Re: "The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...."

[dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)]

tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) writes:
> As with Adam Back's mini-rant yesterday, this is exactly correct. In a free
> society, speech need not be approved, registered, escrowed, labelled, or
> identified with the Registered True Name of the speaker.

But the U.S. is not a "free society". Tim yaks at those who criticize
his beloved United States for not being "polite". Tim is wrong.

> "Books and magazines can be dangerous [bomb recipes, racial hatred,
> instilling bad values, etc.]-- as can restrictions on reading, especially
> in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing unfettered
> reading -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably
> stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."
>
> (i.e., "book escrow," where one's reading materials are escrowed with
> Trusted Authorities, and only accessed by law enforcement under Proper
> Conditions. Failure to escrow reading materials would be a Class B felony.
> Cf. the FBI's Library Awareness Program of circa 1987-8.)

I remember beig surprised to discover that the library computer at City
University of New York (state school where I got all my degrees) had an
(easily accessible) record of every book I've ever checked out in some
15 years, And by the way you need to present A LOT of ids to take books
out of New York's public libraries, or to use the public-access
computers in them. And by the way you're asked to sign your name and
affiliation (fortunately, no ID is required) if you want to just enter
NYPL's Slavic division and use their reading room. Apparently this was
instituted during the cold war under the assumption that anyone
interested in Slavic Division's materials needs to be watched.

> "People moving around can be dangerous [avoiding parental responsibilities,
> avoiding taxes, spying, plotting to bomb buildings]-- as can traceability,
> especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing
> freedom of movement -- with some form of traceability only under terms
> considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."
>
> (a la the "position escrow system" I predicted a couple of years ago would
> someday be seriously considered)

Have you tried to get on an airplane lately? I just had to present my
driver licence (work id w/ picture wouldn't cut it!) to get on. I
understand John Gilmore got himself arrested for refusing to identify
himself. As he said, there used to be a 200-year precedent that a
citizen can travel within the country without having to identify
himself. Shit, I used to fly under phoney names - can't do this anymore.

> A version for anonymous purchases and sales:
>
> "Anonymity in sales and purchases can be dangerous [bomb materials, stolen
> goods, unhealthful foods, etc.] -- as can traceability, especially in/by
> repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing anonymous purchases
> and sales of goods -- with some form of traceability only under terms
> considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."
>
> (There go the flea markets and garage sales (for buyers), which are largely
> anonymous. There goes walking into a store and paying cash for a piece of
> pipe (could be made into a bomb). There goes cash, period. See next item.)

A very good friend of mine does EE for a living, and in particular he
sells some EE equipment by mail order. He told me that every time he
sells something like the gizmo to write magnetic strips on credit cards,
he gets a phone call from los federales saying: you sold X who paid with
Y and shipped it to address Z - do you have any additional details? He
says every time they know as much about the sale as he does. :-)

> A version for cash:
>
> "Cash can be dangerous [illegal purchases, drugs, prostitution, tax
> evasion, illegal workers, extortion, etc.] -- as can traceable money,
> especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing cash
> -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger
> than what are generally required for a wiretap."

That's why any time you attempt a cash transaction for over 10K (buying
a car, depositing it in a bank, etc), you will, by law, be reported to
the IRS, who will take a close look. I can't recall the name of the guy
who tried to take over 10K of cash out of the country without declaring
it, was searched, was caught, and is currently in jail.

> And so on. One can take Dyson's basic argument for why anonymity may be
> dangerous at times and why it may need to be restricted, limited, or
> banned, and use these arguments for a variety of other basic freedoms.
> Essentially, freedom can be dangerous. The world can be dangerous. In fact,
> it is.

As I told John Gilmore: I've known Esther Dyson for some time before she
got involved with EFF. I consider her a very nice person, and admire her
activities in Eastern Europe and elsewhere (and am in particular
thankful for her help on my past projects). I suspect that Esther simply
didn't think enough about this question before saying what she was
quoted as saying... I hope Esther will research the issue further, and
knowing her pro-liberty record, I'm sure she will see the value of
absoletely untraceable anonymity.

(Likewise I have great respect for Dr. Dorothy Denning, with whom I has
a very interesting conversation yesterday. She showed me cituations
where GAK (or generally employer access to keys) makes sense - not when
it's used by folks not affiliated with the government or the employer,
of course.)