Keystone

[pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)]

>From: gnu@cygnus.com

>We have a small project cooking, to use Diffie-Hellman key exchange
>to choose a random key to encrypt Internet connections (telnet,
>rlogin, ftp, smtp).  This same protocol can also be used over an
>ordinary modem connection between a user's PC and a BBS, preventing
>eavesdropping or wiretapping of that phone call.  It would also be
>able to protect phone calls between a PC and a Unix timesharing system,
>regardless of what networks lie in between, if we wrote a simple login
>program that handled the modem protocol.  (It doesn't protect against
>active re-routing of the call, e.g. by substituting another machine
>for the BBS, but we could work on that as Phase II.)

I would suggest that it be done during phase one. Spoofing attacks are
very important things to guard against, and thanks to PGP there is a
handy dandy set of code out there to steal from to provide for public
key based authentication of the link. Indeed, I would go further and
suggest that the protocol be designed so that it does not reveal the
entities forming the link to outsiders (unless one end should
intentionally advertise who it is, the assumption should be that both
ends know who the other end is a priori). There is also a very good
implementation of the IDEA cypher in PGP, which should run well as the
conventional cypher for the link (although I would suggest having the
protocol negotiate the cypher just in case IDEA gets replaced later
on).

I am very interested in seeing such a protocol standardized because I
have another use for it -- secure telephones. Given modern DSPs to do
and cheap V.32bis modems, excellent secure voice communications are
feasable. The presense of code in the public domain to handle secure
encrypted links could be easily dropped right in to this application.

>(I suggest that the initial Diffie-Hellman handshake all be done in
>ASCII encoding, no matter what the medium, so that the same protocol
>can be used on all media, binary-transparent or not.)

I agree that this should be a negotiated option in the protocol
(prehaps with some sort of test done at the beginning of the link for
line transparency), but I'm not sure it should be mandatory as that
eighth bit get significant at times.

>If anyone knows of a reasonably popular PC terminal emulator for
>which source code is freely available and distributable, let us know.

Kermit is the obvious choice.

Perry