Re: Traffic Analysis

[Tim May <tcmay@got.net>]

At 7:48 PM -0700 6/5/97, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

>  Has anyone concerned with remailer development spent any time
>actually doing remailer traffic analysis, similar to a cryptographer
>who does cryptanalysis to raise his level of competence?
>  It would be interesting to see the results of messages being sent
>between cypherpunks and encrypted with a "TA" key so that they could
>be separated and logged for traffic analysis. I would like to see
>what kind of results could be divined by those who know remailer
>operations intimately.

Doing "cryptanalysis" on remailer networks would be very nice.

The problem is that providing analysts with source material is vastly more
difficult than the equivalent problems with conventional cryptanalysis,
where ciphertext can be published, and even the algorithm is expected to be
known, with only the key being searched for.

Amateur cryptanalysts of remailers will generally have none of the source
material needed. I can't imagine a simple solution to this, except by doing
simulations of remailers and then doing cryptanalysis on the simulated
results. (Possibly useful, but lacking in persuasive value to others, I
suspect.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."