"The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...."

[tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)]

At 2:30 PM 9/5/96, Omegaman wrote:

>What strikes me as odd is that the arguments against anonymous
>communication are nearly identical to those against strong crypto.
>ie. the same four horsemen flare up in these discussions.  Yet we
>have parties who are ostensibly pro-crypto but anti-anonymity.
>
>To put it in a nutshell, in a free society I can have a private
>conversation, but I must essentially announce that I am having one
>and who I am having that conversation with?

As with Adam Back's mini-rant yesterday, this is exactly correct. In a free
society, speech need not be approved, registered, escrowed, labelled, or
identified with the Registered True Name of the speaker.

One can paraphrase Esther Dyson's concerns about anonymity in several
fairly equivalent forms.

Here's the original:

"Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by
repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with
some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what
are generally required for a wiretap."

Here's a slightly paraphrased version for freedom to read anonymously, with
some "reasons" included in brackets:

"Books and magazines can be dangerous [bomb recipes, racial hatred,
instilling bad values, etc.]-- as can restrictions on reading, especially
in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing unfettered
reading -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably
stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(i.e., "book escrow," where one's reading materials are escrowed with
Trusted Authorities, and only accessed by law enforcement under Proper
Conditions. Failure to escrow reading materials would be a Class B felony.
Cf. the FBI's Library Awareness Program of circa 1987-8.)

A version for freedom of movement:

"People moving around can be dangerous [avoiding parental responsibilities,
avoiding taxes, spying, plotting to bomb buildings]-- as can traceability,
especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing
freedom of movement -- with some form of traceability only under terms
considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(a la the "position escrow system" I predicted a couple of years ago would
someday be seriously considered)

A version for freedom of association:

"Freedom of association can be dangerous [plotting of crimes, gathering of
mobs, spread of dangerous ideas, disease]-- as can restrictions on such
gatherings, especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor
allowing freedom of association -- with some form of traceability only
under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a
wiretap."

("Club escrow"? All mailing lists, clubs, associations, and such would have
to escrow an up-to-date list of members, associates, and contacts. Then,
with proper authorization by proper authorities, law enforcement could
inspect these lists to see who had been meeting with whom. Hotels would
have to monitor use of rooms by more than two persons (the two person case
is already covered by the "Sex can be dangerous..." variant of the Dyson
Principle).)

A version for anonymous purchases and sales:

"Anonymity in sales and purchases can be dangerous [bomb materials, stolen
goods, unhealthful foods, etc.] -- as can traceability, especially in/by
repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing anonymous purchases
and sales of goods -- with some form of traceability only under terms
considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(There go the flea markets and garage sales (for buyers), which are largely
anonymous. There goes walking into a store and paying cash for a piece of
pipe (could be made into a bomb). There goes cash, period. See next item.)

A version for cash:

"Cash can be dangerous [illegal purchases, drugs, prostitution, tax
evasion, illegal workers, extortion, etc.] -- as can traceable money,
especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing cash
-- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger
than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(One has to presume that Dyson would probably not support Chaumian
untraceable e-cash, though I doubt she would go for the other examples.)

And so on. One can take Dyson's basic argument for why anonymity may be
dangerous at times and why it may need to be restricted, limited, or
banned, and use these arguments for a variety of other basic freedoms.
Essentially, freedom can be dangerous. The world can be dangerous. In fact,
it is.

(No, Dyson has not called for such restrictons on freedom of movement,
freedom of association, freedom to read anonymously. But her argument that
she would support anonymity if some form of traceability is built in
essentially applies, by the same logic (that it can be dangerous) to a wide
variety of other cases.)

To summarize:

"The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...."


--Tim May

We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."