Sat phone permit "wire"taps

[Phil Fraering <pgf@tyrell.net>]

   Date: Fri, 28 Jul 1995 13:42:46 -0400 (EDT)
   From: Brian Davis <bdavis@thepoint.net>
   Mime-Version: 1.0
   Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

   On Thu, 27 Jul 1995, Phil Fraering wrote:

   >    From: Ted_Anderson@transarc.com
   > 
   >    I found these paragraphs in a recent Space News interesting.  They were
   >    at the end of an article titled "Military Officials Open To Using
   >                                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   >    Civilian Links" in the July 3rd issue. 
   > 
   > [...]
   >      "Iridium, Globalstar, Inmarsat-P and Odyssey all plan to include
   >    features to permit authorized eavesdropping, officials said. 
			   ^^^^^^^^^^

   Did you miss this word?  While I suspect that you don't like Title III 
   wiretaps, they are legal at present.  The above contemplates legal 
   wiretaps on some phone service that might otherwise be outside the reach 
   of legal wiretaps.

You misunderstand. With public key encryption, the proliferation of processor
power and bandwidth, and their funding, there is NO reason whatsoever for the
MILITARY to use an intentionally WEAK encryption system.

   > Hmm. Anyone here ever heard of the Walkers, or the 
   Rosenbergs? > 
   > It's a pity that the military has decided that in its zeal to listen
   > in on phone calls, that national security is an expendable asset.

   The military is not authorized to listen in to any phone calls they want 
   to hear.  Otherwise, everyone on the list, including me, would probably 
   be in some hidden military prison.

   :-)  for the humor-impaired.


I think you misunderstood: if we want a military in the first place
(yes, I realize that's an open question to many people on this list)
it needs to have as much of its communications encrypted as possible.
Without back doors or intentionally weakened algorithms. Otherwise
we're just stuck with a standard conventional force that isn't _that_
great compared to the combined assets of a reasonable assembly of
enemy forces.

I would go even farther: since so many of the troops sent over to the Gulf
in the war there went with K-Mart-purchased GPS receivers that the military
had to turn off selective availability, I am willing to bet that in future
conflicts the U.S. soldier's ability to have secure communications (with
no backdoors or weakened algorithms) is dependent on civilians having access
to the same technology. Because the only way they might have it is if Ma
and Pa go down to the local K-Mart and buy one for their son/daughter about
to go overseas.

(I could add some stuff about GPS vs. Geostar, but I figured I've wasted
enough bandwidth already).

Phil