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Re: Broadcasts and the Rendezvous Problem
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Timothy C. May writes:
> Isn't this what "alt.anonymous.messages" is all about?
>
> (It's been at my Netcom site for many months now...I don't recall who
> created it, but it seems to me it was one of us.)
Alas, it is not available at MIT. I'll have to scrounge for a server that
carries it (volunteerings of feeds welcome!); Though netcom is our
IP provider, I'd rather not get news from them.
> > Folks spend a lot of time bemoaning the transience of specific instances
> > of remailer nodes: why not turn this into an advantage by architecting
> > a network of system that is resilient against the destruction and/or
> > compromise of individual nodes?
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by this. More remailers are always a good
> thing, and offshore sites are especially good, but I'm not sure what
> you mean by your last point.
(Following details of the current system might be wrong. Please correct
me where necessary.)
My thought is this: If we were to design and implement a system, perhaps
a two-tiered system with "fortress" and "intermediary" remailers as has
been suggested, it's desirable to build a system that will continue to
work even if a large portion of the nodes are removed (whether by Earthquake
of Sun Devil). This is the system we'll have to build if we stop resisting
the notion that remailers regularly come and go with little warning.
The rendezvous problem is not currently addressed in a satisfactory way:
premail/remailer-ping, or its equivalent, hardwires in the location of
a known set of remailers and finds the subset that corresponds to
remailers having a common characteristic (usually just whether they're
working reliably or not).
That's not a very good approach: a human has to add a new remailer into
the "net" by adding it to the systems polled. Not only is the human
intervention a Bad Thing, but having a central registry of remailers
is bad infrastructure. A more "web-of-trust"-like mechanism is desirable.
So, a dispersed view of the remailer net, both entry points and intermediary
points, is necessary. In order to build such a system, we must solve the
rendezvous problem: how does "premail++" know where to send its mail and
how does remailer A know where to find remailer B (and B find exit point C)?
This is where my train of thought dovetails with the newsgroup question:
bringing a new remailer on line could be achieved by broadcasting a message
through a newsgroup specifying the location and type of the remailer. If
necessary, one or more pseudonymous automatic testing agents could pick up
the message and put the remailer through a barrage of tests, broadcasting
a "remailer certification" with a certain duration. "Premail++" and
remailers could find their next hop by examining current certifications
and choosing one with desired characteristics, scoring by trusted testing
agents and other criteria (including the passage of time since the last
certification). If an exit-remailer is chosen early in the game, multiple
paths to the exit-remailer can be used to improve reliability (exit-
remailers would also probably have a shorter cycle of certification).
Technically, this is feasible. I could write the code fairly easily (though
I'm not offering to do so at this time: if I do, pieces will be offered as
fait accompli). My question is whether this strikes anybody else as a
desirable design: we would end up with a net of remailers that is fairly
resilient and not dependent upon any one list of remailers. If a node
goes down, the net adjusts in rather short order and service is not
disrupted.
This picture needs to be fleshed out a bit more, but I thought I'd bounce
this around before solidifying it in any particular way.
- --
Todd Masco | "'When _I_ use a word,' Humpty-Dumpty said, in a rather
[email protected] | scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -
[email protected] | neither more nor less.'" - Lewis Carroll
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