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Re: Remailer encryption module
From: Derek Atkins <[email protected]>
> I agree. PGP just does not have the support for the encryption
> required for mixing remailers.
is PGP deficient? What do you need PGP to do in order to get it to
work right with remailers?
Note that I said mixing remailers, not just regular remailers.
-- No support for random padding to a fixed length. Yes, this can be
patched by script. Hell, you could rewrite PGP with a script, so the
existence of a workaround is no defense.
-- Message size blowup for encrypted armor-within-armor. Yes, I know
it compresses, but it would be a better thing to get PGP to unpack a
PGP encrypted message (the message to the next hop) to multipart form,
part regular text, part armored.
-- Inability to restrict PGP from accepting a non-encrypted message.
PGP run on an armored plaintext file will work just as if it were
encrypted. This precludes being able to require encryption as a site
policy. (Again this can probably be worked around; again, not an
In addition, there's a few really bad misfeatures for pseudonymity
(which is what everyone seems to want to do with remailers):
-- Identities for secret keys are in cleartext in the secret key ring.
Upon seizure of a secret key ring, presence of a pseudonym name can be
considered a presumption of possession of a corresponding secret key,
simply because people don't fill up their secret key rings with bogus
keys with other people's names.
-- Key ID of the recipient is always in the clear.
-- The RSA-encrypted session key does not have a flat representation
over its multiword container. This yields a statistical traffic
analysis hole. (This point is irrelevant without fixing 4.) Hal and
I completely solved this problem last year.
This is all I can think of off the top of my head. Not having
analyzed the problem recently, I can't say that I've got everything.