's suggestion that something was off-topic) "just delete it." I subscribe to a lot of mailing lists and news groups. Anything that contributes to the noise/signal ratio, and doesn't aplologize for it is a bad thing, IMHO. To be more on-topic, if Mitnick knew more about crypto and covert ops, he probably woudln't have been caught as easily. When he was caught, the feds probably wouldn't have been able to gather as much evidence against him. I'll stop ranting, now. You probably don't know me, and probably don't care about why I don't care to read alt.fan.kevin.mitnick stuff on the cypherpunks list. FWIW, -- S From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Michael Handler Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 12:29:37 +0800 To: Cypherpunks Subject: Domains, InterNIC, and PGP (and physical locations of hosts, to boot) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain The InterNIC (the company responsible for registering .COM, .EDU, .ORG, and .NET domains) has had a great deal of trouble lately, with people submitting malicious CHANGE DOMAIN requests (change admin or technical contact, point root nameserver entries to rival ISPs, etc). In response, the InterNIC has created "the Guardian project" which delineates who has access and authorization to change data in the InterNIC's record. Not much new cpunk relevance, but much of what has been discussed here is very applicable to this project (digital signatures, common access to databases, etc). I'm not completely pleased with their implementation, but it will do for now. They _do_ support PGP as an access controller within the Guardian project, and they have purchased a copy from ViaCrypt for this purpose. A good thing, says I. Check out their proposal: ftp://rs.internic.net/policy/internic/internic-gen-1.txt ObGPS/cpunk/physical-location-of-machines: A recent IETF proposal would create a new DNS record that encoded the physical location of a machine, encoded in latitude and longitude. This would solve the problem MIT has had in distributing PGP, i.e. where exactly is unix5.netaxs.com? However, there's nothing to stop you from adding records that say your machines are at the latitude and longitude of, say, Fort Meade... ;-) ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1876.txt Again, I'm not too sure of the viability of this proposal. Not on effectiveness of proving true location -- it is more geared toward "visual 3-D packet tracing" -- but simply because I have _no_ fricking idea where our machines are (in terms of lat and long) to any degree of accuracy. ("They're somewhere in PA." Brilliant, you can find that out via WHOIS.) The document suggests using GPS to locate your true location, but I'll be damned if my boss is going to spend $1,000 just so I can have more DNS entries to maintain... -- Michael Handler "Hours of frustration punctuated by moments of sheer terror." From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Brad Dolan Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 12:33:46 +0800 To: John Young Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff In-Reply-To: <199601070216.VAA02580@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I'm enjoying the story, partly because I took copious abuse from some CPs for posting - before Mitnick hit the papers - that the Well was under surveillance. [Crypto relevance of (TLA contract?) surveillance of ISPs should be obvious.] Anyway, it's too bad Mitnick didn't read CP. I'm still angry about the Well's voluntary cooperation in this scam. Why should I pay money to an outfit that's in bed with the TLAs? bdolan@use.usit.net, formerly bdolan@well.com On Sat, 6 Jan 1996, John Young wrote: > Perry's askance leads me to propose stealing Littman's > book. It's as techno-thrilling as cypherpunks in describing > the melodrama of unexpected human/technology malfunctions. > > True, only a bit of bare crypto in it, with Kevin advising > Littman to use PGP so his Well mail could not be read -- as > Kevin's e-mail to Littman was by Shimomura and Markoff. > Littman says that was how Markoff learned of Kevin's and > Littman's exchanges and why Markoff started hustling > Littman for leads on Kevin to feed the trackers. > > Also, crypto-related: The fact that Shimomura's supposedly > secret files were not protected by encryption or other > security is what causes Littman and others to think there > was a sting (perhaps with TLA help) rather than foolish > vanity of the security wizard. > > Best, the book provides Clancy-like fun in deciphering the > question of why humans abuse technology to mask their > own frailty. > > > > > > > > > From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 12:52:53 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff In-Reply-To: <199601070023.BAA04907@utopia.hacktic.nl> Message-ID: <199601070438.XAA26617@opine.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Perry Metzger writes: > This is cypherpunks, not Mitnick punks, Shimomura punks, or anything > similar. I personally don't care about Kevin Mitnick, and he most > certainly has little to no cryptography relevance at this point. Take > it elsewhere. I agree 100% with Perry. The Mitnick discussion is somewhat more stimulating than the recent flood of alt.security.pgp fodder (HINT HINT use alt.security.pgp instead HINT HINT), but it doesn't belong here either. Futplex -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO9OIynaAKQPVHDZAQHKrQf9Hc/wotKRqNKTYVQ4Zno6++CXIphyLrH8 qUL8pkTcTkoxB10X6x+TueA2jNFzZbzAdCpR1K20SSFXSSFwmvOtjqsSsJlKhyBC BLlGOtlWfZ9MxOPT/cXkr0a8GRKVz5G38h53vULnttI86eGGuO6XS4p/nBlyPqO5 oZJAFXJjjYSDXkmUKelRv5dKvf7z1sKjzbU0rZl95yX3t/Jy/PamroGWt7dEG//U 64ET47ZYBGg4xEG6hsJlOKiOVH5AmBk2lAUFricrkNw8ytzKwkVwJ0habZ45c0zy fyk+Dl6Kjcr/RO+FMkRKS0c0njmMBrLjDiiSZ3S80uuGc18IIwq9hw== =VLoM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: mikepb@freke.hoplite.org (Michael P. Brininstool) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 07:58:28 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1996Jan6.154423.21243@freke.hoplite.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain In article , Brad Dolan wrote: >Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 00:02:44 -0500 (EST) >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Coming off CompuServe's announcement last week that it was >cutting off all access to "alt.binaries" newsgroups under >pressure from the German government, I'm passing along another >apparent development from another Internet access provider, >Netcom. > >Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed >its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups >altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup >other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it >appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those >discussion groups. I saw all the posts regarding this and proclaiming it to be false. I feel obligated to point out a discussion we had at work last week about our news feeds (I work for an ISP). Our news machines are constantly filling up, and we can only add so much disk-space to the news spools. We have been reducing the expire times, and the news spools are still filling up too fast. 40%, I think it was, of the news was alt.*. I suggested (Bad, Mike!) that we kill all the alt.* groups, and add back only those that people customers actually request. The whole engineering group jumped down my throat saying that that action would be seen by the customers, and potential customers, as censorship. I withdrew my proposal, because I agreed with them. The reason I bring this up is to point out that the removal of the alt.* groups does not necessarily mean the people removing those groups are trying to censor anything, but may just be trying to reduce the resources eaten by news on their systems and network. -------------------------------------------------------------| | #include "std/disclaimer.h" Michael P. Brininstool | | http://www.hoplite.org/~mikepb/ NIC: MB458 | |------------------------------------------------------------- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Lee Fisher Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 20:12:37 +0800 To: "cypherpunks@toad.com> Subject: Re: "Microsoft.com" added to my KILL file Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain | After getting another batch of bounce messages from Microsoft's Postmaster, | I have reluctantly decided to filter out all messages from Microsoft.com | until they fix this problem with Microsoft Exchange. I'm not in the Exchange group, not the internal operations group responsible for this last error, but I'll try to clarify the two issues raised by this thread. (But perhaps this message was pointless, as the folks I'm attempting to explain to have already this filtered out by their KILL file?) MSMail and Exchange started before MIME started. They wanted to have "richer" email (as with MIME), and started some efforts, which put data in a uuencoded WINMAIL.DAT file. Exchange switched from TNEF (Transport Neutral something or another) to MIME. Originally the default was to send "rich" email but after beta feedback came in, it was changed to NOT be the default. So, these winmail.dat and MIME (and some TNEF) data included in some messages are from MSMail and Exchange clients. And while I expect that there are some things that our MS Mail and Exchange groups could have done better to introduce support for more than just ASCII messages, there is also some user education needed (that some forums -- such as mailing lists and newsgroups) often aren't the right place to post non-ASCII text like MIME attachments and older winmail.dat files. Another issue (the one mentioned in the above message). Last week the mail server operations group on Microsoft campus experienced a few "growing pains" switching over to later builds of Exchange server, switching over from MS Mail. Apparently there were some brief problems, causing some bounce messages, which would have manifested from a few users @microsoft.com. I don't know if it due to humans (operations group error) or computers (Exchange server bug) that caused it. The flurry of bounces was [hopefully] a one-time problem. Lee Fisher, leefi@microsoft.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 13:13:03 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff Message-ID: <199601070455.XAA14715@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Littman mentions toad.com twice -- that site, a character says, suspiciously, "run by one of the founders of Sun." Used, allegedly by the perp, to get into the drawers of, Well, you know. BTW, Littman says, and that Markoff agrees, that it was not Mitnick who got into Shimomura's underware, but, more than likely, the "Israeli." Apparently, an incident occurred after Kevin's bust. Agree with Tim that the Markoff/Shimomura book is needed to see both sides. For now, Mitnick seems to be a hapless pawn. Me too, about stuff I only read about. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Frank O'Dwyer" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 08:55:08 +0800 To: "tcmay@got.net> Subject: RE: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <01BADC96.AA0A0B20@dialup-169.dublin.iol.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Saturday, January 06, 1996 07:19, Timothy C. May[SMTP:tcmay@got.net] wrote: >At 9:47 AM 1/6/96, Frank O'Dwyer wrote: >>On Saturday, January 06, 1996 09:18, Timothy C. May[SMTP:tcmay@got.net] wrote: > >>>Basically, you are screwed. Any revocation you attempt will not be trusted, >>>as we will suspect the new "you" to be an attacker, perhaps an agent of the >>>NSA or the Illuminati. In the view that "you are your key," the old you no >>>longer exists. >> >>This is true, but the "old you" can be resurrected if you can get enough >>people to believe your new key using any out-of-band means available >>to you. You can also put a comment in your new key's uid explaining the > >Could you explain how "enough people" can get around a basic >feature/limitation of the current PGP web of trust? Who, besides the >originator, can revoke an old key? How many does it take? I wasn't referring to revoking the old key, but to introducing a new one and letting the old one fall into disuse. I think this can sometimes be done even if you've lost access to the old key, albeit in a painful out-of-band fashion. It does depend on the application, though, and if the (relevant portion of the) web of trust was very large, you might find that the old key kept popping up and you kept getting mail (or whatever-it-is-you're-encrypting) that you couldn't read. (and/or some people wouldn't believe your signatures). Basically, PGP's revocation model is broken unless you create a revocation cert. at the time you make your key, and keep it safely somewhere in case you need it. Even then, as time goes by the keyring keeps accumulating all these extra packets and growing without bound. It's not just PGP--all long-lived certificates are hard to revoke (for example X.509's revocation is also clunky). It's just that PGP's certificates are particularly long-lived, and PGP's revocation is particularly broken. Luckily the data formats do allow for a validity time, and a revocation of a key's countersignature, so this can perhaps be fixed sometime. >If a bunch of the "alleged" friends of Bruce could do this, could they not >revoke the key of someone they simply wish to hassle? Well, see above. The key is not revoked. But a bunch of people _could_ attempt to introduce a key under the name of someone they just wanted to hassle. The conspiracy doesn't have to be especially large. For example, it would be easy for me to invent a key for you and have _my_ friends believe it even in spite of your real key being on their keyrings. It wouldn't be so easy for me to get _your_ friends believe it. In Bruce's case, he'd be trying to do a similar thing, except that the key'd really be his, and more people'd be likely to believe him (especially his friends, and their friends, and so on). >I agree that a new key can be generated, and a new "Please use this key, >not the other one" message sent, and this may work, but I don't believe >this revokes the old key and removes it from the keyservers. I could be >wrong, as I am certainly no expert on the keyservers. I think you're right. The key will still be out there. >The question is: is there a "majority vote" mode on the keyservers that >causes them to remove a key if enough people claim it is no longer valid? I don't think so. At best, you might be able to convince the admins to manually delete the old key from the server's rings (assuming the software is able to do this). Even then, the key might keep popping back up, for example if you had countersigned other people's keys with your old key and they kept uploading their key with additional signatures. A practical solution might be for the key servers to automatically remove keys older than X years (or some time limit related to the key size). Ultimately though, what is needed is a new revocation model (maybe implementing the unused fields in the PGP certs is good enough to begin with). Cheers,Frank O'Dwyer fod@brd.ie http://www.iol.ie/~fod From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 13:36:01 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) Subject: Re: "trust management" vs. "certified identity" In-Reply-To: <01BADC99.C7034FE0@dialup-169.dublin.iol.ie> Message-ID: <199601070522.AAA26624@opine.cs.umass.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Frank O'Dwyer writes: [I've adjusted the line breaks for those of us with 80-column displays] > Privilege is also relative, but identity is not (nyms and that aside). That's a pretty large aside ! > I'm Frank O'Dwyer anywhere I go, I am definitely not "Futplex" in many places I go, and often I am not anyone in particular. "Auuugh! Single personality disorder! No cure!" -Beverley R. White > but I'm not "loyal bank customer" to all banks. Also, it's easier to > securely determine that I'm Frank O'Dwyer than it is to securely determine > (say) my credit limit. So, a signator's job in signing for my identity is > easier (and less risky) than signing for my trustworthiness. I am doubtful. I can't vouch for the identities of very many people on this list. (I've even met, e.g., Lucky in person and I certainly have no clue what his verinym might be, nor do I particularly care.) On the other hand, I am willing to sign onto all sorts of judgements about the trustworthiness of various people on the list, and other aspects of their reputations. I've driven hundreds of miles based on trust developed online with people whose identities I still haven't verified. I've even agreed to loan hundreds of dollars to someone I knew only as an online pseudonym. [...] > Plus, given secure identity (which might be an anonymous id), you can > layer the other stuff on top. I am swayed by the view expounded by Carl Ellison that a key, not an identity, should be the anchor to which attributes are attached. (Sorry if I am misstating or oversimplifying the position here.) I think identity should be hung off the key as just another (optional) attribute. I think your comments apply pretty well to trust relationships in the flesh, but don't fully take the net into account. Futplex The Pack Is Back -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO9YXCnaAKQPVHDZAQHKwwf/UQWZY9X9KV27qePoqPLRdsDN0Yn9v27F uIDapw0btdS4i9kkGONN/dGMC9EvQJv2ZOemIvqJ/0R09X7tD1bRIrqzDokvZEKw zMrkZ2xcvgAnq0FGG//awz8bveFyff1U2PL7xtHdvmNi6mtgzNah9L8yZCLqtmAD Uerh9+Qq9MSq6bidHBadVqwUr2y/7/1IWiYiMFqGZou7Gmwiu4AQDtKi04bVGi4b /VJHVe1/eyoN6nV7PyOWJsigP01+ZJblPgeg8Q37Mf8x7Hxjz5bWuFraS6jO+aNZ EduLoSyulblNKIWs3WRP339RJL0kAsPycdSfh6VVVUQRiHv5uaigyQ== =wcp/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Frank O'Dwyer" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 09:07:26 +0800 To: "'mab@research.att.com> Subject: RE: "trust management" vs. "certified identity" Message-ID: <01BADC99.C7034FE0@dialup-169.dublin.iol.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Saturday, January 06, 1996 10:32, Matt Blaze[SMTP:mab@research.att.com] wrote: >The discussions here of the limits of PGP's certification and >revocation model are close to the core of some work I've been doing >(with Joan Feigenbaum and Jack Lacy) on what we call the "trust >management" problem. > >Essentially we consider the consequences of abandoning the notion >of "certified identity" implicit in systems like X.509 and PGP and >subsuming identity under the more general umbrella of specifying >and determining what a key is trusted to do. This is an interesting idea. I think, though, that there's something to be said for keeping identity and privilege separate things to be vouched for. For one thing privileges and policy change but identity doesn't. Privilege is also relative, but identity is not (nyms and that aside). I'm Frank O'Dwyer anywhere I go, but I'm not "loyal bank customer" to all banks. Also, it's easier to securely determine that I'm Frank O'Dwyer than it is to securely determine (say) my credit limit. So, a signator's job in signing for my identity is easier (and less risky) than signing for my trustworthiness. And we still don't have many CAs signing for identity! Plus, given secure identity (which might be an anonymous id), you can layer the other stuff on top. That's not to say that the certification approach can't be general, though. It occurred to me that a very general certificate format would simply be to sign some assertions (predicates), and then feed all available signed predicates plus some axioms (the analogue of root keys) into a theorem prover. Sounds slow though. More practically perhaps, you could sign some kind of (safe) interpreted code, and have the verifier execute it on some initial variable set to come up with some access decision. I haven't read your paper yet though! I'll read it and get back to you. There does seem to be something about current models of certification that inhibits their take up, so it's good to hear something new in this area... Cheers, Frank O'Dwyer fod@brd.ie http://www.iol.ie/~fod From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 08:42:48 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff Message-ID: <199601070023.BAA04907@utopia.hacktic.nl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 06:31 PM 1/6/96 -0500, Perry Metzger wrote: > >This is cypherpunks, not Mitnick punks, Shimomura punks, or anything >similar. I personally don't care about Kevin Mitnick, and he most >certainly has little to no cryptography relevance at this point. Take >it elsewhere. C'mon, Perry, give it a break. Mitnick's case has to do with security issues as well as the violations of privacy and/or search and seizure the government used to arrest him. It may not be cryptography per se, but are you going to seriously argue that security, etc. is not encompassed in crypto issues? I found it interesting. If you didn't, then all you had to do was delete it. No one needs to read your personal crusade as *The One* who tells us what's relevant and what's not. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Jeff Weinstein Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 07:26:32 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: NSA says strong crypto to china?? Message-ID: <199601070941.BAA12858@ammodump.mcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain This is a quote from an article by Paul Vallely in The Independent, London, which can be found here: http://nytsyn.com/live/News3/006_010696_101827_2723.html > What one government regards as harmful material is an instrument of freedom > and democracy to another. Officials at the US National Security Agency have > suggested that Internet encryption technology - a sophisticated method of > encoding information - be deliberately exported to Chinese dissidents to > help them in their fight against their government - even though its export > is otherwise banned under US arms control regulations. Does anyone know of real documentation of this "suggestion" from the NSA? It quite telling, though no surprise to any of us I'm sure, that they would think that strong crypto should be a tool of freedom in china, but not in this country. Maybe they should get Microsoft to insert subliminal directions for downloading PGP into a future episode of "My Computer Family". :-) --Jeff Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw@netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw/ Any opinions expressed above are mine. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: sameer Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 18:14:03 +0800 To: jsw@netscape.com (Jeff Weinstein) Subject: Re: NSA says strong crypto to china?? In-Reply-To: <199601070941.BAA12858@ammodump.mcom.com> Message-ID: <199601070958.BAA04319@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain > Does anyone know of real documentation of this "suggestion" from the NSA? > It quite telling, though no surprise to any of us I'm sure, that they would > think that strong crypto should be a tool of freedom in china, but not in > this country. But they do. That's why they don't want it. That too should be obvious. I think though, that this is an example of the two major functional halves of the NSA, with rather opposite goals: COMSEC vs. COMINT. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777x3 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer@c2.org From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 16:09:52 +0800 To: Jim Choate Subject: Re: Internet & Porno on A&E tonite Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 10:54 1/6/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Hi, > >Just saw an add for a Investigative Reports show tonite on A&E dealing with >the Internet and some of the current issues relating to porno and privacy. > > > Jim Choate I just got done watching it. Heavy on the porno and Light on the privacy. It did cover some of our hot buttons but stayed away from talking about their context (ie: They covered the TN prosecution of the CA BBS owner but ignored the question of if it was a prosecution or a persecution [as well as the question of if the charge/trial was legal in the first case]). From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Robert A. Rosenberg" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 16:09:55 +0800 To: blanc Subject: Re: FW: Undeliverable: Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:25 1/6/96, blanc wrote: >From: Steve14571@aol.com > >Something else I want to know... Why is my mail going through microsoft.com? >........................................................................... >............................ > >There is an email 'alias' at Microsoft which was subscribed to the cpunk >list, to receive and distribute the cpunk list to members of that alias. > >A new beta version of Exchange is being used on a test basis by some >departments (apparently all of the cpunks at MS are using it), and the >programmers recently encountered a "little complication" (to use a phrase >from the movie 'Brazil'). I'm told that the problems were corrected, but >that now the spoolers are releasing messages which were backed up while >mail delivery was put on hold. I hate to agree with Timothy C. May, but >it is probably best to "use technology " to deal with it for a day or so. > > .. >Blanc I had a bounce from another list () so it is not only cypherpunks which is having the problem. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alex Strasheim Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 22:04:34 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: NSA says strong crypto to china?? In-Reply-To: <199601070941.BAA12858@ammodump.mcom.com> Message-ID: <199601071037.EAA00310@proust.suba.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text > > What one government regards as harmful material is an instrument of freedom > > and democracy to another. Officials at the US National Security Agency have > > suggested that Internet encryption technology - a sophisticated method of > > encoding information - be deliberately exported to Chinese dissidents to > > help them in their fight against their government - even though its export > > is otherwise banned under US arms control regulations. If this is true, it's great news. It would mean that the NSA is adopting both cypherpunk analysis and tactics. Who would have thought? An NSA remade in Tim May's image. > Does anyone know of real documentation of this "suggestion" from the NSA? > It quite telling, though no surprise to any of us I'm sure, that they would > think that strong crypto should be a tool of freedom in china, but not in > this country. The NSA is a big organization with a lot of people in it. It could be that the people in charge of thinking about Chineese dissidents are far removed from the people who think about domestic crypto. I'm skeptical about this story, but it would be a sensible policy for us to pursue. But not just with dissidents, and not just in China. We ought to try to create an environment in which people who want to do business need to have access to strong crypto in order to interoperate with the rest of the world. Pump high quality free tools out to the world, and push for solid standards for encrypted communications. And make sure those Chineese and Iraqi dissidents always have a safe way to post anonymously. We're already living in a world in which it's necessary to give people computers if you want them to be competitive economically. Let's try to make giving people computers the functional equivilant of abandoning any hope of making censorship work. I doubt they're interested in doing this, but I don't understand why. It's a sensible policy. Can you imagine what would happen to freedom and privacy around the world if the NSA went cypherpunk? In the space of a month they could eliminate the possibility of totalitarianism world wide. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Don M. Kitchen" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 22:39:50 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Key Expirations (was: Revoking Old Lost Keys) Message-ID: <199601071308.GAA00421@wero.cs.byu.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) >At 15:45 1/6/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >>Perhaps if keys could be made with expiration dates (certificates too), >>this problem might be reduced to managable proportions. > >I would very much like to see expiration dates on public keys. Is PGP 3.0 >offering this feature? (it would be nice to know of anything that PGP 3 will be offering) >From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) > >Keys should have built-in expiration dates (adjustable by the user >manually the way one would change their user-id, passphrase, etc.) I disagree, I think a key should be be given a specific lifetime. A master key, for example, might be given a life of 7-10 years, while a common-use key a life of, for example, 2-5 years. >PGP should give a warning when the key passes the expiration date. It >should not prevent you from using it, but should remind you that the >key is rather old, and that the owner may have moved, etc. I disagree. I think that it's the key owners' responsibility to provide transitions to a new key. (it would be nice to have a mechanism to auto transfer signatures to a new key, but I can't see that being both safe and practical) I also would also like to see PGP/keyservers with more of a current-status paradigm, rather than a from-the-beginning-of-time model. A "my master key is foo" and "I'm master of: fiz, bar, baz" fields would encourage the emergant practice of having a secure master key, and a common key that is replaced more often. Not-Secure Systems are Not-Secure Systems, and there should be Not-Secure keys to be used on these ISP/multiuser/whatever systems, without resorting to multiple keys, mutually signed, that merely proclaim their properties in the key ID. I'm certainly not calling for Someone[tm] to code it up, only pleading that the paradigms be established conceptually, so that everyone knows (and hopefully agrees) where it's going. We have security (stealth pgp, if generally indistinguishable from random data, will ensure that, and prevent all but human betrayal or tremendously draconian outlawing of random data from taking that security from us) but we do not have seamlessness, and we do not have a PGP that fits how PGP is being used, and not knowing if these things have even been planned is distressing. >Users who want to extend the life of their keys should send special >certificates (at least once a year or every other year?) that tell >keyservers and those with copies of their public keys that the key is >still being used, and to update the expiration time. I can only this working elegantly if the expiration date, as a signed block, could be expunged and a new expiration date block put in. Signatures, of course, would have to authenticate the parts that don't change. If the expiration date is inside the _owner's_ authentication block, everything would still be attack-resistant. (Everything absolutely should be designed to resist spoofing, etc. I would like to see PGP _IGNORE_ key ID's that are not signed, and naturally default to signing key-IDs when being added.) I too would like would like to see expiration dates built into the keys. The PGP key has too much of a static-model, long life paradigm. IMHO, I see two problems. First, key signature are for the key/ID string pair. Every time someone changes email addresses, a clunky ID string addition is made to the key, and subsequent signatures are made to _that_ pair. I don't disagree that it should be this way, only suggest that a more integrated, conceptual view even, should be presented. While I'm presenting my wish list, it would also be nice for PGP to be able to extract keys that are in the Web Of Trust[tm] relative to an arbitrary key. I attempted to do something like this with by Web Of Nobody's keyring for those of you who didn't see my posts, that's what I called what I generated because the brute-force way I extracted it necessitated the signatures going the opposite direction than they should have, resulting in a great many nobody's and missing a few somebody's.) which reduced the then-5 meg keyring to 1 meg. (I am considering doing it again, since I still don't know enough PERL to generate a web of trust instead of a web of nobodies) A feature like this would, in my opinion, largely negate (or at least greatly delay) the need for a DNS-style key lookup. And, after all, what's the purpose in having a list of all keys in the world, why not just have a list of keys that are actually interrelated, extracted from the former. Perhaps even a batch-mode "copy all new and trusted keys from keyring X", THAT would help tremendously with a "locally-trusted" / "globally known" dual-use of PGP and its keys. >From: "Frank O'Dwyer" >portion of the) web of trust was very large, you might find that the old key >kept popping up and you kept getting mail ... >It's just that PGP's certificates are particularly long-lived, and PGP's >revocation is particularly broken. Luckily the data formats do allow for a >validity time, and a revocation of a key's countersignature, so this can >perhaps be fixed sometime. ... >uploading their key with additional signatures. A practical solution >might be for the key servers to automatically remove keys older than X >years (or some time limit related to the key size). Ultimately though, what >is needed is a new revocation model (maybe implementing the unused fields >in the PGP certs is good enough to begin with). This is all a me-too. As I said, I would like to see a current, how-it-is-now list, rather than having keys whose replacement's replacements' replacements have been revolked long ago. >On Sat, 6 Jan 1996 09:47:16 -0000, "Frank O'Dwyer" wrote: > >The PGP formats do allow for a 'revocation' certificate, but PGP doesn't >implement it (yet, I guess). In any case, it's not really strong enough, >since what it says is "I retract all my previous statements that this key is >related to this user". This'd mean that you'd have to visit everyone who'd >ever signed your key and get them to issue this retraction. What would be >needed for this problem is either an "anti-certificate" ("This key does not >belong to this user"), or else some convention. For example, if two _trusted_ >keys are found for the same uid, the most recent one could be chosen, and >the earlier one be purged from keyservers, etc. This may be possible with >current PGP. I haven't tried it, but since I have some keys which have >fallen into disuse, I will need to do so sometime.). I think this is a feature that would be good to have, not necessary for all signatory parties to retract sigs, but certainly for one or more of them to do so. I do think, however, that both should be kept (and not just one cancel another like a current-status model would) and that perhaps the two should default to not being displayed, but certainly PGP explain it as "X revokes signature, contact both parties for explanation" type of thing; let the human be the judge. Don PS: This message may be double-signed, don't think it unusual if it is. - - --- fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Junk mail to root@127.0.0.1 * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company * - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMO/FtsLa+QKZS485AQGcSwL/eyUiZ4YgKfLyQx94K+Vm/y2Jmsx1DnOm Anvv2EA98qY1wBxpg2HUCrV2NO97vafTPNJ5dcZsLUIDOnzjw3Pxj7ikNTnwL45Q 89NVqc6jHG3NCbIirDTPSN/q20N2yhEA =qRq9 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMO/FzcLa+QKZS485AQG8OQMAj9mDA9v7f68cKDl4z8JLieFsFo4EtzJb XDna9JXvYQj/tBd+AFuBNxhawzIgSn7ydIw/QtRcE/a9HbAY4eJDfuEANfoKZARb TpxLWpmGU1uDidEB9irGxGGZd4uen7Mz =Ku7l -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 15:17:46 +0800 To: "Cypherpunks" Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <199601070707.CAA25933@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Sat, 6 Jan 1996 03:10:49 +0000, "Michael C. Peponis" wrote: >If it's widley distributed, or on a keyserver, that becomes hard. >First you would have to be authenticated as the origional key owner, >ie how do I realy know that you are you, and not somebody saying you >are the orgional key owner? [..] >Good topic. Interesting, yes. Also a possible attack... Alice sends a PGP'd message to Charlie, but gets a reply from "Charlie" saying that they original key was lost due to a hard drive crash, etc.... and that she should coinsider it revoked. Is that message from Charlie or from Mallet (the demonic SysAdmin), who is trying to get in between Alice and Charlie...? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 15:22:47 +0800 To: CPunks Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <199601070714.CAA02909@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Fri, 05 Jan 1996 23:07:19 -0800, Bruce Baugh wrote: >I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which >I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. >The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no >longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot >therefore create a revocation certificate? [..] Keys should have built-in expiration dates (adjustable by the user manually the way one would change their user-id, passphrase, etc.) PGP should give a warning when the key passes the expiration date. It should not prevent you from using it, but should remind you that the key is rather old, and that the owner may have moved, etc. Users who want to extend the life of their keys should send special certificates (at least once a year or every other year?) that tell keyservers and those with copies of their public keys that the key is still being used, and to update the expiration time. Comments? --Rob From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 00:34:27 +0800 To: Cypherpunks Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <199601070721.CAA03941@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Sat, 6 Jan 1996 09:47:16 -0000, "Frank O'Dwyer" wrote: [..] >The PGP formats do allow for a 'revocation' certificate, but PGP doesn't >implement it (yet, I guess). In any case, it's not really strong enough, >since what it says is "I retract all my previous statements that this key is >related to this user". This'd mean that you'd have to visit everyone who'd ever >signed your key and get them to issue this retraction. What would be needed >for this problem is either an "anti-certificate" ("This key does not belong to this >user"), or else some convention. For example, if two _trusted_ keys are found for the >same uid, the most recent one could be chosen, and the earlier one be purged >from keyservers, etc. This may be possible with current PGP. I haven't tried it, >but since I have some keys which have fallen into disuse, I will need to do so >sometime.). Revocation of signatures is a good thing, but beware of anti-certificates, since one can create a nasty web of affirmations and denaials that is unresolvable. (Yes, literally from Logic 101 classes about paradoxes....) From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: j.miranda3@genie.com Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 15:53:50 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: info Message-ID: <199601070733.AA020080001@relay1.geis.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Anyone have any connections with the alternative/underground rock scene. I have been reality surfing it here in the L.A. area and am looking for people who are interested in coming along to assorted indsutrial/techno/gothic/rave places. Also, are there any cybernetic developments related to this scene I was thinking of something along a program which would be used when employing the mini-monitors (which you wear like sunglasses). From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "Frank O'Dwyer" Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 22:33:44 +0800 To: "'Cypherpunks Mailing List'" Subject: RE: "trust management" vs. "certified identity" Message-ID: <01BADCE4.66BC9880@dialup-100.dublin.iol.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Sunday, January 07, 1996 12:22, Futplex[SMTP:futplex@pseudonym.com] wrote:>Frank O'Dwyer writes: >[I've adjusted the line breaks for those of us with 80-column displays] Apologies - this mailer doesn't give me any indication where the margin is. [...] >>a signator's job in signing for my identity is >> easier (and less risky) than signing for my trustworthiness. >I am doubtful. I can't vouch for the identities of very many people on this >list. (I've even met, e.g., Lucky in person and I certainly have no clue >what his verinym might be, nor do I particularly care.) On the other hand, I >am willing to sign onto all sorts of judgements about the trustworthiness of >various people on the list, and other aspects of their reputations. I've >driven hundreds of miles based on trust developed online with people whose >identities I still haven't verified. I've even agreed to loan hundreds of >dollars to someone I knew only as an online pseudonym. I'm not saying that trust requires identity (it obviously doesn't, since we all make trusted cash transactions all the time without having to produce any id.). But it is usually easier to determine (and vouch for) who a stranger is than how trustworthy they are, if only because there are quick and easy real-world mechanisms for this (driver's licence, passport,etc.). That's all I meant. (BTW, can you lend me a few bucks? :-) [...] >I am swayed by the view expounded by Carl Ellison that a key, not an >identity, should be the anchor to which attributes are attached. (Sorry if >I am misstating or oversimplifying the position here.) I think identity >should be hung off the key as just another (optional) attribute. That's an extremely useful way of looking at it, I agree. But the lifetime of a key is often less than that of some attribute. It's easy to imagine one email address having a succession of keys. But then again, one might acquire and discard email address more often than keys (I've gone through three addresses in the last year or so). So perhaps a better model is just a loose assocation of attributes, with "key(s)" and "identity(s)" being two very interesting ones, but no one attribute being primary all the time. (I'm thinking out loud here -- I'm actually trying to come up with some C++ classes for this sort of stuff, so this discussion is pretty interesting to me. Thus far, I'd got to the model you describe - a key has a bunch of attributes, one them identity. But now I'm thinking that this maybe isn't enough, and an 'identity-centric' view is also needed. Perhaps there should be multiple views into the same data?). >I think your comments apply pretty well to trust relationships in the flesh, >but don't fully take the net into account. Right. I was only talking about 'verinyms', really. Cheers,Frank O'Dwyer fod@brd.ie http://www.iol.ie/~fod From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Horowitz Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 23:24:35 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: NSA says strong crypto to china?? In-Reply-To: <199601071037.EAA00310@proust.suba.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Yeah but if NSA went Cypherpunks, what would be the new PC dogma - the current San Fransisco trendlines? If you aren't a Sensitive Guy who'd rather re-read Hillary's speech at the Beijing Women's Conference, than watch the jittering cheerleaders on Monday Night Football - there goes your promotion! Not to shatter your illusions boys, but there's a school of thought back here East of the Rockies that the whole shebang south of Redding should be written off after the next Big One - no taxpayer dollars spent _at all_. Commit American Imperialist Aggression against Mexico - use gunboat diplomacy to make them take California back. Only hold onto a few selected spots as Possessions. I mean, Vandenberg's on a very convenient spot for launching birds to listen in on the Beijing apparatchiks on the cellphone, running their mistresses in and out of the secret entrances of the Forbidden City faster than the JFK-era Secret Service could have kept up with. Visit the hospitality room at the next annual convention of the Old Crows Association, if you want to see proof that the electronic-warfare community, like worker-bee military types in general nowadays, comprises LOTS of folks with a rather Libertarian outlook. Alan Horowitz alanh@infi.net From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: "James A. Donald" Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 14:53:10 +0800 To: Alex Strasheim MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 03:23 PM 1/7/96 -0600, Alex Strasheim wrote: > But I don't necessarily look at the > NSA as an enemy. Right now we're on opposite sides of an important issue, > and I think they're doing a lot of damage. But I tend to think that they > believe what they're doing is in the national interest. They're trying > to defend democracy -- our democracy, at least. I see no sign that NSA is capable of distinguishing between the interest of the state and the interest of the nation. It is perfectly clear that the threat that NSA is primarily concerned with comes from within, not from without. > So the question we ought to be putting to the NSA is this: isn't it in > the best interest of the United States and the other capitalist Western > democracies to impose the first ammendment on the rest of the world? There is this big myth, spread partly by the US government, and partly by the radical left, notably Chomsky, that the US has been protecting the world against socialism: This is a load of old bananas. The US government has been pro socialist -- not as pro socialist as the IMF, and the IMF has not been as pro socialist as the Soviets -- but the US has still been shoving socialism down peoples throats in a heavy handed way, because they could get away with that kind of stuff abroad, when they cop hell for it at home. The nastiest piece of socialism was arguably the land reform scheme in El Salvador, which converted the peasants from tenants of a few powerful rural landlords, to serfs on state run collective farms. This screwed up agriculture big time, and the peasants detested it. If you want to use land reform to make peasants into anti communists, you use the method so successfully used in Taiwan. You make it possible for the peasant to buy land, and encourage him to buy land, and once he has some land of his own, and has sacrificed in order to obtain it, you can then trust him to resist communism. If there are communist guerrillas around, you should give him a shotgun. The US government followed a very different strategy in El Salvador, from which we may conclude that just as the South Vietnamese government considered that robbing the Montagnards, and rendering them powerless and afraid was more important than resisting North Vietnamese communism, the US government similarly considered that suppressing private property, was more important than resisting communist infiltration in El Salvador. El Salvador was vulnerable to communism because only two hundred families owned everything worth owning. If you want to prevent communism the kind of land reform you need is land reform that allows more people to acquire individual property rights. > I don't think the NSA is out to suppress our liberties. > [...] it is a mistake to think of them as evil, as people who > will tell any lie to get what they want. I disagree. Two government officials, one of whom is a communist, have more in common than two communists, one of whom is a government official. The NSA is on the same side as the Chinese government, and if Chinese dissidents used crypto with US GAK, this information would be exchanged with the Chinese government. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd@echeque.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 10:02:58 +0800 Subject: A /dev/random standard is need. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I'm revising the DOS NOISE.SYS driver currently. In writing the documentation I am discussing the advantages of such a driver (part of the logic behind writing it). Mainly, a hardware (and to some extent) operating system independent means is needed for generating random numbers. It seems to me that a device driver (at least for DOS, Unix and maybe Amiga or Atari) is the best way to do this. If one has special chips or diodes for generating randomness, a device driver which reads from them can be used. If one lacks such equipment, something like NOISE.SYS or random.c for Linux, or Noiz (which I have not yet look at) can be used. Even then, random.c defines two devices, random (which only returns as many bits as there are fresh bits in the entropy pool) and urandom (which keeps hashing the bits and will return as many as requested.) NOISE.SYS defines only random, which behaves more like urandom above. If there is a standard, it will make it easier to use special hardware since software which reads from a random device can access it. Perhaps a kind of standard should be discussed and created so that cross-platform development is made much easier, and so that features and capabilities can be worked out. Does anybody else see a need for this? --Rob From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alex Strasheim Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 00:51:18 +0800 To: mab@research.att.com (Matt Blaze) Subject: Re: "trust management" vs. "certified identity" In-Reply-To: <199601062232.RAA12812@nsa.tempo.att.com> Message-ID: <199601071633.KAA00530@proust.suba.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text > Comments and discussion appreciated. This is very interesting stuff -- a big improvement, I think. I have the impression that pm might look a little bit like an sql server. Is that in the ballpark? Feeding pm an assertion might be analagous to giving an sql server a command that defines a table, and a pm query might be similar to an sql command that queries a database. Whether or not someone (some key) is allowed to change the assertions would be governed by assertions that are already in place. Or are things going to be setup so that a querying application (like a mailer) will feed pm all the information it needs, including assertions, each time a query is made? Although the name of the paper is "decentralized trust management", it seems to me that the ability to implemenent centralized trust management schemes would be useful for pm. Centralized trust management has a lot going for it as long as no one's being forced to accept it. I would expect that in a large organization the rules as well as the identities of the players would change frequently. Someone will decree that level j is no longer sufficient to authorize purchase orders for $5000 or less, level j+1 will be required in the future. One advantage of the sql style server is that an organization's trust manager could implement these changes for lots of work stations centrally, independently of specific applications (ie., changes could affect all mailers). A particular pm server on a workstation might know about different trust models from different organizations. Someone who reads cypherpunks at work might have a set of assertions that his company's trust manager can modify, a set of assertions about cypherpunks that Eric can modify, and another set of assertions about personal correspondence that only the server's owner can modify. The server's owner could always do anything he wanted -- an assertion that says a specific owner key can do anything would be hardcoded into the system. Does this make sense? From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Raph Levien Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 03:09:59 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: "Re: NSA says strong crypto to china?? In-Reply-To: <199601070941.BAA12858@ammodump.mcom.com> Message-ID: <199601071847.KAA26014@infinity.c2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain The original article in the Indpendent contained too many factual inaccuracies to take the NSA statement at face value. Further, some of the details resemble an interchange between Carl Ellison and the OSTP. For the details, check out: http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/nist-ske.html Here's the relevant excerpt: Sell to Chinese dissidents In the opening session, Mike Nelson of the OSTP (Office of Science and Technology Policy on the vice president's staff) presented his discussion of the Key Escrow criteria. He was asked who in his right mind would buy a product with a master key escrowed in the U.S., with access by US Law Enforcement. His answer was that a Chinese dissident would be quite happy to have the key escrowed by a US agent, in the US, for US government access -- rather than by a Chinese agent, in China, for Chinese government access. That's a good plan, Mike. That's a huge market. I'm looking forward to seeing the agreement with the People's Republic under which they allow the importation of such products. [end excerpt] My best guess is that we're seeing a distortion of this interchange. If I were a Chinese dissident, I wouldn't want to use GAK, for three reasons: using US-lackey encryption is certainly not going to get you into any _less_ trouble than using independent encryption, if you used GAK you'd be working as a US spy whether you wanted to be or not, and finally, who says the Chinese can't decrypt it, especially with the rapid growth of television. Raph P.S. To those who are suriprised that I'm still here - my flight got delayed, and I'm waiting it out on the Net, in true geek style. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tallpaul@pipeline.com (tallpaul) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 01:40:06 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: NSA says strong crypto to China? Message-ID: <199601071553.KAA18768@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Logically, it seems the best thing for the NSA to do (given the political character of the group) is to send strong-but-not-that-strong crypto out. In other words, they would want the various offically-USA recognized "dissidents" (as opposed to officially-USA recognized "terrorists") to have crypto strong enough so that the various defined-as-repressive governments cannot decrypt it while not-strong-enough to prevent NASA from reading it. -- -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 00:21:36 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: CelBomb Message-ID: <199601071609.LAA23989@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain The New York Post, Jan 6, 1996. By Uri Dan from Jerusalem Palestinian police said Ayash [The Engineer] was killed north of Gaza City when he answered a call on a cell phone rigged with two ounces of explosives. Israeli sources said the phone had been secretly traded for Ayash's real phone -- and the explosion was triggered by remote control once it was determined he was on the line. ---------- No brand name given, however, another source writes that Mot runs the IL cel net. So use that neat audio-vox wire on MicroTAC Elites only with paid-up Shin Bet dues, absent TS-immunization. From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: jim bell Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 03:54:47 +0800 To: Brad Dolan Subject: Re: phone calls from hell Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 01:15 PM 1/7/96 -0500, you wrote: >SNS News Service "Exploding Phone" >January 7, 1996..15 Teves 5756..Number 850..Update from Israel >It is now being reported that the cellular phone that killed him was >detonated by a remote control. The son of Ayyash's landlord, identified >as Ikrimeh Hamad, was expected to have handed Ayyash the phone >earlier in the day. Some reports state that his whereabouts are >unknown but other reports stated that he is now hiding-out in Israel. >>>27 Heathway Court * London England * NW3 7TS * 44-181-458-6510 >Fax: 44-181-455-8701 > Copyright, Shomron News Service, 1996 > >*** > >Comment by bd: > >I suppose this phone was prepared especially for Ayyash, but the >imagination wanders. Imagine a world in which *every* cellphone >(or other net-connected computer or ....) had a little explosive built >in. For that matter, the case itself could be constructed of a plastic >explosive. > >Sure would make it easy to get rid of unwanted citizens. >Just match the voice pattern on the cellphone or confirm the password >issuing from the computer, send the special signal down the line and >*BOOM*, one less nuisance for the state. Sorta gives new meaning to the term "_Terminate_ and Stay Resident" program, doesn't it?!? (Or "end of file.") From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Alan Olsen Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 03:49:15 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: "Re: NSA says strong crypto to china?? Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960107193222.009566d0@mail.teleport.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 10:47 AM 1/7/96 -0800, Raph wrote: > > My best guess is that we're seeing a distortion of this >interchange. If I were a Chinese dissident, I wouldn't want to use >GAK, for three reasons: using US-lackey encryption is certainly not >going to get you into any _less_ trouble than using independent >encryption, if you used GAK you'd be working as a US spy whether you >wanted to be or not, and finally, who says the Chinese can't decrypt >it, especially with the rapid growth of television. I can also think of another good reason that no dissident in their right mind would want to use US escrowed GAK. How many times have individuals been sold out for some "greater good". I can just imagine some dissident getting sold out as the result of some mega-trade deal or the like. (And I am sure that they can too...) Why does this news report sound more like someone trying to sell GAK to the US public and not "chinese dissidents? > >Raph > >P.S. To those who are suriprised that I'm still here - my flight got >delayed, and I'm waiting it out on the Net, in true geek style. > > Alan Olsen -- alano@teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: wlkngowl@unix.asb.com (Mutatis Mutantdis) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 22:33:43 +0800 To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys Message-ID: <199601071215.HAA05673@UNiX.asb.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) writes: >I would very much like to see expiration dates on public keys. Is PGP 3.0 >offering this feature? I would very uch like to see PGP 3.0, but that's another story... --Rob From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: mrm@netcom.com (Marianne Mueller) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 04:26:53 +0800 To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com Subject: Jan 13 CA bay area meeting - time Message-ID: <199601072004.MAA27310@netcom20.netcom.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sorry! I forgot to mention that the meeting is held from 12 noon to 6 p.m. Date: Saturday January 13 Time: 12 noon - 6 p.m. Location: Building 21, Sparcy's cafeteria, Sun Microsystems Agenda: YOUR NAME HERE! (hint hint) Food: Bagels provided. Feel free to bring lunch to munch. Directions: Take 101 to Amphitheater Parkway. At the end of the exit ramp, turn left at the light onto Charleston. (This street is also known as Garcia.) After about 1/3 mile, turn right onto the side street. This will be the first city side street on your right, as you drive down Charleston/Garcia. In about 2 or 3 blocks, you'll see purple signs for Building 21 of Sun. If anyone driving down from SF or Berkeley can pick up Ian at the SF airport that would be way groovy. Marianne mrm@netcom.com mrm@eng.sun.com From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 03:17:00 +0800