Re: a hole in PGP

[fc@all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen)]

> > PGP does not use "truly random hardware techniques"
> 
> Correct. However, the excerpt of RFC 1750 you quoted above does not claim
> that all PRNG techniques are unreasonably insecure, nor does it suggest that
> they should never be used.

Nor do I.

> > "...For the present, the lack of generally available facilities for
> > generating such unpredictable numbers is an open wound in the design of
> > cryptographic software. ... the only safe strategy so far has been to
> > force the local installation to supply a suitable routine to generate
> > random numbers. To say the least, this is an awkward, error-prone and
> > unpalatable solution." - 1994 - after PGP was implemented.
> 
> I agree with the RFC's authors that mandating provision of platform-
> dependent routines is an awkward and unappealing strategy. Note, however,
> that they characterize it as "the only safe strategy". They say that the
> _strategy_ is error-prone; they do not say that all locally-supplied
> routines are unreasonably insecure, and should not be used.

But in practice, PGP is not used this way by the masses.  They use standard
distributions withou alteration.

...
> > So I guess the RFC supports my contention and not [Derek Atkins'].
> [...]
> [re: PGP's key generation methods]
> > But the RFC acknowledges that these methods are highly suspect and should
> > not be trusted.
> 
> Where ?  Give a citation, please. It doesn't say anything of the sort in
> the part you quoted previously. Furthermore, you inexplicably omitted all
> mentions of keystroke-timing PRNG techniques in RFC 1750. Here are some
> excerpts that strike me as particularly germane to the quality of the
> randomness in PGP:

That is my interpretation, however, reasonable people may differ...

> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 4.2 Timing and Content of External Events
> 
>    It is possible to measure the timing and content of mouse movement,
>    key strokes, and similar user events.  This is a reasonable source of
>    unguessable data with some qualifications. On some machines, inputs
>    such as key strokes are buffered.  Even though the user's inter-
>    keystroke timing may have sufficient variation and unpredictability,
>    there might not be an easy way to access that variation.  Another
>    problem is that no standard method exists to sample timing details.
>    This makes it hard to build standard software intended for
>    distribution to a large range of machines based on this technique.
> 
>    The amount of mouse movement or the keys actually hit are usually
>    easier to access than timings but may yield less unpredictability as
>    the user may provide highly repetitive input.
> [...]

Sounds like this is not very random - I agree that "the user may provide
highly repetitive input".  Just because one type of input is more
repetitive, doesn't make the other truely random.

...
> I find it difficult to reconcile your claim that "the RFC acknowledges
> that these methods are highly suspect and should not be trusted" with the
> RFC's assertions that:
> 
> 	"the timing and content of [...] key strokes [...] is a reasonable
> 	 source of unguessable data"

You left out "with some qualifications".  This is the part where I have concern.

> 	"the timing and content of requested `random' user keystrokes can
> 	 yield hundreds of random bits"

You missed the "but conservative assumptions need to be made" part.  Hundreds
of random bits are possible, but how many actual bits of content are contained in
PGP input.

> 	"this strategy may make practical portable code to produce good
> 	 random numbers for security"

You missed the "However, it may still fail against a high grade attack
on small single user systems, especially if the adversary has ever been
able to observe the generation process in the past.  A hardware based
random source is still preferable." part and your reliance on the term
"may" as "does" is overly optimistic.

> Having said that, allow me to state my position on some of the other
> issues you've raised. I do not _know_ nor can I _prove_ that PGP has
> no cryptographic backdoors. I happen to _believe_ that it does not --
> among other things, I have met Derek Atkins and Jeff Schiller, and I
> trust them in this regard. I don't consider that any reason for you to
> believe that it's backdoor-free. In fact, I'm not interested in trying to
> persuade you or anyone else that it is backdoor-free. By the same token,
> I don't see any reason for anyone here to heed your demands that they
> justify _their beliefs_ to _your satisfaction_. 

Not demands - questions.  Why is it that you are unwilling to take
questions as questions and instead translate them into demands? You
could have answered my questions without all the other side comments. 
Why didn't you? I interpret this as being defensive, which means to me
that you are not as sure as you outwardly indicate and that there may be
some lingering issues.  So I ask more questions.  You respond with more
posturing and fewer answers, so I become even more concerned.

It's probably my fault for not asking them in the way you are used to
hearing them, or maybe we are all over-sensitive about our work.

> I remain rather baffled as to your motives in this mini-campaign. You said
> that no-one can prove PGP has no backdoors, and many here essentially said
> "what else is new ?". In the white paper about your small "secure" HTTP daemon,
> thttpd, (found at http://all.net/ManAl/white/whitepaper.html, to save you the
> trouble of more self-promotion ;), it says:
> 
> > Proof of program correctness to verify even simple security
> > properties, for example, grows almost exponentially with the number of 
> > program statements. Verifying a 100 line limited-language program for the
> > simple security properties associated with the Bell-LaPadula model of
> > security takes about 24 hours of CPU time on a Cray supercomputer. The 
> > source code for the NCSA W3 server in widespread use today is about 6600
> > lines long, so there is no computer around today that is likely to be able
> > to verify its security (or more likely demonstrate its insecurity).

Which is why we need very small programs (which PGP is not) that do the
security-critical functions.  We can then analyze these programs and
determine many important properties with regard to their security, which
we cannot do with PGP.

> If we adopt this standard, it seems hopeless to "verify" the PGP source, as
> others have noted here. [BTW, I read your detailed code walkthrough for
> thttp with interest, and commend your work on that. I'm planning some
> sort of similar review for a larger piece of code, and it's encouraging
> to see other people pulling it off.]

Thank you, but I think it may be too hard to do for a much larger piece
of code.  There is another gentleman who is now working on formally (and
automatically) verifying these properties.  Perhaps his results will be of
value in your problem and similar problems for other programs.

...

> [On a largely unrelated note, why does http://all.net/admin/usepolicy.html
> contain the following warning ?  Specifically, why the age limit ?
> 
> 	"This service is ONLY for use by legally competent adults human [sic]
> 	 individuals of age 18 or older. If you do not meet these criteria, 
> 	 you should immediately cease and desist your use of this service."]

I think that some of the popular literature sections may be considered
pornography (Fanny Hill, the Kama Sutra, etc.) and in order to comply
with the applicable laws, I thought it would be prudent to warn off our
fragile youth.

> "...because of Dr. Cohen's frequent, blatant, and intentional disregard for
>  the guidelines that this list operates under, and because of his apparent
>  disregard for the frequently expressed opinions of many of the members of
>  this list that they don't appreciate his antics, I've configured Majordomo 
>  to divert all messages he posts to Firewalls to the list owner for review 
>  and approval before posting..." -Brent Chapman, July 24, 1995

And if enough of those on this list feel that this discussion and my postings
are too commercial or too abusive to take, I am certain that Brent will send
you a free copy of his Fred filter.

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