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Re: Request: tamper-proofing executables
On Fri, 8 Jul 1994, Dan Marner wrote:
> I would appreciate any pointers to documents, source code or
> programs that deal with using cryptographic techniques to detect
> or prevent modification of executable code. I am looking for
> something that uses either a signature or a one-way hash to detect
> modifications at run time.
> Of particular interest is information on signing a file that
> includes the signature as part of the file. Is this possible with
> any of the common algorithms?
Hoom. Last year, I was working on an idea I head, of making
self-encrypting executables. It used a simple XOR with a hardcoded value.
Not very secure, but that wasn't the point. The XOR was meant to deter
decompilers and stupid k00l /<-Rad hackerz from hex-editing the strings
in the program. It as, of course, vulnerable to debuggers, but I did run
into code later meant to deter them as well...
My ramblings here do have a point, and it's this: It's VERY
difficult to get an executable protection or encryption scheme to be
undefeatable. If they have a debugger, a decompiler, and various other
crypto-verification tools, they can defeat your scheme. Put a CRC of the
MD5 hash in the file to make sure they don't replace the hash? They can
generate the CRC of their hash and replace it in the file.
I have yet to devise or find a foolproof [ ;) ] or unbreakable
protection scheme. I'mm starting to think there's no such animal. What
you CAN do is protect your executables against file corruption, viruses,
and lame-0 hacker dudez. But, getting any secure PGP-level security is
very difficult.
OTOH, if anyone else has come up with a scheme that is hard to
break / unbreakable, *please* come formward and correct me. I have a few
applications that I'd like to apply this to. :)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brandt Handler <[email protected]>
Philadelphia, PA <[email protected]>
Currently at CMU, Pittsburgh, PA PGP v2.6 public key on request
Boycott Canter & Siegel <<NSA>> 1984: We're Behind Schedule