Re: Eternity Services

[David Miller <dm0@avana.net>]

Tim May wrote:

> I would have thought that a much more robust (against the attacks above)
> system would involve:
> 
> - nodes scattered amongst many countries, a la remailers
> 
> - no known publicized nexus (less bait for lawyers,  prosecutors, etc.)
> 
> - changeable nodes, again, a la remailers
> 
> - smaller and cheaper nodes, rather than expensive workstation-class nodes
> 
> - CD-ROMS made of Eternity files and then sold or distributed widely
> 
> - purely cyberspatial locations, with no know nexus
> 
> (I point to my own "BlackNet" experiment as one approach.)
> 
> It may be that the architectures/strategies being considered by Ryan
> Lackey, Adam Back, and others are robust against the attacks described
> above.
>
> ...
> 
> Comments?

There is one thing that comes to mind that was just a topic covered on
this
list and that is the use of cellular/wireless/RF/ham for connections to
said machines.

Obviously, this would make seizure more difficult (and perhaps increase
the
likelyhood of prior warning, if for example, cellular service was
suddenly
cut off).

I am currently studying some parallels between the established FCC
tolerance
of ham radio self-regulation vis-a-vis anonymous remailers.  I haven't
yet
drawn up my opinions, as they are still being formed.  I think that this
might be one avenue to look down as there is obviously a type of legal
precident in what is allowed/tolerated under obvious FCC jursidiction,
whereas the jurisdiction over IP is obviously still ambiguous.
 
--David Miller

middle  rival
devil rim lad

Windows '95 -- a dirty, two-bit operating system.