Re: Clipper Chip Retreat

[sidney@taurus.apple.com (Sidney Markowitz)]

Carl Ellison writes:
>I don't care about Skipjack.  If they want to publish, I'd read the paper,
>but I'm plenty content with triple-DES for routine stuff and DTDTD

But if the government is going to push key escrow and they are going to use
an unclassified system, then they have to 1) Use a relatively weak
cryptographic system in order to keep people from using the unclassified
system for fully secure communication with their own non-escrowed keys, and
2) Outlaw using any other (more secure) encryption.

This fits right in with Gore's not backing down on export controls. Combine
that with his talk of using unclassified, exportable encryption, and he has
to be talking about replacing Skipjack with a weak or key-size restricted
system (which would not be subject to export controls). And as Mike McNally
pointed out, that just increases the likelihood that the government would
attempt to make use of other encryption illegal, because with the
algorithms known and in software there would be no other way of controlling
(or attempting to control) what people do.

 -- sidney <sidney@apple.com>