Re: ecash remailer

[Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>]

It's very frustrating to have to speculate so much due to the lack of
information.  Imagine how we would react if Cybercash or Netscape had
gone forward with what they claimed were secure protocols but had
refused to publish them, referring simply to old papers on RSA and
DES.  Yet Digicash gets away with this.

Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com> writes:

>At 01:20 PM 11/1/95 -0500, Michael Froomkin <froomkin@law.miami.edu> wrote:
>>I thought a property of Chaumian DigiCash was that a coin *had* to go back
>>to the bank before it could be spent again.  

>No.  The basic Chaum Digicash method looks like this:
>1) Alice creates a number of a recognizable form (Chaum's 1985 CACM paper
>uses n1n2n3...n64n1n2n3....n64, i.e. a 64-bit number concatenated with itself).
>2) Alice blinds the number and sends it to the bank (along with some request
>for withdrawing money from her account or payment in other coin or whatever.)
>3) The bank signs the number and sends it back.
>4) Alice unblinds the coin; now it's good, recognizably signed, and untraceable.

We presume it works basically like this, but there could be elaborations.
In particular, I have heard (from people who claim to know) that the
payee is normally embedded into the coin at spending time.

>>Logically, I can see at least four possibilities:
>>1) payee data is encoded onto the coin at time of payment, making it 
>>impossible for Carol to bank the coin.  I see no evidence of this in the 
>>docs at the Digicash site, but I just rechecked quickly and may have 
>>missed it.

>The basic protocol doesn't say anything about what a valid coin looks like;
>you could use the example in Chaum's paper or a long string followed by
>a checksum or whatever.  You _could_ put the payee's name account number
>in the string as the 64-bit "random" number, or even put both payer and payee.
>The bank could insist on that sort of thing if they wanted.
>If I remember right, the version in the Digicash trial left you the choice
>of filling in a specific payee or using "@" for bearer-payable coins.

Doing this would require the payee to be known at withdrawal time, which
is not apparently how it works.  I would speculate that actually what
happens is that the "basic coin" as above is encrypted, along with the
payee identity, all under the public key of the bank.  This was the
identity could not be stripped out by the payee or by a thief who snooped
the transmission.

Hal